PRC Scholar: Mass Protests Unorganized, Not Stability Threat, Totalitarian System Can Handle Them

This article on mass protests [群体性事件】aka mass incidents in China appeared on Aisixiang, an academic website that carries some intriguing articles at times, and has gotten suppressed now and then over the years.  This article reproduced on Aisixiang originally appeared in the March 2018 issue of   Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology (Social Science Edition) 2018, Issue 03.  http://www.aisixiang.com/data/115692.htmlThis article also appears on chinathinktanks.org.cn  http://www.chinathinktanks.org.cn/content/detail/id/vzo4bv92 an official website of the PRC State Council Development Research Center (DRC). 

The author, Yu Yanhong 余艳红,   is a lecturer in the International Relations Department of the  University of International Business and Economics  对外经济贸易大学  in Beijing. 


I have used Google Translate for the Chinese – English translation and have appended a copy of the Chinese text since. Sometimes good articles suddenly disappear I have noticed over the years. 


The main points using article excerpts:

1. Mass incidents have not affected China’s political stability,


“It can be seen that in the past 10 years, the mass incidents of Chinese society have risen from a relatively small number (scale) to a state of long-term high operation.If mass events as an independent variable will affect the political stability of Chinese society, then this independent variable has undergone such a significant change in the past 10 years, and political stability as a dependent variable should be reflected. However, according to relevant data released by the authoritative institutions of the international community on China’s social and political stability, we can hardly find the relevance of this.

We first use the Foreign Policy magazine Peace Foundation’s The Failed States Index and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators’ Political Stability and the two indices. (indicator) data. Because the two sets of data are annual indicators, and the indicator system covers the political stability of a country. In The Failed States Index, the greater the number of countries in the world, the lower the political risk of the country. In the “Political Stability” ranking of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the higher the Percentile Rank of a country, the safer it is.

Although from 2007 to 2016, the number of mass incidents in Chinese society has soared and has remained at a high level, it can be found from Table 1 whether it is from the failure country index or from the global governance indicators released by the World Bank. From the perspective of “political stability”, the political stability and social order of Chinese society in the past 10 years have generally been steady and rising. The Failed Country Index shows that China’s global ranking has risen from 62 in 2007 to 86 in 2016. Similarly, global governance indicators also show that the overall percentile of Chinese society in these 10 years is relatively stable, with only a large fluctuation in 2011. In fact, if we continue to examine the rankings of other Chinese institutions in the 10 years of political stability in China from 2007 to 2016, this trend is still very obvious, see Table 2.

The above rankings are published by the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) every two years (previously three years) to predict the risk of conflict in a country in the next two years. The higher the ranking, the higher the risk. It can be seen from Table 2 that the year in which the number of mass incidents in China has increased is precisely the year in which China ranks in the future. In other words, in Asia, the risk of social unrest and political instability in China is getting lower and lower. 

2.  Mass incidents are not a challenge to China’s political order 

“these events may have the purpose of collectively challenging the grassroots authority But the events are isolated from each other and do not have a common purpose, let alone to unite. In addition, the participants of the event may have a collective identity and class identity in the subconscious, but this identity has not yet risen to the level of “self-sufficiency”. More importantly, all such incidents do not have “political struggle”. Their targets are often specific economic interests. They do not try to challenge the basic national order, but just want to use different levels of government platforms for their own. Defend the interests. Yu Jianrong pointed out: “The act of defending rights, this is the main type of social incidents in China. Such events account for more than 80% of the current mass incidents in the country.” And “the rights act is mainly a dispute of interests, not The struggle for power is more economic than political.


3. China is a totalitarian state so is well able to prevent any challenge from emerging.[My understanding of passage below is a workable definition of totalitarianism — The state organizes everything and does not allow other entities to organize anything.]


“China’s current national penetration, organizational capabilities, and state control over society have actually created an unbreakable firewall for the political risks of mass events, enabling the state to effectively manage the risks of such events.

First, in terms of China’s national penetration capability, the state not only maintains a more sensitive vigilance for non-institutionalized and non-permitted organizations, even for those legally registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the state will pass mandatory Maintain a “contact” capability in the form of a government organization [22]. In addition, the top-down party structure of the ruling party also makes any organization outside the system not have the basic ability to challenge the existing order. More importantly, for leaders in mass incidents, the ruling party can also conduct procedural regulation through such methods as “party organization discipline” or through administrative absorption, thereby weakening the organizers of these events. Cohesion. If any group behavior is to form political risk, internal organization and institutionalization is a necessary condition, because the degree of organization and degree of institutionalization are often the indispensable dimensions for measuring the maturity of political behavior [23].

Secondly, China’s current state organization and control capabilities make it impossible for any non-permitted “inter-organizational political alliance” to emerge [24]. According to the existing sayings in the academic world, it is basically impossible for political and organizational alliances in China’s current mass incidents, because the state has strong organizational capabilities and control capabilities in addition to the above-mentioned strong penetration capabilities. In fact, China is not only a powerful state power system, but also a country’s infrastructural power [25], especially the government’s ability to absorb financial resources, social control and elites. This directly increases any The cost of action for an organization alliance that wants to challenge this order [26]. In the most extreme sense, this means that even those group events with a certain degree of political symbolism are a group of low-organized, low-institutionalized groups trying to confront a strong organizational, infiltration, and mobilizing ability. The overall state of financial absorptive capacity. In this case, the political risk of mass incidents is basically diluted to the point of no risk.

Begin Google Translate machine translation. Original Chinese text follows.

Yu Yanhong: Group Incidents and Political Stability: A New Explanation Based on Risk Model

Select size: TaiZhongsmall article is read 344 times Updated: 2019-03-28 00:09:42

Entering the topic: political stability of mass incidents● Yu Yanhong

Abstract: Many scholars who study Chinese mass events in the academic circles believe that the current mass incidents in China may threaten the political stability of Chinese society if they are not properly handled. However, by analyzing relevant statistics on mass incidents in the past decade, it has been found that large-scale mass incidents in Chinese society have not had a major impact on China’s basic political order.From the perspective of the risk model, the four factors dilute the impact of mass incidents on political stability and political order. From the perspective of political risk sources, most of the mass incidents themselves are not politically conflictable; from the point of view of risk control, the current Chinese state system makes it difficult for participants of mass events to form political alliances; in addition, the public is in the government. The dualistic tendency of identity structure and the current governance structure of China also constitute two buffer zones for preventing political risks. It is these structural and institutional arrangements that have limited the impact of Chinese mass events on political stability.

Keywords: mass incident political stability political risk government identity governance structure mass incidents political stability political risk governmental identification governance structure

With regard to the current mass incidents in China, many existing studies have warned the government almost in a prophetic tone. If improperly handled, mass incidents are likely to lead to different levels of political instability and even political instability in Chinese society. This kind of research and judgment in the academic circles actually strengthens the political anxiety of various levels of government on mass incidents. In reality, it has repeatedly adopted a high-pressure situation for such incidents. However, although the mass incidents in Chinese society have grown tremendously since the mid-to-late 1990s [1][2], even now, “the overall pattern has not undergone a fundamental change” [3]12, but whether it is from According to relevant statistics, it is still from the perspective of social reality that these mass incidents have not yet had a fundamental impact on China’s political stability.Why is there a huge contrast between this general forecast and actual results? Why did the number of mass incidents not have a big impact on China’s political stability? Will the mass incident affect the political order of contemporary China to a certain extent in the future? Based on these considerations, this paper attempts to propose an interpretation framework based on the existing research results in academia.

I. Concept definition

The concept of mass incidents has always been one of the important topics explored by scholars in this field (Xiao Tang Dart, 2012; Feng Shizheng, 2015), not only because there are many other concepts similar to this concept [4], but also because of differences Scholars do not have the same connotation when using this concept. Zhang Aijun believes that the essence of mass incidents is “defending rights”, so “group events” should be defined as “group rights rights events” [5]. Xiao Tang Dart pointed out: “Group incidents refer to group conflicts between the people and the people, especially the people’s resistance interaction with the government and officials.” [6] The collective incidents referred to in this article mainly adopt the official explanation. It refers to the incidents caused by internal contradictions among the people, the masses believe that their rights and interests have been infringed, through the illegal accumulation, containment, etc., to express their wishes and requests to the relevant organs or units, and their tandem and aggregation in the process of formation and formation. Wait for activities.” 1 This means that, in terms of nature, mass incidents are “internal contradictions among the people”, not “anti-government or “coup, riot and revolution” for the purpose of subverting political power, and it is not a terrorist activity against humanity. According to this, the current ultra-nationalist events in China do not belong to what we call group events. From a characteristic point of view, mass incidents are “illegal but not anti-institutional, gathering but not organized”, which makes such incidents have certain sporadic, destructive, turbulent, and difficult to control [7]115.

Second, theoretical model and data analysis

(1) Theoretical model

There are three theoretical models used by Chinese academics to explain and predict group events that threaten political stability: political participation models, collective mental models, and conflict escalation models. These models generally believe that China’s mass incidents, if not properly handled, will, to varying degrees, cause China’s current social disorder, political instability, and even political instability.

The political consequences of using a political participation model to study mass incidents are currently the most commonly used methods in academia. Huntington believes that “modernity breeds stability, while the modernization process breeds turmoil” and gives a classic formula of political participation/political institutionalization = political unrest [8]. Yu Jianrong (2010), Liu Wei (2016), Liu Yong (2010) and others all use this model to explain the political risks of mass incidents. They believe that “the problem of social and political stability in the process of modernization described by Huntington” is now China “provides a perspective on the social conflicts and stability that emerged in China’s reform and opening up process” [9]. Mass incidents “dissolve the stability mechanism of society from a deep level” [10]. Such incidents “directly affect the construction of a harmonious society, impacting the stable development of the political order” and ultimately “seriously affect the political stability of society” [11].

The collective mental model is based on the theory of collective action in sociology.According to the analysis of this model, collective unconsciousness is a major feature of group events. Under this collective unconsciousness, “people’s way of thinking is extremely simple” [12]. They “appear impulsive, changeable, irritable… the individuals in them become barbaric, brutal and fanatical” [13]. Ye Hong believes that “mass incidents seriously threaten social harmony and stability”, while “consensus mentality” is one of the main causes of frequent mass incidents [14].Liu Lin uses “unorganized” to define a major basic feature of China’s mass incidents. It is precisely because of “unorganized” that China’s mass incidents are difficult to control and eventually become “the most prominent social stability.” The problem becomes a signal of social risk in China” [15]. Chen Tan and Huang said that as an irrational behavior of collective behavior, mass incidents are “disorders of herd behavior” caused by multiple variables [16].

The conflict escalation model is exactly the opposite of the collective mental model. This model believes that mass incidents threaten political stability because the participants of such events are highly rational. Therefore, such explanatory models are game theory and collective action in society. The use of the field. When Han Zhiming analyzes why participants in mass events are willing to “make things big”, they typically use the logic of conflict escalation models. This kind of logic may intensify the “opposing sentiment between classes” and may even lead to violent interference by the government in the name of “maintaining stability” [17]. Huang Jie and others directly deduced the violent logic of Chinese mass incidents from the perspective of conflict escalation models: “differences in risk perception – coping strategies and behaviors – conflicts and escalations” [18].

(2) Data analysis

If group events do affect the political stability of Chinese society as analyzed by the various models mentioned above, then we can draw two hypotheses: First, in terms of quantity, the total number of group events and social and political stability Degree is inversely proportional. This means that, at least in terms of long-term trends, the years of high incidence of mass incidents, the political stability of Chinese society will have obvious changes. Second, from the scale, the scale of individual mass incidents and social and political stability Degree is inversely proportional. This means that if the size of individual mass incidents rises significantly in some years, then the political stability of Chinese society will change significantly from that year onwards.

Below we select the relevant data from 2007 to 2016, which is closest to our time point, as a basis to examine the changes in China’s social and political stability in the past 10 years. In terms of quantity, the absolute number of social events in China has increased from 80,000 in 2007 to 139,000 in 2011. By 2014, this number reached 172,000. Although there is a lack of statistics on data after 2014, However, according to the “China Social Mass Incident Analysis Report” published by Professor Zhang Mingjun, the overall situation of the group event has not changed fundamentally since 2014. The number of mass incidents in 2015 is even slightly higher than that in 2014. “In 2016, the number of mass incidents in China has basically maintained the previous level.” In addition, the “China Rule of Law Development Report NO.12 (2014)” issued by the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences shows that the number of group events of more than 100 people has increased from 23 in 2007 to 163 in 2010, and even reached 209 in 2012. Start. In the first half of 2016 alone, there were 12 people with a scale of more than 1,000. 2

It can be seen that in the past 10 years, the mass incidents of Chinese society have risen from a relatively small number (scale) to a state of long-term high operation.If mass events as an independent variable will affect the political stability of Chinese society, then this independent variable has undergone such a significant change in the past 10 years, and political stability as a dependent variable should be reflected. However, according to relevant data released by the authoritative institutions of the international community on China’s social and political stability, we can hardly find the relevance of this.

We first use the Foreign Policy magazine Peace Foundation’s The Failed States Index and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators’ Political Stability and the two indices. (indicator) data. Because the two sets of data are annual indicators, and the indicator system covers the political stability of a country. In The Failed States Index, the greater the number of countries in the world, the lower the political risk of the country. In the “Political Stability” ranking of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the higher the Percentile Rank of a country, the safer it is.

Although from 2007 to 2016, the number of mass incidents in Chinese society has soared and has remained at a high level, it can be found from Table 1 whether it is from the failure country index or from the global governance indicators released by the World Bank. From the perspective of “political stability”, the political stability and social order of Chinese society in the past 10 years have generally been steady and rising. The Failed Country Index shows that China’s global ranking has risen from 62 in 2007 to 86 in 2016. Similarly, global governance indicators also show that the overall percentile of Chinese society in these 10 years is relatively stable, with only a large fluctuation in 2011. In fact, if we continue to examine the rankings of other Chinese institutions in the 10 years of political stability in China from 2007 to 2016, this trend is still very obvious, see Table 2.

The above rankings are published by the University of Maryland’s Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) every two years (previously three years) to predict the risk of conflict in a country in the next two years. The higher the ranking, the higher the risk. It can be seen from Table 2 that the year in which the number of mass incidents in China has increased is precisely the year in which China ranks in the future. In other words, in Asia, the risk of social unrest and political instability in China is getting lower and lower.

Through the simple analysis of the above three sets of data, we can find that in the early 21st century, China’s mass incidents did increase in absolute terms and in terms of the scale of individual events. However, the combined forces of these events are very limited. There are no serious political consequences of academic predictions, and they have not had a systemic impact on the stability of Chinese politics.

Third, an explanation based on the risk model

From the internal logic point of view, the emergence of a political risk requires not only the risk initiators have the desire to challenge the basic political order and political rules, but also the risk management party’s inability to effectively resolve such challenges. In addition, if there is a buffer zone between the risk initiator and the risk controller, the risk source has been diluted and resolved before the effective impact on social and political order, then this political risk also does not exist.

(1) Risk initiators

Tarrow, a scholar who studies social movements, believes that in order to become a political struggle, a social movement must have four conditions: a collective challenge, participants have a common purpose, a sense of collective identity, and a continuous struggle politics [ 19]. Looking back at the current mass incidents in China, these events may have the purpose of collectively challenging the grassroots authority 


But the events are isolated from each other and do not have a common purpose, let alone to unite. In addition, the participants of the event may have a collective identity and class identity in the subconscious, but this identity has not yet risen to the level of “self-sufficiency”. More importantly, all such incidents do not have “political struggle”. Their targets are often specific economic interests. They do not try to challenge the basic national order, but just want to use different levels of government platforms for their own. Defend the interests. Yu Jianrong pointed out: “The act of defending rights, this is the main type of social incidents in China. Such events account for more than 80% of the current mass incidents in the country.” And “the rights act is mainly a dispute of interests, not The struggle for power is more economic than political [7] 1167. Shan Guangding also believes that most of the mass incidents in China are caused by factors such as “interest damage”. Because of this, the ruling party and the government need new thinking on attitudes towards mass incidents and avoid excessive politicized interpretation [20]. Zhang Mingjun clearly stated in the “2016 China Social Mass Incident Analysis Report” released in 2017: “The interest appealing events still constitute the main body of mass incidents.”[3]3

The source of interest in mass events provides the greatest possibility for resolving the political risks of such events. It means that from the perspective of political identity, the participants of most events have no objections or challenges to the existing state, political system and ruling party. Even from the perspective of resistance politics, they do not agree with individual political roles (officials) and a certain level of government (mainly grassroots governments). Therefore, for such incidents, the government will calm down as long as the government gives the interests of the parties in a timely manner. From the perspective of the government, the transfer of economic interests does not involve fundamental political issues. The current process of political reform in China is itself a process of redistributing interests. In other words, such incidents actually provide an opportunity for political system reform, transformation of government functions, and construction of a service-oriented government [21].

(2) Risk management party

China’s current national penetration, organizational capabilities, and state control over society have actually created an unbreakable firewall for the political risks of mass events, enabling the state to effectively manage the risks of such events.

First, in terms of China’s national penetration capability, the state not only maintains a more sensitive vigilance for non-institutionalized and non-permitted organizations, even for those legally registered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the state will pass mandatory Maintain a “contact” capability in the form of a government organization [22]. In addition, the top-down party structure of the ruling party also makes any organization outside the system not have the basic ability to challenge the existing order. More importantly, for leaders in mass incidents, the ruling party can also conduct procedural regulation through such methods as “party organization discipline” or through administrative absorption, thereby weakening the organizers of these events. Cohesion. If any group behavior is to form political risk, internal organization and institutionalization is a necessary condition, because the degree of organization and degree of institutionalization are often the indispensable dimensions for measuring the maturity of political behavior [23].

Secondly, China’s current state organization and control capabilities make it impossible for any non-permitted “inter-organizational political alliance” to emerge [24]. According to the existing sayings in the academic world, it is basically impossible for political and organizational alliances in China’s current mass incidents, because the state has strong organizational capabilities and control capabilities in addition to the above-mentioned strong penetration capabilities. In fact, China is not only a powerful state power system, but also a country’s infrastructural power [25], especially the government’s ability to absorb financial resources, social control and elites. This directly increases any The cost of action for an organization alliance that wants to challenge this order [26]. In the most extreme sense, this means that even those group events with a certain degree of political symbolism are a group of low-organized, low-institutionalized groups trying to confront a strong organizational, infiltration, and mobilizing ability. The overall state of financial absorptive capacity. In this case, the political risk of mass incidents is basically diluted to the point of no risk.

(3) Risk buffer zone

The reason why China’s mass incidents do not threaten the political stability of Chinese society is related to the current government’s “central weakness” government identity structure and the “party and government division of labor” structure in the national governance system.

1. Citizen’s government identity structure

It is generally believed that Chinese citizens differ in their support for the government [27]. This difference is mainly reflected in the people’s recognition structure of the central and local governments. Many surveys have shown that Chinese citizens, including participants in mass events, generally have a dualistic tendency toward government identity. According to the Fourth Wave of World Values ​​Survey, up to 97% of Chinese respondents expressed strong trust or trust in the central government [28]. Some studies have also shown that farmers’ evaluation of the degree of trust of party committees and governments at all levels decreases with the decline of the government level [29] [30]. Li Yanxia also believes that “the contemporary Chinese public has a greater degree of trust in the central government and local governments, that is, the differential trust pattern of the central public in the public” [31].

The citizen government recognizes that the structural dualism tends to be the result of many factors. The first is the structure of power structure. “The reason why the people trust the central government more may be because the local government seeks political trust with a relatively narrow scope, lack of desire and motivation, and lack of means and measures.”[32]53 Compared with many unitary countries, China’s The central and local government system is quite special. The central government can regulate local public opinion through the means of propaganda and departmental leadership, and organize and personnel departments to perform personnel appointments and dismissals for provincial political elites. Management will eventually form a government power structure of “central strength and weakness”, and the public government’s identity structure is the actual projection of this government power structure. Followed by media placement arrangements. The “News Network” broadcast by CCTV every day is the best footnote for this kind of media implantation. Scholars such as Hibbing believe that people’s recognition of different levels of government is affected by two factors, namely, the government’s visibility and the government’s closeness [32]. From the perspective of the government’s exposure, China’s central government level is often exposed as a positive image, and the local government level is often exposed as a negative image. In this way, the public’s recognition of the central government will naturally be higher than the local level. Finally, the difference between the central and local policy objectives. For local governments, stability and order have become the first performance of governance, and for the central government, some institutional arrangements have actually encouraged the local people to “collectively act” consciously [33], so the public The difference in identity will be further magnified.

Judging from the political risks of mass incidents, the dual tendency of the public in political identity, including the participants of mass events, has invisibly reduced the political risk of such events. This identity structure succeeded in creating a just imagination. It makes the participants of mass events often stay at the level of local government. The local government becomes the direct responsibility of the fermentation and intensification of various problems, while the central government can “put themselves into observers and judge The role of the corrector and the corrector, thus avoiding the possibility of “bottom-up system reflection and overall negation of the interests of the injured group” [34]. Some scholars even believe that the occurrence of many mass incidents, the policy imagination space previously given to the participants by the central government is itself a major incentive [35]; at the same time, this political identity structure will also be used strategically by the central government, thus From the positive, it strengthens its own ruling foundation and legitimacy. In particular, those mass incidents that have caused sensation in the whole society, the central government often appeases through public opinion guidance, leadership instructions, and punishment of local political elites. For those who are lost from the local government because of the incident, they are likely to be rescued through the central government.

2. The governance structure of “Party and government division of labor”

If the government’s identity structure of “central strength and weakness” makes the impact of mass events on political stability dilute vertically, then the governance structure of “party and government division of labor” dilutes the political risk of such events in the horizontal direction. .

The basic state governance model of modern China is different from that of the developed countries in the West. It follows a pre-existing political party, and then the political construction of the state, the establishment of the government, and the creation of a basic system through the political parties. Therefore, the ruling position of the Communist Party constitutes The foundation of the entire country.Therefore, on the issue of government (the ruling party), it is impossible for Chinese citizens to express their dissatisfaction with the government by changing the ruling party as the western developed countries do. However, at the same time, citizens must find other institutionalized channels to express political demands. .Here, the governance model of the party and government division of labor plays a role similar to the electoral system of Western developed countries. Because through the division of labor between the party and the government, the ruling party can respond to citizens’ dissatisfaction with the government by changing the government’s government, which is mainly composed of members of the ruling party, without changing its ruling status.

Realistically, there are two main ways in which the ruling party in contemporary China changes government officials: First, it is a regular, that is, every five years, the election of the main leaders of all levels of government. Second, it is irregular, that is, it can be carried out at any time. This model is often used to deal with mass incidents that have a greater impact. By changing the officials who have made major mistakes in dealing with mass incidents, the ruling party not only responded to the public’s needs in a timely manner, but also strengthened the ruling party’s ability to govern at another level, because the officials handled at this time were often government Members, not members of the ruling party, are punished.Even in certain special events (such as the Guizhou Pan’an incident), the ruling party punishes individual members (the secretary of the Pan’an County Party Committee) (dismissed), and will not cause the legitimacy of the ruling party as a collective symbol to be lost. Because the ruling party can easily raise the handling of such incidents through the media propaganda to the height of the ruling party’s self-adjustment ability. Therefore, in this governance structure of “party and government division of labor”, participants in mass incidents generally do not raise their dissatisfaction with the government to the ruling party, so the political risk of such incidents is once again diluted.

Fourth, from maintaining stability to governance: sustainable political stability

The research in this paper shows that the large-scale mass incidents in Chinese society in the past 10 years have not had a major impact on the basic political stability of Chinese society. This is mainly due to the fact that the original intention of most mass incidents does not have political purpose, and the current national system and governance model of China has also played a strong role in maintaining stability. But this does not mean that we can be optimistic about the political risks of mass incidents in the future.

With the deepening of social transformation, various structural contradictions have become more and more prominent, coupled with the systemic slowness, and ultimately social conflicts have moved from between the early people and the people, between the people and the enterprises. Political conflicts [36]. Recent related research also shows that the current mass incidents in China have a tendency to move from economic interests to political demands. “Growth rights protection is beyond the traditional framework of economic interests, and more involves complex balance of rights” [3]15.These behaviors mean that participants in some group events do not think about issues from the perspective of economic interests, but instead point the problem to the state and government as a whole in a systematic way of reflection, which involves reflection on their own political identity and identity. Questioning the authority and legitimacy of the government and dissatisfaction with the way and means of government governance. In other words, the emergence of such behavior means that one of the parties in the risk model that explains political stability may be changing, which may lead to the stability of our model’s stability in the future, so the political risk of mass events is The future is still unpredictable.

The concept guides action, and governments at all levels need to change the cognitive concept of group events, thus laying a cognitive foundation for reforming the current stability system. It should be recognized that such incidents are normal phenomena in a transitional society. In essence, the vast majority of mass incidents are still “internal contradictions among the people”, and it is also the “new normal” of Chinese society for a long period of time in the future. Therefore, it is not necessary to characterize all such incidents as “a major event affecting political and social stability.” More importantly, the political consequences of such incidents are not completely negative. It not only “can release social tension, maintain social structural flexibility, and have a social safety valve role”, but also “promote citizens’ rights awareness”. Improving the “government behavior of local governments” has certain positive significance [37].

From the perspective of structuralism, the issue of political stability is the result of both the “form of social structure” and the result of “form of political structure”. The former is attributed to the imbalance of social structure, while the latter is due to political opportunities (dialogue, participation). The lack of identity, approval, etc. [38]. Therefore, on the one hand, it solves a series of structural imbalances in social development from the perspective of social and administrative governance, enhances the government’s administrative responsiveness, transparency and openness; on the other hand, from the perspective of political governance, actively expands the institutionalization of citizens’ political participation. Channels, all citizens, including participants in mass events, gradually become one of the main bodies of governance, and they are involved in the political process by means of political absorption. The political pressure to release such incidents also helps reform the current The stability of the system makes the governance of mass events move towards sustainable political stability.

Note:

1 “Working Opinions on Actively Preventing and Properly Handling Mass Incidents”, China Office issued [2004] No. 33.

2 The above data are compiled according to the following materials, Zhang Mingjun and other “Analysis Report of Mass Events in the First Half of 2012”, “Analysis Report of Typical Group Events in Chinese Society” (2011, 2013, 2014), “Analysis Report on Chinese Social Mass Events” (2015, 2016), see: “China Social Public Safety Research Report” (1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 10th); Chen Yu, “The Development and Change of Rural Political Stability in China in the Past 20 Years”, In the “People’s Forum”, No. 11 of 2014; Institute of Law, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “China’s Rule of Law Development Report No. 12 (2014)”, Social Science Literature Publishing House, 2014, pp. 272-273.

Entering the topic: political stability of mass incidents

This article is responsible for: Chen Dongdong 
Sending Station: Love Thought (http://www.aisixiang.com), Column: Tianyi Academic >Political Science > Chinese Politics 
Link to this article: http://www.aisixiang.com/data/115692.html 
Source: Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology (Social Science Edition) 2018, Issue 03 

Original Chinese text

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余艳红:群体性事件与政治稳定:一项基于风险模型的新解释

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进入专题: 群体性事件 政治稳定

● 余艳红

   内容提要:学术界研究中国群体性事件的诸多学者都认为,当下中国的群体性事件如果处置不当,就可能威胁到中国社会的政治稳定。然而,通过分析近十年群体性事件的相关统计数据发现,中国社会大规模的群体性事件并未对中国的基本政治秩序造成较大影响。从风险模型的角度看,四项因素稀释了群体性事件对政治稳定与政治秩序的影响。从政治风险源上看,绝大多数群体性事件本身不具有政治冲突性;从风险管控方来看,当下中国的国家体制使得群体性事件的参与者难以形成政治联盟性;此外,公众在政府认同结构上的二元化倾向以及当下中国的治理结构,也构成了防范政治风险的两个缓冲地带。正是这些结构性与制度性安排,使得中国群体性事件对政治稳定的影响十分有限。

   关 键 词:群体性事件 政治稳定 政治风险 政府认同 治理结构 mass incidents political stability political risk governmental identification governance structure

   关于当下中国的群体性事件,诸多既有的研究几乎是以预言般的口吻告诫政府,群体性事件如果处置不当,极有可能导致中国社会不同程度的政治不稳定甚至政治动荡。学术界的这种研判,实际上强化了各级政府对群体性事件政治不安的心理,在现实中也对此类事件一再采取高压态势。然而,虽然中国社会的群体性事件从20世纪90年代中后期开始一度大量增长[1][2],即使到现在,“整体格局并未发生根本性转变”[3]12,但无论是从相关统计数据来看,还是从社会现实情况来看,到目前为止这些群体性事件并未给中国的政治稳定带来根本性影响。为什么会出现这种一般性预测与实际结果之间的巨大反差?数量惊人的群体性事件为什么并未对中国的政治稳定造成较大的冲击?群体性事件未来是否会在一定程度上冲击当代中国的政治秩序?基于这些问题的思考,本文试图结合学术界已有的研究成果,提出一种解释框架。

   一、概念界定

   群体性事件的概念一直是这一领域的学者(肖唐镖,2012;冯仕政,2015)探讨的重要内容之一,这不仅因为存在着诸多与这一概念相近的其他概念[4],而且还因为不同的学者在使用这一概念时其内涵也并不完全相同。张爱军认为,群体性事件的实质是“维权”,所以应该“把群体性事件定义为群体性维权事件”[5]。肖唐镖则指出:“群体性事件是指发生在民众与民众之间的群体性冲突,尤其是民众与政府和官员的抗争性互动。”[6]本文所指称的群体性事件主要采纳官方的解释,它是指“由人民内部矛盾引发、群众认为自身权益受到侵害,通过非法聚集、围堵等方式,向有关机关或单位表达意愿、提出要求等事件及其酝酿、形成过程中的串联、聚集等活动”。①这意味着,从性质上看,群体性事件是“人民内部矛盾”,而不是反政府或者以颠覆政权为目的的“政变、暴动和革命”,更不是反人类的恐怖主义活动。据此,当下中国少数的极端民族主义事件并不属于我们所说的群体性事件。从特征上看,群体性事件“非法但不反体制,聚众但非组织化”,从而使得这类事件具有一定的偶发性、破坏性、骚乱性、难以控制性等[7]115。

   二、理论模型与数据分析

   (一)理论模型

   中国学术界用来解释与预测群体性事件会威胁到政治稳定的理论模型主要有三个:政治参与模型、集体心智模型和冲突升级模型。这些模型普遍认为,中国的群体性事件如果处置不当,会在不同程度上造成当下中国的社会失序、政治不稳定甚至政治动荡。

   用政治参与模型研判群体性事件的政治后果是目前学术界最常用的方法。亨廷顿认为,“现代性孕育着稳定,而现代化过程却滋生着动乱”,并且给出了一个经典的公式即政治参与/政治制度化=政治动乱[8]。于建嵘(2010)、刘伟(2016)、刘勇(2010)等人都使用这一模型解释群体性事件的政治风险,他们认为,“亨廷顿描述的现代化过程中社会政治稳定问题”为当下中国“透视中国改革开放进程中出现的社会冲突与稳定问题提供了一个视角”[9]。群体性事件“从深层次上消解社会的稳定机制”[10]。此类事件“直接影响了和谐社会的建构,冲击了政治秩序的稳定发展”,最终“严重影响社会的政治稳定”[11]。

   集体心智模型则立基于社会学中的集体行动理论。根据这种模型的分析,集体无意识是群体性事件的一大特征,在这种集体无意识之下,“人们的思维方式极端简单化”[12]。他们“显得冲动、多变、急躁……身处其中的个体变得野蛮、残暴而狂热”[13]。叶宏认为,“群体性事件严重威胁着社会和谐稳定”,而“从众心态”则是导致群体性事件频发的主要原因之一[14]。刘琳则用“无组织化”来定义中国群体性事件的一大基本特征,也正是因为“无组织化”,才使得中国的群体性事件难以控制,最终成为“影响社会稳定最为突出的问题,成为中国社会风险的信号”[15]。陈谭、黄金则表示,作为集体行为的一种非理性行为,群体性事件是由多个变量引致的“从众性行为的失范”[16]。

   冲突升级模型恰恰与集体心智模型相反,这种模型认为群体性事件之所以威胁政治稳定,是因为此类事件的参与者是高度理性的,故而,此类解释模型是博弈论理论在社会集体行动领域的运用。韩志明在分析群体性事件的参与者为什么愿意将事情“闹大”时,就典型地运用了冲突升级模型的逻辑。这种逻辑可能激化“阶层之间的对立情绪”,甚至可能导致政府以“维稳”的名义进行暴力干涉[17]。黄杰等人则直接从冲突升级模型的角度演绎出了中国群体性事件的暴力逻辑:“风险感知差异——应对策略和行为——冲突爆发和升级”[18]。

   (二)数据分析

   如果说群体性事件确实如上述各种模型分析的那样,会冲击中国社会的政治稳定,那么我们可以引申出两个假设:第一,从数量上看,群体性事件的总体数量与社会政治稳定度成反比。这意味着,至少从长期趋势来看,群体性事件连年高发的年份,中国社会的政治稳定度会有比较明显的变化;第二,从规模上看,单个群体性事件的规模与社会政治稳定度成反比。这意味着,如果某些年份单个的群体性事件规模显著上升,那么该年前后中国社会的政治稳定度也有比较明显的变化。

   下面我们选择离我们时间点最近的2007年到2016年这10年的相关数据作为依据,考察这10年中国社会政治稳定的变化情况。从数量上看,中国社会群体性事件的绝对数量由2007年的8万起增长到了2011年的13.9万起,到2014年这一数字达到了17.2万;虽然2014年以后缺乏相关数据的统计,但根据张明军教授每年发布的《中国社会群体性事件分析报告》,2014年以后群体性事件“整体格局并未发生根本性转变”,2015年群体性事件的数量甚至较2014年“会略有增加”,“2016年中国的群体性事件数量基本维持以往水平”。此外,中国社会科学院法学研究所发布的《中国法治发展报告NO.12(2014)》显示,百人以上的群体性事件数量从2007年的23起上升到了2010年的163起,2012年甚至达到209起。而2016年仅上半年,千人以上规模的就有12起。②

   由此可见,最近10年,中国社会的群体性事件从一个相对较小的数量(规模)上升到一个长期高位运行的状态。如果群体性事件作为自变量会对中国社会的政治稳定造成影响,那么,这一个自变量在过去10年间发生如此显著的变化,作为因变量的政治稳定应该有所反映。然而根据国际社会权威机构发布的关于中国社会政治稳定度的相关数据,我们几乎无法发现这其中的相关度。

   我们首先使用《外交政策》杂志和平基金会的失败国家指数(The Failed States Index)和世界银行“全球治理指标”(Worldwide Governance Indicators)中的“政治稳定度”(Political Stability)以及这两个指数(指标)的数据。因为这两组数据都是年度指标,且指标体系覆盖了一个国家的政治稳定情况。在失败国家指数(The Failed States Index)中,某一国家如果在世界上的排名数字越大,则代表该国家的政治风险越低。在“全球治理指标”(Worldwide Governance Indicators)的“政治稳定度”排名中,一个国家的百分位排行(Percentile Rank)越高代表这一指标越安全。

image.png

   虽然从2007年到2016年,中国社会的群体性事件数量激增且一直保持高位运行态势,但从表1可以发现,无论是从失败国家指数来看,还是从世界银行发布的全球治理指标中的“政治稳定度”来看,最近10年中国社会的政治稳定与社会秩序总体上是稳中有升。失败国家指数显示,中国在全球的排名从2007年的62名上升到2016年的86名。同样,全球治理指标也显示,这10年中国社会的总体百分位是比较稳定的,仅仅在2011年有一次较大的波动。实际上,如果我们继续考察国外其他机构对2007年到2016年这10年中国政治稳定的排名,这一趋势依旧很明显,见表2。

image.png

   上述排名由美国马里兰大学国际发展与冲突管理中心(CIDCM)每隔两年(以前是三年)发布一次,旨在预测一国未来两年的冲突风险,其主要是按照各大洲进行分类,排名名次越前代表风险越高。从表2可知,中国群体性事件数量增长的年份,恰恰是中国的排名往后的年份。换句话说,在亚洲,中国的社会动荡与政治不稳定的风险是越来越低。

   通过上面三组数据的简单分析可以发现,21世纪初,中国的群体性事件无论从绝对数量来看,还是从单个事件的规模上看,确实一度剧增,然而这些事件的合力却十分有限,并未出现学术界预测的那种严重的政治后果,它们并没有对中国政治的稳定性造成系统性影响。

   三、一项基于风险模型的解释

   从内在逻辑上看,一项政治风险的产生,不仅需要风险发起方具有挑战基本政治秩序与政治规则的愿望,还需要风险管控方对此类挑战没有能力进行有效化解。此外,如果在风险发起方与风险管控方之间存在着缓冲地带,使得风险源在有效冲击社会与政治秩序之前就已经被稀释与化解,那么,此项政治风险同样不存在。

   (一)风险发起方

研究社会运动的学者塔罗(Tarrow)认为,一项社会运动要成为政治斗争,必须有四个条件:集体性的挑战,参与者具有共同的目的,具有集体认同意识,持续性的斗争政治[19]。反观当下中国的群体性事件,这些事件或许具有集体挑战基层权威的目的性,(点击此处阅读下一页)

进入专题: 群体性事件 政治稳定

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本文责编:陈冬冬

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文章来源:《哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2018年03期

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余艳红:群体性事件与政治稳定:一项基于风险模型的新解释

选择字号:大 中 小 本文共阅读 341 次 更新时间:2019-03-28 00:09:42

进入专题: 群体性事件 政治稳定

● 余艳红

但各种事件彼此之间处于孤立的境地,并不具有共同的目的,更不必说进行联合。此外,事件的参与者或许在潜意识里具有集体的身份与阶层认同意识,但这种认同性还没有上升到“自为”的层面。更重要的是,所有此类事件都不具有“斗争政治性”,其矛头指向往往是具体的经济利益,他们并不试图挑战基本的国家秩序,而只是想借助不同层级的政府平台为自己的利益进行辩护。于建嵘指出:“维权事件,这是目前中国社会群体性事件的主要类型。此类事件约占目前全国群体性突发事件的80%以上。”而“维权事件主要是利益之争,不是权力之争,经济性大于政治性”[7]1167。单光鼎也认为,目前中国的大多数群体性事件,起因是“利益损害”等因素。正因为如此,所以执政党和政府在对待群体性事件的态度上需要新思维,避免过度政治化解读[20]。张明军在2017年发布的《2016年中国社会群体性事件分析报告》中明确提出:“利益诉求类事件依然构成群体性事件的主体。”[3]3

   群体性事件的源头利益性为化解此类事件的政治风险提供了最大的可能性。它意味着,从政治认同的角度来看,绝大多数事件的参与者对于现存的国体、政体以及执政党等都没有提出异议与挑战。即使从抗争政治的角度来看,他们不认同的也主要是个别政治角色(官员)以及某一层次的政府(主要是基层政府)。因此,对于此类事件,政府只要适时给予当事人利益上的满足,事件就会被平息。而从政府一方来说,进行经济利益让渡并不涉及根本性的政治问题,当下中国的政治体制改革过程本身就是各种利益重新分配的过程。换句话说,此类事件其实也为政治体制改革、政府职能转变、建构服务型政府等提供了契机[21]。

   (二)风险管控方

   当下中国的国家渗透能力、组织能力以及国家对社会的管控能力实际上为群体性事件的政治风险构筑了一道牢不可破的防火墙,从而使得国家能够对此类事件的风险进行有效的管控。

   首先就中国的国家渗透能力而言,国家不仅对那些非制度化与非许可性的组织保持一种较敏感的警戒性,即使对那些合法登记的非政府组织(NGO),国家也会通过强制挂靠某一政府组织的形式保持一种“联络”能力[22]。此外,执政党自上而下的党组织结构也使得任何游离于体制外的组织都不具有挑战现有秩序的基本能力。更重要的是,对于群体性事件中的领导者,执政党还可以通过诸如“党的组织纪律”等方式进行合乎程序的管制,或者通过行政吸纳的方式进行分化,从而削弱这些事件组织者的内聚力。而任何群体性的行为如果要形成政治风险,内部的组织性与制度化是一个必要条件,因为组织化程度、制度化程度往往是测量政治行为成熟度必不可少的维度[23]。

   其次是当下中国的国家组织与管控能力使得任何非许可的“跨组织性的政治联盟”基本不可能得以产生[24]。按照学术界的已有说法,当下中国的群体性事件基本不可能进行政治与组织上的联盟,因为国家除了上述极强的渗透能力之外,还具有极强的组织能力与管控能力。实际上,当下中国不仅是一个国家权力强大的政体,同时也是国家基础性能力(infrastructural power)[25],特别是财政汲取能力、社会管制能力与精英吸纳能力强大的政体,这直接增加了任何想要挑战这种秩序的组织联盟的行动成本[26]。在最极端的意义上,这意味着即使那些具有一定程度的政治象征意义的群体性事件,也是一群低组织化、低制度化的群体试图对抗一个具有强大的组织能力、渗透能力、动员能力与财政吸取能力的总体性国家。在此种情况下,群体性事件的政治风险基本被稀释到毫无风险的地步。

   (三)风险缓冲地带

   中国的群体性事件之所以不会威胁中国社会的政治稳定,还与当下中国公民“央强地弱”的政府认同结构以及国家治理体系中的“党政分工”结构有关。

   1.公民的政府认同结构

   一般认为,中国公民在对政府的支持度方面存在差异性[27]。这种差异主要体现在民众对中央与地方政府的认同结构上。诸多调查都表明,包括群体性事件的参与者在内的中国公民普遍存在着一种政府认同结构上二元化倾向。第四波世界价值观调查显示,高达97%的中国受访者表示非常信任或比较信任中央政府[28]。有的研究也表明农民对各级党委和政府信任程度的评价随着政府层级的下降而递减[29][30]。李艳霞也认为,“当代中国公众对中央政府和地方政府信任度差别较大,即公众的中央地方的差序信任格局”[31]。

   公民政府认同结构上的二元化倾向是多方面因素导致的结果。首先是权力结构安排。“民众之所以更信任中央政府可能是因为地方政府寻求政治信任的范围相对狭小、愿望与动机不足和手段措施上的匮乏所导致的。”[32]53与很多单一制国家相比,中国的中央与地方政府体制是比较特殊的,中央政府可以通过宣传部门归口领导的方式规制地方的舆论,通过组织与人事部门对省级政治精英进行人事上的任免,还可以通过财权对地方各种事务进行管理,最终形成“央强地弱”的政府权力结构,而公众的政府认同结构正是这种政府权力结构的实际投射。其次是媒体植入安排。央视每天定点播放的《新闻联播》是这种媒体植入的最佳注脚。美国希宾(Hibbing)等学者认为,民众对不同层级政府的认同度受两种因素影响,即政府的曝光率(visibility)和政府的亲近性(closeness)[32]50。从政府的曝光率上看,中国的中央政府层面被曝光的往往是正面形象,地方政府层面被曝光的往往是负面形象。这样一来,公众对中央政府的认同度自然会高于地方。最后是中央与地方在政策目标上的差异。对于地方政府来说,稳定与秩序成了执政的第一绩效,而对于中央政府来说,一些制度性的安排实际上鼓励了地方民众“集体行动”的自觉[33],故而民众对这两者的认同差异就会进一步扩大化。

   从群体性事件的政治风险来看,包括群体性事件的参与者在内的社会公众在政治认同方面的二元化倾向,在无形中使得此类事件的政治风险性大幅度降低。这种认同结构成功制造了一种公正想象。它使得群体性事件的参与者往往将具体的不满停留在地方政府的层面上,地方政府成了各种问题发酵与激化的直接责任主体,而中央政府则可以“将自己置于观察者、评判者和校正者的角色”,也就避免了“利益受损群体进行自下而上的体制反思与整体性否定的可能”[34]。一些学者甚至认为,很多群体性事件之所以发生,中央政府先前赋予事件参与者的政策想象空间本身就是一大诱因[35];同时,这种政治认同结构也会被中央政府策略地运用,从而从正面强化了自身的执政基础与合法性。特别是那些引起整个社会轰动性的群体性事件,中央政府往往会通过舆论引导、领导人批示、对地方政治精英进行惩罚等方式进行安抚。对于那些因事件“闹大”而从地方政府那里流失的合法性,很有可能会通过中央政府重新拯救回来。

   2.“党政分工”的治理结构

   如果说“央强地弱”的政府认同结构使得群体性事件对政治稳定的影响在纵向上被稀释的话,那么,“党政分工”的治理结构则在横向上稀释了此类事件的政治风险。

   现代中国的基本国家治理模式并不同于西方发达国家,它遵循的是一条先有政党,然后再由政党通过革命缔结国家、建立政府、创建基本制度的国家建构路径,因此共产党的执政地位构成了整个国家建构的基础。故而,在政府(执政党)认同的问题上,中国公民不可能像西方发达国家那样通过更迭执政党的方式表达自己对政府的不满,但同时,公民又必须找到其他制度化的渠道表达政治诉求。在此,党政分工的治理模式发挥了类似于西方发达国家选举体制的作用。因为通过党政分工,执政党可以在不改变自身执政地位的前提下,通过更迭主要由执政党成员组成的政府的方式回应公民对政府的不满。

   现实地看,在当代中国执政党更迭政府官员的方式主要有两种:一是定期性的,即每五年一次的各级政府主要领导人的选举。二是不定期的,即随时可以进行的,此一模式经常被运用于处理那些影响较大的群体性事件。通过更迭那些在处理群体性事件上出现重大失误的官员,执政党不仅及时回应了公众的需求,而且也在另一个层面强化了执政党的执政能力,因为此时处置的官员,往往是以政府成员而不是执政党党员的身份受到惩罚。即使在某些特殊的事件(如贵州瓮安事件)中执政党对个别成员(瓮安县委书记)进行了惩罚(被免职),也不会使得作为一个集体符号的执政党的合法性流失,因为执政党很容易通过媒体宣传的方式将对此类事件的处理上升到执政党自我调适能力得到强化的高度。故而,在这种“党政分工”的治理结构中,群体性事件的参与者一般不会把他们对政府的不满上升到执政党那里,因此此类事件的政治风险再一次被稀释。

   四、从维稳到治理:可持续性政治稳定

   本文的研究显示,最近10年中国社会大规模的群体性事件,并未对中国社会基本的政治稳定造成较大影响。这主要归因于绝大多数群体性事件的初衷本身不具有政治目的性,此外当下中国的国家体制与治理模式也发挥了较强的维稳功能。但这并不意味着未来我们就可以对群体性事件的政治风险持乐观态度。

   随着社会转型的深入,各种结构性矛盾越来越突出,再加上体制性迟钝,最终社会冲突从早期的民众与民众之间、民众与企业之间走向“官民、干群之间的政治冲突”[36]。最近的相关研究也显示,当下中国的群体性事件已经有了从经济利益走向政治诉求的趋势。“群体性维权超出传统的经济利益框架,更多的涉及复杂的权利均衡”[3]15。这些行为意味着部分群体性事件的参与者并不是从经济利益的角度思考问题,而是以系统反思的方式将问题指向作为整体的国家与政府,其中涉及对自身政治认同与身份认同的反思、对政府权威与合法性的质疑以及对政府执政方式与手段的不满等。换句话说,这种行为的出现意味着我们在此阐释政治稳定的风险模型中的一方可能正在发生改变,从而有可能导致我们模型的稳定性在未来发生变化,因此群体性事件的政治风险在未来依旧具有不可预期性。

   理念指导行动,各级政府需要转变对群体性事件的认知理念,从而为改革当前的维稳体制奠定认知基础。应该认识到此类事件是转型社会的正常现象,从本质上看,绝大多数群体性事件依旧是“人民内部矛盾”,它在今后相当长的一段时期内也是中国社会的“新常态”,故而没有必要将所有此类事件大而化之地定性为“影响政治与社会稳定的大事”。更重要的是,此类事件的政治后果并非完全是负面的,它不仅在一定程度上“可以释放社会张力,保持社会结构弹性,具有社会安全阀作用”,而且对于“促进公民的权利意识”、改善“地方政府的施政行为”等,都具有一定的积极意义[37]。

   从结构主义的视角看,政治稳定问题既是“社会结构的形式”的结果,也是“政治结构的形式”的结果,前者归因于社会结构的失衡,而后者则因缘于政治机会(对话、参与、认同等)的缺失[38]。因此,一方面从社会与行政治理的角度解决社会发展的一系列结构失衡问题,增强政府的行政回应性、透明度与公开性;另一方面从政治治理的角度,积极拓宽公民政治参与的制度化渠道,将包括群体性事件的参与者在内的所有公民逐步作为治理的主体之一,以政治吸纳的方式让他们介入政治过程之中,释放此类事件的政治压力,同样有助于改革当前的维稳体制,使得群体性事件的治理走向可持续性的政治稳定。

   注释:

   ①《关于积极预防和妥善处置群体性事件的工作意见》,中办发[2004]33号。

   ②以上数据根据下列材料整理而成,张明军等《2012年上半年群体性事件分析报告》、《中国社会典型群体性事件分析报告》(2011,2013,2014)、《中国社会群体性事件分析报告》(2015,2016),详见:《中国社会公共安全研究报告》(第1、2、5、6、8、10辑);陈莺《近20年来我国农村政治稳定的发展与变迁》,载《人民论坛》2014年第11期;中国社会科学院法学研究所《中国法治发展报告NO.12(2014)》,社会科学文献出版社2014年版,第272-273页。

进入专题: 群体性事件 政治稳定

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本文责编:陈冬冬

发信站:爱思想(http://www.aisixiang.com),栏目:天益学术 > 政治学 > 中国政治

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文章来源:《哈尔滨工业大学学报(社会科学版)》 2018年03期

About 高大伟 David Cowhig

Retired now, translated Liao Yiwu's 2019 "Bullets and Opium", and studying some things. Worked 25 years as a US State Department Foreign Service Officer including ten years at US Embassy Beijing and US Consulate General Chengdu and four years as a China Analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Before State I translated Japanese and Chinese scientific and technical books and articles into English freelance for six years. Before that I taught English at Tunghai University in Taiwan for three years. And before that I worked two summers on Norwegian farms, milking cows and feeding chickens.
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