Chinese Scholars Discuss Chinese Maritime Security Vulnerabilities and How China Might Reduce Them

Du Debin, editor of the Chinese geographic and geostrategy journal World Regional Studies, and his co-authors in the June 2015 issue of World Regional Studies published an examination of China’s maritime security vulnerabilities and how China can reduce them.  The article is online at

Nothing very surprising, but a nice, clear discussion of China’s geographic constraints by a Chinese professional geographer and a flavor of current Chinese domestic discourse on this issue.

Copied below is a summary translation of “Research on China’s Maritime Transportation Security and Thoughts on Its Protection” .  The Chinese original text is also attached.  World Regional Studies claims that its audience includes officials at the Chinese Foreign Ministry and other central government organizations.

The authors focus on Chinese maritime security vulnerabilities, noting that currently the US and its allies have a global and robust capability to disrupt Chinese maritime commerce and with it China’s national economy.  The authors propose that China reduce tensions and build trust through expanded cooperation with the US and the countries along its sea routes and more active participate in maritime organizations.  They authors also stress that China needs, over the longer term, to build up its navy so that China will be able to deter interference with its shipping by foreign powers.

World Regional Studies June 2015     Vol 24 No. 2

Research on China’s Maritime Transportation Security and Thoughts on Its Protection

Tu Debin (Huadong Normal University), Ma Liya (Huadong Normal University), Fan Bei (Shanghai Normal University), and Hui Caixing (Wuhan University)


杜德斌,马亚华,等. 中国海上通道安全及保障思路研究[J].世界地理研究,2015,24(2):1-10

DU D B, MA Y H, China’s maritime transportation security and its measures of safeguard [J].

World Regional Studies, 2015,24(2):1-10

[Translation of article summary]:   Since China’s reform and opening began, and especially since its entry into the WTO, China’s supply of raw materials and the marketing of China’s manufactured goods has been closely tied to foreign countries and China’s maritime  transportation.  Owing to the very large scale of China’s maritime trade and its concentration in several areas of the world and the closed or semi-closed nature of some seas, China’s maritime security concerns in areas such as the Malacca Strait are much greater than other countries.  China has not yet built a maritime security system that matches China’s economic strength and its present needs.  Therefore China’s overseas supply chain faces many security threats that could damage China’s national economy.  Strategic threat come principally from the US, Japan and India.  Among these, the US is the only that that through its global system of alliances could close down the sea lanes and paralyze the Chinese transportation system.  Therefore, based on an analysis of China’s maritime security situation and of China’s strategic assets, this article proposes “through co-operation reduce threats and through deterrence guarantee security”.  Therefore, we propose, centered on the construction of a “new kind of great power relationship between China and the US”, to strongly promote strategic and in various practical matters cooperation with the US, Russia, and countries along the sea lanes, as well as make preventive strategic deployments along the South China Sea in order to increase Chinese deterrence and so protect the security of China’s maritime transportation.

[Summary translation of article follows]

  1. The Position and Function of Maritime Transportation in China’s Social and Economic Development
  • The Chinese Economy is Severely Dependent Upon Foreign Trade


The Chinese economy is strongly oriented to the outside world, with a very high volume of both imports and exports, ninety percent of which are transported by sea.

In the decades since China’s opening and reform, and particularly in the ten-odd years since China’s WTO entry,  foreign markets and foreign trade have become an ever more important to the Chinese economy.  In 2014, China exports were US $ 2.3427 trillion and imports amounted to US$ 1.9603 trillion – respectively 240 and 183 times the 1978 totals.  Although it has declined somewhat from 2006, the dependence of the Chinese economy on foreign trade is about 50% — higher than other large countries such as the US, Japan and  India.  China is the world’s largest importer of strategic resources such as iron ore, coal and food and the second largest importer of oil.  China is 60% dependent on oil imports.  China imports 71% of the world trade in iron ore, 25% of the coal, 28% of the food and 14% of the crude oil.  In China, 200 million people are directly or indirectly employed as a result of China’s foreign trade or about one-quarter of China’s labor force.

  • China’s Foreign Trade is Severely Dependent Upon Maritime Transportation

Ever since 2000, China’s trade freight volume has been increasing at a 15% annual pace, reaching 3.52 billion tons in 2014. Ninety-five percent of this is shipped by sea. Broken down by commodity,  the proportion shipped by sea are crude oil 94%, food imports 92%, coal imports 91%, iron ore imports 98%, traditional large products 86%,  and machinery and electrical products 73%.  China’s maritime trade consumes about 1/3 of the total world maritime shipping capacity.   About half of China’s maritime trade goes by a southern route Southeast Asia; a western route past SE Asia and on onwards to the Middle East, West Africa or Europe.   Twenty-five percent goes eastwards across the Pacific to North America and Latin America. By value the picture is different: 50% on the eastern route, 34% on the western and 10% on the southern route. The western route has the most strategic importance: by value it transports 80% of China’s crude oil imports, 64% of its natural gas imports, 22% of its iron ore imports, and 50% of its manganese ore imports.

1.3  China’s Maritime Transportation is Severely Dependent Upon a Few Maritime Passages

China is highly dependent on shipping through a few sea routes that pass through narrow straits such as the Malacca Strait, Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandab and the Suez Canal. Access to s to Australia and Southeast Asia rely heavily on transport of goods through the Bashi Channel, the Strait of Sunda and Lombok Strait.  Chinese routes to Japan and the United States pass near the Okinawa island chain.  Shipments to the east coast of North America pass through the Panama Canal.

PRC shipping routes

China’s Maritime Trade Routes and Passages (circles)

As China’s imports of raw materials continue to rise and these supplies for China are concentrated in ever fewer areas, the problem of China’s trade passing through choke points is becoming more acute.  Eighty percent of China’s oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait.

  1. Challenges and Threats to China’s Maritime Security

China has not yet created strategic resources to match the size of its economy and its present needs.   China is seriously short of capacity to ensure the security of Chinese shipping, particularly lacking in the ability to assert strategic control of its oil shipping route through the Indian Ocean.  This means that China’s overseas supply chain has long been exposed to security threats and in particular strategic threats from western countries.  This is a potential threat to the smooth running of the Chinese national economy and a strategic weakness that cannot be ignored.

US bases and key Chinese maritime passages

US Military Bases Worldwide and Key Maritime passages (circles)

2.1 Most of the World’s Sea Routes are Under US Control

The world’s sea lanes are largely under US control.  In 1986, before the end of the Cold War, the US announced that it in a war it would control 16 strategic choke points around the world.   In 1998, the US clarified its position, saying that the Malacca Strait and other energy shipping lanes are an interest of the US and that the US military will have full control of all the strategic passages, straits and waters of the Indian Ocean (9).   In the 21st century, by starting the Afghanistan War, the US linked up its western and eastern strategic areas by linking them in South Asia.  This completed the first ever strategic encirclement of the Eurasian landmass. The US has 374 military bases in 140 countries and regions at which are stationed 300,000 military personnel.  Using these resources, the US can control all the strategic nodes and passageways on the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans.

2.2  The US Intent to Block China’s Maritime Routes is Getting Clearer

 During the Cold War, the US and its allies were capable of sealing off  China’s maritime routes to the south and west and so constrained China’s strategic space.  During the first decade of the 21st century, China rapidly integrated into the world economic system, grew rapidly.  The global balance of power shifted towards the developing countries of the Asia-Pacific region.  Owing to this change as well as differences in values and ideology, the US increased its capacity to repress China and the sea became an important part of the global competition between the US and China.

In 2009,  the Obama Administration announced its “Rebalancing to Asia” policy and planned to deploy 60% of US nuclear submarines and half of its aircraft carriers to the Asia-Pacific region and made plans with Japan and certain Asian countries for a “C-shaped strategic encirclement of China” using the first and second offshore island chains.  Over the past five years, successfully taking advantage of the anxiety China’s neighbors feel about China, the US strengthened its military alliance with Japan and improved its military ties with countries such as Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia creating a multi-level, offshore attack posture of great depth.  To meet the needs of the US return to Asia, the US government in 2010 enunciated the integrated air-sea battle theory and proposed working together with Asia-Pacific allies to create an integrated strategic space that would include air, sea and outer space elements so that they could destroy a “regional opponent”  (China) ‘s strategic capability to intervene.

In the future, the western Pacific will be the region which will have the most US forces stationed, the most advanced armaments and the strongest control of the air. The response speed of US bases will increase and China’s problem of security its nearby sea lanes will become more complicated.  They are by nature placed in a position in which they could threaten China’s sea lanes. The two countries have increased their maritime security cooperation and overall strategic cooperation with the US and have established a strategic control of the seas strategy devised chiefly to constrain China.  They continually increase their interest in disputes over rights and their control over the neighboring seas. This has compressed the sphere of China’s maritime interests and reduced its strategic depth.

2.3 The Big Countries Neighboring China Have Been Creating Their Maritime Strategies

 In Asia, Japan and India have significant operational capacity.  They are in similar locations and have overlapping strategic spaces so they both have a strategic intent to exclude China.  The two countries stand astride the strategic corridor from China to the Pacific and Indian oceans respectively.

The primary goal of Japan’s maritime security strategy, founded on the US – Japan alliance, is to ensure Japan’s rights in the neighboring seas and to secure Japan’s long distance sea lanes.  Japan and China have similar concerns about maritime security and its sea lanes are largely the same as China’s.  Thus there is great scope for cooperation.  However, because of the US-Japan alliance and because of its territorial dispute with China, Japan in maritime matters looks at China as a power that needs to be defended against and not a potential partner for cooperation.  After the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995, Japan adjusted the mission of its Maritime Security force, expanding their scope of operations to distant sea lane protection.  Japan is a two-fold threat to China: first as an ally of the US which uses Okinawa and other coral islands as the base for an anti-submarine and monitoring network which can monitor and if necessary block Chinese access to the Pacific Ocean.  As a country that has now extended its maritime patrols along sea lanes towards the Indian Ocean and could use the Strait of Malacca, Japan could also stop Chinese shipping going south or west.

India’s maritime strategy is very simple that it to be the predominant maritime power in the Indian Ocean.  India sees the entire Indian Ocean as its strategic backyard and wants to control the sea lanes from East Africa to Malaysia.  From the 1990s, India as based forces in the Andaman and Nicobar islands so that it can control the passage from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean.  For a long time, India has seen China as an obstacle to expanding its influence in South Asia and deliberately ignores China’s interests in the region.  As both the US and China increase their presence in the Indian Ocean, India decided to “cooperate with the US to stop China”.

2.4  Instability in the Regions Along China’s Sea Routes is Getting Worse

 China’s long-distance sea routes pass by many unstable areas which had become more unstable after the end of the Cold War and the 2008 financial crisis. In Southeast Asia, the US continually talks up the China threat and has encouraged the Philippines and some small ASEAN countries to dispute China’s maritime rights.  As a result, China’s doorway to the southern seas would be in danger if a war should break out.  In Northeast Asia, the US stresses the Korean issue and disputes between China and Japan are increasing tensions in the region.  This puts pressure on the sea lanes near the Korean strait and the Okinawan islands.

2.5  Many Kinds of Non-Traditional Threats are Becoming More Serious

 China maritime security faces formidable non-traditional as well as traditional security threats.  According to the International Maritime Organization, there are over 1000 incidents of piracy, seventy percent of which occur in Asia.  In recent years, the number of pirate and seaborne terror attacks against Chinese shipping has been increasing, make China one of the world’s biggest victims of piracy.  Although for now the West is the main target of terrorist, this may change – terrorists may choose China as a terror target.  Considering that traditional security threats are not diminishing, the increase in piracy and seaborne terrorism means that the threat to the security of China’s sea lanes is becoming more serious.

  1. Thoughts on Protecting China’s Maritime Security

China’s maritime security problem is the result of the rapid increase in China’s overseas interests and its challenge to the current configuration of international maritime security interests. The Somalia pirates and other seaborne terrorists generally come from small countries and are not big enough to seriously perturb China’s maritime transport security.  China’s maritime strategic threat comes from the US, Japan and India.  Of these three countries, the US is the only country that could use the power of its global alliances to close off the principal sea lanes and so paralyze the Chinese transportation system.   China still lags far behind the US in both hard and soft power.  However, China has a culture of deep strategic thinking and rapidly developing national strength.  Over the short term, its strategy is in important areas of the Pacific Ocean and in the Indian Ocean to have a limited engagement with strategic opponents by using political, economy and military resources to assure a relatively secure environment.  We will take an overall approach of “reducing risks through cooperation, and ensure security through deterrence”, and centering on the “new type of great power relationship” between China and the US, work strenuously to promote with the US, Russia, and the countries along the sea lanes strategic and other types of cooperation.   We should strive with sincerity and great effort to create a space of mutual benefit in which we work to reduce all kinds of maritime security risks.  At the same time, we should do preventive deployment of strategic assets in the South China Sea and along the sea lanes to the Indian Ocean and so create a security system along the sea lanes.  We should increase the deterrent capability of Chinese sea power in to prevent dangerous maritime activities against China and to so be able to fundamentally guarantee the security of China’s sea lanes.

3.1   Reduce Maritime Security Risks Through Co-operation

 Peaceful development has already become a guiding principle of our times. The international system has become increasingly integrated and complex.  State means for assuring security have become more diverse and comprehensive.  In the domain of maritime security, China should vigorously promote the new concepts of the “harmonious seas” and “cooperation on security” in order to maintain a just order on the high seas and legal maritime rights, stand for mutual trust, mutual interests, equality and cooperation, increase the cooperation of international society,  and create with the countries involved a “joint system for maritime navigation” so that we can work together to respond to maritime security threats and challenges.

3.1.1  Vigorously Seek Maritime Security Co-operation with the US


The US is the main security threat to China’s sea lanes and so it should be China’s most important partner in building cooperation in maritime security matters. Strengthening China’s cooperation with the US not only helps controls the strategic risk of conflict between the two countries, reduce the risk of conflict on the high seas, and helps China respond to various kinds of non-traditional maritime security threats.  Therefore, China should strive to establish a maritime security partnership with the US.  Where China and the US have mutual interests, such as in confronting piracy and seaborne terrorism, and in other areas such as illegal migration and drug smuggling, we need to deepen cooperation.  We need to be finding and opening up new areas of cooperation so that we can expand the domain of mutual cooperation so that both countries are equal and responsible upholders of maritime interests, further increase economic and trade cooperation.  Creating a system in which we are tied together by our mutual interests will help the Chinese side and both sides reduce conflicts of interest in certain areas.  Taking the non-traditional security area as an entry point, continually work to cooperation in military and security affairs, gradually strengthen strategic trust and avoid strategic confrontations.

3.1.2 Deepen Maritime Strategic Cooperation with Russia

 China and Russia share a common interest in facing the Western threat. Cooperation with Russia will not only help resolve differences in view on maritime interest but will also help maintain the global strategic balance but also help in other areas such as a hedge against the strategic risk from the US and in restraining Indian adventurism.  In the foreseeable future, Russia will be a strategic partner with China in ensuring maritime security.  China and Russia, both globally and through multilateral frameworks should consult and on important maritime issues coordinate their views, have wide ranging discussions on the balance of power on global maritime issues so that they will be able to speak with one voice or nearly so.  Over the short term, the two countries could discuss cooperation in the following areas:

  • Increasing Russian oil deliveries to China by land including improving or building pipelines in order reduce the risk China faces from maritime oil deliveries
  • Strengthen China’s maritime transport capacity in the north by developing ports on the Tumen River and sea routes through the Japan Sea and the Arctic Ocean;
  • Carry out with Russia defensive joint exercises in the Pacific, northern Indian Ocean and Mediterranean as a deterrent against non-specific threats.

3.1.3 Strengthen Cooperation with the Countries Along Sea Passages


Countries along sea passages are the strategic resource points for the US and at the same time are on the front line for China’s maritime defensive struggles. In the Asia-Pacific region, China should take advantage of its economic strength and its central position, strengthen its cooperation with Japan and India, and look for common interests in maritime transportation, maritime security and other areas.  Through the ASEAN 10 plus six and other multilateral mechanisms, increase its trade and economic cooperation with Japan, India, Australia and ASEAN countries.  Work to build support for a new Asia-Pacific security concept, to create a new China-centered East Asian industrial order, and then through dialogue to reduce security anxieties, persuade these countries to maintain their strategic independence, and guard against them slipping into the strategic orbit of the US.

In the Indian Ocean region, China should actively participate in regional cooperative activities.  Under frameworks such as ASEAN, the Arab League and the African Union, strengthen economic and trade, technology and anti-terror cooperation with Sri Lanka, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and East African countries along China’s maritime trade routes.  China should strengthen its military cooperation with Pakistan and Iran and seek access to the Indian Ocean through countries such as Pakistan and Myanmar.  Through bilateral and regional cooperation, use land bridges to get into the Indian Ocean region, look for locations which can be strategic support points.  The Indian Ocean is important to China’s ocean strategy and part of China’s system for ensuring maritime security.

3.1.4 Actively Participate in and make use of Existing International Organizations

 International law, international mechanisms, and international organizations are important means for civilized countries to protect their interests in time of peace.  They form the legal basis for sovereign states to make peaceful use of sea lanes. As an independent sovereign state, China has the fundamental right to peacefully use maritime passages to develop its exchanges with foreign states.  In this peaceful age in which war cannot be the first option, China needs to learn how to use international civil law to protect its interests, use the rights that it enjoys under international law, and make international law a strong weapon in maritime power struggles.  China should work through the UN Security Council to create a mechanism through which interest countries could fight piracy and ensure security of maritime passages.  China should make full use of current international mechanisms such as the “Right of Innocent Passage” and the “Right of Passage Through Straits and Archipelagoes” in order to expand the prevailing norms for international travel through passages.  China should expand its cooperation with and actively participate in the work of the International Maritime Organization and the International Hydrographic Organization on matters including maritime security, ship security and port security. China should take the lead in enacting national legislation on maritime safety matters and crisis handling  processes, achieve a position in which its voice can be heard, and promote a just and reasonable international maritime security order and system.

Protect Maritime Security Through Deterrence

In today’s globalizing economy, “cooperation” plays an important part in reducing risks to maritime security.  However, it cannot in itself fundamentally ensure maritime security.  If Chinese shipping were to be faced with an intention on the US and its allies to harm it or blockade it, the only way to ensure maritime security would be a strong Chinese naval force and deterrent capability.  Today, China’s navy is relatively weak and Chinese shipping along maritime passages faces severe potential dangers and threats.  Therefore China must be prepared for a long term maritime struggle.  Particularly important will be the material and psychological preparation for a naval struggle.  Accelerating the buildup of China’s naval strength,  raising China’s maritime strength across the board so that will be able to achieve the core deterrent capabilities of being able to  strike at faraway targets,  provide escort on distant seas, and provide resupply on distant seas.

Maintain China’s Deterrent Posture

 First of all, we should use economic methods to deter.  Towards medium-sized and small countries which are harassing China at sea, we could consider  cutting off economic ties, financial sanctions, or closing our markets to them as our reprisal.  Towards countries that are to some extent a strategic threat and are regional powers highly dependent upon the Chinese economy (such as Japan and India), if they are determined to cause maritime problems for China, we could consider using the methods of trade war, monetary war or mixed methods to retaliate and to punish.   The second type of response would be to use conventional military means as a deterrent.  We can use military capabilities as a preventive measure to deter a potential adversary from making a maritime attack.  Long distance cruises, long distance escorting of vessels, maritime anti-terror exercises, ship visits, naval exercises etc. maintain awareness of China’s strategic presence in the waters around maritime passages.

In international waters near potential adversaries, carry out irregular electronic information collection, mapping and surveys of the sea floor, anti-submarine exercises,  and maritime live-fire exercises etc.  Be prepared when necessary in international waters to forcibly stop, search or detain enemy merchant vessels.   The third type of deterrence is nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is tightly linked to the most important interests of the two sides involved.  Confronting the security threat of the US military alliance, China must prepare for military struggles in line with “assured mutual destruction” in mind.  It must always keep in reserve a certain number of nuclear weapons in combat duty status.  Fourth, China must be ready to fight a small-scale naval war so it must be fully psychologically prepared for war. China does not want to fight but China is not afraid to fight.  In circumstances in which the intensity, length and theater of a war could be contained, China should be willing to take some strategic risk and choose some arrogant medium or small adversary and fight a small naval war with them.  This would increase China’s credibility and create a strategic situation.

China Should Accelerate the Buildup of its Sea Power

China should master the principles of the revolution in military affairs, increase its investments, raise it technological level, accelerate naval modernization, and achieve leapfrog development in naval affairs.  This will make the Chinese navy the core of China’s strategic deterrent.  This will ensure the safety of Chinese shipping and strengthen China’s deterrence at important straits.  China needs to invest more in building up its naval power.  Spending on national defense and military technology should be oriented more towards building up naval power.  China needs to focus first on current threats and increase its overall combat capability in the waters near China.  Then, taking into account the expansion of China interests it needs to develop its capability to fight defense battles in distant seas and so accelerate investment in creating the capacity to deploy and escort in distant seas.  China needs to change its naval strategy, accelerating the change in the Chinese navy from “littoral defense and littoral combat” to “defense in distant seas and control of distant seas”.

China should quickly build a long-distance deployable aircraft carrier combat group, build up its ability to long distance navigation and precision attacks on far away targets.  China needs to continually increase its strategic depth at sea.  Third, China needs to devote more resources to building up its sea-based nuclear deterrent, building up a fleet of 10 – 15 strategic nuclear submarines to ensure that at least one of them will always be present in the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic oceans. China needs to develop its sea-based deterrent capability to both “control the sea from the sea” and “control the land from the sea” so that both the land and sea-based assets of a potential adversary and its allies including principal cities, transportation network, foreign military bases, ships at sea and foreign allies all fall within the combat range of the Chinese navy. In this way, a potential adversary, aware of the long distance accurate strike power and awesome destructive power of the Chinese navy would be too intimidated to take chances at sea.  Fourth, China needs to promoted naval deployments that would “show off to the West” such as increasing deployments to the Indian Ocean, and to make full use of diplomatic and economic methods to establish at strategic maritime locations points for resupply and military bases so as to protect strategic maritime passages and to provide prompt and powerful logistical and military support.

Strengthen China’s Maritime Presence

With sea power as a last resort, closely coordinate political, economic and diplomatic struggle to strengthen maritime presence is how the countries of the world protect the security of their sea routes.  Maritime presence is demonstrated by regular peacetime naval exercises that demonstrate military capabilities and the determination to protect maritime security in order to achieve the goals protecting safe passage on the seas.  In the future, China should gradually increase its presence along strategic passages and nearby waters by gradually increasing such measures as maritime patrols, sea cruises, maritime escort exercises, and maritime monitoring.  This will demonstrate China’s capability and determination to keep its sea routes open in order to prevent any kind of threat to China’s maritime security from developing.  Moreover, China should also its capacity to undertake long sea voyages, improve the technology and armaments of its escort vessels and so their overall ability to ensure maritime security,  increase naval exercises far away from Chinese ports in order to strengthen the capabilities of China’s maritime security protection forces and the personnel who man them.


  1. Liu Zhongmin, World Oceans Politics and China’s Ocean Development Strategy, Beijing, Shishi Publishing House, 2009.
  2. Ju Hailong, Chinese Sea Power Reference System  Beijing, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2012
  3. Li Bing, On the Status and Function of Maritime Strategic Passages, Dangdai Shijie yu Shehuizhuyi, 2010 (2): 90 – 94
  4. Wang Lirong, Maritime Passages in a Globalizing World and China’s Economic Security, Guangdong Haiyang Daxue Xuebao, 2012, 32(5),  1 – 7.
  5. Zhao Xu, Gao Jianbin,  Lin Wei,   “Building a Security System for  China’s Energy Transportation Sea Lanes”,  Zhongguo Ruan Kexue, 2013 (2): 8 – 15
  6. Jia Dashan, Sun Junyan, Luo Hongbo,   Evaluation and Measures to Protect  the Security of China’s Oil Transportation Sea Lanes,  Dalian Haishi Daxue Xuebao, 2006, 32(2): 62 – 66
  7. You Ji, Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect its Energy Supply, Strategic Analysis, 2007, 31(3): 467 – 489.
  8. Marc Lanteigne, China’s Maritime Security and the Malacca Dilemma, Asian Security 2008, 4(2): 143 – 161.
  9. Liang Fang,  Maritime Strategic Passages.  Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 2011
  10. Tang Wen,  Liu Qiang, U.S. Overseas Bases (online)
  11. Lu Mingxiang, Keeping Watch on “Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific”
  12. Gao Zhao, “Air-Sea Battle” Past and Present
  13. Jonathan W. Greenert, Norton A. Schwartz, Air-Sea Battle
  14. Sean Mirski,  “The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China”.  Journal of Strategic Studies,  2013(10): 1 – 37.
  15. Shu Biquan.  “Research on Japan’s Maritime Strategy and Trends in the Development of the Japan-US Alliance”   Taipingyang Xuebao,   2011  (1):54 – 68
  16. Wang Shaoyuan, Lu Chunsheng, “Analysis of US Factors involved in Maritime Transport of Japanese Oil Resources”,  Dongbei Caijing Daxue Xuebao, 2012 (4): 27 – 32.
  17. Zuo Liping “Theory of State Maritime Deterrence” Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 2012.
  18. Gao Lan, The Development of Japan’s Maritime Strategy and its International Influence, Waijiao Pinglun, 2012 (6): 52 – 59
  19. Ma Sao, A Preliminary Analysis of India’s Maritime Strategy,  Taipingyang Xuebao, 2010, 18(6): 74 – 80.
  20. Song Dehuang, Bai Jun, “On India’s Traditional Maritime Strategy and Modern Maritime Security Thinking”, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi Luntan, 2013(1): 17 – 29.
发表在 经济, 安全, 政治 | Tagged , , , , , , , , | 发表评论

Chinese Navy Recruiting Video Translated — 中国海军征兵宣传片英文翻译

Chinese PLA Navy recruiting video on Youtube.

Opening video slot – Chinese PLA Navy emblem: Navy recruiting publicity film

Our Dream

We were born in the 1990s
By then China had already risen [images of return of Hong Kong and Macao in 1997]
We have the same concerns
With bright dreams, we want to shine like the new century
For our dreams
We want to give our all
We want to grow be very strong

The Call of Duty

Seventy-one percent of this globe we depend upon is blue water
No matter which corner of the globe
Wherever there is blue water, we are there to protect the security of navigation
The ideology of the “One Belt and the One Road” [Note: President Xi Jinping’s new silk road concept for China’s economic development]
China’s oceanic and overseas interests are developing rapidly.
Our land is vast
But we will not yield a single inch of our frontiers to foreignersChina has 3 million square kilometers of ocean under its jurisdiction
Including 6700 islands with a surface area of over 500 square meters
The struggle over sea rights has not ended – we will not give up even the tiniest bit of our resources [pictures of oil rigs at sea]

The Honor Gene

Thousands of sea battles forged us
In very bloody combat
Hot blood and the smell of gunpowder
We kept working hard
We kept growing
The passionate efforts of youth
Forging in trials makes possible the breakthrough
We maintain combat readiness
We are prepared for war
What we really want is to grow together with you
Let’s all share together

Seeking the Blue Dream

We are stronger because you are stronger
Here with us, you will be able to reach your dreams
Here with us, we will let you demonstrate your extraordinary talents [sailor holding a child’s drawing “We are in the Navy too!”]
Here we us, we give you the chance to sprout wings

[Group with Chinese flags and smaller UK flags, banner written “Giving a Warm Send-Off to the Chinese Naval Expeditionary Force!”]
Here, the eyes of the entire world are open us!
This the Chinese Navy!
This is you with us – full of pride!
A strong motherland needs a strong navy
The Navy needs you.
Let’s together realize the dream of the great Chinese renaissance.

Title at end in calligraphy: Sail the four seas, brave and courageous
End title under PLA Navy emblem: We invite you to join the Chinese Navy

发表在 政治 | Tagged , | 发表评论

Why Did China’s Diplomatic Strategy Change?

Good article from the Chinese Financial Times website by Li Jiang, a Chinese graduate of the Department of International Studies at King’s College London, on why Chinese diplomatic strategy has changed.  This may be a bit too dark about China’s internal situation but it is a useful analysis.  Here is my summary translation.  Full Chinese text copied below.

Why Did China’s Diplomatic Strategy Change?

By Li Jiang  李江

Why?  Reaction to repeated frustrations in relations with SE Asian countries, US rebalancing and SE Asia welcome to it?  Then S. China Sea actions made things much worse, although Chinese do not see their own actions as the cause, rather they see a US-led conspiracy to contain China.  Also, there is the Chinese structuralist approach to foreign policy — they see world balance of power changing with China becoming relatively stronger, US etc. relatively weaker.  However, although a structuralist analytic framework is useful, the typical neglect of internal issues by structuralists often results in mistaken conclusions.

China’s economy is slowing down, and the Chinese economy is not as strong as it appears.  China has a “market Leninism” model (sometimes called “technologyless industrialization”) that has stressed industrialization.  It has largely neglected developing its own technologies and is highly dependent upon its trading partners.  For a long time, China has stressed cheap factors of production, neglected human rights and the environment for the sake of rapid economic growth.

The result is that China’s economy is highly dependent upon the core countries in the global order and so faces a very difficult task in trying to move up the ladder of industrialization.  The kind of economic model China has runs into trouble when the capital cost of the factors of production rise and the external economic environment deteriorates.  That is just where China is now.  China faces large real estate debt, overcapacity in manufacturing, growing unemployment and workers becoming more insistent about rights, environmental problems and exhaustion of resources.

The top priority for the leaders of the Communist Party is maintaining their monopoly on power.  This means that competition within the party must be restrained.  The revelations about Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang show hazards of “limited competition” within the Party (which some hoped would lead to liberalization) and has brought a tightening.  The climate of society also worries Chinese policymakers.  Deepening cynicism and the loss of traditional values are leading to more corruption and social disorder. Interestingly, many Chinese believe that China is rising and the West is declining and so the day is near when China will be as powerful as the US. This thinking favors the growth of patriotism and nationalism.

Although China is confident on the international stage, Beijing’s core policymakers must know the real situation. China’s internal problems take priority.  For China’s leaders, the top priority is guaranteeing the continued rule of the Chinese Communist Party.  If the regime faces a threat, it can’t afford to be fighting both internal and external enemies so the traditional strategy of using an outside threat to solve domestic disorder cannot apply here.

Most important is the fact that China does not have the capacity to challenge the international order.  China is a dependent country in the international order. If it could achieve some degree of autonomy as an industrialized country, as the USSR had, and as Germany and Japan had in the 1940s, then China would be in a position to challenge the international order.  China may well be trying to use foreign relations as a way out of resolving its very difficult internal problems.  We see in the regime’s tightening of ideological and speech control and strong measures taken to ensure social stability as well as the new security law as a struggle to preserve the regime.

There are misunderstandings in Washington’s policy towards China among those who do not have a deep understanding of China’s internal situation and also  among certain influential pressure groups who are blinding policymakers.  The comparisons these pressure groups make between China and Imperial Germany or Nazi Germany are wrong.  Their view ignores that fact that China is already deeply integrated into the US-led world order and the international order and China’s industrial strength is not comparable to that of the USA.  To understand China, we need to look at China’s historical experience and at its current circumstances — otherwise we are just looking at a Western image of China.


英国《金融时报》中文网撰稿人 李江












在中国,“经济发展”与“经济增长”两个概念一直被混淆,不过官员最关心的是经济增长。08年以来,温家宝和李克强每年都在强调中国经济的困难。从历史数据来看,2010年开始经济增速明显下滑,7月15日公布的第二季度数据更是降至7%(国际媒体对该数据的真实性存在广泛质疑)。下行压力的巨大,使“新常态”一词流行。然而真正让人忧心的是中国的经济发展水平,其核心在于工业化水平。中国的工业产值虽然巨大,但正如一位学者岳健勇在《中国模式的神话——市场列宁主义与全球资本主义的联姻》形容的那样,实际上却是一种无技术工业化(technologyless industrialization)。历史上任何一个强国的崛起,都伴随着工业技术的飞跃。






更为重要的是,中国没有能力挑战国际秩序。英国著名的战略家迈克尔•考克斯(Michael Cox)认为中国在硬实力和软实力上与美国相距甚远,这种差距在短时间内无法消除。更为关键的是,中国作为世界体系中的依附国,发动对核心国家(core state)的战争所带来的成本是她根本无法承受的。只有在真正成为具备相当程度自主性的工业国之后,至少像昔日的德国、日本、苏联那样,中国才有可能成为秩序挑战者。





发表在 外交 | Tagged , , , , , | 发表评论

Download He Qinglian’s Book on Media Control in China

Available in PDF from Human Rights in China,  He Qinglian’s The Fog of Censorship paints a detailed portrait of the workings of the Chinese censorship system.  See the Table of Contents below.

Download the book at


Shattering the Myths about China’s Media Market xiii

Media Control and Public Ignorance 1
Media control in China before 1978
Media control since “reform and opening-up” in 1978
The myth of China’s “media reform” in 2003

Government Control of the Chinese Media 22
The law versus the constitution
The Chinese government’s tracking and management of the media
“Unified news coverage” of major incidents
The political education and thought control of media professionals
The life and times of China’s propaganda czars
The Political and Economic Control of Media Workers 44
The media’s political pyramid
The function of rank
Case study: CCTV’s “Focus”

“Internal (neibu) Documents” and the Secrecy System 54
Anything can be a state secret
Classified documents and public access to information

Chinese Journalists—Dancing in Shackles 79
Control of news sources and reporting
News blackouts of mining disasters
The use of violence
The Public Security Bureau and court orders
A Worker’s Daily issue recalled

News Censorship and Half-truths 97
Interference in the Project Hope corruption scandal
Lies sprinkled with truth: The Nanjing poisoning case

Journalism as a High-risk Occupation 114
The death of Feng Zhaoxia
The arrest of Ma Hailin

The jailing of Gao Qinrong The recall of a “reactionary book” Jiang Weiping, jailed for subversion Exposing official corruption as a punishable offense

A Prickly Rosebush Cut Off at the Root 129

Southern Weekend’s heyday

Reasons for Southern Weekend’s Survival

The gradual evisceration of Southern Weekend Why was Southern Weekend rendered powerless?

Foreign Journalists in China 144

“Free” foreign journalists and “unfree” interviewees

Containing foreign journalists

Using foreign journalists Foreign journalists in Chinese media

The stories of two foreign journalists

 Foreign Investment in China’s Media Industry 160

Chinese media off-limits to foreign investors

A pack of lies

Controlling access to foreign news in China

Can foreign investment bring press freedom?

发表在 媒体, 政治 | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , | 发表评论

Chinese Scholars on Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Myanmar and Non-Interference in Politics Policy Mean Supporting Dictatorships?

Capsule summary: Myanmar is examined as a case study of the rise and consequences for China of anti-China feeling.  The authors say that  many Chinese officials and scholars agree that anti-Chinese feeling is a big obstacle for China’s trade and investment plans in many countries. Other Chinese scholars are also doing studies on the same topic in other countries.   The authors argue that China needs to re-examine its policy of focusing on economic relations and ignoring the domestic policies of other countries since support for unpopular dictatorships makes China unpopular and can lead to great difficulties for Chinese trade and investment later on.  See the summary translation of highlights below.  The full Chinese text is I found the article on the World Regional Studies website at
World Regional Studies is published by East China Normal University.

The World Regional Studies 世界地理研究 June 2015 article “An analysis on the formation and cause of anti-China sentiment in Myanmar” 2015,24(2):20-30 by Li Cancong of Beijing Normal University and Ge Yuanjing of Yunnan Normal University
examined anti-Chinese feeling in Myanmar along with a review of the history of anti-Chinese feeling in the country, and suggestions for improving the situation. Causes examined include feelings of excessive dependence upon China yet being unable to avoid it; resentment of Chinese cooperation with the previous military government; foreign NGOs and western countries badmouthing China; excessive flaunting of wealth by local Chinese and Chinese from the PRC dispatched by Chinese companies; the concentration of Chinese companies on exploiting natural resources and concerns that Chinese companies employ few local people; and exaggeration of problems by the Myanmar media.

One intriguing passage discusses public instability overseas as the obstacle to Chinese overseas investment, noting that Chinese most officials and scholars believe that Chinese needs to develop new sources of energy supplies [elsewhere the authors recommend that China limit imports from the Middle East and increase imports from more reliable sources such as Africa and Latin America. Angola and the Congo are noted as particularly reliable oil suppliers.] The authors note that failing to handle anti-Chinese feeling properly could prevent China from building a rail link across Burma to the Indian Ocean that would enable China to avoid the Malacca Strait and the US strategy of blocking China from emerging from behind the “island chain”.

(p. 24)其次,缅甸的排华思潮给中国能源的安全供给带来了极大的威胁。中国成为世界上第二大石油净进口国。中国经济发展对外资源的高度依赖,使得能源安全成为制约我国经济发展和社会稳定的重要因素。目前,对于能源的供给,大部分政府官员和学者普遍认为开拓更多的能源供给地是保证能源安全供给的重要举措。而从中东动乱、利比亚国内动荡、马六甲海峡之困等一系列的事件和事实,我们不难发现拥有安全、稳定的能源供给地远远胜过“开拓更多的能源供给地”。因为在现有的中国“不干预内政”、“政经分开”的指导下,因局部性的战争和区域局势动荡,中国想在中东等地区获得稳定的能源供给很难得以保障;加之,中国能源进口的远距离特征明显、“马六甲海峡之困”等因素,中国要保证能源供给地的安全和稳定困难重重。学者梅育新就提出目前中国海外投资最大的障碍是当地社会的不稳定[22]。加之2013年中缅油气输油管道的贯通,缅甸和中东地区的石油、天然气等能源可以更为安全、稳定的进入中国,缅甸逐步成为中国重要“稳定和安全的能源供给地”。但是由于缅甸的排华和反华情绪,“稳定和安全的能源供给地”受到极大的威胁。


The authors recommend that China find ways to help the average person in Myanmar including through cooperation with NGOs (the author say Chinese help has often been channeled through the government, causing resentment), that Chinese become more aware of and sensitive to local concerns (mentioned as an example the dam project where work has been stopped — a site sacred to the Kunhing people and precious to Myanmar culture)

“Just as the scholar Fan Hongwei has said, Myanmar may become trigger a re-assessment of Chinese thinking on foreign relations. These circumstances are not limited to Myanmar — Chinese investors in Africa and the Middle East face them as well. China is a hot spot in the economies of the countries getting Chinese investment but politically it feels a chill. The unhappiness of local people towards Chinese companies is a big problem for Chinese investment overseas. It is a problem shared across many different Chinese investments overseas. This is a problem that the Chinese government and Chinese companies should reflect deeply upon. Li Chenyang has said that Chinese foreign policy in its relations with neighboring countries should pay attention to the details. The policies of “non-interference in domestic politics” and “separating economics from politics” are the fruit of China’s diplomatic experience. However, as China rises and the world geopolitical environment changes, will the Chinese policy of non-intervention while engaging in economic cooperation remain suitable in the changed geopolitical situation?

We need to think deeply about this. When considering how to solve the difficulties of Chinese overseas investment, we need first of all to think about China’s current foreign policy and how it needs to be adjusted, and become clear about China’s diplomatic strategy and position. During military rule in Myanmar, the Myanmar people were very unhappy about the dictatorship and the people came to oppose the military government. China according to its “non-interference in domestic politics” policy engaged in economic cooperation with the military government so the Myanmar people have reason to feel that China was the “accomplice” of the military government and helped the military government implement its dictatorship. Therefore, we need to clarify our foreign policy and to make our position clear.”

(p. 27) 5.1 反思中国现行的外交策略,调整中国外交的整体思路

发表在 外交 | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , | 发表评论

Prof. Yang Zhizhen: “Interactions Between US – China Relations and China’s Relations with its Neighbors”

Prof. Yang Zhizhen’s May 2014 article “Interactions Between US – China Relations and China Building Relations with the Countries on its Periphery” examines the structural competition and functional cooperation built into this triangle.  The Chinese text of Prof. Yang’s article is online at

Prof. Yang Zhizhen is that the Institute of Politics and Law at the Hubei Province Academy of Social Sciences in Wuhan. Yang specializes in US –China and US – India relations and is the author of a 2014 volume of essays on US – China relations “China’s Development Strategy and US – China Relations” 中国开放战略与中美关系

I don’t know how influential Prof. Yang is but this is interesting and positive big picture thinking. Yang sees the South China Sea unhappiness as a distracting peripheral issue that needs to be handled properly and some difficulties in Chinese relations with their neighbors as due to their unwillingness to see a dominant China (not because of the US stirring up trouble which is the conventional explanation) My summary of this:
“The great majority of East Asian countries are also worried about China and don’t want to see it become the dominant power and so the leader in East Asia. In East Asian international relations, the old rule that economics determines political has lost effectiveness. Nearly all these countries rely on China economically but in security and in politics rely on the US. They welcome a US role that balances out an excessive growth of Chinese power. What is needed is for the US and China to cooperate in Asia.”

This seems more realist than the political science “realists” who sit around thinking dark thoughts all the time!

The environmental cooperation angle at the end is intriguing too.

Summary translation (full text at URL above) China is a rapidly growing country, and while some foreign policy “realist” thinkers would claim that a collision is inevitable, that should not be the case in an era of peace and development. The core US strategic and security interest is preserving the leading role of the US in the world; since the collapse of the USSR it has been the only superpower and a hegemonic power. China is a rapidly growing power that came late to the international order but it is an active participant and builder of it. There is a structural element of competition in US – China relations and is a natural consequences of changes in the international power system.

Although the gap between the US and China has shrunk considerably over the past 15 years, it is still an enormous one. China cannot in the near term hope to be competitive with the US in military power, S&T capacity, diplomacy, and creativity

Although China has achieved an equal place in the international system, China did not participate in the creation of the post-war order [Note: China here must mean PRC since China as the ROC did participate prior to 1949] Therefore, as China becomes stronger, it will want to change some of the “rules of the game” to better accord with its own interests and preferences – that is just what the western countries fear. The US does not want to see East Asia united, but even less does it want to see a war there. China and the US share many common interests in protecting the world order and has worked constructively with China on avoiding conflict by restraining Japan and Taiwan independence. China has been actively developing its economic relations, particularly focusing on SE Asia.

A mass of complicated territorial disputes in the South China Sea are a big challenge. The US can use it to separate China from its neighbors in order to preserve its leadership in East Asia and the world. But there is no advantage to the US to conflict in the SCS.

China’s relations with its neighbors is not a zero-sum game. Both the US and China can win. The complication is that as China gets closer to its neighbors, the US will fear that it will lose influence in the region – this will increase the competition between the US and China. The US has made it clear that the SCS problem should be handled multilaterally through ASEAN and not in bilateral negotiations with China. After China put the nine-dotted lines on its passports, the US openly expressed doubt about the Chinese position and warned against unilateral action by China.

The US and China are both countries with worldwide influence that are bound together by history. If the US were to openly try to organize the Asian countries to contain China, or to create an ideological bloc of democratic countries opposed to China, that plan would certainly fail. Similarly, if China were to try to take the US out of Asian economic and security affairs, it would certainly encounter the determined opposition of other countries.


China must consider US- China relations and its future as it builds it relationships with its neighbors in order to stimulate positive energies in the relationship and to avoid structural competition from complicating China’s relations with its neighbors.


There is both structural competition and functional cooperation in the US – China relationship. There will be a great deal of “benefits leakage” to the US from increasing Asian integration. Only increasing contact, cooperation and exchanges between the US and China in these areas will US doubts about China’s intentions be reduced.

The US has important interests in the East Asia region and is concerned about being excluded by regional integration. The US doesn’t want there to come a day when East Asia doesn’t see the US as a leader. The great majority of East Asian countries are also worried about China and don’t want to see it become the dominant power and so the leader in East Asia. In East Asian international relations, the old rule that economics determines political has lost effectiveness. Nearly all these countries rely on China economically but in security and in politics rely on the US. They welcome a US role that balances out an excessive growth of Chinese power. What is needed is for the US and China to cooperate in Asia.

。美国在东亚地区具有重要的利益,担心东亚国家通过地区一体化将其排挤出去,因而对东亚区域一体化保持高度的警惕。东亚转向一个真正不再需要美国当“老大”的格局是美国最不想看到的#”$%。绝大多数东亚国家对中国持有戒心, 不愿意看到中国在东亚地区独大从而主导东亚事务。对于东亚国际关系来说,经济决定政治的规律已经 失效,几乎所有国家是在经济上依赖中国而在政治安全上依赖美国,主动迎合甚至邀请美国来制衡中国影响的扩大,显然这不利于互联互通的深度推进。因此,这条路径并不可取。随着亚太经合组织互联互通 建设的启动,亚太自由贸易区的建设是历史的必然。中国应该选择第二条路径,或者至少选择第三条路 径,争取早日加入跨太平洋伙伴关系计划,与美国在亚太区域互联互通建设中开展合作,以此充实中美新型大国关系的内容,进而促进中国同周边国家互联互通建设。

One area where the United States could help, both officially and unofficially, is on big infrastructure projects which have sometimes run into difficulty on environmental issues. U.S. expertise on environmental impact assessment would be valuable on these projects. Some of the SE Asian countries that China cooperates with are poor developing countries that pay inadequate attention to environmental issues.


发表在 外交 | Tagged , , | 发表评论

Ilham Tohti: Xinjiang’s Economic Development and the Relationship Among the Nationalities

Xinjiang’s Economic Development and the Relationship Among the Nationalities

[A 2009 article on economic development and government sponsored migrations that have accentuated ethnic frictions in the Xinjiang Autonomous region by an ethnic Uighur scholar, Professor Ilham Tohti of China’s Central University for Nationalities in Beijing 中央民族大學任教的維族教授伊力哈木土赫提. This article is appearing on many websites within China. A Chinese-language website founded by Professor Ilham Tohti is no longer accessible. He told a Mingbao reporter on July 7 that he was then being questioned in his home by Chinese security police and so giving an interview was inconvenient.

In his article “Xinjiang’s Economic Development and the Relationship Among the Nationalities” Professor Ilham Tohti discusses Xinjiang’s economic development in the light of five factors that affect the relationship between the Uighur nationality and the Han nationality in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.

A summary translation of 新疆经济发展与民族关系 作者:伊力哈木土赫提(中央民族大学经济学院)

With the end of the Cold War, many long submerged minority nationality issues have emerged. Minority nationality issues generally occur because of economic, national, religious and cultural differences and the loss of rights and benefits to a minority or other weak group and so calls for equality and self-determination (autonomy) are often wrapped up in these minority issues. In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous region, large numbers of ethnic Han settlers arrived over the past half century, transforming its ethnic composition and greatly reducing the proportion of minority people in its population. The number of nationalities in Xinjiang increased from 13 to 54. In economic development, particularly in the Develop the West program, Xinjiang has not made for itself a development strategy based on its own situation and a minorities development strategy. As a result, with development Xinjiang’s minorities remained closed off or else increasingly marginalized. We need to understand clearly that without development and modernization for the minority nationalities of Xinjiang, there can be no development for Xinjiang. Without this modernization, there can be no social peace in Xinjiang.

  1. Certain basic principles on the relationship between the nationalities
  2. Aspects of the distribution of the population of Xinjiang, the characteristics of local populations, and the effect that has on relationship between nationalities
  3. The capacity of the minority nationalities of Xinjiang to accumulate capital
  4. Ignorance and inequalities in education
  5. The capacity to acquire information about laws and the powers and functions of government
  6. Institutional discrimination
  7. Victimization by a power games of powerful groups

Some problems are caused by the basic principles the PRC applies to minority issues. In this “nationalities model” there is the problem of a considerably state bias towards one nationality in preference to the others. In some totalitarian countries, minorities are beaten to submission or other non-violent methods are used to ensure the submission of minority nationalities. In a truly democratic society, the principles of fairness and democracy are paramount, unfairness destroys democratic society. The state must remain absolutely neutral and have no preference for one or another nationality. Over 50 years in Xinjiang, the minorities have made definite progress. In Xinjiang, some parts of society and government, and some leaders don’t understand this. At the national and the local level , among groups and individuals, many don’t understand the tight link between national minorities development and the development of a minority nationality autonomous region.

  1. The distribution of nationalities in Xinjiang is uneven. Seventy-three percent of the ethnic Han in Xinjiang live in the north of the region. The scale of in-migration to Xinjiang is unprecedented. Between 1949 and 1953, the PLA organized settlers into the military construction corps (bingtuan) – 330,000 from Tianjin, Beijing, Jiangsu, Henan, Shandong and other areas. During 1962 – 1966, Shanghai sent 150,000 young people to Xinjiang. During 1949 – 1984, 3 million people moved to Xinjiang from the east – one third of Xinjiang’s population of about 10 million at the time. The development plans of the central government concentrated on Han areas, not the rural areas where the minority people were concentrated. The industrialization of these areas was not considered. In the large minority areas of southern Xinjiang not one enterprise of any size was established. In today’s Xinjiang, the state should not be restraining or encouraging migration – the state should not aim at preventing the Uighurs or any other nationality from being the majority in any particular locality. In the eyes of the minority nationalities of Xinjiang, Xinjiang has already been defined – “Xinjiang is the Uighur Autonomous Region and the region of citizens of all the nationalities of the entire country who are now or will be here.”
  2. Xinjiang minority people have great difficulty accumulating capital. Ninety percent of Xinjiang minority people depend upon agriculture. Xinjiang peasants have a severe tax burden. Government statistics from the middle 1990s onwards show a steady decline in peasant incomes. The gap between city and countryside is even larger than the national average. Since 1949, the PRC has invested considerable amounts in increasing arable land – but this land has been used to settle new immigrants from the construction corps. During this same period, the arable land around the oases where most of Xinjiang’s minority people live has decreased. Moreover, the household registration system that creates barriers between the city and the countryside and institutional discrimination harm the minority nationalities of Xinjiang. Although even if these barriers were to fall completely, the proportion of minority people who could take advantage of them would be relatively small because of their lack of education. However, in some occupations and industries, even minority people with excellent qualifications are rejected. For example, these barriers of policy based institutional discrimination exist in the police, military, finance, banks, oil industry, natural gas, Communist Party organization (restrictions on minority nationality party secretaries), party and government organization departments, chemical industry and telecommunications.

Moreover the Uighur language and educational institutions are unjustifiably disadvantaged by our country’s laws and policies. There are even taxi drivers, cleaning people and cotton pickers who are brought in from other areas ostensibly to “help Xinjiang”. Experts to develop Xinjiang are brought in from far away villages in the Chinese interior. The oil and natural gas industry employ almost no minority nationality people. Xinjiang minority peasants are suffering under a large tax burden. Part of the problem is the system that brings in local leaders with no knowledge of local conditions or the local language. Another problem is that the peasants are ignorant and local government is very corrupt. Stressing appearances and propaganda is another problem. With all the propaganda brigades and campaigns, minority people are afraid to speak up, to voice their opinions for fear of being fined. Although Xinjiang is supposed to be a minority autonomous region, no law on implementing the autonomy of Xinjiang was ever enacted. Ignorance, Poverty and Educational Inequality

Looking at educational statistics over the decades, one can see clear progress. But in fact because local village schools are financed by the village and city schools are paid for by the government, school fees in the village are high, school assess additional unauthorized fees and many students leave after elementary school. This failure to finance rural education while financing city education is a serious issue and a major cause of ignorance in rural Xinjiang. According to China’s compulsory education law,

financing compulsory education is the responsibility of local government. Many local government in impoverished southern Xinjiang just can’t afford it. Higher and higher college tuition makes school fees impossible for 85% of minority nationality families in rural Xinjiang. Few minority people have information about laws and how government organs function. This puts them at a severe disadvantage. In China’s closed system of policy formation and transmission where policies come down step by step, they can be modified as needed by local government to suit their own purposes — that is called “tricking those above while keeping those below ignorant”. Institutional discrimination – in the household registration system, the military construction corps (bingtuan) system, and natural resources exploitation are so many barriers that limit the possibilities that the minority nationalities of Xinjiang have to develop.

One result is that more and more minority people because marginalized in society, and the larger society associates crime and drug taking with Uighurs. The military construction corps (bingtuan) is very powerful in the government, economy, military, society and cultural fields in Xinjiang. In China, the law and constitution make all resources the property of the state. Rights to exploit resources are not clearly defined. The construction corps work in extracting natural resources results in little value added and benefits in Xinjiang and so minority nationality people are not benefiting from resource extraction in Xinjiang.

Equipment and technicians needed for resource exploitation come from the outside, and the production goes to the outside with no benefit to Xinjiang minority nationality people. This is just a sketch of important institutional, systems, policies, and natural resource exploitation system that constrain the development of minority people in Xinjiang. There are of course other important issues affecting the development of the minority nationalities of Xinjiang, such as their own problems such as poor skills, conservative ways of thinking, short-sightedness, a work ethic not suited for a modern market society, a lack of competitive spirit, and tendency to be satisfied with the status quo.

Many of these issues I have not addressed here. This is because policy adjustments that will further perfect the autonomy of the nationality region and actually implement autonomy, the opportunities for the minority people to advance, to gain educational and occupational opportunity and enjoy rights of equality as citizens will grow. These factors are strongly linked — low income affects educational opportunity for children, ignorance affects incomes, institutional barriers affect opportunities, which in turn affect their ability to get more skills, education and income. In these many areas where there are barriers that constrain the development of the minority people of Xinjiang also severely affect the development of Xinjiang as a whole and the relations among the nationalities that live there. Have they been forsaken? They have already been forsaken at least in part. The question is will they continue to be forsaken. … The future cannot be foreseen. However, if the environment for development for the minority people of Xinjiang can be greatly improved, that I can say for certain, that the most beautiful place of all will still be our Xinjiang.


作者:伊力哈木土赫提(中央民族大学经济学院) 后冷战时代,长期被掩盖的民族问题由于世界格局的转换而凸现,冷战时期建立的国家,民族关系准则随之发生动摇,全球政治生活由此发生强烈震撼。民族关系问题成为影响国家乃至地区政治稳定的一个重要因素。但因国情不同,民族问题的表现形式存在明显的区别。一般而言,引发和构成民族问题的基本要素是经济,民族、宗教和文化传统等面的差异,以及由此导致的少数民族或弱势群体的不平等待遇及权益的缺失,因此,谋求平等和自决权(自治权)往往成为民族问题的核心内容。就中国新疆维吾尔自治区而言,随着新中国成立后的半个世纪大量以汉族为主的移民的涌入以及民族结构的急剧改变。民族成分从自治区成立之初的13个民族增加到54民族。新疆史居少数民族人口在新疆人口的比重急剧下降。当今新疆各个民族处于不同的发展层次上,有着不同的发展条件和需求,各自走着不同的发展道路。但他们面临的是同一种挑战:现代化的挑战,争取的是同一个前途民族发展的前途。各民族在社会经济方式,宗教,文化层次,教育,气候地理条件等多方面存在着不同程度的差异。特别是在发展新疆区域经济,尤其是中国西部大开发的环境中,新疆不根据自己的情况制定地区和民族发展战略其结果是新疆史居少数民族或是在封闭,越来越边缘化的状态下保持贫困的恶性循环或成为竞争较量中的牺牲品。我们应清醒认识到,没有少数民族的发展,就谈不上中华民族的振兴,没有新疆少数民族的发展和现代化,也谈不上新疆的发展和现代化。新疆少数民族总是处于贫困和落后,就很难保证新疆的长治久安。估计新疆民族关系现状时,我们必须站在新疆乃至全国改革开放的背景下,充分注意民族关系广阔的区域历史遗产,各民族发展的总体态势和格局并从更长远的趋势出发。我相信新疆少数民族乃至世界将会新疆少数民族从新疆社会经济乃至全国社会经济发展中得到多少实惠是否公平来评判新疆民族关系。形势迫使我们把新疆民族关系研究重点放在对经济发展进程中新疆少数民族群体的境遇和宿愿的剖析,来解释新疆民族问题的多元性和独特性。 本报告中影响新疆维吾尔族和汉族民族关系的主要因素的讨论集中在以下几个方面:1、关于民族关系的一些基本原则,2,新疆人口分布情况及特点及民族关系,3、新疆少数民族群体的资本积累能力,4、知识贫困和教育的不平等,5、 权能信息获取能力, 6、制度歧视,7、集团博弈的受害者 一、关于民族关系的一些基本原则 无论是从理论上还是从实践上讲,国家在民族问题上都起着关键的作用。通常国家处 理和解决民族问题所采取的模式可以粗略地划分为两种。第一种是“民族模式”,在这种模式中存在巨大民族差异,甚至严重分离倾向的国家“偏爱”某个民族群体甚于其它民族群体。在实施“民族模式”的国家中,民族主义的体现在本质上是民族的,而不是国民的或领土的这些国家即便拥有形式上的民主制度,但在公民待遇和权益问题上,民主则让位于优先考虑的民族利益。还有一些国家采取的是极权主义体制,即用暴力和非暴力手段来对付居于从属地位的(或少数人)群体,以保持和维系居统治地位的(或多数人)群体的绝对优势地位上述两种情形都是在国家的作用下,赋予某个民族群体及其个体成员比其它群体及其个体成员优先或特殊的权益。少数民族或弱势群体被排除在国家的整体民族目标之外,他们不仅在政治上而且在生存上面临困境。然而,任何民族群

体,谋求平等,归属和认同都是其最基本的准则,是不能被长期忽视或遭受长久压制的无可商议的人类需求。第二种是“民主模式’,民主是在特定的政治构架内的一种社会组织形式他有两条基本原则:自由和所有社会成员或公民在法律面前一律平等缺失这两个要件中的任何一个,都将造成社会的不公正、不民主。除此之外,在存在严重民族分离的国家中建立的民主政体,还必须确保国家及其政府机构严格执行平等政策,并设立相关的专门机构,监督和惩处社会内部的民族歧视行为。民主模式的宗旨是,废止任何一个群体的支配地位或国家对他们的特殊认同,一视同仁地赋予所有群体完全平等的权利,保持国家在不同群体间竞争中的中立。也就是说,国家务必以相同的标准认同所有的群体。中国统一的多民族的国家。我国宪法明确保证全体中国公民,不分宗教,信仰,民族与性别法律面前最充分享受平等。同时民族区域自治法和其它有关民族政策赋予自治区和自治民族的各项权利已有明确的规定,其中包括发展本地区和本民族的社会,经济,文化,教育的权利。其目的是让各民族在平等的基础上调整本民族内部的关系和其它民族的关系,以建立新型的民族关系。这种关系有利于促进民族的发展,有利于增进各民族的相互沟通和理解。客观地讲,新中国成立后尤其是新疆维吾尔自治区成立后的半个世纪里,新疆少数民族社会经济状况不断发生的明显的变化,与他们的祖辈相比各方面有了长足的进步。新疆少数民族参政议政的情况方面也有了改善,例如,每一届中国政协,和全国人大有新疆少数民族的代表,新疆维吾尔自治区政府,人大,政协,法院,检察院和新疆多数县市的第一把手由新疆少数民族干部担任等等。把新疆称为维吾尔自治区,我国在政体上还是全体中国社会是认同的。但新疆的社会经济实践中有些部门和单位,领导在这些方面认识不清,认识不够。国家与地方,集体与个人,民族自治区域社会经济发展与民族发展利益关系方面认识模糊。 二.新疆人口分布情况及特点及民族关系 新疆目前正面临着西部大开发的千载难逢的机遇与挑战。作为中国21世纪西部大开发的重要基地之一,新疆具有其它省区不可比拟的丰富的矿产资源和光热水上条件,具备加快发展的有利物质基础条件和发展向西开方的地缘政治,经济,人文优势。但是,西部大开发战略的实现,除需要具备一定的物质条件,还需要具备较好的人口环境条件,包括人口数量规模及其变动、合理的人口结构以及良好的人口素质。除此之外,人口的分布与迁移状况,尤其是新疆各民族人口的区域分布和变动,也将会在很大程度上影响新疆的发展和民族关系。这在西部开发中将会变得日益重要。作为一个多民族的维吾尔自治区,新疆各个民族地域空间的分布及其变动,不仅反映出各不同区域人口在出生、死亡等方面的变化,也可以反映人口,劳动力在区域间和部门间的流动情况,反映出新疆民族发展和民族关系。 新疆各地州人口密度差异悬殊(表1)单比较各地州伊犁州直属县人口密度最高,为44. 60人/平方公里,其次是喀什地区( 25. 1人/平方公里),最低的是巴州,仅为2. 4人/平方公里。如果将三个单列市(乌鲁木齐、石河子和克拉玛依)再考虑进来,那差异会更大。新疆又是一个多民族聚居的地区,共有54个民族,其民族人口分布呈现“大杂居,小聚居”的特点,其中汉族占约39. 87%少数民族占60. 137。 1)少数民族人口中又以维吾尔族为主。其占少数民族人口的75. 88.占新疆总人口的45. 62%。维吾尔族主要居住在南疆,北疆的伊黎地区和东疆以及散居在北疆的昌吉州,塔城地区。 2)汉族人口的地区分布特点 新疆汉族人口表现为非常明显的广域性分布特点,全疆15个地、州、市都有分布目_ ,有一定比重。北疆的汉族人口,占全疆汉族总人口的73. 29%,南疆的汉族人口只占26. 71%。从各个地州市来看,受到地区范围大小以及汉族人口木身分布状况的双重影响,乌鲁木齐市、伊犁州和昌吉州的汉族人口比重较大,占全疆汉族总人口的比例均在10%以上,占当地总人口的比例分别为72. 72%, 44. 71%和74. 88%,三地汉族人口合计占全疆汉族总人口的58. 22% ,其它如北疆的克拉玛依,石河子、和奎屯市,东疆的哈密地区内汉族人口,到75%

甚至98%以上,在汉族总人口中的比重也在20%以上。 (3)哈萨克族人口的地区分布特点 哈萨克族作为新疆第二大少数民族.在人口分布上.与维吾尔族有相似之处.也是人口分布的集中化程度较高.不过不是主要分布在南疆.而是主要分布在北疆。北疆地区的哈萨克族人口,占全疆哈萨克族总人口的94. 27% , 南疆仅占5. 73% 。其中以伊犁地区为最集中.,全疆哈萨克族总人口的36. 76% ,占本地总人口的22. 88%。此外.阿尔泰地区和塔城地区的哈萨克族人口,占全疆哈萨克族总人口的比例也都在17%以上.,占本地总人口的比例分别是49.31%和24.63% o昌吉州、乌鲁木齐市、此外哈密和博州也都有零散分布。 (4)回族人口的地区分布特点 新疆回族人口有广域分布特点,全疆各地均有分布,但以北疆为主,占全疆回族总人口的83.27%,南疆占16.73%。从地区来看,昌吉州最多,占全疆回族总人口的21.45%;伊犁地区第二占20.86% ;乌鲁木齐第三,占18.71% ;以后依次是塔城(7.68%)、吐鲁番( 4.58%)、巴州(6. 69%)、阿尔泰(2. 57%)。 (5)柯尔克孜族人口主要分布在南疆,占全疆柯尔克孜族总人口的88. 38%,其中76.98%的人口分布在克孜勒苏自治州境内.集中化程度非常高。其次.北疆的伊犁地区分布有9.54%的柯族人口,阿克苏有5.07%的柯族人口。 ( 6)蒙古族人口的地区分布特点 蒙古族人口在新疆的分布表现为大分散、小集中的特点。南北疆均有分布.但相对集 中在某几个地区内。蒙古族人口的地区分布以北疆,占全疆蒙古族总人口的68. 02%. 南疆占31.98%。蒙古族人口在北疆主要分布在伊犁地区、塔城地区和博尔塔拉蒙占自治州境内.比重均在10%以上.在南疆主要分布在巴州.,占全疆蒙古族总人口的27.88%。此外乌鲁木齐市和昌吉州也有少量分布。从1982年至1998年少数民族人口的年均增长率为2.02% , 而同期汉族的为1.53%。不过汉族人口90年代的年均增长率(2.12%)明显高于80年代(0.94%). 这主要是机械人口增长所致。在12个少数民族中满族和俄罗斯族人口的增长率大大高于其它民族。这主要源于80年代民族成分的更改.这不说明这两个民族人口的自然增长率或机械人口增长率奇高。从1982年到1990年满族和俄罗斯族人口的年均增长率竟分别高达9.21%和14.86%。 从1990年至1998年两个民族的年均增长率分别回落到了1.47%和1.74%的水平。90年代以后民族成分更改基本上得到了有效的遏制。人口最多的维吾尔族的人口年均增长率逐步走低.人口最少的塔塔尔族和乌孜别克族的人口年均增长率不到1%其它少数民族的人口年均增长率基本上高于全区少数民族的平均水平。表1新疆各民族人口数量及其增长 (巾一位:万人 %) 这半个世纪以来,新疆地区的人口迁移的规模是历史上前所未有的。新疆成了中国吸引移民最多的地区,人口增长最快的地区。为了新疆的稳定,促进经济建设。国家有计划地先后多次组织以内地青年、复转军人及其它人口稠密地区人员向新疆的移民活动。例如1949 -1953年进入新疆的部分中国人民解放军部队和起义部队陆续转业组建了生产建设兵团。之后,津,京,武汉、江苏、浙江、湖北、河南、山东等省市33万人各类人员来疆;1962 -1966年,上海共组织了15万青年进入新疆等。他们的艰苦劳动塑造了一些新的“移民城市”。如奎屯,石河子,阿拉尔,北屯等等。为发展经济和巩固国防发挥了重要作用。同时,除国家有计划地组织的人口迁移外还有国家实行鼓励东部地区广大农村人口向边疆民族地区的自发流动政策而迁移。以上人员中农民比重大,劳改,劳教,刑满人员的比重也不小。1949 -1984年国内其它省、市、区迁入新疆的人口统计数总计为306. 91万人。推算数为955. 65万人,约占新疆总人口数的1/ 4。大批移民的进入缓和了当时新疆劳动力不足的矛盾带来了内地先进技术和文化。 使新疆城市人口数量大增,不仅绝对改变了新疆的民族人口结构,而且改变了新疆发展的方向,也改变了新疆的城镇特征以及民族关系。新疆的多数城镇具有很强的移民特征。据统计资料显示1953 -1964年新疆城市人口净迁移量为84.63万人,占城市总人口的62.43% ;1964 -1982年间新疆城市人口净迁移

数量为86. 06万人,占城市总人口的32. 91%。这正是前30年新疆成为城市化水平增加幅度较大的省区的原因,也是新疆城镇汉族人口占绝对优势的主要原因。新疆是中国经济不发达民族区域自治区,移入过多的人口必然加大人口压力。到2003年,新疆人口为1933.65, 占全国的1.05%,国土面积为1664897.17平方公里约占全国的1/6,人口密度为11. 62人/平方公里,为全国平均人口密度的8.6%。但是新疆区域人口分布主要受区域自然条件和地理环境的影响97%以上的人口集中分布在仅占新疆土地总面积3.5%的绿洲上。2002年,新疆劳动力资源总数达1309. 72万人,占总人口的68.74%;从业人员为701.49万人,占劳动力资源的53.56%.劳动力资源供大于求。这种状况势必使就业问题越来越来突出,继而影响居民生活水平的提高影响民族关系和社会稳定。其次人口的过快增长也会对资源环境造成巨人压力。据资料统计新疆的人均耕地面积已经从1990年的0. 20公顷/人减少到2003年的0. 17公顷/人部分落后地区甚至低于全国平均水平(0。11公顷/人),如和田和克州在1990年人均耕地面积分别是0. 17公顷/人和0. 16(公顷/人,2003年减少到0.10公顷/人和0. 07公顷/人。这种日益减少的趋势会随着人口的迅速增长速增长持续下去。绿洲人口密度为207人/平方公里.这种人口压迫生产力的地区转移可以说是增加了自治区就业工作的难度,只是在当时吃大锅饭的计划经济条件下引起的严重后果还不容易被察觉出来,其实新疆劳动力就业矛盾早就发生了,在少数民族尤其是维吾尔族聚居的城镇和乡村尤其严重。同时,国家在新疆兴建的一批批工业企业及新垦区,新城镇总伴随着东部大量人口的移入,而几乎没有吸收当地少数民族劳动人口。而与此同时没有能够或忽视少数民族聚居的老城镇和乡村的各项投入。在制定地区发展计划,预算分配方面和资源使用等方面,新疆少数民族处于被边缘化的极不平等的态势。根据中央和自治区政府的发展计划经济发展落后的新疆少数民族聚居的地区和城乡没被列入任何发展计划,工业化未给予任何考虑。在广大南疆少数民族聚居区未开办有一家有规模的企业。因此,拨给少数民族聚居地区的发展预算仅占预算总额的极小部分。某种意义上讲,新疆少数民族没有很好的分享新疆经济发展的果实。新疆实施的名目繁多的发展计划,实质上不是出于新疆经济发展的需要,而是索取资源更好地为全国经济发展服务,同时确保移民安置和大量的资源储备,以待日后大规模开发。 相关政策的探讨 在新疆民族人口的问题上政府的相关政策主要体现为移民政策。资料显示政府对城镇和农村移民的直接参与程度都很高。国家一直是实行移民的最重要动力。汉族人口的大量迁入改变了新疆的民族人口结构。汉族从1949年,占新疆总人口的6. 71% ,居第三位发展到1997年,占新疆总人口的38.41%,居第二位。中央政府进行大规模移民的目的主要是推动民族融合,边区开发和稳定。从目前看预期的目标基本达到。但是,汉族移民的大量迁入也给新疆其它民族造成就业,咨询,资源,教育,城市化以及使用公共机构和设施方面巨大的压力。 即使是如此大规模的移民一一建国后新疆每四个新增人口中就有一个是从内地迁移来的。新疆的民族人口的分布格局仍是不均衡的。南疆喀什、阿克苏、和田仍然是维吾吾尔族的聚居地区;汉族人口主要居住在北疆的城乡和南疆的各个城镇。此外,超过三分之一的人(1997年占汉族人口的36. 11%)生活在相对隔离的兵团(占新疆总人口的13. 88% )。这种聚居带来的相对隔离的民族分布格局.过去,今天乃至将来都影响着新疆民族关系的发展。在新的形势下在区内外应该停止鼓励或支持移民活动;国家不应该阻碍新疆维吾尔族人或其他任何群体可能发展成为多数人群体。对于新疆的绝大多数少数民族人口来说,新疆的地区性质更可取的定义是“新疆是维吾尔族自治区和全体已经在新疆或将来在新疆定居的全国各族公民的地区”。 三、新疆少数民族群体的资本积累能力

资本积累能力是最根本和最具有决定意义的能力。无论从新疆少数民族人口的地域分布,行业和职业分布还是从产业结构来看,我们很清楚地知道在新疆,约九成少数民族群众靠农牧业吃饭。也就是说他们的经济活动,主要收入跟农村和农业有关。农民的资本积累能力取决于农业剩余和外部输入。而农业剩余=农民收入—农民负担;外部输入主要有国家财政支农和贷款。所以下面将从收入能力,减负能力等2个方面来衡量和分析少数民族农民的资本积累能力。 1. 新疆少数民族获取收入能力 先让我们审视一下新疆少数民族的收入的现状。我们主要看收入增幅和城乡收入差距两方面。根据一些报导和政府统计的资料,和学者的研究发现:⑴.九十年代中后期以来全国农民收入增幅连年下降,新疆一些地区甚至出现了负增长,收入为0的新疆少数民族的农牧民数量更进一步扩大,收入为0和负增长的农户数量居然也在增加,一些地区返贫现象严重。新疆的26个贫困县市都是少数民族高度聚居的⑵.北疆与南疆,兵团与地方,城市与乡村,汉族聚居与少数民族聚居的城市之间的发展差距进一步拉大;进而汉族与少数民族群众之间的收入差距不断扩大。据资料统计,新疆城镇居民家庭全年人均纯收入是9061. 72 元/人,位列全国第14位,而农村居民家庭全年人均纯收入只有2106. 19 元/人全国排名23位。可见新疆城乡经济发展水平差距显著。新中国成立以后,新疆的社会经济获得了前所未有的发展,但与内地许多省区,尤其是东南沿海一些发达省区相比,还是相对落后,居民的收入水平与生活水平都相对较低1999年,上海市城镇居民人均收入与农村居民的人均纯收入分别是新疆同类收入指标的2倍与3. 7倍尤其是新疆农村居民收入水平从1990年以后与全国平均水平的差距越来越大,由负的2.8元增至负的737.1 元,人均纯收入由1980年在全国排第13位降至 1999年的第25位。新疆共有16个地、州、市,各地经济发展水平极不平衡,各地居民收入的差距也越来越大以喀什地区为例,1990年喀什市城镇居民家庭人均可支配收入是乌兽木齐市的70%,1999年仅为57%; 1990年喀什地区农村居民家庭人均纯收入是昌吉回族自治州的72% ,1999年仅为33%.南疆的和田,喀什、克孜勒苏和阿克苏四地州是维吾尔族高度聚居区,也是全疆相对贫困的地区,全疆92.5 %的贫困人口分布在这里。据自治区农村调查队的抽样调查,1999年和田地区农民一年的纯收入仅够生活费支出,而喀什地区还远远不够,两地农民家庭的恩格尔系数(家庭用于食品的开支在家庭收入的比重)达到60%以上。(新疆史居主要少数民族2000年城镇人口比例:维吾尔族19.44哈萨克族15.25柯尔克孜族11.55,塔吉克族9.16,新疆为约35%)。现状如此,客观存在了的。我们的着眼点放在今后的增收能力上。 在新疆广大少数民族群众发展环境的制约下,无论即在家务农,还是外出打工,发展的空间都是很狭窄的。如果小农经济,即一家一户耕种一小块土地,还继续存在的话,再怎么挖潜都将是徒劳的。可行的出路在于农村剩余劳动力向非农领域转移。按照是否转移(迁徙),我们将新疆少数民族农民分为在家务农的和外出打工的两部分。 对于前者,即在家务农的农民,他们收入的途径主要有:⑴ 规模经营;⑵ 农业产业化、产品结构调整;⑶ 融入“公司+农户”的所谓农业产业化之中;⑷ 农业技术创新;⑸ 农产品价格上升。对于⑴,理论上虽然讲得通,但仍需要两个条件的支持:一是农村剩余劳动力向外转移的力度要充分大;二是土地私有或是说农地有偿转让制度的形成。这两个条件对新疆少数民族来说由于制度和政策等多种原因两个条件同时达到的可能性是很小的。假定两个条件都能达到,少数民族农民由于资本积累能力弱,投资和经营能力不够等诸多原因,也只能在自己的原来的土地上当一个农民工的宿命。少数民族农牧民依靠规模经营增加收入并非理论上那么简单。当然我们能够想象其中极少数成功的典型。对于⑵,有一定的潜力是不可否认的,但是并非说要调整就能调整的,比如一些地区只适合种植某种作物,如果硬要种另外一种不适合当地气候条件的作物,无易于自讨苦吃。有一些地方就是这样做的。对于⑶,我们并不持过于乐观的态度。尽管在一些地方农业产业化搞的好,但这并不具有普遍意义。所谓的农业产业化实质上就是工商业资本投入到农业领

域,在市场条件下,资本所有者是追求利润最大化的,他不可能盲目“搞派对”将资本投入到没有效益的地方去的。此外新中国成立以来国家在新疆投资开垦新的土地,新疆耕地面积大幅扩大。但主要作为兵团用地安置移民,但新疆少数民族聚居的绿洲耕地并未随着人口的增加而相应的增加人均可种耕地减少,人地矛盾很突出。所以农业产业化并不是有些人说的那样是解决新疆少数民族农村,农民增收问题的关键出路。对于⑷新疆不是没有好的农业技术,也不是广大少数民族群众排斥新的技术,而是难于推广。技术如何推广,政府有没有推广的意愿和决心,谁来推广是一个难题。再说,技术转让是要支付成本的,且不论单个农户能不能付的起这笔费用,有没有必要都成问题。有那么多劳动力有剩余,又转移不出去,何必用技术替代劳动。对于⑸,由于我国已加入WTO ,农产品,尤其是一些常见的,如玉米、小麦、水果、棉花等价格上升的空间几乎为零。因此,对于上述5点,我不是很乐观的。这并不是说新疆少数民族群众的人就不能致富了,少数民族就不前进了。我只是强调一点:他们收入的能力在现有的环境制约下是十分有限的。 对于后者,收入途径只有打工一条,即工资收入。然而,这条路有是何等的崎岖。首先,户籍制度的障碍。这种“制度歧视”的弊端我向大家都很清楚。其次,行业进入壁垒,这里主要指的是学历或是说知识壁垒。新疆少数民族人口的整体素质差,文化水平低,这是事实。即使是户籍制度取消了,广大的少数民族农民工也只能从事一些服务业、建筑业、小商业。因为你知识积累不够,进不了报酬高的行业和部门。突破知识壁垒取决于新疆少数民族的知识获取能力。而这种能力又是很有限的。此外,有些职业和行业,少数民族群众哪怕学历和学识等各项条件都具备,甚至优秀的情况下也遭到不同程度的排斥。表现在诸多领域,例如,新疆少数民族很少招募入伍,在军队,警察,财政,银行等金融部门以及石油,天然气,党组织(书记),组织部,化工,通讯等诸多领域新疆少数民族担任高官要职收到政策的限制。另一方面,新疆少数民族的教育机构和语言都受到了与我国的法律和政策都不允许的,不应有的轻视。更有甚至卡车司机,清洁工,采棉农,都被当成援助新疆,开发新疆的专家从遥远的内地农村招聘。石油天然气,化工等劳动密集型产业企业几乎不用当地少数民族劳动力。这也在很大程度上在诸多方面影响了少数民族居民的包括收入获取能力。 少数民族缺乏取得收入的渠道就会丧失自我积累自我发展和融资的能力。市场条件下,资本是趋于收益高的领域或区域流动的。新疆的农村金融组织,如“农村基金会”、“信用合作社”面向少数民族农牧民的金融服务呈收缩趋势。农民的存款也纷纷向城市集中,而同时农民却告贷无门,“就是传统的生产和生活小额借贷,也与农民无缘”。银行等金融机构是嫌贫爱富的。由于农业生产效益低,甚至负效益;再加上面对的是高度分散、贫穷的农户,资本是不会进入农民手中的。当然农民有时又必须借款,不得以只好求助于高利贷了。很明显新疆少数民族农民通过正常渠道融资的能力几乎为零。如果仅仅靠农业剩余,新疆少数民族农民的原始资本积累什么时候才能完成?遥遥无期,天要下雨,娘要嫁人!但又能怎么样哪? 2.减负能力 中国农民的负担现在是非常重的,这个大家都清楚,我不打算在这里论述。我将用举例子的方式来表述对新疆少数民族农民负担问题。 一个典型例子就是农民负担越减越重的政策失败怪圈。这里我们不讨论少数民族农民究竟被拿去多少钱。大量的事实已经证明:新疆南疆少数民族农民快被那些负担压死了!问题在于造成这个怪圈后面的原因。体制是其中的一个重要原因。例如:通常任命毫无农村工作经验,不懂当地语言文化的人当乡里的第一把手。另外的原因主要有:农民知识的匮乏、基层政权和地方恶势力的相互勾结以及愈演愈烈的腐败,还有民族工作方法有问题。重视形式和宣传的效果:中央和地方派出民族访问团,慰问团,工作团,到民族地区,传达党中央和国务院和全国各族人民对少数民族的关怀,表达汉族人民对他们的兄弟情谊,宣传党的民族宗教政策,进行民族团结,爱国主义,国际主义教育,党和国家派出短期医疗队,工作队等等。更为严重地是近年来出现一种趋向,无论发生任何事情,解决任何问题与民族关系联动在一起,其结果少数民族同胞不敢反映情况,不敢提意见,更不敢批评,抨击政府的政策,怕遭到惩罚。把民族区域自治仅仅理解为政治制度的问题,着重于这一制度本身的政治因素的任务,而忽视了还有具有经济因素的方面。中央政府政治高度集权体制与民族区域自治思想冲突,虽然有民族区

域自治法,从法律上对民族区域自治给予切实保证,但新疆维吾尔自治区执行民族区域自治法的自治条例至今还未出台,自治地方许多应有的权力仍集中在中央和地方一级政府,法律所规定的自治权利不能完全兑现。民族区域自治制度不能完全落实。相当程度上地方行政当局已经丧失了协调社会各阶层,各民族之间的利益关系的职能以及促进发展的政策优势。不改变这些作为原因的现状,新疆少数民族农民负担就不可能减下来。少数民族群众有些不知所措,困惑,有时冲动,茫然,感到失落。农民期望费改税。如果这一制度建立起来,有可能将农民负担减下来,但并非治本之策。这一制度在新疆具体执行中会不会走样呢?会不会达到应有的目的呢?。我们将拭目以待。 案例:“在叶亦克乡我了解到.每户早己分得了15亩土地.但农民不能自主经营。在这里.计划经济体制依然存在.整个农业生产始终要按上级党政部门的指令来执行。后来到了和田的其他县属农村和喀什、阿克苏地区的一些农村后.我才知道这种政策在南疆的大部分地区都在执行。在农村有五个统一即统一耕地.统一播种.统一管理.统一灌溉和统一收割。而且像种子、化肥、塑料薄膜和农药等也必须县乡政府统一购进后.按乡里确定的价格统一销售给农民.农民不得自行购置。农民没有钱.可以从乡信用社贷款。夏收之后.农民所用的全部费用及贷款等一并扣除后.剩余的才是农民的实际收入。叶亦克乡的一位村干部给我算了这样一笔账:如果一户农民种10亩小麦.那么按当地的收成标准和粮食销售价格.可以有4500- 5000元的收入。但当年的耕地费、播种费、水费、施肥费、管理费、地税、乡和村基金、公益金等支出就将达到4000元左右。扣除这些费用后农民实际能得到的也只有500- 1000元”。{拜合提亚尔吐尔逊《新疆南疆地区社会经济发展面临的问题,对策及其意义》,《西北民族研究》,2003年第2期. 四.知识贫困和教育的不平等 那么新疆少数民族尤其是他们的子女的知识状况以及在获取知识的能力和途径又如何呢?那么他们改变这种状况的能力又多大呢 根据,我国第四次和第五次人口普查有关新疆教育人口素质资料,我们不难发现新疆教育有了长足的进步,新疆少数民族同胞受教育年限普遍提高,(看表)。但问题是区域内教育资源和人才的分布极不平衡。存在着严重的民族和地区差异,南疆与北疆,城市与农村,汉族与少数民族之间存在着严重的差异。少数民族,尤其是广大的南疆地区的处于严重的知识贫乏状态。人口素质指人的智力,体力,知识与科技水平等,是制约一个地区经济社会发展水平的重要因素。人口素质又人口分文化素质和健康素质。健康素质方面,据全国第五次全国人口普查资料统计,新疆平均预期寿命只有67. 41,低于全国71.4的平均水平,位列全国倒数第五。文化素质方面,虽然新疆文盲和半文盲比例低于全国平均水平,从每万人大专及以上学历人数、每万人专业技术人员数等指标看,新疆都高于全国平均水平,但是新疆具有大专以上学历的居民中有80%以上是新疆本地院校培养的,少数民族中这个比例更高。而本地院校,其人才素质,教育水平远不能与内地院校相比。就受教育居民的实际素质而言,并不像数字所显示的那样乐观。新疆从事科研活动的人员不少,但成果极少。这又从另一个角度说明新疆。如2003年,新疆从事科研活动的人数为25246人,占全国从事科研活动总人数 328. 4万人的0. 77%,专利申请仪为1473件,占全国308487件的0. 48%,专利批准数仅为752件,占全国182226件的0. 41%。。总之,新疆人口文化素质总体不高的状况,势必影响新疆的国民经济发展水平。 大多数新疆少数民族只能一辈子呆在农村,自生自灭了(当然我不否认少数有文化的农民的存在)。把目光转向少数民族农民子弟。他们接受知识的最主要的途径就是接受学校教育。首先看义务教育。状况并不乐观:由于学杂费高,学校乱收费,很多学生读完小学就辍学。读不起书的现象比比皆是。这里值得一提的是“普九”检查。很多地方的学校都是临时雇人当“学生”。所以,尽管表面上“普九”达标;其实学生流失严重!乡村的义务教育,是一种公共商品,理应有国家公共财政来支持,但却让农民集资来承担大部分费用。不出钱,有要乡村学校硬性达标,岂非怪事!城乡二元教育体制造成城乡教育的严重不平等。我们看一下1986年9月11日颁发的《关于实

施〈义务教育法〉若干问题的意见》,其中第22条意见规定:”城镇,凡国家举办的中小学新建、扩建、改建校舍所需的投资,按学校隶属关系,列入主管部门基本建设投资计划,并予以照顾。农村中小学校舍建设投资,以乡、村自筹为主。地方人民政府对经济有困难的地方,酌情予以补助。”也就是说,城镇中小学属于由国家举办的学校,由国家和地方财政拨款建设,农村中小学则是农民自己的学校,由农民自筹资金兴办。制度设置造成的教育的起点的不公平是最大的不平等。当一个少数民族农民的子弟问我电视里的计算机是什么时。我不知怎样回答,只能说“等你上了大学就知道了。”他如果知道城市里的孩子已经在利用计算机上网玩游戏,学习文化知识时会作何感想呢?无论从校舍等基础设施的建设,还是师资的配备来说,农村的教育和城市的差距很大(同一个城市的民汉学校基础设施,人员配备,政策待遇上的差距更是不能理解)。差距主要在预算内经费上,而其余差距主要在预算外经费支出上。据有关统计资料和自己的长期观察,农村县与一般城市市区在初中预算内和预算外经费支出上都存在着明显差距,以预算外上的差距更突出。而市和直市县的生均预算内经费较低,但其预算外经费支出则显著高于农村县。 我国的《义务教育法》明确规定,义务教育事业由地方负责,分级管理。在实际操作中,县、区级政府具体负责义务教育的实施。但是在我国的贫困地区,县、乡级财力有限、赤字严重的情况十分普遍。新疆最贫困的广大少数民族高度聚居的南疆地区除极少数县市外,在财政上靠上级的转移支付来维持基本的行政职能的运转,经费大量用于人员开支,对教育的投入、开支少而又少。据报道,这些问题已经引起了中央政府的强烈关注,这两年自治区和中央每年都有专款资助贫困地区,而且过去几年中教育转移支付的力度由于“国家贫困地区义务教育工程”的实施得到加强。在转移支付的政策框架的设计上,一个重要的问题是各级政府的职责的分担。目前,在“义务教育工程”这样的大型项目上中央起着主导和决策的作用,而一般性的教育专款的设置省级政府也基本在中央的教育专款的框架之内操作。在这样的体制下,省级政府在平衡地区间教育不平等上的努力很大程度上受中央政府的影响。考察发现,自治区级对下级的转移支付项目中,资金量的一半是为了满足中央政府项目的配套资金要求的。当然,这样的安排是与我国整个的财税体制,以及当地政府的行政体制和能力分不开的。 其次看高等教育。且不论高校招生上巨大的城乡和民族差别,即使一个少数民族农家孩子考上了大学,能否供得起就是一个大问题。自从1997年高校收费并轨以来,学费连年上涨。一个一般的农村家庭根本供不起一个大学生。2000年的高校学杂费一般都在3000-4500圆之间,住宿费在500-1200元之间,一些艺术类学校更高。居住在乡村的人口占总人口的约85%以上的新疆数少数民族家庭有一半即使拿出所有的现金收也供不起一个大学生一年的学杂费。(新疆高校除塔里木农垦大学,喀什师范学院都分布在乌鲁木齐,石河子等等天山北坡地区的城市。离少数民族地区1000-1500公里,又增加一笔大的费用)考上了大学,家长也只能”望学兴叹” !也许会有人说,我们有奖、贷、助、勤的措施,能够保证贫困学生完成学业。能不能保证所有的贫困学生都能完成学业是一个问题。奖学金是给成绩好的学生,并不必然给贫困学生;至于国家助学贷款,银行也只青睐一些名牌大学,如北大、清华等一般的院校是很难贷到的,即使贷到也只有一小部分;学校助学款和勤工俭学数量有限。越来越高的学费却将很多的少数民族子弟拒之门外。难怪很多少数民族父母祈祷自己的孩子考不上大学!此外,极少数新疆少数民族学生也只能报考少数内地高校,而受到严格的名额和专业限制。硕士,博士等更高的学历教育招生体制对新疆少数民族来说也是很不公平的。 评论:1教育严重匮乏。⑴适龄儿童入学率低,不能在可接受教育的年限及时入学;⑵孩子随家长四处流动,其中许多人有过辍学的经历;⑶流动子女失学情况普遍。2基础教育的边缘化。新疆少数民族及其子女在接受教育上是处于非常不平等的地位,少数民族的教育资源是何等的贫乏. 五. 权能信息获取能力 权能信息是指控制、调节、协调全社会生产一切具有流动单向性的社会经济教育文化信息,都属

于此类信息。比如国家的法律法规,政府的政策法令,经济宏观决策等等。它是一种重要的信息资源。它的获取意味着知情权的获取,为进一步做出反映和决策提供信息基础。举个例子来说,知道了哪些费该缴,哪些不该缴,就会做出缴什么,不缴什么的决策,以维护自己的利益等等。 由于我国的政治体制是集权型的,而权能信息的传递是单方面的,必须要经过多个环节(各级政府),并且信息信道狭窄。比如中央的政策往往是采用下发的形式,一级级地向下传达。这就有很多问题了。在每个环节都存在类似“一夫当关,万夫莫开”的状况,只要在每一个环节做一点小手脚,比如说某一级政府将上级政府的决策改动一下,隐蔽一点,下一级政府再改动一点,到最后,这个政策就变样了。有令不行,有法不依的另一个重要原因就是信息不对称和监督成本太高。欺上瞒下能屡屡得逞就是由于权能信息信道关口一些追求自身利益的人控制了,好政策下不来,坏消息上不去。所以一个对一些官僚不利的政策连续过几道关口,到头来要么“消失”了,要么变样了。再加上自己文化素质低或语言不同,缺乏直接接受权能文化(如看报,上网查询,等)的能力,即使知道什么政策,也只知道一个大概。南疆农民负担越减越重的政策失败怪圈形成的重要原因之一就是获取权能信息能力的极度缺乏。权能信息,尤其是一些有利于少数民族的政策、法令被大大小小的官僚垄断。 六.制度歧视 户籍制度,兵团制度,资源开发体制像一堵无形的墙,将城乡分割开来,它带给新疆少数民族的最恶劣的影响莫过于发展机会的狭窄。新疆少数民族无法融入先进的社会生产力系统中排斥在新疆社会整体发展目标之外,始终难以融入新疆城市的发展系统,尤其是先进生产力系统中去。这固然有他们文化水平低等他们自身的因素,但不可否认少数民族有大量的发展机会被惯性的制度限制了。所以农民干得是“脏、苦、重”得活,职业选择范围的缩小,极大地影响新疆少数民族的发展机会。新疆少数民族也没有成为新疆石油天然气,化工工业等资源垄断性,劳动密集型产业和企业的招工对象因此更不能成为训练对象。因而他们很难转化为训练有素、有技术、具有现代化观念的工人队伍”。试想收入低不用说,最重要的是因此而失去了分享现代化发展成果(先进的文化、信息、技术、方法等)的机会 ,难以融入先进的生产力系统,意味着少数民族综合“素质”将难以提高,也只能充当“边缘人”的角色了。很多少数民族群体成员因此从中国社会经济边缘中寻找生存与发展的机会,只能唱着流浪者之歌,甚至走向犯罪。(看附1)素质低,无能,道德品质差,不可信任,脏,贫穷,犯罪,好斗,酗酒,吸毒,罪大恶极,无可救药。例如:我的坐出租车的亲身经历。“新疆人”身份先天性地低人一等。“新疆人”或“维族人”本是称呼,在我国却越来越具有“身份”的另一层含义。“新疆人”二字只和“小头,毒贩”相联结,人就是这样给“新疆人”定位的。因此,无论一个人干什么事,只要他(她)是一个“新疆人”“维吾尔族人”,就免不了要受歧视。被排斥感由此而生。天然地处于“身份”劣势的他,她想出人头地是非常困难的。这种后果无论从哪方面讲,都是灾难性的,影响是长久的。我的新疆同胞问:我们的民族会被抛弃吗?。其实新疆少数民族宽容的精神,吃苦耐劳的精神和创造力完全可以在新疆乃至中国现代化发展过程中发挥更大的作用。 七.集团博弈的受害者 兵团制度,户籍制度,资源开发体制的背后其实是一种利益关系。谈户籍制度:这种不合理制度取消与否并不取决于我们的口头呼吁和书面的批判,而是取决于它所涉及到的两个利益集团之间的博弈结果。这两个利益集团一个是农民群体,包括;另一个是城市居民,“包括人数广泛的工商企业家、企业员工、政府官员、专家学者等”。我们知道城乡差别的收益者是城市居民,受害者是农民。城市居民为了维护他们的工作岗位、福利、安全等既得利益,是倾向于不让农民进城的。但农民是倾向于进城的。 谈兵团体制:新疆生产建设兵团是党政军企合一的特殊组织。它的前身是中国人民解放军进疆部队的大部分.1954年 .10. 5万官兵就地转业.部分来自全国各地的大中专生、支边青年、复员军人组建兵团。它担负着中央赋子的屯垦戍边保卫边疆,巩固国防的历史使命,既是新疆的重要组成

部分,又在国家实行计划中一列.是国内最大的特殊的农工商经济联合体。设有自己的法院,检察院,公安,银行,保险,大学…。它下设14个师、174个农牧团场以及517个独立核算工交建商企业和3215个社会事业单位。到2002年底,土地总面积7454. 21千公顷.其中耕地面积1057.08千公顷;总人口250.12万,其中汉族约占89%,兵团人口自然增长率4.17%,是历年来最低的。其中从业人员95.5万人;实现GDP 222.51元。兵团是强大的,在我国,新疆政治,经济,军事,社会文化,教育等领域具有强大的影响力,有绝对的发言权。而兵团的成长环境的封闭型和外生性以及又肩负着特殊的使命。因此他尽力维护,争取,发展自己的集团利益。近年来兵地之间争夺水土资源,矿产资源,资金分配,…行政管辖权等方面竞争加剧,纠纷不断,难以协调。 谈资源开发体制:我国宪法规定:所有资源(部分土地集体所有)都归国家,全民所有。但至今为止,却缺乏与其配套的资源管理制度和与之相适应的机制。目前新疆自然资源的管理仍然沿用的是行业管理模式,在自治区,地州,县三级政府对资源产权界定,国营,集体,个人对资源开发利用的使用权限界定,部门之间对官属权限的界定方面都还有许多不确切之出。造成在资源的产权问题上模糊,混乱的状况,如新疆维吾尔自治区国有资源的合法代表是谁,是地方政府,新疆各族人民,还是全体中国人,还是中央企业,作为国有资源的开发者和使用者的中央企业是不是有权无限期,无偿的占有资源,资源归全民所有,是不是每个人都可以有权开采矿产自然资源。在新疆由于特殊历史原因形成目前中央,兵团及地方等部门条块分割比较复杂的状况,各利益主体都把加速无偿资源储备转化成大量有价产品作为实现经济增长的主要手段。而我们长期实行的是“产品高价,原料地价,资源无价”的价格体系。这种价格体系对新疆是很不利的。新疆把高成本的原料以低于其价值的价格调拨出疆的同时等于把部分巨额利益也转移出去了。资源无价造成的自然资源开发过程中浪费现象也很严重。“无偿”的价值观念客观上助长了追求狭隘的经济效益观念的种种行为。宝贵的有限资源被超过一定承载能力的人口分享时,每个个体,每个群体都想得到更多的利益。当地少数民族也不例外。而新疆的资源产业基本上是采用由国家投资在新疆建立中央直接管理的企业建立起来的,虽然表面上看促进了区域经济的发展,但这种开发模式开发的冲动,计划,资金,各类人员,技术,设备都来自区外有没有吸收当接劳动力的直接参与开发活动,产品也主要输往区外,也与当地产业无法弥补,达不到产业联动,他与当地少数民族社会几乎处于“隔离”的状态。因此不能促进周围经济的发展,成为当地的经济“高地”。当年对吐哈油田刚刚进行开发时,制定的一系列政策,应该说是不得全体新疆民众的民心的,新疆石油管理局不在参与开发之列;塔里木油田的会战,也主要是内地大石油公司之间的地盘争夺,最多是库尔勒市靠“为石油服务”得到一些利益,可是对整个南疆地区的经济发展远没有宣传的那么大。 虽然新疆少数民族为这些利益集团的发展付出了巨大代价,而他们拒绝以新疆少数民族作为国有资源的可能受益人,不仅偏袒内地劳动力,而且想方设法把各种发展计划的实惠留给自己独享。“改革以来发生在政治生活中的一个重要变化就是,城市居民,大型企业对于自身利益的表达和寻求动力加强了,渠道拓宽了,更容易被反映在政策之中”。而新疆少数民族多数聚居在乡村,再加上他们的经济、政治和社会地位不高,缺乏表达利益的代表和畅通的渠道。在内外环境都极为不利的条件下,加上及其悬殊的力量对比的条件下,新疆少数民族要求变革的意愿和呼声被忽略,其影响力似乎没断奶的宝宝的哭声。尽管他们是各项政策的拥护者,依然是失败者!因此渴望国家法律框架内区域自治,要求给予我国的民族区域自治制度上或法律上规定的自治权,在新疆发展进程中承认维吾尔族是中国新疆实行区域自治的民族的重要性。但这种愿望不能得到利益集团的支持,因为现行体制对他们有利.。注:(维吾尔族在国家民委连一个工人都没有;至今没有一家研究新疆少数民族社会经济状况的专门机构,缺少发表学术成果的平台) 当然影响少数民族发展和民族关系的因素很多例如:文化,宗教,历史,国际政治环境,三股势力等等。不过我所分析的是其中最重要的。需要说明的是:总体上只是分析了它们作为相对于新疆少数民族个体的环境之意义上的主要方面。勾画了一幅限制、束缚新疆少数民族发展的有关制

度、体制、政策、资源等联结在一起组成的简明的图画。所以对一些问题并没有深入分析。只求总体清晰即可。至于新疆少数民族自身的状况,如技术技能低,思想保守、目光短浅,不适应现代市场经济的劳动价值观点,竞争意识不强,安于现状.很少或是基本没有谈。因为我认为通过政策的调整,民族区域自治法的进一步完善,有关自治条例的制定和贯彻执行,少数民族发展环境的改善,如受教育机会和就业机会的拓展,平等国民待遇的实现等,他们自身的弱势地位是会改变的。因此我们将讨论的重点放在发展环境上。构成新疆少数民族的发展环境的诸因素的相关性是相当大的。比如说收入低,就会影响他及其子女受教育的程度;知识贫困又影响他收入能力;制度壁垒限制了他们的发展机会,发展的机会的缺乏又会影响他们获取“素质”的能力,增加收入的能力等等。因此虽然我们在形式上是分开讨论几个因素的,但事实上它们是作为一个有机整体而存在的。任何一个因素的变动都会直接或间接影响到其它的因素。从这个意义上说,要回答“新疆经济发展与民族关系”的问题,不仅要一个一个因素的分析,还要从总体上考察。 结语 我们看到,在所注意到的几个方面确实存在着许许多多的障碍束缚着新疆少数民族的发展也严重影响着新疆经济发展和民族关系。那么是不是说他们就一定会被抛弃呢?我们可以说已经有部分被抛弃了。问题在于会不会继续抛弃。如果答案是是,我的回答就是:不会,绝对不;如果答案是不,我的回答就是:。未来是不确定的,不可预测的。但如果新疆少数民族的发展环境能得到充分的改善,我可以肯定的是:最美丽的还是我们新疆。 附1 据对新疆流浪儿童中心所作的问卷调查分析,去内地流浪的儿童人多是来自新疆南部城乡的维吾尔族男孩在97名新疆流浪儿童中,维吾尔族儿童占到85%,在内地流浪的儿童中,维吾尔族儿童更占到了98% ,83%来自南疆, (在新疆流浪儿童中心救助的915名新疆各族流浪儿童中,来自喀什、阿克苏两地区的也.占到45%) 54%的维吾尔族流浪儿童来自城镇,北京市收容遣送站在1998年和1999年分别收容维吾尔族流浪儿童达382人与515人分别占到当年收容16岁以下儿童的12%和11% 当地社会和政府有关部门对遥远的异地、异族文化陌生,因此流浪儿童的个人行为,成为内地一些地方出现歧视与排斥新疆人现象的一个重要原因,甚至因此影响到新疆与内地、维吾尔族与汉族的关系。谈谈这方面的影响近几年在一些内地城市中,“新疆人”似乎突然成为避之不及者的代名词,在宾馆、商场、市场、火车、公共汽车等公共场所,人们对来自新疆的人或相貌类似新疆一些少数民族的人百般防范,甚至公然拒绝提供服务,令不少去内地的新疆人心寒新疆人的名声为什么如此了一些人认为,一是新疆人中贩毒、吸毒的多,一是新疆人中偷窃、抢劫的多 人们总是凭借社会记忆(或经验)来确定自己的行为,建构自己对周围的认识没有社会记忆,人们在互动上就找不到一致性,就缺乏行动的规则也正是因为不同的记忆,造成了不同群体之间交流和沟通的困难,因为这样的记忆影响着他们彼此的认同,他们很容易被当地人辨识,他们的行为进而被夸人许多内地人通过亲身经历或各种传媒,形成对新疆人的思维定势,将其定格为“偷、抢、毒”,从而造成广泛的社会影响,甚至形成为一种社会记忆,并因此而影响整个新疆人的声誉一些地方就干脆避而远之,采取怀疑、防范甚至是拒绝等过激态度对待新疆人并波及合法流动、合法经营的新疆人[]李晓霞(1964830011女新疆社会科学院民族研究所}

发表在 Uncategorized | Tagged , , , | 发表评论