The archives of declassified foreign relations documents from the United States, China and other countries can give us some insights. I’ve enjoyed reading some of the documents in Wilson Center Digital Archive and even translated some of them. When one side takes notes and passes them up the chain, what do they leave in and what do they leave out? This is a judgement call — just what is significant? After the meeting the notetaker’s note will be reviewed by the U.S. side principals who might add something to or revise the notes.
Sometimes one can get a guesstimate of what might have been going on if you compare memoranda of conversation from both sides. However, judgments about what is important and how much details is needed will vary. Sometimes there are two meetings on the same day that might be confused or perhaps the main conversation might be preceded by an informal getting-to-know you icebreaker conversation that might not be considered significant enough to leave in. Politically incorrect jokes that might be misunderstood might be omitted.
For example:
Miss Wong: If the minutes of this talk were made public, it would incur the public wrath on behalf of half the population.
Chairman Mao: That is half of the population of China.
Prime Minister Zhou: First of all, it wouldn’t pass the Foreign Ministry.
Chairman Mao: We can call this a secret meeting. (Chinese laughter) Should our meeting today be public, or kept secret?
Dr. Kissinger: It’s up to you. I am prepared to make it public if you wish.
Chairman Mao: What is your idea? Is it better to have it public or secret?
Dr. Kissinger: I think it is probably better to make it public.
Chairman Mao: Then the words we say about t women today shall be made nonexistent. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: We will remove them from the record. (Laughter) We will start studying this proposal when I get back.
Perhaps the U.S. side did not keep their promise to remove part of the conversation from the record.
In the Wilson Center Digital Archive resides February 17, 1973 Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Henry Kissinger. Looking at the large Chinese language page of the Marxism Archive on marxists.org I found a memoranda of conversation (memcon) in Chinese for the same Mao-Zhou-Kissinger meeting: 毛泽东会见基辛格博士的谈话 （1973年2月17日） [Mao Zedong’s Talk with Dr. Kissinger (February 17, 1973)] There are other PRC memoranda of conversation of Mao with our world leaders on the Marxism Archive. For example 毛泽东会见斯里兰卡总理班达拉奈克夫人谈话记录节选 （1972年6月28日）[Excerpts from the transcript of Mao Zedong’s conversation with Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike (June 28, 1972)].
The Chinese diplomatic historian Shen Zhihua discusses his Sherlock Holmes like detective work in Russian and Chinese diplomatic archives in 2010: Diplomatic Historian Shen Zhihua on Archival Work
U.S. and PRC notes from a second Mao-Kissinger meeting ten months later are compared in 1973: PRC Mao-Kissinger November 12, 1973 Memcon
More on Mao Zedong:
- An article translated from Communist Party News: 2022: Mao Zedong and the “Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Governance” 《資治通鑒》
- 2023 Miles Yu : Mao’s Other Personal Physician Fu Lianzhang
- 2006: Visiting Mao’s Hometown
- Russian Perspective: PRC Foreign Policy 1949 – 1976
Sakura Ayane 佐仓绫奈 （probably not the Japanese singer with the same name) is credited with collecting, inputting and proofreading [ 感谢 佐仓绫奈 收集、录入及校对] the text of the Mao -Zhou-Kissinger PRC memcon that presumably reached the Marxism Archive from the PRC State Archives. According to Shen Zhihua, “any citizen [of the PRC] can access and copy historical documents. On the other hand, “archival publication” involves the approval of relevant departments to hand over historical documents from archival institutions to specialized personnel for organization and editing.” Sometimes material is excised from documents destined for publication. That second part for excision of some material explains why most of the PRC diplomatic documents I found on the Marxism Archive appear to be excerpts. Some have ‘excerpt” in the title; others are lengthy but I can’t tell whether they too have had material excised. By comparing it with the U.S. side’s memorandum of conversation (memcon), I can see that considerable material was removed from the Chinese side memcon translated below.
Secretary Xi has stressed improving Marxism research and its guiding role in Chinese education so perhaps some Chinese Marxism scholars are enriching the Chinese language pages of the online Marxism Archive.
I found more memoranda of conversation of Mao Zedong with foreign leaders by using Google to search the Marxism Archive on the name of 佐仓绫奈 , the person who added the Mao-Kissinger memcon to the Marxism Archive. You can try for yourself if you like. You could use a Google Search directed at the Marxism Archive to find more: site:www.marxists.org/chinese 佐仓绫奈 收集 to find more declassified PRC diplomatic documents. Most here appear to be excerpts of segments cleared for release. Many more declassified PRC diplomatic documents can be found in books published by Shen Zhihua’s group at East China Normal University.
The PRC State Archives were more available to scholars, even foreign scholars 20 years ago; since access has been more restricted. Shen Zhihua and his group of Chinese diplomatic historians have published many documents from the PRC State Archives and the archives of some other countries including the United States and the Soviet Union and used them in their analyses of Cold War history and PRC relations with the Soviet Union, North Korea and the United States. See for example 2020: Shen Zhihua on State of Chinese Research on Relations with Neighboring Asian Countries and 2020: Zhang Baijia: Reflections on China’s Research on Frontiers and Relations with Neighboring States
Some documents from the PRC Archives have been translated and are available on the Wilson Center Digital Archive but as far as I can tell not the PRC side account of the Mao-Zhou-Kissinger conversation of February 17, 1973. There is a large section in the US side notes that are not in the Chinese memcon that we have; perhaps the memcon text we have was withheld for some reason such as Chairman Mao’s jokes.
The U.S. side and Chinese side documents do not contradict each other; not surprising especially since both sides used PRC interpreters although the US side notetaker Winston Lord was fluent in China. Each in places adds some information, often joking asides such as Chairman Mao’s joke about exporting excess women to the United States that his interpreter broke in to protest. Omissions are very few on the US memcon. I have but in italics the parts of the Chinese memcon that do not appear in the US side memcon and inserted in brackets text from the Wilson Digital Archive in bold the parts missing from the PRC side memcon.
Translation of the Chinese side memorandum of conversation (matter that does not appear in the US memcon in italics):
Mao Zedong’s Talk with Dr. Kissinger
February 17, 1973
[(US memcon): Chairman Mao (As he headed toward his chair): I don’t look bad, but God has sent me an invitation.
(To Mr. Lord) You are a young man.
Mr. Lord: I am getting older.
Chairman Mao: I am the oldest among those seated here.
Prime Minister Chou: I am the second oldest.
Chairman Mao: There was someone in the British Army who was opposed to the independence of your country. Field Marshal Montgomery was one of those to oppose your policy.]
Chairman Mao: In the past, Britain also had a lord. Opposing your Dulles was a nobleman, a military man named Bernard Montgomery, opposing your American Dulles’ policies.
Kissinger: Yes.
Chairman: He is not opposing you now, right? At that time, you opposed us, and we opposed you. We were enemies.
Kissinger: We were enemies in the past.
Chairman: Former enemies, now our relationship is called friendship [Mao said ‘friendship‘ in English].
Kissinger: That’s how we feel. I told the Premier that we have never had such frank and honest conversations with any other country as we do with you.
Chairman: Let’s not tell lies or play tricks on one another. We don’t steal your documents. You can deliberately left them out to test us. We don’t engage in wiretapping and those tricks. We don’t do big tricks or little tricks. I talked to one of your journalists, Edgar Snow. I told him that your Central Intelligence Agency is not capable, it can’t do the job.
Kissinger: That’s right. That’s our situation.
Chairman: If you issue an order saying the President needs certain information, intelligence flies in like snowflakes. We are not Song Xiang. We also have an intelligence agency, but it’s not effective. For example, with the case of Lin Biao, it didn’t warn us. For example, when you were coming, it couldn’t tell us in advance. [ (Prime Minister Chou laughs).] I read two articles. One of them said that in 1969, the director of the China Desk from your State Department went to Japan. A Japanese newspaper published an article about that.
Kissinger: I haven’t read it.
Premier Zhou We didn’t mention this article to you before.
Chairman: You are very good at your work. You fly everywhere! Are you a swallow or a pigeon? The Vietnam issue can be considered basically resolved.
Kissinger: That’s how we feel. We now need a transitional period towards peace.
Chairman: Yes.
Kissinger: The fundamental issues have been resolved.
Chairman: We also need that. Your President is sitting here (pointing to Kissinger’s seat), and because we need one another, it’s like this (joining both his hands together) hand-in-hand.
Kissinger: Both sides face the same dangers, and sometimes we have to employ different methods, but the goal is the same.
Chairman: That’s not good. As long as the goal is the same, we won’t harm you, and you won’t harm us. Together, we’ll deal with that son of a bitch! That’s the reality. Sometimes we have to criticize you, and you have to criticize us. Your President calls this “the power of ideas” and “influence.” He means, “Go to hell, Communist Party! Go to hell, communism!” And we say, “Go to hell, imperialism!” Sometimes we have to speak up; we have no choice.
Kissinger: I believe both sides should be loyal to their fundamental principles. In reality, if both sides speak the same tune, it will only confuse the situation. As I told the Prime Minister, in Europe, you can speak more firmly based on your own principles than we can.
Chairman: We hope you will cooperate with Europe and Japan. Some quarreling is acceptable, but fundamentally, you need to cooperate.
Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, from our side, although we sometimes have to criticize, we still need to coordinate our actions with you. We will never participate in any actions that attempt to isolate you. As for Japan and Europe, we agree to cooperate with them on all substantial issues, but currently, Europe’s leadership is weak.
Chairman: They lack unity.
Kissinger: They are not united, and they don’t have foresight like you do. When they face danger, they always want to make it disappear effortlessly.
Premier Zhou (to the Chairman): On helping Pompidou, he (indicating Kissinger) agrees.
Kissinger: We are trying our best to do so. After returning, we will strive to do more.
Chairman: Now Pompidou is being threatened. It’s the Socialist Party and the Communist Party joining forces against him.
Kissinger: The two parties are united.
Chairman: Both parties are united. The Soviet Union wants the Communist Party to take the stage. I don’t like that Communist Party, just like I don’t like your Communist Party. (Kissinger laughs.)
You in the West have always had a policy. The beginning of both World Wars was pushing Germany against Russia.
Kissinger: But pushing Russia to attack China is not our policy. Because if a war breaks out in China, the danger to us is as great as a war breaking out in Europe.
Chairman: That’s exactly what I wanted to say. Are you now pushing West Germany to make peace with Russia and then pushing Russia to move eastward? I suspect that the entire West has such a line. Eastward, mainly towards us, and also towards Japan, and partly towards you, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Kissinger: We don’t agree with Germany’s policy. We would rather have the opposition party in Germany come to power. The opposition party in Germany doesn’t pursue this policy.
[[Long stretch of text from US side memcon]
Chairman Mao: Yes, that’s our feeling. We are also in favor of the opposition party in Germany.
Dr. Kissinger: They conducted themselves very stupidly.
Chairman Mao: Yes, they were defeated. The whole of Europe is thinking only of peace.
Prime Minister Chou: The illusions of peace created by their leaders.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we will do our best to strengthen European defenses and keep our armies in Europe.
Chairman Mao: That would be very good.
Dr. Kissinger: We have no plan for any large reduction of our forces in Europe for the next four years (Chairman Mao turns to Prime Minister Chou).
Prime Minister Chou: In talking about reducing your troops, you mean only at the most 10 to 15 percent.
Dr. Kissinger: That is exactly correct.
Chairman Mao: What is the number of American troops in Europe? They are probably mostly rocket units.
Prime Minister Chou: There are between 300-350,000 including the Mediterranean.
Chairman Mao: That probably does not include the Navy.
Dr. Kissinger: It does not include the Navy. There are about 275,000 in Central Europe. That does not include the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Chairman Mao: And your troop deployment to Asia and the Pacific Ocean is too scattered. You have them in Korea. I heard the number is about 300,000.
Dr. Kissinger: About 40,000.
Chairman Mao: And from 8 to 9, 000 with Chiang Kai-shek.
Prime Minister Chou: In Taiwan.
Chairman Mao: Then it is said that there are two groups in Japan, 40,000 in Okinawa and 20 to 30,000 in Japan proper. I don’t know how many there are in the Philippines. Now you have remaining in Vietnam a bit over 10,000.
Dr. Kissinger: But they will all be withdrawn.
Chairman Mao: Yes, and I heard that you have 40,000 in Thailand.
Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. But all the units the Chairman mentioned are mostly air force units and therefore they probably cannot be measured by the number of personnel.
Chairman Mao: You also have ground forces, for instance, in South Korea.
Dr. Kissinger: In South Korea we have ground forces.
Chairman Mao: That was all begun by Truman and Acheson. So this time you held a memorial service for Truman and we didn’t go. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: When you have a liaison office in Washington it will be more possible in the future.
Prime Minister Chou: You’ve held all these memorial services, both for Truman and Johnson (Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou laugh).
It seems to me that your voice is hoarse today. You should have a day’s rest tomorrow. Why do you want to continue to talk so much?
Dr. Kissinger: Because it is very important that you and we understand what we are going to do and to coordinate our actions, and therefore we always tell the Prime Minister what our plans are in various areas of the world so that you can understand the individual moves when they are made.
Chairman Mao: Yes. When you pass through Japan, you should perhaps talk a bit more with them. You only talked with them for one day and that isn’t very good for their face.
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, we wanted this trip’s emphasis to be on the talks in Peking, and I will take a separate trip to Tokyo.
Chairman Mao: Good. And also make clear to them.
You know the Japanese feelings towards the Soviet Union are not so very good.
Dr. Kissinger: They are very ambivalent.
Chairman Mao: (Gesturing with his hand) In a word, during the Second World War, Prime Minister Tanaka told our Premier, what the Soviet Union did was that upon seeing a per son about to hang himself, they immediately took the chair from under his feet.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Chairman Mao: It could be said that they didn’t fire a single shot and yet they were able to grab so many places (Prime Minister Chou chuckles). They grabbed the People’s Republic of Mongolia. They grabbed half of Sinkiang. It was called a sphere of influence. And Manchuko, on the northeast, was also called their sphere of influence.
Dr. Kissinger: And they took all the industry out of it.
Chairman Mao: Yes. And they grabbed also the islands of Sakhalin and the Kuriles Island. (Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou discuss among themselves.) Sakhalin is the southern part of the Kuriles Island. I will look it up in the dictionary to see what its Chinese translation is.
Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese are tempted by the economic possibilities in Russia.
Chairman Mao: (Nodding yes) They want to grab something there.
Dr. Kissinger: But we will encourage closer ties between Japan and ourselves, and also we welcome their relationship with the People’s Republic.
Chairman Mao: We also believe that rather than Japan having closer relations with the Soviet Union, we would rather that they would better their relations with you. That would be better.
Dr. Kissinger: It would be very dangerous if Japan and the Soviet Union formed closer political relations.
Chairman Mao: That doesn’t seem likely.
Prime Minister Chou: The prospects are not too good.
Chairman Mao: We can also do some work there.
Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union has made overtures but the Japanese have not responded. They have invited Ohira to go to Moscow.
Prime Minister Chou: Yes, this year, the second half.
Dr. Kissinger: This year.
Prime Minister Chou: And it seems on this question that Ohira has a clearer idea of the Soviet Union than others. But there are some not so clear in their understanding as their Foreign Minister.
Dr. Kissinger: That is correct.
Prime Minister Chou: That is also the bureaucracy as you term it.
Dr. Kissinger: We are prepared to exchange information with you on these matters.
Prime Minister Chou: (To Chairman Mao) We have decided besides establishing a liaison office in each capital to maintain the contact between Huang Hua and the White House.
Chairman Mao: (To Prime Minister Chou) Where is the stress?
Prime Minister Chou: The liaison office will handle the general public exchanges. For confidential and urgent matters not covered by the liaison office we will use the channel of Ambassador Huang Hua.
Chairman Mao: Huang Hua has met an ill fate (Prime Minister Chou laughs). He was doing very well in your place and immediately upon his return to Shanghai, he twisted his back.
Dr. Kissinger: We will find a doctor for him when he returns.
Chairman Mao: Yes. (Prime Minister Chou laughs). He seemed more safe in your place. Immediately upon his return to Shanghai he collapsed.
From the atmosphere with which your President received our acrobatic troupe, I thought that the Vietnamese issue was going to be settled.
There were some rumors that said that you were about to collapse (laughter). And the women folk seated here were all dissatisfied with that (laughter, especially pronounced among the women). They said if the Doctor is going to collapse, we would be out of work.
Dr. Kissinger: Not only in China.
Chairman Mao: Yes, and the whole line would collapse like dominos.
Dr. Kissinger: Those were just journalists’ speculation.
Chairman Mao: Only speculation?
Dr. Kissinger: Only speculation.
Chairman Mao: No ground whatsoever?
Dr. Kissinger: No ground whatsoever. In fact the opposite was true. We have now been able to place our men into all key positions.
Chairman Mao: (Nodding yes) Your President is now saying that you are propsoing something as if you were moving the Great Wall from China to the United States, that is, trade barriers.
Dr. Kissinger: What we want to do is lower barriers.
Chairman Mao: To lower them? Then you were doing that just to frighten people. You are saying that you are going to raise tariffs and non-tariff barriers and maybe you do that to intimidate Europe and Japan.
Dr. Kissinger: Partly. We are proposing a trade bill which gives both the power to raise and lower barriers, in order to get it passed through Congress. We must create the impression that we might increase barriers. We want executive authority to do it without Congressional approval, but if we ask Congress to reduce barriers they would refuse. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) And this is why we are asking for executive authority to move in either direction.
Chairman Mao: What if they don’t give it to you?
Dr. Kissinger: We think they will give it to us. It will be a difficult battle, but we are quite certain we will win. We are proposing it also in such general language that we can remove discrimination that still exists towards the People’s Republic.
Chairman Mao: The trade between our two countries at present is very pitiful. It is gradually increasing. You know China is a very poor country. We don‘t have much. What we have in excess is women. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: There are no quotas for those or tariffs.
Chairman Mao: So if you want them we can give a few of those to you, some tens of thousands. (Laughter)
Prime Minister Chou: Of course, on a voluntary basis.
Chairman Mao: Let them go to your place. They will create disasters. That way you can lessen our burdens. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: Our interest in trade with China is not commercial. It is to establish a relationship that is necessary for the political relations we both have.
Chairman Mao: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: That is the spirit with which we are conducting our discussions.
Chairman Mao: I once had a discussion with a foreign friend. (The interpreters hold a discussion with Chairman Mao.) I said that we should draw a horizontal line – the U.S. – Japan – Pakistan – Iran (Chairman Mao coughs badly.) – Turkey and Europe.
Dr. Kissinger: We have a very similar conception. You may have read in a newspaper that Mr. Helms has been moved to Iran, and there was a great deal of speculation how this affected my position. In fact we sent Helms to Iran to take care of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, because of his experience in his previous position and we needed a reliable man in that spot who understands the more complex matters that are needed to be done. (Chairman Mao lights his cigar again.) We will give him authority to deal with all of these countries, although this will not be publicly announced.
Chairman Mao: As for such matters we do not understand very much your affairs in the United States. There are a lot of things we don’t know very well. For example, your domestic affairs, we don’t understand them. There are also many things about foreign policy that we don’t understand either. Perhaps in your future four years we might be able to learn a bit.]
(Resume Chinese side memcon)
Chairman: I once told a foreign friend that I want to draw a line, a latitude line: the United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Europe.
Kissinger: Our ideas are very similar. You may have seen from the newspapers that I sent Richard Helms to Iran, which caused a lot of speculation about how my position was affected. In fact, we sent Helms to Iran because we want a capable person to handle the region of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf. Given Helms’ past experience, he is a suitable person. We need a reliable person who understands what complex issues need to be dealt with in this region. So, I gave him the authority to deal with all the countries in this region, but this matter will not be made public.
Chairman: In the past, we didn’t understand these things well, nor did we understand the affairs of the United States. We didn’t understand your internal affairs and many aspects of your diplomacy. Maybe in these four years, we can learn some. Do you still have four years?
Kissinger: I have told the Premier that your way of action is more straightforward and courageous than ours. Sometimes we have to adopt complex methods due to the domestic situation.
Chairman: What is the English term for 行动方式 “way of action”?
Interpreter: Mode of action.
Kissinger: Regardless of public opinion, we will be decisive in our basic goals. If the intention to dominate becomes active, then the real danger will develop. Wherever there is such an intention, we will surely counterbalance it. The President once told the Chairman that we do this for our own interests, not to show goodwill to others.
Chairman: What you said is honest.
Kissinger: That’s our position.
Chairman: The Chinese people are quite xenophobic [排外得很]. You can accommodate many ethnic groups. We don’t have many foreigners in China. You have many different ethnic groups. You have 600,000 Chinese in the United States, but we probably don’t even have 60 Americans. I don’t know why.
[Miss Tang: Mr. Lord’s wife is Chinese.
Chairman Mao: Oh?
Mr. Lord: Yes.]
You could study the issue. We have never liked foreigners, including the Japanese, very few, not even one Indian.
Kissinger: That’s because historically you have had unfortunate dealings with foreigners.
Chairman: There’s something to that. Probably in the past 100 years, it was mainly the Eight-Nation Alliance, and later the Japanese occupied China for 13 years, occupying a large part of the territory. Not only did they occupy Chinese territory in the past, but they also demanded compensation for occupying Beijing.
Kissinger: And there was extraterritoriality.
Chairman: Extraterritoriality, indeed! Now we don’t want Japan to pay us compensate. It’s impossible to calculate, no one can figure it out. They could never afford to pay it.
Premier Zhou: If we demand compensation, it would increase the burden on the [Japanese] people.
[Chinese memcon ends; still more in the US side memcon]
And only in this way can we move from hostility to relaxation in relations between peoples. And it will be more difficult to settle relations of hostility between the Japanese and Chinese peoples than between us and you.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. There is no feeling of hostility of American people at all toward the Chinese people. On the contrary. Between us right now there is only essentially a juridical problem. (Chairman Mao nods agreement.) Which we will solve in the next years. But there is a strong community of interest which is operating immediately.
Chairman Mao: Is that so?
Dr. Kissinger: Between China and the U.S.
Chairman Mao: What do you mean by community of interest? On Taiwan?
Dr. Kissinger: In relation to other countries that may have intentions.
Prime Minister Chou: You mean the Soviet Union?
Dr. Kissinger: I mean the Soviet Union.
Prime Minister Chou: Miss Shen understood you.
Chairman Mao: (Looking toward Miss Shen.) The Chinese have a good command of English. (To Prime Minister Chou.) Who is she?
Prime Minister Zhou: Miss Shen Jo-yun.
Chairman Mao: Women. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) Today I have been uttering some nonsense for which I will have to beg the pardon of the women of China.
Dr. Kissinger: It sounded very attractive to the Americans present. (Chairman Mao and the girls laugh.)
Chairman Mao: If we are going to establish a liaison office in your country do you want Miss Shen or Miss Tang?
Dr. Kissinger: We will deal with that through the channel of Huang Hua. (Laughter)
Chairman Mao: Our interpreters are truly too few.
Dr. Kissinger: But they have done a remarkable job, the interpreters we have met.
Chairman Mao: The interpreters you have met and our present interpreters who are doing most of the work are now in their twenties and thirties. If they grow too old they don’t do interpretation so well.
Prime Minister Chou: We should send some abroad.
Chairman Mao: We will send children at such a height (indicating with his hands), not too old.
Dr. Kissinger: We will be prepared to establish exchange programs where you can send students to America.
Chairman Mao: And if among a hundred persons there are ten who are successful learning the language well, then that would be a remarkable success. And if among them a few dozens don’t want to come back, for example, some girls who want to stay in the United States, no matter. Because you do not exclude foreigners like Chinese. In the past the Chinese went abroad and they didn’t want to learn the local language. (Looking toward Miss Tang) Her grandparents refused to learn English. They are so obstinate. You know Chinese are very obstinate and conservative. Many of the older generation overseas Chinese don’t speak the local language. But they are getting better, the younger generation.
Dr. Kissinger: In America, all, or the vast majority, speak English.
Prime Minister Chou: That is the younger people. The first generation ones don’t learn the local language. There was an old overseas Chinese who came back to China after living abroad. She was old and died in Peking in the 1950s when she was in her nineties. She was a member of our People’s Government. She didn’t speak a word of English. She was Cantonese, extremely conservative.
Dr. Kissinger: Chinese culture is so particular that it is difficult to assimilate other cultures.
Chairman Mao: Chinese language is not bad, but the Chinese characters are not good,
Prime Minister Chou: They are very difficult to learn.
Chairman Mao: And there are many contradictions between the oral and written language because the oral language is monosyllabic while the written language develops from symbols. We do not use the alphabet.
Dr. Kissinger: There are some attempts to use an alphabet I am told.
Prime Minister Chou: First we must standardize the oral language.
Chairman Mao: (Gestures with his hand and points to his books.) But if the Soviet Union would throw its bombs and kill all those over 30 who are Chinese, that would solve the problem for us. Because the old people like me can’t learn Chinese. We read Chinese. The majority of my books are Chinese. There are very few dictionaries over there. All the other books are in Chinese.
Dr. Kissinger: Is the Chairman learning English now?
Chairman Mao: I have heard that I am studying it. Those are rumors on the outside. l don’t heed them. They are false. I know a few English letters. I don’t know the grammar.
Miss Tang: The Chairman invented an English word.
Chairman Mao: Yes, l invented the English term “paper tiger.”
Dr. Kissinger: “Paper tiger.” Yes, that was all about us. (Laughter)
Chairman Mao: But you are a German from Germany. But your Germany now has met with an ill fate, because in two wars it has been defeated.
Dr. Kissinger: It attempted too much, beyond its abilities and resources.
Chairman Mao: Yes, and it also scattered its forces in war. For example, in its attack against the Soviet Union. If it is going to attack, it should attack in one place, but they separated their troops into three routes. It began in June but then by the winter they couldn’t stand it because it was too cold. What is the reason for the Europeans fear of the cold?
Dr. Kissinger: The Germans were not prepared for a long war. Actually they did not mobilize their whole forces until 1943. l agree with the Chairman that if they had concentrated on one front they would almost certainly have won. They were only ten kilometers from Moscow even by dispersing their forces. (Chairman Mao relights his cigar.)
Chairman Mao: They shouldn’t have attacked Moscow or Kiev. They should have taken Leningrad as a first step. Another error in policy was they didn’t cross the sea after Dunkirk.
Dr. Kissinger: After Dunkirk.
Chairman Mao: They were entirely unprepared.
Dr. Kissinger: And Hitler was a romantic. He had a strange liking for England.
Chairman Mao: Oh? Then why didn’t they go there? Because the British at that time were completely without troops.
Dr. Kissinger: If they were able to cross the channel into Britain… I think they had only one division in all of England.
Prime Minister Chou: Is that so?
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Prime Minister Chou: Also Sir Anthony Eden told us in Germany at that time that a Minister in the Army of Churchill’s Government said at that time if Hilter had crossed the channel they would have had no forces. They had withdrawn all their forces back. When they were preparing for the German crossing, Churchill had no arms. He could only organize police to defend the coast. If they crossed they would not be able to defend.
Dr. Kissinger: It also shows what a courageous man can do because Churchill created by his personality much more strength than they possessed.
Chairman Mao: Actually by that time they couldn’t hold.
Prime Minister Chou: So Hilter carried some romantic feelings about Britain?
Dr. Kissinger: I think he was a maniac, but he did have some feelings about Britain.
Chairman Mao: I believe Hitler was from the Rhine area?
Dr. Kissinger: Austria.
Prime Minister Chou: He was a soldier in the First World War.
Dr. Kissinger: He was in the Germany Army, but he was a native of Austria.
Prime Minister Chou: From the Danube.
Dr. Kissinger: He conducted strategy artistically rather than strategically. He did it by intuition. He had no overall plan.
Chairman Mao: Then why did the German troops heed him so much?
Dr. Kissinger: Probably because the Germans are somewhat romantic people and because he must have had a very strong personality.
Chairman Mao: Mainly because during the First World War the German nation was humiliated.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that was a very important factor.
Chairman Mao: If there are Russians going to attack China, I can tell you today that our way of conducting a war will be guerrilla war and protracted war. We will let them go wherever they want. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.) They want to come to the Yellow River tributaries. That would be good, very good. (Laughter.) And if they go further to the Yangtse River tributaries, that would not be bad either.
Dr. Kissinger: But if they use bombs and do not send armies? (Laughter)
Chairman Mao: What should we do? Perhaps you can organize a committee to study the problem. We’ll let them beat us up and they will lose any resources. They say they are socialists. We are also socialists and that will be socialists attacking socialists.
Dr. Kissinger: If they attack China, we would certainly oppose them for our own reasons.
Chairman Mao: But your people are not awakened, and Europe and you would think that it would be a fine thing if it were that the ill water would flow toward China.
Dr. Kissinger: What Europe thinks I am not able to judge. They cannot do anything anyway. They are basically irrelevant. (In the midst of this Chairman Mao toasts Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord with tea.) What we think is that if the Soviet Union overruns China, this would dislocate the security of all other countries and will lead to our own isolation.
Chairman Mao: (Laughing) How will that happen? How would that be? Because since in being bogged down in Vietnam you met so many difficulties, do you think they would feel good if they were bogged down in China?
Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union?
Miss Tang: The Soviet Union.
Chairman Mao: And then you can let them get bogged down in China, for half a year, or one, or two, or three, or four years. And then you can poke your finger at the Soviet back. And your slogan then will be for peace, that is you must bring down Socialist imperialism for the sake of peace. And perhaps you can begin to help them in doing business, saying whatever you need we will help against China.
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, it is really very important that we understand each other’s motives. We will never knowingly cooperate in an attack on China.
Chairman Mao: (Interrupting) No, that’s not so. Your aim in doing that would be to bring the Soviet Union down.
Dr. Kissinger: That’s a very dangerous thing. (Laughter)
Chairman Mao: (Using both hands for gestures) The goal of the Soviet Union is to occupy both Europe and Asia, the two continents.
Dr. Kissinger: We want to discourage a Soviet attack, not defeat it.
We want to prevent it. (Prime Minister Chou looks at his watch. )
Chairman Mao: As for things, matters, in the world, it is hard to say. We would rather think about things this way. We think this way the world would be better.
Dr. Kissinger: Which way?
Chairman Mao: That is that they would attack China and be defeated. We must think of the worst eventuality.
Dr. Kissinger: That is your necessity. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)
Chairman Mao: We have so many women in our country that don’t know how to fight.
Miss Tang: Not necessarily. There are women’s detachments.
Chairman Mao: They are only on stage. In reality if there is a fight you would flee very quickly and run into underground shelters.
Miss Wong: If the minutes of this talk were made public, it would incur the public wrath on behalf of half the population.
Chairman Mao: That is half of the population of China.
Prime Minister Chou: First of all, it wouldn’t pass the Foreign Ministry.
Chairman Mao: We can call this a secret meeting. (Chinese laughter) Should our meeting today be public, or kept secret?
Dr. Kissinger: It’s up to you. I am prepared to make it public if you wish.
Chairman Mao: What is your idea? Is it better to have it public or secret?
Dr. Kissinger: I think it is probably better to make it public.
Chairman Mao: Then the words we say about t women today shall be made nonexistent. (Laughter)
Dr. Kissinger: We will remove them from the record. (Laughter) We will start studying this proposal when I get back.
Chairman Mao: You know, the Chnese have a scheme to harm the United States, that is, to send ten million women to the United States and impair its interests by increasing its population.
Dr. Kissinger: The Chairman has fixed the idea so much in my mind that I’ll certainly use it at my next press conference. (Laughter)
Chairman Mao: That would be all right with me. I’m not afraid of anything. Anyway, God has sent me an invitation.
Dr. Kissinger: I really find the Chairman in better health this year than last year.
Chairman Mao: Yes, I am better than last year.
[The photographers entered the room.]
They are attacking us. (The Chairman then gets up without assistance to say goodbye to the Americans.)
Please give my warm regards to President Nixon. Also to Mrs. Nixon. I was not able to meet her and Secretary Rogers. I must apologize.
Dr. Kissinger: I will certainly do that.
Prime Minister Chou: We will send you a press release in one hour.
(Chairman Mao escorts Dr. Kissinger into the outer room where he says goodbye to Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord. Prime Minister Chou then escorts Dr. Kissinger to his waiting car. )]
PRC side memcon, likely an excerpt since considerable material in the US memcon is omitted.
（1973年2月17日）
主席：从前英国也有一个lord（勋爵）。反对你们杜勒斯的，是一个老爷，陆军，叫蒙哥马利，反对你们美国杜勒斯的政策。
基：对。
主席：他现在不反对你们了吧。那个时候，你们也反对我们，我们也反对你们，咱们两家是仇人啊。
基：是以前的仇人。
主席：以前的仇人，现在我们的关系说是叫做什么friendship（友谊）。
基：我们方面的感情是这样。我告诉过总理，我们同别的国家从未像同你们这样开诚布公和诚实地谈话。
主席：不要讲假话，不要搞鬼。你的文件我们是不偷的。你故意放到那里试试看嘛。我们也不搞窃听器那一套，搞那些小动作没有，有些大动作也没有。我跟你们的一个记者Edgar Snow（埃德迦·斯诺）谈过，我说你们的中央情报局大事也不行，不管用。
基：说得很对。我们的情况就是如此。
主席：有你下了命令，说总统要什么问题的材料，就有情报像雪片一样飞来。我们也不是宋翔，我们也有一个情报局，就是不灵。比如林彪的事，它就不知道。比如你要来，它也不敌。我看了两篇文章。其中一篇说，1969年你们国务院一个中国科科长到日本去了。这篇文章在日本报纸上发表了。
基：我好像没有读到过。
总理：我们过去没跟你提过这篇文章。
主席：你的事情干得好，到处飞。你是燕子，还是鸽子？越南问题可以算是基本解决了。
基：我们感觉是这样，我们现在需要一个走向平静的过渡时期。
主席：对。
基：基本问题已经解决了。
主席：我们也需要嘛。你们的总统坐在这里讲的（手指基的座位），我们两家出于需要，所以就这样，（把两只手握在一起）hand-in-hand（手携手）。
基：我们双方都面临同样的危险，我们可能有时不得不运用不同的方法，但目标相同。
主席：这不好。只要目标相同，我们也不损害你们，你们也不损害我们，共同对付一个王八蛋！实际上是这样。有时候我们也要批你们一回，你们也要批我们一回。你们总统说是叫“思想力量”的“影响”。就是说，“共产党去你的吧！共产主义去你的吧！”我们就说，“帝国主义去你的吧！”有时我们也要讲点呢，不讲不行呢。
基：我认为我们双方应该忠于各自的基本原则，实际上如果双方讲同样一个调子，只会使局势混乱。我对总理说过，在欧洲，你们出于自己的原则，可以讲得比我们更坚定。
主席：我们希望你们跟欧洲、跟日本合作。有些事情吵吵闹闹可以，但是根本上要合作啊。
基：主席先生，从我们这方面说，你们和我们之间虽然有时要进行批评，但我们仍要同你们协调行动。我们在任何时候都不会参与企图孤立你们的行动。至于日本和欧洲，我们同意在一切实质问题上要同他们合作，但目前欧洲的领导很弱。
主席：他们不团结。
基：不团结，而且不像你们那样有远见。当他们面临危险的时候，他们总想不费力气就使危险消失。
总理（对主席）：帮助蓬皮杜，他（指基）同意。
基：我们正在尽量这样做，回去后我们要争取做得更多。
主席：现在蓬皮杜受到威胁，就是那个社会党和共产党联合起来顶他。
基：两家联合。
主席：两家联合，苏联想要共产党登台。那个共产党我不喜欢，就像你们的共产党我也不喜欢一样。我喜欢你们，不喜欢你们的共产党。（基笑）
你们西方历来有条政策，两次世界大战开始都是推动德国失俄国。
基：但是，推动俄国打中国不是我们的政策。因为如果在中国爆发战争，对我们来说，其危险性和在欧洲爆发战争一样。
主席：我正是要讲这句话：是不是你们现在是推动西德跟俄国讲和，然后又推俄国向东进。我怀疑整个西方有这么一条路线。向东，主要向我们，而且向日本，也有一部分向你们，在太平洋和印度洋。
基：我们并不赞成德国的政策。我们宁愿德国的反对党上台，德国的反对党不奉行这个政策。
主席：我跟一个外国朋友说过，我说要搞一条横线，就是纬度，美国、日本、中国、巴基斯坦、伊朗、土耳其、欧洲。
基：我们的观念十分相似。你们可能已从报纸上看到，我派赫尔姆斯到伊朗去，引起了许多猜测，说什么我的地位如何受到了影响。实际上我们派赫尔姆斯去伊朗，是因为我们想要一个有才干的人管土耳其、伊朗、巴基斯坦、波斯湾这个地区。而鉴于赫尔姆斯过去的经历，他是一个合适的人。我们需要有一个可靠的、能理解需要处理些什么复杂问题的人在这个地区工作。所以，我给他权力同所有这个地区的国家打交道，但这件事不会公布。
主席：这些我们过去不大懂，对你们美国的事都不大懂，内政什么东西不懂，外交也有很多不懂。大概你们这4年，我们可以学懂一些。你们还有4年嘛。
基：我曾告诉过总理，你们的行动方式要比我们直裁了当和英勇一些。我们有时要采用复杂的方法，这是由于国内的形势所造成的。
主席：英文什么叫做行动方式啊？
译员：mode of action（行动方式）。
基：不管公众舆论如何，我们对基本目标会有决断的。如果称霸的意图活跃起来，那么真正的危险会发展。不管哪里有这种意图，我们肯定都将予以抗衡。总统曾对主席说过，我们这样做是为了我们本身的利益，而不是为了对别的任何人表示善意。
主席：你说的这个是老实话。
基：这是我们的立场。
主席：中国人排外得很。你们可以容纳很多民族。我们中国没有几个外国人。你们不同的民族有多少，你们美国有60万中国人，而我们恐怕连60个美国人都没有，我也不知道是什么道理，你们研究一下吧。从来就不喜欢外国人，包括日本人也很少，印度人一个都没有。
基：这是因为历史上你们同外国人打交道不幸运。
主席：有这么点理由。恐怕过去100年，主要是八国联军，后来日本人占领中国13年，占领大部分领土。他们过去占领中国领土不算，占领了北京还要赔偿。
基：还有治外法权。
主席：治外法权，多哩！现在我们对日本，不要它赔偿。没法算，谁也算不清。赔不起。
总理：一赔就要增加人民负担。
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