2008 Liu Yawei: A John Leighton Stuart to Whom We Can’t Say Farewell

Liu Yawei: A John Leighton Stuart to Whom We Can’t Say Farewell

by Liu Yawei June 8, 2022

[Editor’s Note] This article was written in December 2008. In early September 2016, the G20 Summit was held in Hangzhou. In his speech at the welcome dinner on September 4, Xi Jinping said, “140 years ago, in June of 1876, Mr. John Leighton Stuart who had been the U.S. ambassador to China, was born in Hangzhou and lived in China for more than 50 years, and his ashes were laid to rest in the Anxian Cemetery in Banshan District, Hangzhou 杭州半山安贤园 .” At a time when U.S.-China relations are on the decline, it may be meaningful to revisit Stanton’s relationship with China to refresh the past and learn from the new. This article is accompanied by Mao Zedong’s editorial “Farewell, Leighton Stuart” published on August 18, 1949, Hao Ping’s December 12, 2008 article “The Soul Returns Home: How Leighton Stuart’s Ashes Came to be Buried in Hangzhou and Aftermath” and Xinhua News Agency’s published on September 9, 2016, “Hangzhou Give Leighton Stuart’s the Warmth of a Hometown”.

History cannot be rewritten, but one can think about what might have been.

[Interlude

John Leighton Stuart interred at the Anxian Cemetery “司徒雷登,1876—1962,燕京大学首任校长 the tombstone is inscribed John Leighton Stuart 1876 – 1962, first president of Yenching University” from the welll-illustrated 2017 Sohu.com article “In Hangzhou Visiting the Old Home and Tombstone of John Leighton Stuart” 在杭州,寻觅司徒雷登先生的故居和墓地.

Interesting to look at John Leighton Stuart’s strong criticism of the China White Paper 1949 and what he saw as defeatism at the U.S. State Department. In his memoirs, John Leighton Stuart strongly criticized Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s Letter of Transmittal of the White Paper

From the “Letter of Transmittal”:

We gave “aid to Nationalist China in the form of grants and credits”; we “sold the Chinese Government large quantities of military and civilian war surplus property. Of the military supplies, a “large proportion” has “fallen into the hands of the Chinese Communists through the military ineptitude of the Nationalist leaders, their defections and surrenders, and the absence among their forces of the will to fight. “A realistic appraisal of conditions in China, past and present, leads to the conclusion that the only alternative open to the United States was full-scale intervention on behalf of a Government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people. Such intervention would have required the expenditure of even greater sums than have been fruitlessly spent thus far, the command of Nationalist armies by American officers, and the probable participation of American armed forces-land, sea and air-in the resulting war. Intervention of such a scope and magnitude would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people, and would have been condemned by the American people.

“The heart of China is in Communist hands. The Communist leaders have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, In this case, the foreign domination has been masked behind the façade of a vast crusading movement which apparently has seemed to many Chinese to be wholly indigenous and national. Under these circumstances, our aid has been unavailing “The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the 

civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result, nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it.

“We continue to believe that, however tragic may be the immediate future of China and however ruthlessly a major portion of this people may be exploited by a party in the interest of a foreign imperialism, ultimately the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke. I consider that we should encourage all developments in China which now and in the future work toward this end.

from Letter of Transmittal, China White Paper

John Leighton Stuart on the “Letter of Transmittal” of the 1949 China White Paper

From John Leighton Stuart’s Fifty Years in China – The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador available in full text on the Internet Archive.

The contents of the "Letter of Transmittal" had astonished 
and alarmed me. The contents of the report, with this laying 
bare of confidential materials, shocked me. I thought with con- 
standy growing apprehension: what effect will all this have in 
and upon the United States, in and upon China, in and upon 
American-Chinese relations? Soon, too, I asked myself: how will 
this affect various Chinese whose names are given and whose 
statements are quoted; how will it affect various Americans 
myself among them whose observations and estimates and 
advice are reproduced verbatim-, how will it affect the future 
reporting of United States diplomatic and consular officials? 

Another disturbing feature of the "White Paper ' was the in- 
consistency of its conclusions with previously stated policies and 
later stated policies of the United States Government. Two 
months after its publication the Department of State declared 
that the United States still recognized the National Government 
as the legal government of China. In January, 1950, the United 
States Government declared that no assistance would be given 
to the National Government of China (by then moved to For- 
mosa), and this policy prevailed until the Communist attack 
upon the Republic of Korea in June, 1950, when it was sud- 
denly changed. 

I was, in fact, merely one of many persons who were per- 
plexed and filled with apprehension by what they found in this 
extraordinary book. Among other things, I learned soon that the 
Department of State had sent copies of the book in considerable 
numbers to all United States diplomatic missions abroad and had 
instructed that it be given wide distribution and effective 
publicity. 

The book has been both highly praised and severely criti- 
cized. I know of nothing with which to compare it, and I shall 
not attempt to assess its merits or its demerits. On one point, 
however, I feel disposed to go on record: it seems to me to have 



Fifty Years in China 270 

given an accurate display of the materials on which the United 
States Government relied in the making of its decisions of policy 
regarding China. It is clear that the purpose was not to produce 
a "historian's history 1 ' but to select materials which had been 
used in making the policy in effect at the moment. What had 
been omitted were materials rejected in the making of policy, 
materials which had not been relied upon. 

The "White Paper" served to inform the world that the Nation- 
alists, in the opinion of the United States Government, had 
lost the "civil war." Without admitting any mistakes in United 
States policy, it tried to place all the blame upon the National 
Government of China. United States policy, it claimed, had been 
in no way responsible for the "ominous result." By implication 
it announced that the United States support of the National 
Government and the efforts of the United States toward survival 
of that government were at an end. 

Such was the officially declared position of my government in 
the summer of 1949. And such I found to be the position of the 
officials whom I met in Washington after my arrival there. 

In Washington my principal conversations were with the 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Walton Butter- 
worth. I found him fully committed to the position which our 
government had adopted and to the idea that I should think and 
should express myself accordingly. It was he who suggested that 
I avoid contact with the press and with the public, and attempt 
to "calm down" certain editors. 

When it came to the question of public utterances I was 
authorized to give an address before the Hartford Seminary 
Foundation on the basis of a text which I prepared with great 
care and which was censored and then approved by the Depart- 
ment of State. I delivered that address, and I repeated it, with 
the same text, before the Central Presbyterian Church in Rah- 
way, New Jersey. 



To Washington and in Washington 271 

5 

In September, 1949, the Communist victors in China or- 
ganized in Peiping (whose name they now changed back to 
Peking) a new government, with Mao Tse-tung as Chairman. 
That government was modeled upon the government of the Soviet 
Union in its formative stages. 

In October the Department of State convened a conference 
of "experts" on the Far East. The attendants were persons from 
various walks of life, assembled upon invitations issued by the 
Department, together with officials assigned by the Department. 
Accounts of what transpired, together with the names of the per- 
sons present by invitation and of several, but not all of the 
officials present by assignment, together with a full text of the 
verbatim recording of the discussions, have since been made 
public. 

The conference was "briefed" by several officials on subjects 
relating to the Far Eastern situation especially in China and 
on matters of policy. Discussion was held in accordance with an 
agenda circulated in advance of the conference. As the meeting 
went on it became clear that the majority of participants, among 
whom several educators were the most vocal, assumed that the 
National Government of China was "finished." They were no 
longer interested in the fate of that government. The chairman, 
Mr. Philip Jessup, proposed that the question of recognizing the 
Communist regime be discussed; thereupon several participants 
strongly urged recognition of and assistance to the new regime. 
A smaller number opposed this view and urged that action be 
not hastily taken. 

I was present during the whole period of that conference, and 
the effect of what I heard was disconcerting and discouraging. 
Notwithstanding the weaknesses and shortcomings of the Na- 
tional Government which I have freely affirmed in my story 
that government had after all been brought into existence 



Fifty Years in CMna 272 

through a revolutionary enthusiasm inspired by American demo- 
cratic ideas. Throughout the years, it had been under attack 
from dissident elements in China, especially the Communists, 
and had been under the pressure of diplomatic and armed 
assaults from without, especially from Japan. There had been 
no period in which it could devote itself under circumstances 
of peace and security to problems of reform and the "people's 
livelihood." No wonder that when, after eight years of defensive 
struggle against the Japanese invaders, it was subjected to an 
all-out attack by the armed forces of the Communist party in 
China, which in turn were given encouragement and material 
aid by the Soviet Union, it had been unable to rally to an effec- 
tive resistance a war-weary people. It had been forced to retreat 
from one position to another and finally to withdraw to Formosa. 
Yet in this conference relatively little was said about China's 
difficulties within and without, and all the onus for the National 
Government's collapse was placed upon that government itself. 

The National Government had counted on assistance from 
the United States greater in amount and different in kind from 
that which it received. Some of the aid promised was so long in 
reaching China that it did no good. The National Government 
had not envisioned a Yalta Agreement turning over vital rights 
in Manchuria to the Soviet Union and thus also to the Chinese 
Communists and paving the way for Communist victory in 
China. Nor did that government or others expect that the 
Soviet Government would so soon repudiate its agreement of 
August 15, 1945, promising material and moral aid to the Na- 
tional Government only. The aberrant and contradictory policies 
of the United States Government during the period between the 
end of World War II and the beginning of the Communist 
attack in Korea in 1950 served to weaken rather than to 
strengthen the National Government at a time when it des- 
perately needed sympathetic understanding and assistance. 

When General Cheng Chieh-min, a confidential representa- 



To Washington and in Washington 273 

tive of Generalissimo Chiang, arrived in Washington on October 
n, 1949, I was able to say to him only that, as the situation 
appeared to me, the National Government would receive no 
further assistance from the United States. 



On October i, 1949, the "Central People's Government of the 
People's Republic of China" was formally inaugurated, and it 
at once sought recognition by other governments. On the next 
day, October 2, the Soviet Union announced its recognition. 
On October 3 the National Government of China announced 
severance of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. 

On October 4, as already stated, the United States Department 
of State reaffirmed United States' recognition of the National 
Government as the legal government of China. 

Although I gained no impression at that time or later that my 
government intended to recognize the Communist "People's 
Government" in China, I found the attitude of the Department 
of State on the whole subject of China essentially one of 
frustrated, unsympathetic defeatism. Viewing matters in retro- 
spect, it seems to me that the low point was reached in October 
1949, when, although the National Government was still recog- 
nized, the American Government discontinued assistance to it. 
This attitude persisted until the Communist aggression eight 
months later in Korea, when it was decided that the Communist 
advance in the Far East was dangerous to the peace of the world 
and must be resisted by the United States and the United 
Nations. 

As the Communist armies advanced southward in the fall of 
1949, the National Government decided that evacuation of 
Canton was necessary. On October 12, Acting President Li 
Tsung-jen announced that the government would move to 
Chungking. Seven weeks later, however, Chungking fell to the 
Communists. Finally, the National Government, under the 



Fifty Years in China 274 

direction o Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, removed to Formosa, 
and on December 9 the Executive Yuan began to function in 
Taipeh, Formosa's capital city. Li Tsung-jen went to the United 
States and, on December 7, entered a hospital in New York for 
medical treatment. 

On December 30, the Government of India accorded recog- 
nition to the Communist regime at Peiping. One week later, on 
January 6, the British Government announced recognition of 
that regime by the United Kingdom. This involved, of course, 
withdrawal of recognition from the National Government. There 
ensued, during the first six months of 1950, a series of such 
transfers of recognition, some by Asiatic and some by European 
governments. In all, some twenty-five governments thus com- 
mitted themselves. Had the United States Government followed 
the example of the British Government, that number would 
probably have been increased, for many would presumably have 
followed the example of the United States. 

The United States Government was apparently in a quandary. 
It seems to have been unfavorably disposed toward the National 
Government and favorably disposed toward the Communist 
regime. But abuse by the Communists of American officials and 
seizure by the Communists of property of the United States in 
Peiping produced in the United States such waves of popular 
resentment that official action affirmatively favorable to the 
Communists was precluded. The government did, however, 
take negative action against the Nationalists. President Truman 
announced on January 5, 1950, that the United States would 
give no military assistance, directly or indirectly, neither materials 
nor advisers, to the Nationalists in Formosa. On January 12, 
Secretary of State Acheson, in a speech at the Press Club in 
Washington, repeated and elaborated this statement. 

After that, for several months the question of recognizing the 
Communist regime at Peiping was debated, in the press and on 
many platforms, throughout the United States and also at the 



To Washington and in Washington 275 

United Nations. In May, 1950, some thirty-five United States 
senators signed jointly and sent to President Truman letters 
asking for a clear assurance that the United States Government 
did not intend to recognize the Communist regime in China 
or to give support to the movement to admit that regime as 
representative of China in the United Nations. In reply Mr. 
Acheson gave an assurance that the administration would not 
accord recognition to the Communist regime without first having 
consulted with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 

Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek had on March i resumed office 
in Taipeh as President of the National Government; General 
Chen Cheng had been named Premier on March 8; Dr. K. C. 
Wu, former Mayor of Shanghai, had been appointed Governor 
of Taiwan; and General Sun Li-jen, Chief of Ground Forces. 

7 

This may be an appropriate place for me to give my final 
estimate of Chiang Kai-shek. During the six months of my asso- 
ciation with the Marshall mission, the Generalissimo was always 
the dominant figure. It was he who made all decisions for the 
government or party, and it was he who was most feared or 
denounced by the Communist delegates. It was always interest- 
ing to watch how quickly he understood what was being said to 
him, how incisively he grasped its essence, and how tenaciously 
he held to that first reaction. He is a man of strong will power 
and indomitable courage. But as so often happens his failings 
are due to the excess of his best qualities. Any judgment of him 
should be formed against the background of his cultural heritage 
and of the precarious circumstances amid which he has carried 
his terrific responsibilities. With this in mind, and by comparison 
not only with the history of Oriental despotism but also with 
contemporary dictators, Chiang Kai-shek deserves credit for the 
restraint with which he has generally acted. 

I never had any question as to the moral character of the 



Fifty Years in China 

Generalissimo despite some of the political measures he took 
which might seem wrong according to our contemporary Eu- 
ropean and American standards. I am convinced that he has 
faithfully acted for what he believed to be the best interests of 
his country. It has not always been easy for him to distinguish 
between his personal and his country's advantages. But in con- 
trast with the venality, avarice, indolence and cowardice of many 
of the traditional "Mandarins," his nobility of character stands 
out as exceptional. 

When Chiang Kai-shek burst into prominence after the death 
of Sun Yat-sen, he was a popular hero. The new movement 
under its youthful leader had vigor and high idealism. But as he 
successfully pursued his efforts to unify the nation the shadow of 
the Japanese policy of continental expansion grew darker. Chiang 
seemed to be doing nothing effectual about it. Was he in sym- 
pathy with the Japanese militarists? Was he so much preoccu- 
pied with the nascent Communist uprising that he failed to 
sense the imminent Japanese threat? No, he knew that there 
must first be political and military preparedness. He had the 
sense to exercise restraint in order to avoid inviting and pos- 
sibly warranting a Japanese attack. 

For more on this period, the U.S. State Department Office of the Historian website has some documents: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1949, THE FAR EAST: CHINA, VOLUME IX.

End Interlude, translation continues below.

Mao Zedong Too “Told Lies”

On August 18, 1949, Mao Zedong published an article entitled “Farewell, Leighton Stuart!”. In the article, Mao wrote that

When the People’s Liberation Army crossed the Yangtse River, the U.S. colonial government at Nanking fled helter-skelter. Yet His Excellency Ambassador Stuart sat tight, watching wide-eyed, hoping to set up shop under a new signboard and to reap some profit. But what did he see? Apart from the People’s Liberation Army marching past, column after column, and the workers, peasants and students rising in hosts, he saw something else — the Chinese liberals or democratic individualists turning out in force, shouting slogans and talking revolution together with the workers, peasants, soldiers and students. In short, he was left out in the cold, “standing all alone, body and shadow comforting each other”. [12] There was nothing more for him to do, and he had to take to the road, his briefcase under his arm.

Mao Zedong, “Farewell, Leighton Stuart!

What Mao did not tell the Chinese people, who welcomed the PLA to the city and the Communist Party to power, was that before the PLA crossed the river, all the envoys to China, including the Soviet ambassador, retreated south to Guangzhou with the Kuomintang government while Leighton Stuart, who insisted on staying in Nanjing and tried to meet Mao in Beijing.

If Leighton Stuart had gone to Beijing, it cannot be known whether the Chinese government would have followed Moscow and been drawn into the Korean War as it pursued its policy of “leaning to one side”.

John Leightton Stuart’s Last Wish

In his “Farewell, Leighton Stuart!” Mao also wrote that

“Stanton was an American born in China, had quite extensive social ties in China, ran a church school in China for many years, served in a Japanese prison during the anti-Japanese period, and always pretended to love America and China, quite able to confuse some Chinese people, so he was seen by Marshall, became ambassador to China, and became one of the popular figures in Marshall’s system. “

What Mao did not tell his superstitious readers was that Stanton did not “pretend to love both America and China”.

Upon his return to the United States in 1949, he was ordered by the State Department, then under the shadow of McCarthy’s anti-communist campaign, not to speak and not to attend any official functions. He died in the United States in 1962, leaving a will that he be buried on the campus of Yanjing University. His wife, who died in 1926, is buried there.

Leighton Stuart founded Yenching University in 1919 and served as its provost from 1919 to 1946, and many people who became pillars of the society of New China came from this school.

But, naturally, no one in China dared stand up for Leighton Stuart when Mao Zedong, spoke about him. If McCarthyism ran rampant in the United States for less than 10 years, China’s “McCarthyism” has never stopped before the reform and opening up. Stanton has been dead and buried.

In 2006, Xi Jinping heard about Stuart’s wishes during his visit to the United States, and after much mediation, finally buried Stuart’s ashes in Hangzhou on November 17, 2008.

When John Leighton Stuart, a fluent speaker of the Hangzhou topolect went to university in the United States, his classmates ridiculed him, saying that he was more Chinese than he was a devout Christian or an American. Leighton Stuart was an outstanding cultural envoy, talented educator, but out of his depth as a diplomat. He was the Chinese people’s old friend, the United States and China’s friendship and witness to the crossfire. Finally his soul returned to China to be buried along the West Lake in Hangzhou.

In the words of Wang Xuejin, “This time, the Hangzhou government completed the ceremony for the interment of Mr. Stanton’s ashes with solemn and thoughtful courtesy. This not only reflected a noble humanitarian spirit and fulfilled the last wish of his soul to return to China, but also greatly corrected the image of Mr. Leighton Stuart in China’s mind and completed an exorcism. This has significance for deepening Sino-American friendship as well as clarifying history. “

A group of gray-haired old Yanjing people attended the burial ceremony of Leighton Stuart’s ashes.

Without official permission, they played “Amazing Grace” and the “American National Anthem” on the CD player they brought with them after the burial ceremony. Perhaps the spirit of the old Mr. Leighton Stuart was relieved. Perhaps the new president of Peking University will repeat the words of the father of its forerunner Yenching University, “Our purpose is to cultivate a spirit of cooperation, construction, and service to the people in order to serve the community and the nation. …… We do not want to become the most famous school in the world, nor the most famous school in history, but the most famous school in ‘China today’ and to become the school that is making the greatest contributions to ‘China today.”

Had it not been for Xi Jinping’s efforts, could Mr. Leighton Stuart’s ashes have made it all the way back to Hangzhou across the Pacific Ocean?

The Values “Don’t Leave Leighton Stuart” Represents

Leighton Stuart was no Norman Bethune, but he was indeed “a noble man, a pure man, a moral man, a man free from low taste, a man dedicated to the welfare of the people.”

The values he represents may well be the values we Chinese need to embrace.

However, in China in 2008, the “great red sun” of Mao Zedong was still shining, and his spirit, his style, and his “wisdom” are still formative for many Chinese scholars and elites. In recent months alone, articles such as Chen Kuiyuan’s “Western Values Cannot be Honored as so-called Universal Values”, Feng Yuzhang’s “How to Understand So-called “Universal Values””, Xu Tianliang’s “To Do Good Ideological Work Keeping a Clear Head is Essential“, Quyi’s “The Separation of Powers cannot be Universal Value”, and Li Biesheng’s “A Significant Political Signal”.

However, no matter how much we see that every value in the world has a class nature, no matter how much we accuse the Western countries, especially the United States, of constantly planning to subvert China, to tear China apart, and to destroy China, China is already part of the world, and the world is also part of China.

In his speech at Yale University on April 22, 2006, Hu Jintao said

“Today, China is endeavoring to build a harmonious society. It is a society of democracy and rule of law, fairness and justice, integrity, fraternity, vitality, stability, order and harmony between man and nature. It is a society where there is unity between the material and the spirit, democracy and rule of law, fairness and efficiency, and vitality and order…… “

“China and the United States are both countries of vast territory where many ethnic groups co-exist and different cultures intermingle. Both our two peoples are hard-working and talented. Due to different historical backgrounds and national conditions, there are differences between China and the United States. But this enables us to learn from each other and draw on each other’s strength. Closer China-US cooperation serves the fundamental interests of our two countries and peoples and is also of far-reaching significance for peace and development of the whole world…..”

“A composer cannot write enchanting melody with one note, and a painter cannot paint landscape with only one color. The world is a treasure house where the unique cultural achievement created by people of all countries are displayed. The culture of a nation tells a lot about the evolution of the nation’s understanding of the world and life, both past and present. Culture thus embodies a nation’s fundamental pursuit of mind and dictates its norms of behavior. The historical process of human development is one in which different civilizations interact with and enrich each other and all civilizations in human history have contributed to human progress in their own unique way.

“Cultural diversity is a basic feature of both human society and today’s world and an important driving force for human progress. As history has shown, in the course of interactions between civilizations, we not only need to remove natural barriers and overcome physical isolation, we also need to remove obstacle and obstruction of the mind and overcome various prejudices and misunderstanding. Differences in ideology, social system and development model should not stand in the way of exchanges among civilizations, still less should they become excuses for mutual confrontation. We should uphold the diversity of the world, enhance dialogue and interaction between civilizations, and draw on each other’s strength instead of practicing mutual exclusion. When this is done, mankind will enjoy greater harmony and happiness and the world will become a more colorful place to live in.”

Hu Jintao’s words are actually the best summary of the spirit of Leighton Stuart.

John Leighton Stuart was born in Hangzhou in 1876; founded Yenching University in 1919; was imprisoned by the Japanese during the war; became U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China’s ambassador in 1946, returned to the United States in 1949; died in 1962; and finally “returned” to China in 2008.

Over the course of 132 years [since the Opium War], China has gone from weak to strong. Every step forward has been difficult, and every step has involved interference, swayed and influenced by domestic and foreign forces.

It was only 46 years after Leighton Stuart’s death before he could return to the land he loved so much.

China’s reforms are about to celebrate their 30th birthday.

It may not be too long before China has another wave of reforms.

If members of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee had not raised their hands in late 1978 to approve reform and opening up, the most dramatic, bloodless, nonviolent change in Chinese history would not have even gotten off the ground.

Chinese understanding in the United States would have remained as it was in Mao’s time: “The United States does have science and technology, but unfortunately it is in the hands of the capitalists and not in the hands of the people, and its use is to exploit and oppress internally and to invade and kill externally. The United States also has “democratic politics”, but unfortunately it is only an alias for the dictatorship of one class of the bourgeoisie. The United States has a lot of money, but unfortunately it is only willing to give it to the extremely corrupt Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries. Now and in the future it is said to be quite willing to support its subversive Fifth Column in China, but not willing to support the average bookish uneducated liberal, or democratic individualist, and certainly even less to give any support to the Chinese Communist Party.”

Our own mentality would be as Mao Zedong portrayed it then, “What is the fear of more or less a little difficulty. Let’s blockade, blockade for ten or eight years, and all the problems of China will be solved. The Chinese people are not afraid of death, so why should they be afraid of difficulties? Lao Tzu said, “The people do not fear death, so how can we fear it?”

China’s intellectual elite would also still carry the burden that they may be the lackeys of U.S. imperialism, “There are still some intellectuals and others in China who are confused and have illusions about the United States, so they should be persuaded, fought for, educated and united so that they will come to the people’s side and not fall for the imperialist trick. But the whole prestige of U.S. imperialism among the Chinese people is bankrupt, and the U.S. White Paper is a record of that bankruptcy. The advanced people should make good use of the White Paper in their educational work with the Chinese people. It is good that Leighton Stuart is gone and the White Paper is here. Both of these things are cause for celebration.”

If the “progressive forces” within China had not arisen, Leighton Stuart would not have been able to return to China.

China’s reforms have come to a point where China cannot, and will not say “Farewell Leighton Stuart”.

Reform to this day, China can not, and will not say, “Farewell, John Leighton Stuart”

Don’t leave, Leighton Stuart! [Translator’s Note: Following the first section of the article is a copy of the Chinese text of Mao Zedong’s essay. I have copied the translation on the marxists.org website but omitted the notes on the translation you can find there. ]


Mao’s front-page article in August 18, 1949 People’s Daily “Farewell, Leighton Stuart!”

Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung

FAREWELL, LEIGHTON STUART!

August 18, 1949


It is understandable that the date chosen for the publication of the U.S. White Paper was August 5, a time when Leighton Stuart [1] had departed from Nanking for Washington but had not yet arrived there, since Leighton Stuart is a symbol of the complete defeat of the U.S. policy of aggression. Leighton Stuart is an American born in China; he has fairly wide social connections and spent many years running missionary schools in China, he once sat in a Japanese gaol during the War of Resistance; he used to pretend to love both the United States and China and was able to deceive quite a number of Chinese. Hence, he was picked out by George C. Marshall, was made U.S. ambassador to China and became a celebrity in the Marshall group. In the eyes of the Marshall group he had only one fault, namely, that the whole period when he was ambassador to China as an exponent of their policy was the very period in which that policy was utterly defeated by the Chinese people; that was no small responsibility. It is only natural that the White Paper, which is designed to evade this responsibility, should have been published at a time when Leighton Stuart was on his way to Washington but had not yet arrived.

The war to turn China into a U.S. colony, a war in which the United States of America supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, has been an important component of the U.S. imperialist policy of world-wide aggression since World War II. The U.S. policy of aggression has several targets. The three main targets are Europe, Asia and the Americas. China, the centre of gravity in Asia, is a large country with a population of 475 million; by seizing China, the United States would possess all of Asia. With its Asian front consolidated, U.S. imperialism could concentrate its forces on attacking Europe. U.S. imperialism considers its front in the Americas relatively secure. These are the smug over-all calculations of the U.S. aggressors.

But in the first place, the American people and the peoples of the world do not want war. Secondly, the attention of the United States has largely been absorbed by the awakening of the peoples of Europe, by the rise of the People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe, and particularly by the towering presence of the Soviet Union, this unprecedentedly powerful bulwark of peace bestriding Europe and Asia, and by its strong resistance to the U.S. policy of aggression. Thirdly, and this is most important, the Chinese people have awakened, and the armed forces and the organized strength of the people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China have become more powerful than ever before. Consequently, the ruling clique of U.S. imperialism has been prevented from adopting a policy of direct, large-scale armed attacks on China and instead has adopted a policy of helping Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war.

U.S. naval, ground and air forces did participate in the war in China. There were U.S. naval bases in Tsingtao, Shanghai and Taiwan. U.S. troops were stationed in Peiping, Tientsin, Tangshan, Chinwangtao, Tsingtao, Shanghai and Nanking. The U.S. air force controlled all of China’s air space and took aerial photographs of all China’s strategic areas for military maps. At the town of Anping near Peiping, at Chiutai near Changchun, at Tangshan and in the Eastern Shantung Peninsula, U.S. troops and other military personnel clashed with the People’s Liberation Army and on several occasions were captured.[2] Chennault’s air fleet took an extensive part in the civil war.[3] Besides transporting troops for Chiang Kai-shek, the U.S. air force bombed and sank the cruiser Chungking, which had mutinied against the Kuomintang.[4]All these were acts of direct participation in the war, although they fell short of an open declaration of war and were not large in scale, and although the principal method of U.S. aggression was the large-scale supply of money, munitions and advisers to help Chiang Kai-shek fight the civil war.

The use of this method by the United States was determined by the objective situation in China and the rest of the world, and not by any lack of desire on the part of the Truman-Marshall group, the ruling clique of U.S. imperialism, to launch direct aggression against China. Moreover, at the outset of its help to Chiang Kai-shek in fighting the civil war, a crude farce was staged in which the United States appeared as mediator in the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; this was an attempt to soften up the Communist Party of China, deceive the Chinese people and thus gain control of all China without fighting. The peace negotiations failed, the deception fell through and the curtain rose on the war.

Liberals or “democratic individualists” who cherish illusions about the United States and have short memories! Please look at Acheson’s own words:

When peace came the United States was confronted with three possible alternatives in China: (1) it could have pulled out lock, stock and barrel; (2) it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists, (3) it could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid a civil war by working for a compromise between the two sides.

Why didn’t the United States adopt the first of these policies? Acheson says:

The first alternative would, and I believe American public opinion at the time so felt, have represented an abandonment of our international responsibilities and of our traditional policy of friendship for China before we had made a determined effort to be of assistance.

So that’s how things stand: the “international responsibilities” of the United States and its “traditional policy of friendship for China” are nothing but intervention against China. Intervention is called assuming international responsibilities and showing friendship for China; as to non-intervention, it simply won’t do. Here Acheson defiles U.S. public opinion; his is the “public opinion” of Wall Street, not the public opinion of the American people.

Why didn’t the United States adopt the second of these policies? Acheson says:

The second alternative policy, while it may look attractive theoretically and in retrospect, was wholly impracticable. The Nationalists had been unable to destroy the Communists during the 10 years before the war. Now after the war the Nationalists were, as indicated above, weakened, demoralized, and unpopular. They had quickly dissipated their popular support and prestige in the areas liberated from the Japanese by the conduct of their civil and military officials. The Communists on the other hand were much stronger than they had ever been and were in control of most of North China. Because of the ineffectiveness of the Nationalist forces which was later to be tragically demonstrated, the Communists probably could have been dislodged only by American arms. It is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned such a colossal commitment of our armies in 1945 or later. We therefore came to the third alternative policy. . . .

What a splendid idea! The United States supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the United States and slaughter the Chinese people, to “destroy the Communists” and turn China into a U.S. colony, so that the United States may fulfil its “international responsibilities” and carry out its “traditional policy of friendship for China”.

Although the Kuomintang was corrupt and incompetent, “demoralized and unpopular”, the United States nevertheless supplied it with money and guns and made it fight. Direct armed intervention was all right, “theoretically”. It also seems all right “in retrospect” to the rulers of the United States. For direct armed intervention would really have been interesting and it might “look attractive”. But it would not have worked in practice, for “it is obvious that the American people would not have sanctioned” it. Not that the imperialist group of Truman, Marshall, Acheson and their like did not desire it — they very much desired it — but the situation in China, in the United States and in the world as a whole (a point Acheson does not mention) did not permit it; they had to give up their preference and take the third way.

Let those Chinese who believe that “victory is possible even without international help” listen. Acheson is giving you a lesson. Acheson is a good teacher, giving lessons free of charge, and he is telling the whole truth with tireless zeal and great candour. The United States refrained from dispatching large forces to attack China, not because the U.S. government didn’t want to, but because it had worries. First worry: the Chinese people would oppose it, and the U.S. government was afraid of getting hopelessly bogged down in a quagmire. Second worry: the American people would oppose it, and so the U.S. government dared not order mobilization. Third worry: the people of the Soviet Union, of Europe and of the rest of the world would oppose it, and the U.S. government would face universal condemnation. Acheson’s charming candour has its limits and he is unwilling to mention the third worry. The reason is he is afraid of losing face before the Soviet Union, he is afraid that the Marshall Plan in Europe, [5] which is already a failure despite pretences to the contrary, may end dismally in total collapse.

Let those Chinese who are short-sighted, muddle-headed liberals or democratic individualists listen. Acheson is giving you a lesson; he is a good teacher for you. He has made a clean sweep of your fancied U.S. humanity, justice and virtue. Isn’t that so? Can you find a trace of humanity, justice or virtue in the White Paper or in Acheson’s Letter of Transmittal?

True, the United States has science and technology. But unfortunately they are in the grip of the capitalists, not in the hands of the people, and are used to exploit and oppress the people at home and to perpetrate aggression and to slaughter people abroad. There is also “democracy” in the United States. But unfortunately it is only another name for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie by itself. The United States has plenty of money. But unfortunately it is willing to give money only to the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, who are rotten to the core. The United States, it is said, is and will be quite willing to give money to its fifth column in China, but is unwilling to give it to the ordinary run of liberals or democratic individualists, who are much too bookish and do not know how to appreciate favours, and naturally it is even more unwilling to give money to the Communists. Money may be given, but only conditionally. What is the condition? Follow the United States. The Americans have sprinkled some relief flour in Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai to see who will stoop to pick it up. Like Chiang Tai Kung fishing, [6] they have cast the line for the fish who want to be caught. But he who swallows food handed out in contempt [7] will get a bellyache.

We Chinese have backbone. Many who were once liberals or democratic individualists have stood up to the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs, the Kuomintang reactionaries. Wen Yi-to rose to his full height and smote the table, angrily faced the Kuomintang pistols and died rather than submit.[8] Chu Tse-ching, though seriously ill, starved to death rather than accept U.S. “relief food”.[9] Han Yu of the Tang Dynasty wrote a “Eulogy of Po Yi”, [10] praising a man with quite a few “democratic individualist” ideas, who shirked his duty towards the people of his own country, deserted his post and opposed the people’s war of liberation of that time, led by King Wu. He lauded the wrong man. We should write eulogies of Wen Yi-to and Chu Tse-ching who demonstrated the heroic spirit of our nation.

What matter if we have to face some difficulties? Let them blockade us! Let them blockade us for eight or ten years! By that time all of China’s problems will have been solved. Will the Chinese cower before difficulties when they are not afraid even of death? Lao Tzu said, “The people fear not death, why threaten them with it?” [11] U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, the Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries, have not only “threatened” us with death but actually put many of us to death. Besides people like Wen Yi-to, they have killed millions of Chinese in the last three years with U.S. carbines, machine-guns, mortars, bazookas, howitzers, tanks and bombs dropped from aeroplanes. This situation is now coming to an end. They have been defeated. It is we who are going in to attack them, not they who are coming out to attack us. They will soon be finished. True, the few problems left to us, such as blockade, unemployment, famine, inflation and rising prices, are difficulties, but we have already begun to breathe more easily than in the past three years. We have come triumphantly through the ordeal of the last three years, why can’t we overcome these few difficulties of today? Why can’t we live without the United States?

When the People’s Liberation Army crossed the Yangtse River, the U.S. colonial government at Nanking fled helter-skelter. Yet His Excellency Ambassador Stuart sat tight, watching wide-eyed, hoping to set up shop under a new signboard and to reap some profit. But what did he see? Apart from the People’s Liberation Army marching past, column after column, and the workers, peasants and students rising in hosts, he saw something else — the Chinese liberals or democratic individualists turning out in force, shouting slogans and talking revolution together with the workers, peasants, soldiers and students. In short, he was left out in the cold, “standing all alone, body and shadow comforting each other”. [12] There was nothing more for him to do, and he had to take to the road, his briefcase under his arm.

There are still some intellectuals and other people in China who have muddled ideas and illusions about the United States. Therefore we should explain things to them, win them over, educate them and unite with them, so they will come over to the side of the people and not fall into the snares set by imperialism. But the prestige of U.S. imperialism among the Chinese people is completely bankrupt, and the White Paper is a record of its bankruptcy. Progressives should make good use of the White Paper to educate the Chinese people.

Leighton Stuart has departed and the White Paper has arrived. Very good. Very good. Both events are worth celebrating.



The Soul Returns Home: How Leighton Stuart’s Ashes Came to be Buried in Hangzhou and Aftermath

魂归故里:司徒雷登骨灰安葬杭州的前前后后

Hao Ping

China Reader [Zhongguo Dushubao]

December 12, 2008

[Editor’s Note] On November 17, 2008, exactly 46 years after his death, Stanton’s ashes were moved from Washington, D.C., to the Anxian Garden in Banshan District, Hangzhou. I believe most people know of Stanton because of Mao Zedong’s “Farewell, Leighton Stuart!”, which was included in the middle school language textbook, in which Stuart was used as a symbol of the “total failure of the American policy of aggression” and was made fun of. This name has become synonymous with infamy and failure in China.

John Leighton Stuart was born in Hangzhou and served as president and provost of Yenching University before becoming U.S. ambassador to China. This relocation is said to be the return of his soul to his hometown.

Stanton has always been a controversial figure in China, especially after Mao Zedong wrote a commentary for the Xinhua News Agency on August 18, 1949, “Farewell, Leighton Stuart!” and until the reform and opening up, Stuart was used as a symbol of American imperialism. After the reform and opening up, academics conducted some factual research on Leighton Stuart and gradually restored the real Leighton Stuart.

The burial of Leighton Suart’s ashes in Hangzhou can be called a return to his hometown. Hangzhou, the scene of Leighton Stuart’s birth, his childhood and his youth. Leighton Stuart’s parents and two brothers are also buried there.

Both of Leighton Stuart’s parents were American missionaries who had opened a school in Hangzhou. They had four sons in Hangzhou, with Stanton being the eldest. From 1876 to 1887, Stanton spent his childhood on the shores of beautiful West Lake. In his memoirs written in later years, Stanton wrote: “I remember that we used to go on excursions and wander around the beautiful lake and mountains of Hangzhou. In spring, the hills were full of azaleas. We had picnics and picked strawberries. In the summer, we took refuge in the shady old temples in the mountains, which were extremely tempting adventures for us kids.” At age 11, Stanton was sent back to the United States by his parents to study, and at 28, he returned to Hangzhou as a missionary with his new wife until four years later when he served at the Jinling Theological Seminary in Nanjing, and has since become involved with China’s education and its political situation.

Stanton’s life was complex and multifaceted. He had a close relationship with top KMT figures such as Chiang Kai-shek, Soong Tzu-wen, Kung Hsiang-hsi, Chang Hsueh-liang, and Li Tsung-jen, and was a guest of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. From his birth in Hangzhou on June 24, 1876, to his return to the United States in August 1949, excluding 17 years of study in the United States, Stanton lived in China for a total of 56 years, so he claimed to be “more of a Chinese than an American. I think Stuart’s life has six major achievements and two major faults.

At the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution in 1911, Stanton was a missionary in China and a special correspondent for the Associated Press, and he became the first person to report abroad on China’s Xinhai Revolution, which he hailed as “China’s War of Independence”.

As the first president of Yenching University, Stanton made outstanding contributions to building the university into a first-class university on par with Peking University and Tsinghua University, and trained a large number of outstanding talents in various fields such as politics, economics, diplomacy, science and technology for China in the 20th century.

Stanton was an anti-fascist warrior. After the outbreak of the war, while Peking University, Tsinghua University, Nankai University and other universities moved south to the mainland and formed the Southwest United University, Yenching University has been holding on in Beiping. He was imprisoned by Japanese gendarmes for three years and eight months for supporting the anti-Japanese activities of Yenching University’s teachers and students. During his imprisonment, he translated all the Chinese idioms he had memorized into English pamphlets.

In his old age, he became U.S. ambassador to China as someone already well-known and respected by public opinion in the United States as well as in China among people in both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party.  He deeply abhorred the corrupt practices of the Kuomintang government.  When in 1949, the Kuomintang was defeated, he refused to accompany the Kuomintang government when it retreated south to Guangzhou.  Stuart urged the U.S. government to take the lead in recognizing the Communist regime. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai had secretly invited him to come north, but due to the opposition of the U.S. government, high-level contacts between the Communist Party and the United States were short-lived, and he had to leave China with deep regret and helplessness.

Stuart returned to the United States, although he suffered from McCarthyism’s cruel persecution, but still firmly opposed to the right-wing splittist Two China —  “one China, one Taiwan” — rhetoric.

Stuart had a life-long love for Chinese culture, and he made his own contributions to the cause of Chinese culture.

Of course, Stanton also had his own limitations. As a missionary, Stanton had a deep ideological bias against Marxism-Leninism and made many statements critical of socialism and communism. During his tenure as U.S. ambassador to the Republic of China, Stanton represented the U.S. government’s position on China policy and took a biased attitude toward the Kuomintang reactionary faction in waging the civil war. It was for this reason that Chairman Mao, in his article “Farewell, Leighton Stuart!,” severely criticized the role that Stuart had played representing U.S. policy toward China.

Only three months after his return to the United States, Stuart fell ill and spent the last 13 years of his life in a wheelchair and on a hospital bed, suffering from the consequences of a severe stroke. At that time, Stanton had no family around him, his wife had died in Beijing when he was 50, and his only son was not with him. On November 28, 1952, Stanton submitted his resignation to the outgoing President Harry S. Truman, saying that he wished to resign from his post as Ambassador to China for health reasons. On October 15, 1954, Stuart’s memoirs, Fifty Years in China–The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador, were published by Random House in New York. Random House, New York, USA. In 1955 and 1982, Chinese translations of Stuart’s memoirs were also published in Hong Kong and China. This illustrates the extent of Stuart’s influence in China.

On September 19, 1962, Stanton died of a heart attack in Washington, D.C., at the age of 86.

In 1973 and 1974, at the secret invitation of Premier Zhou, Mr. Fu Jingbo returned to China twice, and twice proposed to the relevant authorities to bury Stanton’s ashes in the Yanching Garden, but did not receive a clear answer. In January 1986, Fu Jingbo personally wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping again to raise the issue of burial of Stanton’s ashes back in China. At the end of June of the same year, the Central Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party approved that suggestion, and agreed that Leighton Stuart’s ashes as the former president of Yanjing University be buried in his former residence Linhuxuan  at Yanching University. After Mr. Fu Jingbo for health reasons was not able to return, the burial of Leighton Stuart’s ashes was put on hold. After the death of Mr. Fu Jingbo in 1988, Leighton Stuart’s ashes were at the home  of Mr. Fu’s daughter Ms. Fu Hailan, until the morning of November 17 this year, 46 years after his death, when they were buried in the Anxian Cemetery in the Banshan District of Hangzhou.

While writing my book 《无奈的结局——司徒雷登与中国》”An Ending that Could Not Be Helped – Leighton Stuart and China”, I was in charge of foreign affairs work at Peking University. Preparing for the burial of Leighton Stuart’s ashes, I enquired into their whereabouts.  According to Stuart’s memoirs, his wife died in 1926, and was buried in the cemetery of Zhongguanyuan. For this reason, I went to the field to find out. Before the Cultural Revolution, Peking University built a dormitory in Zhonguangyuan, the original cemetery was moved. Since no written records were left at that time, no one knows now where these burials were actually moved. At that time, I supposed that they might be moved to Wan’an Cemetery at the foot of Xiangshan Mountain, and twice went to check the files of Wan’an Cemetery, but I still found nothing. I heard from the director of Wan’an Cemetery that there is a special cemetery for foreigners in Beijing, and he will keep an eye on it for me and continue to search for it. I hope that one day I will be able to find Mrs. Stuart’s ashes and move them back to Hangzhou, so that the couple can be together forever on the shores of West Lake.

At the burial ceremony of Mr. Leighton Stuart’s ashes, the U.S. Ambassador to China,Clark T. Randt Jr., said: “China is the country that John Leighton Stuart loved. He was born in Hangzhou and returns here today to complete his life’s journey. He believed that education is one of the most important ways to deepen the relationship between our two countries, and he would be very happy if he could see the changes that have taken place today.” I deeply share this sentiment.

(The author is the president of Beijing Foreign Studies University)

[Note: See also the November 19, 2008 David Barboza New York Times “John Leighton Stuart, China Expert, Is Buried There at Last”]

Hangzhou Gave Leighton Stuart the Warmth of a Hometown 

杭州给了司徒雷登故乡的温暖

Ding Yongxun

Xinhua Daily Telegraph

September 09, 2016.

At the welcome dinner of the G20 Hangzhou Summit on Sept. 4, President Xi Jinping said in his speech, “140 years ago, in June 1876, Mr. John Leighton Stuart, who was once the U.S. ambassador to China, was born in Hangzhou and lived in China for more than 50 years. His ashes were laid to rest in Anxian Garden in the Banshan District of Hangzhou.”

John Leighton Stuart, a name both familiar to and held at a distance from the Chinese people, is today a representative of the friendship between China and the United States. Words like this have appeared in the speeches of China’s top leaders.

By descent, John Leighton Stuart is purely American, his parents having been missionaries who came to China in the late Qing Dynasty. But Stuart himself said he was “more of a Chinese than an American. Stanton’s “Chinese” identity began and ended in Hangzhou because his ashes are now buried there.

In June 1876, Stanton was born in Hangzhou in the parsonage of the Tianshitang Church (now known as Jesus Church Lane in Xiacheng District, Hangzhou). Until he returned to the United States at the age of 11 to study, he lived in Hangzhou, spent a full childhood in Hangzhou, learned a pure Hangzhou language, and recognized Hangzhou as his second hometown.

In 1904, after his marriage, Stanton returned to China with his wife, and his first stop was Hangzhou. In 1908, he became a professor of Greek at the Jinling Theological Seminary in Nanjing, and in 1910, he became chairman of the Nanjing Church Business Committee. In Hangzhou, he participated in the founding of Yuying College, later known as Zhejiang University, of which his brother later became president.

The most brilliant achievement of Stanton’s life was due to his founding and long presidency of Yenching University. In the minds of the older generation of Chinese intellectuals, Stuart was first and foremost an educator and an excellent university president.

At the end of the Qing Dynasty, the Boxer Rebellion burned down the buildings of Huiwen University, the North China Union Women’s University and Tongzhou Union University, founded by the American and British churches, which the founders later planned to rebuild and merge into one university. The founders later planned to merge them into one university.  Disagreements about what the new university should be named and the choice of the president were great until a compromise was reached: an “outsider” was chosen to be the president. John Leighton Stuart, who knew China well and had a reputation for excellence and scholarship, was the popular choice of the Americans in China.

Stanton took over the “unmanageable mess”. He rode around on a donkey to choose a site for the new school, to raise funds for the school around, with missionary piety and perseverance, in the western suburbs of Beijing to build a beautiful university like a garden. Today, Yenching University has long since ceased to exist, but the campus that Stuart left behind has become the campus of Peking University. The lakes and towers of today’s Yenching Garden, the Chinese-style president’s office building, and the student dormitories have largely remained the same as they were designed under Stuart’s auspices.

Although Yenching University was a church school, Leighton Stuart proposed the principle of “making Yenching University completely Chinese. He said: “Yenching University must be a university in the true sense of the word that can withstand any test, and what it believes in is an entirely personal matter”. As an educator, he knew that “a university should not only have a building, but also a master”, and hired the most famous Chinese scholars at that time to teach at the university, enjoying the same status and compensation as foreign teachers. Within a short period of time, Yenching University was filled with famous teachers, almost all of whom were heard: Hong Ye, Yu Pingbo, Zhou Zuoren, Zheng Zhenduo, Chen Yuan, Gu Jie Gang, Zhang Dongsun, Feng Youlan ……

At the same time, he actively promoted exchanges and cooperation between Yenching University and leading universities. The Harvard-Yenching Institute, established in cooperation between Yenching University and Harvard University, is still highly respected today as an academic program and is regarded as a guarantee of academic quality.

Stuart’s outstanding construction and management has enabled Yenching University to rapidly increase its popularity and academic standards, and in just over a decade, it has become the best academic church university in China, ranking among the top universities in the world more than 80 years ago.

Yenching University existed for 33 years and taught less than 10,000 registered students.  Over 100 went on to become renowned scholars and leaders in their disciplines, including 42 members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and eleven members of the Chinese Academy of Engineering. Yenching University was also the earliest pioneer of journalism and sociology education in China, producing famous alumni such as Bing Xin, Fei Xiaotong, Hou Renzhi, Yang Jiang, etc. Huang Hua, who later served as PRC  foreign minister, was also a student of John Leighton Stuart.

As president, Stuart sympathized with the student movement, and after the September 18 Incident, he personally led hundreds of Yenching University students and faculty in a street march to protest the Japanese invasion of China. When the Pacific War broke out in 1941, he was imprisoned in an internment camp for refusing to cooperate with the Japanese army. He was held there until Japan surrendered. During the Japanese invasion of North China, a large number of students from Yenching University fled the areas that had fallen to the Japanese and  went to the liberated areas held by the Chinese Communist Party’s People’s Liberation Army.  Leighton Stuart personally saw them off.

For the rest of his life, Stanton carried the label of “symbol of America’s total failure in China” from his appointment as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China in 1946. During his tenure as ambassador, he was invited to Hangzhou to attend an event and visit the graves of his parents, and was awarded the title of “Honorary Citizen of Hangzhou”. He was described by the Chinese at the time as “both a politician and a scholar, a cunning adversary and a warm friend”.

In 1949, on the eve of the decisive battle that would determine China’s fate, Stuart chose to stay in Guangzhou, hoping to act as a mediator in the Chinese civil war, but eventually had to return quietly to the United States because of the dramatic change in circumstances, and then retired until his death.

Because of his performance as ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart who had “no enemies in the world,” became an unpopular person in the eyes of all parties. In China’s particular context, he became synonymous with being an agent of aggression against China and a notorious loser because of his famous essay, which was selected for inclusion in a high school textbook; back in the United States, he was “banned” by the pro-KMT and McCarthyist authorities, harassed and attacked by some, and left poor, sick and alone. Had it not been for the loving care of his personal secretary, Fu Jingbo and his family, he would have been even more miserable in his old age.

In September 1962, after years of illness, Leighton Stuart died in Washington, D.C.. His last wish was to have his ashes sent back to China and buried on the campus of Yenching University. But for complicated reasons, this wish was never realized. The buildings left behind by Stanton are still in use on the Yenching University campus, which has long since become the campus of Peking University. There is not a single statue of Stanton on the campus to date, and the whereabouts of the grave of his wife, who was buried there earlier, is also unknown.

On November 17, 2008, Mr. Leighton Stuart’s ashes were placed in the Anxian Garden in the Banshan District of Hangzhou. Although this was not entirely according to his wishes, Hangzhou was his second home where he was born and raised, and where his parents and brother have lain at rest for many years. To be born and buried in Hangzhou is a fulfillment of his wish to return to his roots.

Hangzhou, this beautiful and inclusive city, gave Leighton Stuart, a “familiar stranger” to the Chinese the warmth of his hometown but also a monument to the friendship between the two great countries beyond the vagaries of history.

刘亚伟:别不了的司徒雷登

by 刘亚伟 

June 8, 2022June 8, 2022

【编者按】本文写于2008年12月。2016年9月初,G20峰会在杭州举行。习近平在9月4日的欢迎晚宴上致辞时说,“140年前,1876年的6月,曾经当过美国驻华大使的司徒雷登先生出生于杭州,在中国生活了50多年,他的骨灰就安放在杭州半山安贤园。”在中美关系走低的今天,重温司徒雷登与中国的关系或许有温故知新的意义。与本文同时发布的还有毛泽东1949年8月18日发表的社论“别了,司徒雷登“,郝平2008年12月12日发表的文章“魂归故里:司徒雷登骨灰安葬杭州的前前后后”和新华社2016年9月9日发表的报道“杭州给了司徒雷登故乡的温暖”。

历史不能改写,可以假设。

毛泽东也说“假”话

1949年8月18日,毛泽东发表了一篇《别了,司徒雷登》的文章。在文章里,毛泽东写到,

“人民解放军横渡长江,南京的美国殖民政府如鸟兽散。司徒雷登大使老爷却坐着不动,睁起眼睛看着,希望开设新店,捞一把。司徒雷登看见了什么呢?除了看见人民解放军一队一队地走过,工人、农民、学生一群一群地起来之外,他还看见了一种现象,就是中国的自由主义者或民主个人主义者也大群地和工农兵学生等人一道喊口号,讲革命。总之是没有人去理他,使得他“茕茕孑立,形影相吊”,没有什么事做了,只好挟起皮包走路。”

毛泽东当时没有告诉敲锣打鼓欢迎解放军进城和共产党掌权的中国人民的是,在中国人民解放军渡江之前,所有驻华使节,包括苏联大使,都跟国民党政府南下去了广州,只有司徒雷登还执意留在南京,并试图去北京与毛泽东见面。

假如当年司徒雷登去了北京,中国政府会不会“一边倒”死心塌地跟上莫斯科并被卷入朝鲜战争,我们不得而知。

司徒雷登的遗愿

毛泽东在向司徒雷登告别的文章中还写道,

“司徒雷登是一个在中国出生的美国人,在中国有相当广泛的社会联系,在中国办过多年的教会学校,在抗日时期坐过日本人的监狱,平素装着爱美国也爱中国,颇能迷惑一部分中国人,因此被马歇尔看中,做了驻华大使,成为马歇尔系统中的风云人物之一。”

毛泽东没有告诉迷信他的读者的是,司徒雷登并不是“装着爱美国也爱中国”。

司徒雷登是真的爱中国。1949年回到美国之后,他被当时在麦卡锡反共运动笼罩下的美国国务院勒令不能讲话,不能参加任何正式活动。心情抑郁的他在照顾他的傅泾波家里不幸中风,从此靠这个中国家庭的无微不至的照顾度过余生。1962年司徒雷登在美国去世,留下的遗嘱是希望自己能够葬在燕京大学的校园里。他在1926年去世的夫人就葬在那里。

司徒雷登1919年创办燕京大学,并从1919年到1946年出任该校的教务长,新中国许多栋梁人才都出自这个学校。

但是,毛泽东他老人家说了话,中国自然没有人敢去给司徒雷登平反。如果说麦卡锡主义在美国横行了不到10年,中国的“麦卡锡主义”在改革开放之前就从来没有停歇过。司徒雷登一直死无葬身之地。

即使在中美建交近30年的今天,司徒雷登还是不能被葬在当年的燕京,今天的北大。2006年,习近平在访美期间听说了司徒雷登的遗愿,经过多方斡旋,终于在2008年11月17日把司徒雷登的骨灰下葬到了杭州。

司徒先生,这个曾经一口杭州话、回到美国被同学嘲笑、自诩中国人成分多于美国人成分的虔诚的基督教徒、杰出的文化特使、天才的教育工作者、蹩脚的外交官、中国人民的老朋友、中美友好和交恶的见证人,终于魂归西子湖畔。

用王学进的话说,“此次杭州市政府用隆重周到的礼节完成司徒雷登先生骨灰安放仪式,不仅体现了高尚的人道主义精神,圆了先生魂归中国的遗愿,也极大地修正了先生在国人心目中的形象,完成了驱魅的任务,这对于加深中美友好以及廓清历史有着积极的意义。”

一群白发苍苍的老燕京人参加了司徒雷登的骨灰下葬仪式。

他们未经官方许可,在下葬仪式开始后用自己带的光盘设备播放了“Amazing Grace”和“美国国歌”。也许,司徒老人的在天之灵会感到欣慰。也许刚刚换了校长的北大会重温燕京之父当年的训导,“我们的目的,是以养成一种合作、建设、服务人群的精神以服务社会国家……我们不要变成世界上最有名的学校,也不要成为有史以来最有名的学校,而是要成为‘现在中国’最有用的学校。”

假如没有习近平的努力,司徒先生的骨灰可以远渡太平洋回到杭州吗?

别不了,司徒雷登代表的价值

司徒雷登不是白求恩,但的确是“一个高尚的人,一个纯粹的人,一个有道德的人,一个脱离了低级趣味的人,一个有益于人民的人。”

他所代表的价值观也许是我们中国人需要拥抱的价值。

不过,在2008年的中国,毛泽东的“阳光”还普照着,他的精神,他的风格、他的“英明”还滋润着许多中国的学者和精英,与毛泽东当年讽刺、挖苦和攻击司徒雷登的经典异曲同工的文章还层出不穷,仅仅最近几个月就有陈奎元的《不能将西方的价值观念尊奉为所谓的普世价值》、冯虞章的《怎样认识所谓“普世价值”》、徐天亮的《做好意识形态工作贵在保持清醒头脑》、求是的《三权分立是不可能普世的》和李必胜的《一个重大的政治信号 》。

但是,无论怎么说世界上的任何价值都有阶级性的,不管如何指责西方国家,特别是美国,每时每刻都在策划颠覆中国,瓦解中国,灭亡中国,中国已经是世界的一部分,世界也是中国的一部分。

胡锦涛2006年4月22日在美国耶鲁大学发表演讲时说,

“今天,中国提出构建和谐社会,就是要建设一个民主法制、公平正义、诚信有爱、充满活力、安定有序、人与自然和谐相处的社会,实现物质和精神、民主和法制、公平和效率、活力和秩序的有机统一。

“中美两国都拥有辽阔的国土,都是多个民族并存,多种文化融合的国家,都生活着勤劳智慧的人民,中美因不同的历史背景和现实国情而存在着差异,在有利我们相互借鉴,取长补短。中美加强合作,符合两国和两国人民的根本利益,对世界的和平与发展也具有重大影响。

“一个音符无法表达出优美的旋律,一种颜色难以描绘的多彩画卷,世界是一幅丰富多彩的殿堂。一个民族的文化往往凝聚着这个民族对世界和生命的历史认知和现实感受,也往往积淀着这个民族对深层的精神追求和行为准则,人文历史发展的过程就是各种文明不断交流,融合创新的过程,人类历史上各种文明都以各自的独特方式为人类进步做出了贡献,文明多样性是人类社会的客观现实,是当今世界的基本特征,也是人类进步的重要动力。

“历史经验表明,在人类文明交流的过程中,不仅需要克服自然的屏障和隔阂,而且需要超越思想的障碍和束缚,更需要克服各种偏见,意识形态、社会制度,发展模式的差异,不应成为人类文明交流的障碍,更不能成为相互对抗的理由。我们应该积极维护世界多样性,推动不同文明的对话和交流,相互借鉴,而不是相互排斥,使人类更加和睦幸福,让世界更加丰富多彩。”

胡锦涛的话其实是对司徒雷登的精神的最好的总结。

司徒雷登1876年在杭州出生;1919年创办燕京大学;抗战期间被日军囚禁;1946年出任中国大使;1949年返回美国;1962年病故;2008年又“重返”中国。

132年,中国从弱到强,每走一步都很艰难,每一步都受到国内和国外势力的干扰、左右和影响,每一步,无论是向前还是退后,其实都在朝着“同一个世界,同一个梦想”的目标艰难地迈进。

司徒雷登死后46年才能返回自己深深爱着的土地。

中国的改革也就要过30岁的生日了。

中国的更进一步的改革也许不会再需要太长的时间。

假如1978年年末没有党中央委员会的成员举手通过改革开放,中国历史最为波澜壮阔的、不流血的、非暴力的变革就不会启动。

我们对美国的认识还会停留在毛泽东时代,“美国确实有科学,有技术,可惜抓在资本家手里,不抓在人民手里,其用处就是对内剥削和压迫,对外侵略和杀人。美国也有“民主政治”,可惜只是资产阶级一个阶级的独裁统治的别名。美国有很多钱,可惜只愿意送给极端腐败的蒋介石反动派。现在和将来据说很愿意送些给它在中国的第五纵队,但是不愿意送给一般的书生气十足的不识抬举的自由主义者,或民主个人主义者,当然更加不愿意送给共产党。”

我们自己的心态也会如毛泽东当年的描绘,“多少一点困难怕什么。封锁吧,封锁十年八年,中国的一切问题都解决了。中国人死都不怕,还怕困难吗?老子说过:“民不畏死,奈何以死惧之。”

中国的知识精英也还会背着他们可能是美帝国主义的走狗的包袱,“中国还有一部分知识分子和其他人等存有糊涂思想,对美国存有幻想,因此应当对他们进行说服、争取、教育和团结的工作,使他们站到人民方面来,不上帝国主义的当。但是整个美帝国主义在中国人民中的威信已经破产了,美国的白皮书,就是一部破产的记录。先进的人们,应当很好地利用白皮书对中国人民进行教育工作。 司徒雷登走了,白皮书来了,很好,很好。这两件事都是值得庆祝的。”

中国人民“先进”不起来,司徒雷登也回不了中国。

改革走到今天,中国已经不能、也不会“别了,司徒雷登”。

别不了,司徒雷登。

【附文】

别了,司徒雷登

毛泽东

1949年8月18日

美国的白皮书,选择在司徒雷登业已离开南京、快到华盛顿、但是尚未到达的日子——八月五日发表,是可以理解的,因为他是美国侵略政策彻底失败的象征。司徒雷登是一个在中国出生的美国人,在中国有相当广泛的社会联系,在中国办过多年的教会学校,在抗日时期坐过日本人的监狱,平素装着爱美国也爱中国,颇能迷惑一部分中国人,因此被马歇尔看中,做了驻华大使,成为马歇尔系统中的风云人物之一。在马歇尔系统看来,他只有一个缺点,就是在他代表马歇尔系统的政策在中国当大使的整个时期,恰恰就是这个政策彻底地被中国人民打败了的时期,这个责任可不小。以脱卸责任为目的的白皮书,当然应该在司徒雷登将到未到的日子发表为适宜。

美国出钱出枪,蒋介石出人,替美国打仗杀中国人,借以变中国为美国殖民地的战争,组成了美国帝国主义在第二次世界大战以后的世界侵略政策的一个重大的部分。美国侵略政策的对象有好几个部分。欧洲部分,亚洲部分,美洲部分,这三个是主要的部分。中国是亚洲的重心,是一个具有四亿七千五百万人口的大国,夺取了中国,整个亚洲都是它的了。美帝国主义的亚洲战线巩固了,它就可以集中力量向欧洲进攻。美帝国主义在美洲的战线,它是认为比较地巩固的。这些就是美国侵略者的整个如意算盘。

可是,一则美国的和全世界的人民都不要战争;二则欧洲人民的觉悟,东欧各人民民主国家的兴起,特别是苏联这个空前强大的和平堡垒耸立在欧亚两洲之间,顽强地抵抗着美国的侵略政策,使美国的注意力大部分被吸引住了;三则,这是主要的,中国人民的觉悟,中国共产党领导的武装力量和民众组织力量已经空前地强大起来了。这样,就迫使美帝国主义的当权集团不能采取大规模地直接地武装进攻中国的政策,而采取了帮助蒋介石打内战的政策。

美国的海陆空军已经在中国参加了战争。青岛、上海和台湾,有美国的海军基地。北平、天津、唐山、秦皇岛、青岛、上海、南京都驻过美国的军队。美国的空军控制了全中国,并从空中拍摄了全中国战略要地的军用地图。在北平附近的安平镇,在长春附近的九台,在唐山,在胶东半岛,美国的军队或军事人员曾经和人民解放军接触过,被人民解放军俘虏过多次[2]。陈纳德航空队曾经广泛地参战。美国的空军除替蒋介石运兵外,又炸沉了起义的重庆号巡洋舰。所有这些,都是直接参战的行动,只是还没有公开宣布作战,并且规模还不算大,而以大规模地出钱出枪出顾问人员帮助蒋介石打内战为主要的侵略方式。

美国之所以采取这种方式,是被中国和全世界的客观形势所决定的,并不是美帝国主义的当权派——杜鲁门、马歇尔系统不想直接侵略中国。在助蒋作战的开头,又曾演过一出美国出面调处国共两党争端的文明戏,企图软化中国共产党和欺骗中国人民,不战而控制全中国。和谈失败了,欺骗不行了,战争揭幕了。

对于美国怀着幻想的善忘的自由主义者或所谓“民主个人主义”者们,请你们看一看艾奇逊的话:“和平来到的时候,美国在中国碰到了三种可能的选择:(一)它可以一干二净地撤退;(二)它可以实行大规模的军事干涉,帮助国民党毁灭共产党;(三)它可以帮助国民党把他们的权力在中国最大可能的地区里面建立起来,同时却努力促成双方的妥协来避免内战。”

为什么不采取第一个政策呢?艾奇逊说:“我相信当时的美国民意认为,第一种选择等于叫我们不要坚决努力地先做一番补救工作,就把我们的国际责任,把我们对华友好的传统政策,统统放弃。”原来美国的所谓“国际责任”和“对华友好的传统政策”,就是干涉中国。干涉就叫做担负国际责任,干涉就叫做对华友好,不干涉是不行的。艾奇逊在这里强奸了美国的民意,这是华尔街的“民意”,不是美国的民意。

为什么不采取第二个政策呢?艾奇逊说:“第二种供选择的政策,从理论上来看,以及回顾起来,虽然都似乎是令人神往,却是完全行不通的。战前的十年里,国民党已经毁灭不了共产党。现在是战后了,国民党是削弱了,意志消沉了,失去了民心,这在前文已经有了说明。在那些从日本手里收复过来的地区里,国民党文武官员的行为一下子就断送了人民对国民党的支持,断送了它的威信。可是共产党却比以往无论什么时候都强盛,整个华北差不多都被他们控制了。从国民党军队后来所表现的不中用的惨况看来,也许只有靠美国的武力才可以把共产党打跑。对于这样庞大的责任,无论是叫我们的军队在一九四五年来承担,或者是在以后来承担,美国人民显然都不会批准。我们因此采取了第三种供选择的政策……”

好办法,美国出钱出枪,蒋介石出人,替美国打仗杀中国人,“毁灭共产党”,变中国为美国的殖民地,完成美国的“国际责任”,实现“对华友好的传统政策”。

国民党腐败无能,“意志消沉了,失去了民心”,还是要出钱出枪叫它打仗。直接出兵干涉,在“理论上”是妥当的。单就美国统治者来说,“回顾起来”,也是妥当的。因为这样做起来实在有兴趣,“似乎是令人神往”。但是在事实上是不行的,“美国人民显然都不会批准”。不是我们——杜鲁门、马歇尔、艾奇逊等人的帝国主义系统——不想干,干是很想的,只是因为中国的形势,美国的形势,还有整个国际的形势(这点艾奇逊没有说)不许可,不得已而求其次,采取了第三条路。

那些认为“不要国际援助也可以胜利”的中国人听着,艾奇逊在给你们上课了。艾奇逊是不拿薪水上义务课的好教员,他是如此诲人不倦地毫无隐讳地说出了全篇的真理。美国之所以没有大量出兵进攻中国,不是因为美国政府不愿意,而是因为美国政府有顾虑。第一顾虑中国人民反对它,它怕陷在泥潭里拔不出去。第二顾虑美国人民反对它,因此不敢下动员令。第三顾虑苏联和欧洲的人民以及各国的人民反对它,它将冒天下之大不韪。艾奇逊的可爱的坦白性是有限度的,这第三个顾虑他不愿意说。这是因为他怕在苏联面前丢脸,他怕已经失败了但是还要装做好像没有失败的样子的欧洲马歇尔计划陷入全盘崩溃的惨境。

那些近视的思想糊涂的自由主义或民主个人主义的中国人听着,艾奇逊在给你们上课了,艾奇逊是你们的好教员。你们所设想的美国的仁义道德,已被艾奇逊一扫而空。不是吗?你们能在白皮书和艾奇逊信件里找到一丝一毫的仁义道德吗?

美国确实有科学,有技术,可惜抓在资本家手里,不抓在人民手里,其用处就是对内剥削和压迫,对外侵略和杀人。美国也有“民主政治”,可惜只是资产阶级一个阶级的独裁统治的别名。美国有很多钱,可惜只愿意送给极端腐败的蒋介石反动派。现在和将来据说很愿意送些给它在中国的第五纵队,但是不愿意送给一般的书生气十足的不识抬举的自由主义者,或民主个人主义者,当然更加不愿意送给共产党。送是可以的,要有条件。什么条件呢?就是跟我走。美国人在北平,在天津,在上海,都洒了些救济粉,看一看什么人愿意弯腰拾起来。太公钓鱼,愿者上钩。嗟来之食,吃下去肚子要痛的。

我们中国人是有骨气的。许多曾经是自由主义者或民主个人主义者的人们,在美国帝国主义者及其走狗国民党反动派面前站起来了。闻一多拍案而起,横眉怒对国民党的手枪,宁可倒下去,不愿屈服。朱自清一身重病,宁可饿死,不领美国的“救济粮”。唐朝的韩愈写过《伯夷颂》,颂的是一个对自己国家的人民不负责任、开小差逃跑、又反对武王领导的当时的人民解放战争、颇有些“民主个人主义”思想的伯夷,那是颂错了。我们应当写闻一多颂,写朱自清颂,他们表现了我们民族的英雄气概。

多少一点困难怕什么。封锁吧,封锁十年八年,中国的一切问题都解决了。中国人死都不怕,还怕困难吗?老子说过:“民不畏死,奈何以死惧之。”美帝国主义及其走狗蒋介石反动派,对于我们,不但“以死惧之”,而且实行叫我们死。闻一多等人之外,还在过去的三年内,用美国的卡宾枪、机关枪、迫击炮、火箭炮、榴弹炮、坦克和飞机炸弹,杀死了数百万中国人。现在这种情况已近尾声了,他们打了败仗了,不是他们杀过来而是我们杀过去了,他们快要完蛋了。留给我们多少一点困难,封锁、失业、灾荒、通货膨胀、物价上升之类,确实是困难,但是比起过去三年来已经松了一口气了。过去三年的一关也闯过了,难道不能克服现在这点困难吗?没有美国就不能活命吗?

人民解放军横渡长江,南京的美国殖民政府如鸟兽散。司徒雷登大使老爷却坐着不动,睁起眼睛看着,希望开设新店,捞一把。司徒雷登看见了什么呢?除了看见人民解放军一队一队地走过,工人、农民、学生一群一群地起来之外,他还看见了一种现象,就是中国的自由主义者或民主个人主义者们也大群地和工农兵学生等人一道喊口号,讲革命。总之是没有人去理他,使得他“茕茕孑立,形影相吊”,没有什么事做了,只好挟起皮包走路。

中国还有一部分知识分子和其它人等存有糊涂思想,对美国存有幻想,因此应当对他们进行说服、争取、教育和团结的工作,使他们站到人民方面来,不上帝国主义的当。但是整个美帝国主义在中国人民中的威信已经破产了,美国的白皮书,就是一部破产的记录。先进的人们,应当很好地利用白皮书对中国人民进行教育工作。

司徒雷登走了,白皮书来了,很好,很好。这两件事都是值得庆祝的。

魂归故里:司徒雷登骨灰安葬杭州的前前后后

郝平

中华读书报

2008年12月12日

【编者按】2008年11月17日,在去世整整46年之后,司徒雷登骨灰自美国华盛顿迁葬杭州半山安贤园。相信多数人知道司徒雷登,还是因为毛泽东的《别了,司徒雷登》,在这篇被收入中学语文教材的评论文章中,司徒雷登被作为“美国侵略政策彻底失败的象征”大遭讽刺,“司徒雷登”这个名字在我国也成了声名狼藉和失败的代名词。

司徒雷登出生于杭州,在担任美国驻华大使之前,曾创办并担任燕京大学的校长和校务长。此番迁葬,可说是魂归故里。

司徒雷登在中国一直是一个有争议的人物,特别是1949年8月18日毛泽东为新华社撰写了评论员文章《别了,司徒雷登》之后,一直到改革开放之前,司徒雷登都被作为了美帝国主义的象征。改革开放之后,学术界对司徒雷登进行了一些实事求是的研究,逐步还原司徒雷登的真实面貌。

司徒雷登骨灰安葬在杭州,可以说是魂归故里。杭州,既是司徒雷登的出生地,也是他儿时生长和青年时工作过的地方。同时,杭州还是他的父母和两个弟弟的安息地。

司徒雷登的父母都是曾在杭州开办过学校的美国传教士。他们在杭州一共生了四个儿子,司徒雷登是长子。从1876年到1887年,司徒雷登在美丽的西子湖畔度过了他的童年。在晚年撰写的回忆录中,司徒雷登曾这样写道:“我记得,我们当时经常进行郊游,在杭州秀丽的湖光山色中徜徉。春天,漫山遍野盛开着杜鹃花。我们举行野餐,采摘草莓。夏天,我们到山里阴凉的古庙里避暑,对我们这些孩子来讲,那是极富诱惑力的探险。”11岁,司徒雷登被父母送回美国读书。28岁,他以传教士的身份携新婚妻子重返杭州,直到四年后赴南京金陵神学院任职,并从此与中国的教育事业和中国政局结下了不解之缘。

司徒雷登的一生是复杂而多面的。他既与蒋介石、宋子文、孔祥熙、张学良、李宗仁等国民党高层人物关系甚笃,又曾是毛泽东和周恩来的座上客。从1876年6月24日在杭州出生,到1949年8月返回美国,除去在美国求学的17年,司徒雷登在中国前后共生活了56年之久,所以他自称“是一个中国人更甚于是一个美国人”。我认为,司徒雷登的一生有着六大功绩和两大过失。

辛亥革命爆发时,司徒雷登是派驻中国的传教士和美联社的特邀记者,他成为向国外报道中国辛亥革命,并将其誉为“中国独立战争”的第一人。

司徒雷登是燕京大学首任校长,为将燕京大学建设成为与北大、清华齐名的一流大学做出了突出的贡献,并为20世纪中国政治、经济、外交、科技等各个领域培养了一大批杰出人才。

司徒雷登是反法西斯的勇士。抗战爆发后,北大、清华、南开等高校南迁内地,组建西南联大,燕京大学一直坚守在北平。他因支持燕京大学师生的抗日活动而被日本宪兵关押了三年零八个月。在被监禁期间,他把所有背诵下来的中国成语翻译成了英文小册子。

年逾古稀之际,他在中美两国和国共两党舆论的一片赞誉声中出任美国驻华大使,他对国民党政府的腐败行径深恶痛绝。1949年,在国民党节节溃败之际,他拒绝随国民党政府南撤广州,并敦促美国政府率先承认共产党政权。毛泽东和周恩来曾秘密邀请他北上,由于美国政府的反对,使中共与美国之间的高层接触稍纵即逝,他不得不带着深深的遗憾与无奈离开中国。

司徒雷登返回美国之后,虽然遭受麦卡锡主义的残酷迫害,但仍然坚决反对美国右翼“一中一台”分裂中国的言论。

司徒雷登一生非常热爱中国文化,对中国文化事业做出了贡献。

当然,司徒雷登也有他自身的局限性。司徒雷登是传教士,他从意识形态上对马列主义带着很深的偏见,并多次发表批判社会主义和共产主义的言论。司徒雷登担任美国驻华大使期间,代表美国政府对华政策的立场,对国民党反动派发动内战持偏袒的态度。也正因此,毛主席在《别了,司徒雷登》一文中,对司徒雷登在美国对华政策上所代表的角色给予了严厉批判。

回到美国仅3个月,司徒雷登一病不起,严重的中风后遗症使他在轮椅和病榻上度过了最后的13个春秋。那时,司徒雷登身边没有亲人相伴,他的妻子在他50岁时病逝于北京,唯一的儿子也不在身边。他的生活起居完全依赖从年青时便追随在他身边的私人秘书傅泾波及其家人照料。1952年11月28日,司徒雷登向即将离任的美国总统杜鲁门递上辞呈,提出因健康原因,希望辞去驻华大使的职务。3天后,杜鲁门在给他的回信中,对他在中国期间为增进中美关系所做的努力给予极高的评价。1954年10月15日,司徒雷登的回忆录《在华五十年(Fifty Years in China——The Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador)》由美国纽约兰登出版社正式出版。次日,台湾《大华晚报》即开始一边请人翻译,一边予以连载,并于同年12月1日出版了中译本。1955年和1982年,香港和中国大陆也分别出版了司徒雷登回忆录的中译本。可见司徒雷登在中国的影响力之大。

在意识到自己可能不久于人世时,司徒雷登立下遗嘱,请傅泾波在他去世后,如有可能,将他的骨灰安葬在他妻子的墓地旁。1962年9月19日,司徒雷登因心脏病突发在华盛顿去世,终年86岁。

1973年和1974年,应周总理的秘密邀请,傅泾波先生两次回国,并两次向有关部门提出将司徒雷登的骨灰安葬在燕园的请求,但都未获得明确的答复。1986年1月,傅泾波亲笔上书邓小平再次提出司徒雷登骨灰回中国安葬的问题。同年6月底,中央书记处做出批复,同意司徒雷登的骨灰以原燕京大学校长的名义安葬于他在燕大时的故居临湖轩。后傅泾波先生因健康原因始终未能再次回国,司徒雷登的骨灰安葬之事也就此搁置下来。自傅泾波先生1988年去世后,司徒雷登的骨灰一直由傅的女儿傅海澜女士供奉在家中,直至今年11月17日上午,在他去世46年之后,得以在杭州半山安贤园落土为安。

我在撰写《无奈的结局——司徒雷登与中国》一书时,负责北大外事工作,为落实司徒雷登骨灰安葬一事,做了一些调查研究,还多方打听司徒雷登夫人骨灰的下落。据司徒雷登回忆录记载,他的夫人1926年病故后,被安葬在中关园的墓地。为此,我专程前去实地查找。文革前,北大在中关园建宿舍,把原先的墓地迁出去了。由于当时没留下任何文字记载,所以现在没有人知道这些墓葬到底被迁往何处。当时,我分析也可能会就近迁到香山脚下的万安公墓,也曾两次前去查过万安公墓的档案,可依然一无所获。听万安公墓管理处主任介绍,北京还有一处专门的外国人墓地,他会帮我留意,继续查找下去。我寄希望于有一天能够找到司徒雷登夫人的骨灰,迁回杭州,让他们伉俪得以在西子湖畔永远相依相伴。

在司徒雷登骨灰的安葬仪式上,美国驻华大使雷德先生发表感言说:“中国是司徒雷登先生热爱的国家。他出生在杭州,今天回到这里,完成了他的人生旅途。他相信教育是加深两国关系的重要途径之一,如果他能看到今天的变化,他一定会非常高兴。”对此,我深有同感。

(作者为北京外国语大学校长)

杭州给了司徒雷登故乡的温暖

丁永勋

新华每日电讯

2016年09月09日

在9月4日的G20杭州峰会欢迎晚宴上,国家主席习近平致辞时说,“140年前,1876年的6月,曾经当过美国驻华大使的司徒雷登先生出生于杭州,在中国生活了50多年,他的骨灰就安放在杭州半山安贤园。”

司徒雷登,一个中国人熟悉又隔膜的名字,这一次作为中美两国友谊的代表,出现在中国最高领导人的讲话中。

从血统上说,司徒雷登是纯粹的美国人,他的父母都是在清末就来到中国的传教士。但司徒雷登自己说,他“是一个中国人更多于是一个美国人”。司徒雷登的“中国人”身份,始于杭州,最后又因为他的骨灰归葬于此,也终于杭州。

1876年6月,司徒雷登出生在杭州天水堂教士住宅(今杭州下城区耶稣堂弄)。直到11岁回到美国读书,他都生活在杭州,在杭州度过了完整的童年,学会了一口纯正的杭州话,并认杭州为自己的第二故乡。

1904年,司徒雷登结婚后偕妻子回到中国,第一站也是杭州。在这之后,他的主要事业是传教,并钻研汉语。1908年开始任南京金陵神学院希腊文教授,1910年任南京教会事业委员会主席,辛亥革命时曾兼任美联社驻南京特约记者。在杭州,他参加创建了育英书院,即后来的之江大学,他的弟弟后来成为之江大学校长。

司徒雷登一生最辉煌的成就,是因为他创办并长期主持燕京大学。在老一代中国知识分子心目中,司徒雷登首先是一个教育家,一个优秀的大学校长。

清末,义和团烧毁了美英教会创办的汇文大学、华北协和女子大学和通州协和大学校舍,创办者后来计划重建,将其合并为一所大学。但在学校名称和校长人选上分歧很大,后来达成妥协方案:选一位“局外人”任校长。非常了解中国,且学养出众、令名远播的司徒雷登,成为在华美国人公推的校长人选。

司徒雷登接过了这个“无法收拾的烂摊子”。他曾骑着毛驴为新学校选址四处奔波,为筹集办学经费四处化缘,用传教的虔诚和毅力,在北京西郊建起了一座园林一样优美的大学。如今,燕京大学早已不复存在,但司徒雷登留下的校园,成了北京大学的校园。今日燕园的湖光塔影、中国风格的校长办公楼和学生宿舍,基本保持了司徒雷登主持设计的原貌。

燕京大学虽然是教会学校,但司徒雷登却提出了“使燕大彻底中国化”原则。他说:“燕大必须是一所经得起任何考验的、真正意义上的大学,至于信仰什么,则完全是个人的私事”。作为教育家,他深知“大学不仅要有大楼,还要有大师”的道理,聘请了当时最著名的中国学者来校任教,与外籍教师享受同等待遇。短短时间内,燕大名师云集,几乎个个如雷贯耳:洪业、俞平伯、周作人、郑振铎、陈垣、顾颉刚、张东荪、冯友兰……

同时,他积极推动燕京大学与一流名校交流合作,燕大与哈佛大学合作成立的哈佛燕京学社,作为一个学术项目至今仍备受推崇,被视为学术质量的保证。

司徒雷登出色的建设和经营,让燕京大学的知名度和学术水平迅速提升,短短十多年,已成为中国学术水平最高的教会大学,在80多年前,就已经跻身世界一流大学行列。

燕京大学存在了33年,注册学生不到一万人,后来成为著名学者和学科带头人的,就超过100人,其中包括中国科学院院士42人,中国工程院院士11人。燕京大学还是中国新闻学、社会学教育最早的开拓者,培养的著名校友有冰心、费孝通、侯仁之、杨绛等,后来担任外交部长的黄华,也曾是司徒雷登的学生。

作为校长,司徒雷登同情学生运动,九·一八事变后,他亲自带领数百名燕京大学师生上街游行,抗议日本对中国的侵略。1941年太平洋战争爆发,他因拒绝与日军合作,被关在集中营,直到日本投降后获释。在日本侵占华北期间,大批燕大学子从沦陷区奔赴解放区,司徒雷登亲自为他们送行。

司徒雷登后半生背上“美国在中国彻底失败的象征”的标签,源于他于1946年出任美国驻华大使。在大使任上,他曾受邀到杭州参加活动并祭扫父母亲之墓,并被授予“杭州市荣誉公民”称号。当时中国人这样评价他,“既是政客又是学者,既是狡猾的对手又是温馨的朋友”。

1949年,在决定中国命运的决战前夕,司徒雷登选择留在广州,希望充当中国内战调解者的角色,但最终因为形势剧变,不得不悄然返回美国,随即退休直至去世。

因为他在驻华大使任上的表现,“举世无仇敌”的司徒雷登成了各方眼中都不受待见的人。在中国特殊的时代背景下,因为那篇被选入中学课本的著名文章,他成了对华侵略政策代理人和声名狼藉的失败者的代名词;回到美国,他被支持国民党和奉行麦卡锡主义的当局“禁言”,还被一些人骚扰攻击,贫病交加,孤独落寞。如果不是私人秘书傅泾波一家悉心照料,晚景会更加凄凉。

1962年9月,卧病多年的司徒雷登在华盛顿病故。他最后的遗愿,就是把骨灰送回中国,葬在燕京大学校园。但由于错综复杂的原因,这一愿望一直未能实现。在早已成了北京大学校园的燕园,司徒雷登留下的建筑仍在使用,但校园里至今没有一座司徒雷登的塑像,早年安葬于此的其妻墓地,也不知所终。

在傅泾波后人持续不懈的推动下,司徒雷登的第二故乡杭州,最终接纳了他。2008年11月17日,司徒雷登先生的骨灰被安放在杭州半山安贤园。虽然这不是遵照他遗愿的最优选择,但杭州是他出生成长的第二故乡,也是他父母和弟弟的长眠之地。生于斯、葬于斯,也算完成了他叶落归根的心愿。

杭州,这个美丽包容的城市,给了司徒雷登这个中国人“熟悉的陌生人”故乡的温暖,也成就了两个大国之间超越历史的友好佳话。

About 高大伟 David Cowhig

After retirement translated, with wife Jessie, Liao Yiwu's 2019 "Bullets and Opium", and have been studying things 格物致知. Worked 25 years as a US State Department Foreign Service Officer including ten years at US Embassy Beijing and US Consulate General Chengdu and four years as a China Analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Before State I translated Japanese and Chinese scientific and technical books and articles into English freelance for six years. Before that I taught English at Tunghai University in Taiwan for three years. And before that I worked two summers on Norwegian farms, milking cows and feeding chickens.
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