英文翻译摘要:Non Combat Roles for the PLA: Lessons Learned

Non Combat Roles for the PLA: Lessons Learned

Jin Yinan, vice director of Strategy Education and Research at the PRC National Defense University (Prof. Jin’s web page at http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/51756/34950/index.html in an August 1, 2008 Zhongguo Qingnianbao article, “The Hero Arrives at the Disaster Scene: I Look at Non-Combat Activities for the PLA in the New Century” examines non-combat roles of the militaries of the U.S. and other countries in disaster relief and looks at the PLA and what it will need to operate more effectively in disaster relief. 

This article appeared in the August 1 issue of Zhongguo Qingnianbao and later in the New China Digest (Xinhua Wenzhai).  http://www.xinhuawz.com/zw.asp?title_id=54968

Begin summary:

 The U.S. Combat Strategy o作战纲要of 1993 and Guidelines for Joint Combat Operations  联合作战纲要 of 2001 which discussed 18 kinds of non-combat military roles such as control of weapons and other military materiel, fighting terrorism and disaster relief.  

  The big difference between the U.S. and China is the enormous capacity of the U.S. to use its over 1500 transport aircraft to transport troops and support materials anywhere in the world, supported by its network of bases around the world.  This difference was obvious in the 2005 Tsunami relief when Chinese supplies had to be carried sometimes by U.S. forces.  Although the U.S. go off to a slow start in Katrina relief, the many helicopters of the U.S. military combined with superb air traffic control led to quick and efficient rescue work.   The militaries of the developed nations have about 100 helicopters for every 10,000 troops.  China has far, far fewer helicopters than that.  Although China has launched the Chang’e satellite to the moon, it has few  remote sensing satellites in orbit.  This was a special problem after the May 2008 Wenchuan earthquake because China did not have radar reconnaissance satellites that could have pierced the fog and cloud cover over the disaster area.

After May 12,  China requested  satellite imagery.  Reuters reported the the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency analysts were already working on spy satellite data. Japan responded first on May 13, followed by the Digital Globe Co. (US) on May 17 with high resolution satellite imagery from May 14, 15, and 16.  NGA provided unclassified imagery on May 19.  As of May 19, China had received satellite imagery from seven countries: USA, Japan, UK, France, Germany, Canada and Nigeria.

  英国路透社报道,汶川地震第二天即513日,美国国家地理空间情报局(NGA)的情报分析人员,已经在分析由间谍卫星获取的四川大地震图像。515日,日本宇宙航空研究开发机构(JAXA)在网站上刊登利用陆地观测卫星(ALOS)观测的四川地震地区资料图。同一天,台湾“福卫2号”卫星拍的震区图片也在网上公布。

  汶川大地震中,我们国家共有9种型号的15颗卫星为救灾提供支援,但其中的遥感遥测卫星不多,特别是由于最初几天灾区上空阴云密布,只有雷达探测卫星的波束才能穿透云层拍回地面图像,使我们在救灾的初期阶段通过太空了解掌握灾情的能力受到很大限制。我们成功进行了载人航天飞行,成功开展了嫦娥探月工程,但国家在轨卫星数量少、军用卫星数量更少的现实和探测感知手段不多、能力不强的现状,在救灾过程中显露出来。

  5121530分,汶川大地震发生一小时后,中国国家航天局启动国际减灾合作机制,向《空间和重大灾害国际宪章》成员提出卫星数据申请。51314时,日本航天局向我提供ALOS遥感卫星拍摄的受灾地区雷达卫星遥感图片。517日,美国Digital Globe公司中国代理向我提供“快鸟”卫星拍摄的514日、15日、16日三天高分辨卫星影像数据。519日,美国国家地理空间情报局向中国提供首批非保密卫星图像。截止到519日,美国、日本、英国、法国、德国、加拿大、尼日利亚等7个国家,向中国提供地震灾区卫星遥感影像技术支持。

  每个中国人都十分感激汶川大地震中各国救援力量提供的支持和帮助,不管这种支持和帮助是精神的还是物质的,是资金的还是技术的。与此同时,我们自己也必须具备相应的能力,才能主导国际援助,使其更好地发挥作用。这方面我们的需求很大,空白很多,必须保持清醒。“一跃而起”的快速反应能力是瞬间的能量爆发,它依赖于长期的默默耕耘,默默积累,默默储备。

Military non-combat mission is not the most important role of the PLA. That mission is to win local wars on informatized battlegrounds.

:非战争军事行动能力并非军队的核心军事能力。就新世纪的中国人民解放军来说,核心军事能力依然是打赢信息化条件下局部战争的能力。我们依然需要牢记我军存在的“两个不适应”:现代化水平与打赢信息化条件下的局部战争的要求还不相适应;军事能力与履行新世纪新阶段我军历史使命的要求还不相适应。 Military non-combat missions can help identify shortcomings and help supplement capabilities needed to complete the primary mission of the military.

第二句话是:非战争军事行动能力检验、培育和辅助生成军队的核心军事能力,是新形势下增强我军核心军事能力的重要途径。特别是和平时期,非战争军事行动成为我军经常性、现实性重要任务,执行这一任务的过程,就是对我军现有理论、机制、装备、训练的检验过程。

 The full text of the aricle is http://www.xinhuawz.com/zw.asp?title_id=54968

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