PLA Navy Spokesperson’s Commentary on U.S. – China Tensions

PLA Navy Spokesperson

中国海军首位女发言人邢广梅 PLA Navy first female spokesperson Senior Captain Xing Guangmei

Must War Break Out Between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea?   PLA Navy Female Spokesperson Xing Guangmei Gives the Inside Story

My translation –

http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2015-12-18/doc-ifxmttme5758528.shtml

Commentary on the Global Times net from a PLA Navy spokesperson Xing Guangmei “first female spokesperson of the PLA Navy” on whether war can be avoided in the South China Sea.

There is a lot of talk in international society these days about how the “argument between the US and China about rules”. US President Obama ‘s recent comment on the Trans Pacific Partnership, that “we don’t want to let China write the economic rules for the world”. These made discussions on this point even more intense. In this writer’s view, this argument about rules is superficial. This talk about rules is really just an excuse and is very deceptive.

Although there is a “struggle” these days between the U.S. and China, we need to understand that what the US struggles for and what China struggles for are very different. China’s struggle is for the survival of the state and for its right to development. The key point is the expansion of opportunities for China’s development in the world and the rise of China’s influence. The US struggle, however, is to maintain world hegemonism and its place as the #1 hegemon. The US believes that China’s rise threatens its fundamental nation interests. Therefore, its “struggle” is to contain the increase in China’s international influence. This will must lead to a bumping of heads between the US and China and indeed created the collision we see today between the US and China.

Over the short term, the US will strive even harder to achieve its so-called strategic objectives. One of the way it is doing this is, through various means, to strengthen its presence in the region. One example is directly stationing military forces or increasing the frequency of patrols; another is selling weapons and equipment to its allies or partners as well as by holding joint military exercises with countries in the region. By increasing its presence, the US aims to counter-balance China’s building up of military capacity in the South China Sea. Many people are concerned that, as this trend continues, that the South China Sea could become a “tinderbox that ignites” or even that “war is certain”. The most important way to avoid that possibility is for the United States to give up its strategy of world hegemony and its Cold War thinking, accept the fact of the rise of China. However, for now it appears that the US is not doing that. Therefore, China still needs to endure facts of that the US is not willing to accept the development of China and that it is doing its utmost to contain China.

The “US struggle”, which is the US containment of China, is both strong and has its methodical. Its strength refers is the power it has built up over the past century, its absorptive capacity, and its multifarious soft power. Methods refers to the military alliance system that the US has been running for the past half-century and the pragmatic spirit embodied in it. The “Chinese struggle” face many difficulties and constraints. A new round of big changes for China — new technologies such as the Internet are creating comprehensive changes in society, big changes in the structure of the Chinese economy; big changes in the Chinese military that are underway; and how institutions in the areas of politics, culture, and the law are being improved and made more comprehensive.  When we come to the many obstacles that China faces in its development, this refers to the constraints and provocations that China gets from the U.S. and its allies.

Overall, there is more cooperation than opposition and competition in the US – China relationship. However, the tone of US – China relationship these days is becoming the shrill one of opposition and competition, and that trend is becoming steadily stronger. The danger point is at sea, and particularly in the South China Sea. The U.S. and China do have procedures in place to manage crises and clearly both sides are committed to preventing a crisis from breaking out. Fundamentally, this is about the strategic choices the US makes. The choices the U.S. makes in the Pacific region will directly affect the peace and stability of the not only the region but of the entire world. Easing tensions is not just China’s responsibility. Easing of tensions is a big challenge to the U.S. as well.  (The author Xing Guangmei is the first female spokesperson for the Chinese Navy.)

 

新浪军事> 中国军情>  正文

中美南海是否必有一战 海军女发言人解读内情

2015年12月18日 15:03 环球网 微博

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国际社会一直流行有关“中美规则之争”的讨论。美国总统奥巴马不久前在谈到TPP时明确表示“不能让中国书写全球经济规则”,这使相关讨论变得更加热闹。但在笔者看来,规则之争只是一种表象,美国拿“规则”说事,实际上是想把它当成一个借口,极具欺骗性。

尽管中美之“争”确实存在,但“美国之争”与“中国之争”内涵并不相同:中国争的是国家的生存和发展权,关键点是中国国际发展空间的拓展和国际影响力的提升;美国争的则是维系全球霸权和美元霸主地位。美国认为中国崛起威胁到其根本利益,因此它的“争”就是要遏制住中国国际影响力的增长。而这必然导致其与中国迎头相撞,造成今天中美冲突的现实。

短期来看,美国还将为实现所谓的战略目的做出更多努力。其中一个方向就是通过各种方式加大在亚太地区的存在,比如通过直接兵力部署或加大巡航频度;再如出售武器装备给盟国或其他伙伴,并与相关国家举行联合军演。通过加强自身存在,美国谋求平衡中国在南海的军事能力建设。很多人都担心,随着形势进一步发展,南海可能出现“擦枪走火”甚至“必有一战”。避免这种可能性的主要办法就是美国放弃全球霸权战略和冷战思维,接受中国崛起的现实,但目前来看美国还做不到这一点。因此,中国还得承受美国不接受中国发展并竭力遏制中国的现实。

“美国之争”,即美国对中国的遏制,强大而有手段。说强大,是指美国近百年霸权的实力积累以及兼收并蓄、包容万千的软实力;说有手段,是指美国经营半个多世纪的军事同盟体制和实用主义的灵活运用。“中国之争”艰难而阻力重重。说艰难,是指中国正在经历新一轮巨大变革:互联网等新技术带给社会的全方位变革,中国经济结构的转型,中国新军事变革的推进以及政法、文化等领域的机制改良和完善等;说阻力重重,是指中国的发展时时遭受来自美国及其盟友的牵制和挑衅。

总体而言,中美之间的合作大于对抗竞争,只是当前中美关系的高音变成了竞争和对抗,而且烈度有上升的趋势。其中最危险的接触点无疑是在海上,尤其是在南海方向。当前,中美之间虽有危机管控机制,双方管控危机的意愿也很明确,但要真正防范冲突的爆发,根本上还是取决于美国对既往战略的调整。美国在亚太地区做何选择,将直接影响该地区甚至整个世界的和平与稳定。就此而言,缓解中美之争不仅仅是中国的责任,更是摆在美国面前的一个现实而紧迫的挑战。(作者:邢广梅  系中国海军首位女发言人)

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2009: Translation of Liu Xiaobo Conviction in a Chinese Court

http://freemorenews.com/2009/12/26/liu-xiaobo-first-instance-verdict/

英文翻译之后有中文原文

 

Conviction of Liu Xiaobo for Incitement to Overthrow State Power, December 25, 2009

Several errors in the Chinese language transcription of the court verdict text that appeared on-line are corrected in the translation. A scan of the original text at http://crd-net.org/Article/Class18/lxb/200912/20091230104501_19190.html confirmed that the changes made in the online transcription/scan were correct.

Chinese text from http://freemorenews.com/2009/12/26/liu-xiaobo-first-instance-verdict/


Beijing Municipality First Intermediate People’s Court Verdict in Criminal Case

(2009) First Intermediate Court No. 3901

Public Prosecutor: Beijing Municipality People’s Procuratorate First Branch.

The accused, Liu Xiaobo, male, 53 years old (born December 28, 1955), Han nationality, born in Changchun City, Jilin Province, doctoral student level education, unemployed, household registration at Qingchun Street No. 5, 2-1-2, Xigang District, Dalian City, Liaoning Province. Resides temporarily at No. 7 Xiancun, Bank of China dormitory Building 10, Unit 1, No. 502 in the Haidian District of Beijing Municipality. In January 1991, he committed the crime of making counter-revolutionary propaganda but escaped criminal punishment; in September 1996 because he disturbed the social order, he was sent to re-education through labor for three years. He was summoned for detention on December 8, 2008 on suspicion of incitement to overthrow state power and on December 9 put under residential surveillance. On June 23, 2009 he was arrested. He is now confined to Beijing Municipality Detention Center No. 1.

  • Defense counsel: Ting Xikui, a lawyer at the Beijing Mo Shaoping Law Office
  • Defense counsel: Shang Baojun, a lawyer at the Beijing Mo Shaoping Law Office

Beijing Municipality People’s Procuratorate First Branch in Beijing Procuratorate First Branch Criminal Prosecution Indictment (2009) 247 charged the accused Liu Xiaobo of the crime of incitement to overthrow state power and on December 10, 2009 filed the indictment in this court. This court according to law assembled the court and held an open court session to try the case. The Beijing Municipality People’s Procuratorate First Branch sent Prosecutor Zhang Rongge and Deputy Prosecutor Pan Xuechu to sustain the indictment. The defense counsel for the accused Liu Xiaobo, Ding Xikui and Shang Baojun came to court to participate in the hearing. The trial has now already concluded.

The Beijing Municipality People’s Procuratorate First Branch incitement accuses the defendant Liu Xiaobo has, due to his dissatisfaction with the people’s democratic dictatorship state power system and socialist system of our country, since 2005, through various Internet websites such as “Observe China” and the “BBC Chinese Net” published articles such as “The Dictatorial Patriotism of the Chinese Communist Party”, “How Can it be that Only Party-Guided Democracy is Suitable for the Chinese People?”, “Change the Political Regime by Changing Society”, “The Many Faces of the Chinese Communist Dictatorship”, “The Negative Effect of the Rise of a Dictatorship on World Democratization”, “Inquiring Further into the Case of the Child Slaves of the Black Kilns”, and other inflammatory articles. The articles instigate rumors and libels such as “Since the Communist Party took power, the top priority of Communist dictators has been their own power and what they care least about is human life”; “The Chinese communist dictatorial state power promotes patriotism for officials, and the absurd theory of a party that takes the place of the state. What patriotism has become in effect is the call the people to love the dictatorial government power, to love the dictatorial party, to love the dictator. This is simply stealing the name of patriotism to create a reality that brings calamity to the country and to the people. “; “All the methods of the Chinese communists are based on a plan to support the rule and interests of the dictators, but there is no hope for them to continue for long since countless cracks have already appeared in the edifice of their dictatorship.” “Expecting a free China to appear from the “new policies” of the rulers is far less likely that hoping for it to come through the steady expansion of ‘new forces’ among the people.” Just as strong are these incitements: “Change the Society to Change the Regime”, and “Expecting a free China to appear from the “new policies” of the rulers is far less likely that hoping for it to come through the steady expansion of “new forces” among the people.”

Between September and December 2008, the defendant Liu Xiaobo colluded with others to draft and concoct the “Charter 08”, that proposed views such as “eliminate the monopoly of one party on the exercise of political power”, “to create a Chinese federation under the framework of democratic constitutional system of governance”, seeking to incite the overthrow of state power. Liu Xiaobo collected the signatures of over 300 people and sent “Charter 08” together with the signatures in an email to websites outside of the borders of mainland China publish it on websites outside the borders of mainland China such as “Democratic China” and “The Independent Chinese Pen Association”.

After Liu Xiaobo committed this offense, he was tracked down and brought to justice.

The Beijing Municipality Procuratorate First Branch provided to this court testimony of witnesses as to the guilt of of the defendant Liu Xiaobo. This included evidence such as the on scene investigation, the record of the investigation and electronic data that had been verified by the experts. The Beijing Municipality Procuratorate First Branch was convinced that the defendant Liu Xiaobo’s behavior violated section 105 part two of the “Criminal Code of the PRC”, and constituted incitement to the overthrow of state power, a serious offense. The Procuratorate handed the case over to this court for judgment according to the law.

The defendant Liu Xiaobo during the trial said that he was not guilty and that he was merely exercising the constitutional right of all citizens to free speech. The criticisms he expressed did not do any actual harm to anyone and is not incitement to overthrow state power.

Counsel for the defendant Liu Xiaobo argued that the six articles written by Liu Xiaobo mentioned in the indictment and “Charter 08” did not create rumors or libels and did not insult anyone. Moreover, said counsel, the articles published by Liu Xiaobo fall within the scope of the free speech of a citizen, expressing personal opinions and do not constitute incitement to overthrow state power.

During the trial it became clear that the defendant Liu Xiaobo, due to his dissatisfaction with the people’s democratic dictatorship and socialist systems of our country, between October 2005 and August 2007, at his temporary residence at No. 7 Xiancun, Bank of China dormitory Building 10, Unit 1, No. 502 in the Haidian District of Beijing Municipality, wrote and published articles on websites such as “Observe China” and “BBC Chinese Language Net”. On multiple occasions, he incited the overthrow of our country’s political system and the socialist system.

Liu Xiaobo in his articles

  • “The Dictatorial Patriotism of the Chinese Communists”,
  • “How Could it Be That the Chinese People Are Only Suited to ‘Party-Guided Democracy'”,
  • “Change the Political Regime by Changing Society”,
  • “The Many Faces of the Chinese Communist Dictatorship”,
  • “The Negative Effect of the Rise of a Dictatorship on World Democratization”, and
  • “Inquiring Further into the Case of the Child Slaves of the Black Kilns”

slandered the Chinese Communist Party. He made statements in these articles such as:

  • “Since the Communist Party took power, the top priority of Communist dictators has been their own power and what they care least about is human life”;
  • “The Chinese communist dictatorial state power promotes patriotism for officials, and the absurd theory of a party that takes the place of the state.  What patriotism has become in calling on the people to love the dictatorial regime, to love the dictatorial party, and to love the dictator.   This is simply stealing the name of patriotism to create a reality that brings calamity to the country and to the people. “; and
  • “All the methods of the Chinese communists are based on a plan to support the rule and interests of the dictators, but there is no hope for them to continue for long since countless cracks have already appeared in the edifice of their dictatorship.”
  • Equally as inciting are the statements “Expecting a free China to appear from the “new policies” of the rulers is far less likely that placing hope in its emergence through the steady expansion of “new forces” among the people.”

Between September and December 2008, the defendant Liu Xiaobo colluded with others to draft a document entitled “Charter 08”. That document proposed to “eliminate the monopoly of one party on the exercise of political power”, “to create a Chinese federation under the framework of democratic constitutional system of governance” and other incitements. Liu Xiaobo colluded with others to collect the signatures of 300 people and then sent “Charter 08” together with the signatures in an email to websites outside of the borders of mainland China and released it on websites outside the borders of mainland China such as “Democratic China” and “The Independent Chinese Pen Association”. The documents mentioned above that Liu Xiaobo put on websites were linked to and copied to other websites and viewed by many people.

The accused Liu Xiaobo after he committed this crime was investigated and brought to justice.

The facts above were proved during the trial.   The evidence presented has been shown to be true and this court affirms that the following has been demonstrated to be true:

1. The testimony of the witness Liu Xia proves: She is the wife of Liu Xiaobo and lived together with him at No. 7 Xiancun, Bank of China dormitory Building 10, Unit 1, No. 502 in the Haidian District of Beijing Municipality, that there are three computers in the home, one a desktop and other two are notebooks. Because she doesn’t understand anything about computers. Liu Xiaobo uses the computer mainly to write articles and to go on-line. Only two people, herself and Liu Xiaobo, live in the home, no-one lives with them. Only very seldom do guests come to visit — when Liu Xiaobo participates in a meeting, it is almost always outside his home. She doesn’t know how the computer connects to the Internet. Liu Xiaobo arranged for the Internet connection in late 2001. Their income comes chiefly from what Liu Xiaobo earns from his writings. Liu Xiaobo opened an account at the bank in her name. Deposits to the account for Liu Xiaobo’s writings come irregularly. Every month she goes to the bank at irregular intervals to withdraw money.

2. The Beijing and Muxi branches of the Bank of China, Ltd. provided the “evidence of opening an account” and “bank money order receipt” that prove that Liu Xiaobo’s wife Liu Xia went to the bank to receive and withdraw money orders (in foreign currency) coming from outside the borders of mainland China.

3. China United Network Communication Co., Ltd. Beijing subsidiary provided a “Reply to a request for assistance in conducting an examination of digital data”. This proves: Liu Xiaobo used an ADSL account, and a record of his having gone on-line.

4. The testimony of the witness Zhang Zuhua proves: she together with Liu Xiaobo at the end of 2008 drafted and completed “Charter 08”. She also collected signatures. Thereafter, Liu Xiaobo published “Charter 08” on websites outside the borders of mainland China.

5. The testimony of the witness He Yongqin proves: in early December 2008, he received an email from Liu Xiaobo contained “Charter 08”. Liu Xiaobo let him see it and sign it if he wants. After reading the email, he replied to Liu Xiaobo that he agreed to sign it.

6. The testimony of the witness Zhao Shiying proves: that in October 2008, Liu Xiaobo sent “Charter 08” to him through the Internet and asked for his advice on revising it, and asked that he find other people willing to sign it. At a meeting, Zhao showed “Charter 08” to over ten people. Four of them said that there were willing to sign it. Liu Xiabo through the Internet also asked him to go to Guangzhou to collect signatures. In Guangzhou, he collected five signatures.

7. The testimony of the witness Yao Bo proves: that in October 2008, when Liu Xiaobo met him, and discussed the charter with him, and he agreed to sign it.

8. The testimony of the witness Zhou Duo proves: that one day in November 2008, Liu Xiaobo went to his home to show him the draft of “Charter 08”, and asked for his help in revising it. After Liu Xiaobo left, he looked over the draft but did not revise it. He did not sign at that time, but later he saw the Charter on-line had his signature.

9. The testimony of the witness Fan Chunsan proves: that in late October 2008, when we was eating with Liu Xiaobo and others, Liu Xiaobo took out a copy of “Charter 08” for him to read. When Liu Xiaobo asked him whether or not he would sign it, he agreed to sign it. He knew that Liu Xiaobo has published this document already on websites outside the borders of mainland China such as “Boxun”, “The Independent Chinese Pen Association”. He had also read it on-line and knew that the Liu Xiaobo’s document was of the kind that criticized contemporary politics.

10. The testimony of the witnesses Xu Junliang, Zhi Xiaomin and Teng Biao prove: that in November and December 2008, they received in their e-mail mailboxes “Charter 08” but did not know who had sent it. They each signed “Charter 08” and sent it back to the mailbox they had received it from.

11. The testimony of the witness Wang Zhongxia proves: that in December 2008, after reading “Charter 08” on-line, he found that he agreed with it and signed it. Later, he had printed some “Charter 08” shirts and wore it himself and gave to other people to wear in order to publicize “Charter 08”.

12. The “investigation record” of Public Security organs and material evidence photographs of December 8, 2008 prove: that relying on the testimony of witnesses, Public Security searched Liu Xiaobo’s residence at No. 7 Xiancun, Bank of China dormitory Building 10, Unit 1, No. 502 in the Haidian District of Beijing Municipality, found and took into custody the tools that Liu Xiaobo used to write the documents and to send them to websites — two notebook computers, one desktop computer, and one copy of a printed document “Charter 08 — Request for Comments”.

13. The Beijing Municipality Networking Industry Association Forensic Electronic Data Center provided a “Judicial Testimony Opinion Document” proves: that on December 13, 2008, according to a forensic examination of the data stored on the three computers that authenticated the discovery of the electronic documents “The Dictatorial Patriotism of the Chinese Communist Party”, “How Can it be that Only Party-Guided Democracy is Suitable for the Chinese People?”, “Change the Political Regime by Changing Society”, “The Many Faces of the Chinese Communist Dictatorship”, “The Negative Effect of the Rise of a Dictatorship on World Democratization”, “Inquiring Further into the Case of the Child Slaves of the Black Kilns” and “Charter 08”.   In the records of the software “Skype” on his computer were found and recorded from the software a record of multiple emails that he sent from November to December 8, 2008 multiple emails were sent containing “Charter 08” and the “request for comments” document.

14. The on the scene investigation by the Public Security organs, and record of the investigation and the explanation of the work proves:

  1. The Beijing Municipality Public Security Public Information Network Security and Supervision Office First Detachment on December 19 – 23 discovered and downloaded the document signed “Liu Xiaobo” entitled “Liu Xiaobo The Dictatorial Patriotism of the Chinese Communist Party”. The document resided on a website with the domain name epochtimes.com. The website server is outside the borders of mainland China. The document was marked as having been published on October 4, 2005. That document as of December 23, 2008 links were found to five websites that had either published or republished that document.
  2. Between December 19, 2008 and August 3, 2008, Beijing Municipality Public Security Public Information Network Security and Supervision Officer First Detachment founded and downloaded from the Internet a document signed “Liu Xiaobo” entitled “Liu Xiaobo How Can it be that Only ‘Party Guided Democracy’ is Suitable for the Chinese People?”. That document resided on the websites with the domain names epochtimes.com (The Epoch Times) and http://www.observechina.net (Observe China). Both website servers are outside the borders of mainland China. The document is marked published on January 5, 2006 and January 6, 2006. This document as of December 23, 2008 had been published or republished on five websites and had a total of 402 hits.
  3. Between December 19, 2008 and August 3, 2008, Beijing Municipality Public Security Public Information Network Security and Supervision Officer First Detachment founded and downloaded from the Internet a document signed “Liu Xiaobo” entitled “Liu Xiaobo Change the Political Regime by Changing Society”. That document resided on the websites with the domain names epochtimes.com (The Epoch Times) and http://www.observechina.net (Observe China). Both website servers are outside the border of mainland China. The document is marked published on February 26, 2006 and February 27, 2006. This document as of December 23, 2008 had been published or republished on five websites and had a total of 748 hits.
  4. Between December 19, 2008 and August 3, 2008, Beijing Municipality Public Security Public Information Network Security and Supervision Officer First Detachment founded and downloaded from the Internet a document signed “Liu Xiaobo” entitled “Liu Xiaobo The Many Faces of the Chinese Communist Dictatorship”. That document resided on the websites with the domain names http://www.secretchina.com (Secret China) and http://www.observechina.net (Observe China). Both website servers are outside the border of mainland China. The document is marked published on March 13, 2006. This document as of December 23, 2008 had been published or republished on six websites and had a total of 512 hits.
  5. Between December 20, 2008 and August 3, 2008, Beijing Municipality Public Security Public Information Network Security and Supervision Officer First Detachment founded and downloaded from the Internet a document signed “Liu Xiaobo” entitled “Liu Xiaobo The Negative Effect of the Rise of a Dictatorship on World Democratization”. That document resided on a website with the domain name http://www.secretchina.com (Secret China). The website server is outside the borders of mainland China. The document is marked published on May 7, 2006. This document as of December 23, 2008 had been published or republished on seven websites and had a total of 57 hits.
  6. Between December 20, 2008 and August 3, 2008, Beijing Municipality Public Security Public Information Network Security and Supervision Officer First Detachment founded and downloaded from the Internet a document signed “Liu Xiaobo” entitled “Liu Xiaobo Persisting with a Deeper Inquiry into the Case of the Child Slaves of the Black Kilns”. That document resided on websites with the domain names http://www.minzhuzhongguo.org (Democratic China) and http://www.renyurenquan.org (Human Rights in China). Both website servers are outside the border of mainland China. The document is marked published on August 1, 2007. This document as of December 23, 2008 had been published or republished on eight websites and had a total of 488 hits.
  7. On December 11, 2008, Beijing Municipality Public Security Public Information Network Security and Supervision Officer First Detachment founded and downloaded from the Internet a document entitled “Charter 08”. That document resided on the website with the domain name http://www.chinesepen.org (The Independent Chinese Pen Center). The website server is outside the borders of mainland China. The document is marked published on December 9, 2008 and is signed by a group of people. The same day, a document entitled “Chinese People From All Walks of Life Join Together to Issue Charter 08” was found and downloaded from the websites with the domain names boxun.com and http://www.minzhuzhongguo.org (Democratic China). Both of the website servers are located outside the boundaries of China and show publication dates of December 8, 2008 and December 12, 2008. This document as of December 12, 2008 had been published or republished on 33 websites including 19 outside the borders of mainland China and had a total of 5154 hits and 158 replies. On December 9, 2008, it was found that the website with the domain name http://www.2008xianzhang.info (Charter 08) had as of December 9, 2009 the signatures of 10,390 people who had signed “Charter 08”.
  8. The Beijing Municipality Public Security Public Information Network Security and Supervision Office investigated Liu Xiaobo’s e-mails and as a result of that examination found that Liu Xiaobo’s email mailbox is located outside the borders of mainland China. After using a password to get into that mailbox to check it, it was found that the earliest email sent from that mail box was dated November 25, 2008 and that 30 of the sent emails included “Charter 08”.

15. Liu Xiaobo’s signature in acknowledgement proves: that Liu Xiaobo confirmed the authenticity of documents downloaded and saved by the Public Security network monitoring and control departments “Liu Xiaobo The Dictatorial Patriotism of the Chinese Communist Party”, “Liu Xiaobo How Can it be that Only Party Democracy is Suitable for the Chinese People?”, “Liu Xiaobo Change the Political Regime by Changing Society”, “Liu Xiaobo The Many Faces of the Chinese Communist Dictatorship”, “Liu Xiaobo The Negative Effect of the Rise of a Dictatorship on World Democratization”, “Liu Xiaobo Enquiring Further into the Case of the Child Slaves of the Black Kilns”. Liu Xiaobo acknowledges that the documents in question were written by him and then published on the Internet. The evidence presented about demonstrate that those documents acknowledged by Liu Xiaobo contain inciting speech.

16. The defendant Liu Xiaobo’s deposition proves: that Liu Xiaobo deposes that he used his computer to write and then publish on the Internet the documents described above. Liu Xiaobo and the evidence presented above are mutually confirmatory.

17. The account that the Public Security organs provided on the progress of the case proves: that Public Security on the evening of December 8, 2008 went to Liu Xiaobo’s residence at No. 7 Xiancun, Bank of China dormitory Building 10, Unit 1, No. 502 in the Haidian District of Beijing Municipality in order to arrest Liu Xiaobo.

18. The previous “criminal verdict document” issued by the Beijing Municipality Intermediate Court (1990) Criminal Case 2373, the Beijing Municipality People’s Government Re-education Through Labor Management Committee (96) Beijing Labor Case No. 3400 “Decision on Re-education Through Labor”, proves: that Liu Xiaobo on January 26, 1991 although he committed the crime of making counter-revolutionary inciting propaganda was not given a criminal punishment; and that on September 26, 1996 because he had disturbed social order, his case was handled by giving him three years of re-education through labor.

19. Identification provided by the Public Security organs prove: that the name, residence and other information of the defendant Liu Xiaobo.

This court believes that the defendant Liu Xiaobo with the purpose of incitement to overthrow our country’s people’s democratic dictatorship system and socialist system, used the Internet to distribute his document because of its rapid speed, great scope, large social influence and the attention to which the people pay to it. He wrote the documents and used the Internet to publish it in order to slander and urge other people to overthrow our country’s people’s democratic dictatorship system and socialist system. This conduct already constitutes the crime of incitement to overthrow state power. Moreover, he has been committing this crime for a long while and the subjective evil caused is great. The published documents have been spread through links and republishing. People read them and they have a bad effect. This is the crime of a major criminal and should be severely punished according to law.

The Beijing Municipality First Intermediate Court First Branch believes that the facts are clear and the evidence has been confirmed that the defendant Liu Xiaobo committed the crime of incitement to overthrow and so he is found guilty of the crime for which he has been charged. As for the views presented by Liu Xiaobo and his defense counsel in court, the court found through its examination that the facts and evidence are sufficiently prove that Liu Xiaobo made use the characteristics of the Internet as a communications medium, by publishing slanderous documents on the Internet, to carry out his action of inciting the overthrow of our country’s people’s democratic dictatorship system and the socialist system. The actions of Liu Xiaobo are beyond the scope of freedom of speech and constitute a crime. Therefore, the pleas presented by Liu Xiaobo and his defense counsel cannot be established and this court does not accept them. According to the facts and nature of the crime committed by the defendant Liu Xiaobo, the circumstances, and the harm that has been done to society, this court according to Chapter 105, Section two; Chapter 55, Section one; Chapter 56, Section one, and Chapter 64 of the Criminal Code of the PRC, makes the following verdict:

  1. The defendant Liu Xiaobo, for the crime of incitement to overthrow state power, is sentenced to prison for eleven years and deprivation of political rights for two years. (The sentence is to be served from the day of sentencing, with deduction for time in confinement on a day for day basis, that is from June 23, 2006 to June 21, 2020.)All the materials that Liu Xiaobo used to commit the crime are to be confiscated (list follows).
  2. If the defendant does not accept this judgment, an appeal can be made between two days and ten days after the issuance of this verdict, either through this court or directly to the Beijing Municipality Superior Court. The appeal should be accompanied by an original of this verdict together with two copies.

Jia Lianchun, Chief Judge

Bang Jiaowei, Assistant judge

Zhai Changxi, Assistant judge

December 25, 2009

Gu Xin, Court Clerk

The items confiscated when taken into custody are to be forfeited:

  1. Notebook computer (IBM model T43), one
  2. Notebook computer (Lianxiang model Chaoyang 700 CFe), one
  3. Desktop computer (Lianxiang model Jiayue), one
  4. “Charter 08 request for comments draft (sealed together with the court papers), 7 pages+

http://freemorenews.com/2009/12/26/liu-xiaobo-first-instance-verdict/

 

北京市第一中级人民法院刑事判决书

(2009)一中刑初字第3901号

公诉机关北京市人民检察院第一分院。

被告人刘晓波,男,53岁(1955年12月28日出生),汉族,出生土吉林省长春市,博士研究生文化,无业,户籍所在地辽寧省大连市西岗区青春街 5号2-1-2号,暂住北京市海淀区七贤村中国银行宿舍10号楼1单元502号。1991年1月因犯反革命宣传煽动罪被免予刑事处分;1996年9月因扰 乱社会秩序被处劳动教养三年。因涉嫌犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪于2008年12月8日被拘传,12月9日被监视居住,2009年6月23日被逮捕。现羈押在北 京市第一看守所。

辩护人丁锡奎,北京莫少平律师事务所律师。

辩护人尚宝军,北京莫少平律师事务所律师。

北京市人民检察院第一分院以京一分检刑诉(2009)247号起诉书指控被告人刘晓波犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪,于2009年12月10日向本院提起公 诉。本院依法组成合议庭,公开开庭进行了审理,北京市人民检察院第一分院指派检察员张荣革、代理检察员潘雪楮出庭支持公诉,被告人刘晓波及其辩护人丁锡 奎、尚宝军到庭参加诉讼。现已审理终结。

北京市人民检察院第一分院起诉书指控,被告人刘晓波出于对我国人民民主专政的国家政权和社会主义制度的不满,自2005年以来,通过互联网先后在 “观察”、“BBC中文网”等境外网站上发表《中共的独裁爱国主义》、《难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》、《通过改变社会来改变政权》、《多面的中共独 裁》、《独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》、《对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》等煽动性文章。在文章中造谣、诽谤︰“自从中共掌权以来,中共歷代独裁者最在乎的 是手中的权力,而最不在乎的就是人的生命”;“中共独裁政权提倡的官方爱国主义,是‘以党代国’体制的谬论,爱国的实质是要求人民爱独裁政权、爱独裁党、 爱独裁者,是盗用爱国主义之名而行祸国殃民之实”;“中共的这一切手段,都是独裁者维持最后统治的权宜之计,根本无法长久地支撑这座已经出现无数裂痕的独 裁大厦”。并煽动︰ “通过改变社会来改变政权”;“自由中国的出现,与其寄希望于统治者的‘新政’,远不如寄希望于民间‘新力量’的不断扩张”。

2008年9月至12月间,被告人刘晓波还伙同他人起草、炮制了《零八宪章》,提出“取消一党垄断执政特权”、“在民主宪政的架构下建立中华联邦共 和国”等多项主张,试图煽动颠覆现政权。刘晓波在征集三百余人签名后,将《零八宪章》及签名用电子邮件发给境外网站,在“民主中国”、“独立中文笔会”等 境外网站上公开发表。

被告人刘晓波作案后被查获归案。

北京市人民检察院第一分院向本院向本院移送了指控被告人刘晓波犯罪的证人证言,现场勘验、检查笔录,电子数据司法鉴定意见书等证据。认為被告人刘晓波的行為触犯了《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第二款之规定,已构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪,罪行重大。提请本院依法判处。

被告人刘晓波在法庭审理中辩称︰自己无罪,自己只是行使宪法赋予公民言论自由的权利,自己所发表的批评性言论,并未给他人带来实际损害,也没有煽动颠覆国家政权。

被告人刘晓波的辩护人在法庭审理中提出的辩护意见是︰公诉机关指控刘晓波撰写的六篇文章及《零八宪章》没有造谣、诽谤、诬蔑的内容。刘晓波所发表的文章属于公民言论自由、表达个人观点的范畴,不构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪。

经审理查明,被告人刘晓波出于对我国人民民主专政的国家政权和社会主义制度的不满,于2005年10月至2007年8月间,在其暂住处北京市海淀区 七贤村中国银行宿舍10号楼1单元502号,以撰写并在互联网“观察”、“BBC中文网”等网站发表文章的方式,多次煽动他人颠覆我国国家政权和社会主义 制度。刘晓波在发表的《中共的独裁爱国主义》、《难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》、《通过改变社会来改变政权》、《多面的中共独裁》、《独裁崛起对世界 民主化的负面效应》、《对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》文章中诽谤︰“自从中共掌权以来,中共歷代独裁者最在乎的是手中的权力,而最不在乎的就是人的生命”; “中共独裁政权提倡的官方爱国主义,是‘以党代国’体制的谬论,爱国的实质是要求人民爱独裁政权、爱独裁党、爱独裁者,是盗用爱国主义之名而行祸国殃民之 实”;“中共的这一切手段,都是独裁者维持最后统治的权宜之计,根本无法长久地支撑这座已经出现无数裂痕的独裁大厦”。并煽动︰“通过改变社会来改变政 权”;“自由中国的出现,与其寄希望于统治者的‘新政’,远不如寄希望于民间‘新力量’的不断扩张”。

2008年9月至12月间,刘晓波又伙同他人撰写了题為《零八宪章》的文章,提出“取消一党垄断执政特权”、“在民主宪政的架构下建立中华联邦共和 国”等多项煽动性主张。刘晓波伙同他人在征集三百余人对文章的签名后,将《零八宪章》及签名用电子邮件发给境外网站,在“民主中国”、“独立中文笔会”等 境外网站上公开发布。刘晓波在互联网站发布的上述文章,被多家网站链接、转载并被多人瀏览。

被告人刘晓波作案后被查获归案。

上述事实,有下列经庭审举证、质证的证据在案证实,本院予以确认。

1、证人刘霞的证言证明︰她是刘晓波的妻子,与刘晓波共同居住在北京市海淀区七贤村中国银行宿舍10号楼1单元502号,家中一共有三台电脑,其中 一个台式机,两个笔记本电脑。因為她根本不懂电脑。刘晓波使用电脑主要是写文章和上网,家里只有她和刘晓波两个人单独住,没有其他人,平时家里也不怎幺来 客人,刘晓波有聚会也基本都是到外面去。家里的电脑以什幺形式上网她不清楚,是2001年底刘晓波联系安装的。她和刘晓波平日的生活来源就是刘晓波写东西 的稿费,刘晓波在银行以她的名字开户,稿费不定期的匯到帐户里,她每月不定期的去银行取钱。

2、中国银行股份有限公司北京市分行和木樨地支行出具的《开户证明》和《银行匯款单据》证明︰刘晓波的妻子刘霞的银行账户接收和支取过境外匯款(外币)。

3、中国联合网络通信有限公司北京市分公司出具的《关于协助对相关数据进行调查的復函》证明︰刘晓波使用的ABSL账号,有上网记录。

4、证人张祖樺的证言证明︰他与刘晓波于2008年年底共同制作完成了《零八宪章》,他也征集了签名,后刘晓波将《零八宪章》发表在境外网站。

5、证人何永勤的证言证明︰2008年12月初,他收到刘晓波发的《零八宪章》的电子邮件,刘晓波让他看后签名,他看后以电子邮件形式回復刘晓波,表示同意签名。

6、证人赵世英的证言证明︰2008年10月份,刘晓波通过网络向他传送了宪章,并征求他的修改意见,让他寻找别人签名,他在一次聚会上拿出宪章给聚会的十多人传看,有四人表示愿签名。刘晓波还通过网络让他到广州征集签名,他到广州征集了五人签名。

7、证人姚博的证言证明︰2008年10月份,刘晓波在一次与他见面时,跟他说了宪章的事,他同意在宪章后签名。

8、证人周舵的证言证明︰2008年11月份的一天,刘晓波到他家给他看了《零八宪章》的文稿,让他帮助修改。刘晓波走后他看了文稿,但没修改。当时没谈签名的事,可后来在网上看到宪章时有他的签名。

9、证人范春三的证言证明︰2008年11月底,他和刘晓波等人一起吃饭时,刘晓波拿出《零八宪章》给他看了,刘晓波问他是否签名,他同意签名。他知道刘晓波在境外的“博讯”、“独立中文笔会”等网站上发表文章,也在网上看到过,刘晓波写的文章内容都是时政评论类的。

10、证人徐君亮、智效民、滕彪的证言证明︰2008年11月至12月间,他们的电子邮箱先后接收到电子邮件《零八宪章》,不知是谁发给他们的,他们分别签名后将《零八宪章》发回了原邮箱。

11、证人王仲夏的证人证言证明︰2008年12月份,他在网上看到了《零八宪章》,他认同文章内容签了名。后他印制了一些《零八宪章》的文化衫,想自己穿和送给别人穿,宣传《零八宪章》。

12、公安机关出具的《搜查笔录》及物证照片证明︰2008年12月8日,公安机关在见证人的见证下,对刘晓波的居住地北京市海淀区七贤村中国银行 宿舍10号楼1单元502号进行了搜查,发现并扣压了刘晓波撰写并发送文章到互联网上的工具二台笔记本电脑、一台台式电脑和一份《零八宪章》(征求意见 稿)的打印件。

13、北京市网络行业协会电子数据司法鉴定中心出具的《司法鉴定意见书》证明︰2008年12月13日对搜查起获的刘晓波的三台电脑内存储的数据进 行了电子数据司法鉴定,鉴定中发现、提取到电子文本《中共的独裁爱国主义》、《难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》、《通过改变社会来改变政权》、《多面的 中共独裁》、《独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》、《对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》和《零八宪章》。

在电脑中的SKYPE聊天软件记录信息中,发现、提取该软件自2008年11月至12月8日间多次发送《零八宪章》及其“征求意见文本”的记录。

14、公安机关出具的现场勘验、检查笔录及工作说明证明︰

(1)2008年12月19日至2008年12月23日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章 《刘晓波︰中共的独裁爱国主义》,该文章存在于域名為epochtimes.com(大纪元)的网站,该网站服务器位于境外。文章显示发布时间為2005 年10月4日。该文章截止至2008年12月23日,在互联网上存在登载或转载该文章的网页链接共计5个。

(2)2008年12月19日至2009年8月3日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》, 该文章存在于域名為epochtimes.com(大纪元)和域名為http://www.obseruechina.net/(观察)的网站,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為2006年1月5日和2006年1月6日。该文章截止至2008年12月23日,在互联网上共存在登载或转载该文章的网页链接共计5个,总点击率402次。

(3)、2008年12月20日至2009年8月3日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰通过改变社会来改变政权》, 该文章存在于域名為epochtimes.com(大纪元)和域名為http://www.obseruechina.net/(观察)的网站,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為2006年2月26日和2006年2月27日。该文章截止至2008年12月23日,在互联网上存在登载或转载文章的网页链接共计5个,总点击率748次。

(4)2008年12月20日至2009年8月3日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰多面的中共独裁》, 该文章存在于域名為http://www.secretchina.com/(看中国)和域名為http://www.obseruechina.net/(观察)的网站,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為2006年3月13日。该文章截止至2008年12月23日,在互联网上存在登载或转载文章的网页链接共计6个,总点击率512次。

(5)2008年12月20日至2009年8月3日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》, 该文章存在于域名為http://www.secretchina.com/(看中国)的网站,网站服务器位于境外,文章显示发布时间為2006年5月7日。该文章截止至2008年12月23日,在互联网上存在登载或转载该文章的网页链接共计7个,总点击率57次。

(6)2008年12月20日至2009年8月3日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》, 该文章存在于域名為http://www.minzhuzhongguo.org/(民主中国)和域名為http://www.renyurenquan.org/(人与人权)的网站,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為2007年8月1日。该文章截止至2008年12月23日,在互联网上存在登载或转载文章的网页链接共计8个,总点击率488次。

(7)2008年12月11日北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了标题為《零八宪章》的文章, 该文章存在于域名為http://www.chinesepen.org/(独立中文笔会)的网站,该网站服务器位于境外,显示网络发布时间為2008年12月9日,作者署名為公民群体。同日在域名為boxun.com(博讯)和域名為http://www.minzhuzhongguo.org/(民 主中国)的网站,发现并下载了标题為《中国各界人士联合发布<零八宪章>》,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為2008年12月8日 和2008年12月9日。上述文章截止至2008年12月12日,在互联网上存在登载或转载该文章的网页链接共计33个,其中境外网站19篇,总点击率 5154次,回復158篇。2009年12月9日,在域名為http://www.2008xianzhang.info/(零八宪章)的互联网站发现该网站首页显示截止至2009年12月9日,《零八宪章》签名共计10390人。

(8)、2009年8月14日北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处对刘晓波使用的电子邮件进行了核查,经查,刘晓波使用的邮箱属境外,通过密码登录邮箱中核实,邮箱发件箱中最早发件时间為2008-11-25,发送的邮件中有30封涉及发送《零八宪章》。

15、刘晓波签字确认的文章证明︰刘晓波对公安机关网络监管部门下载、保存的文章《刘晓波︰中共的独裁爱国主义》、《刘晓波︰难道中国人只配接受 “党主民主”》、《 刘晓波︰通过改变社会来改变政权》、《刘晓波︰多面的中共独裁》、《刘晓波︰独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》、《刘晓波︰对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》、 《零八宪章》及从其电脑中提取的电子文本《中共的独裁爱国主义》、《难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》、《通过改变社会来改变政权》、《多面的中共独 裁》、《独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》、《对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》进行了辨认,刘晓波确认辨论的文章是其撰写并发布到互联网上的文章。刘晓波辨论并 签字确认的文章,有上述事实认定的煽动性言论。

16、被告人刘晓波的供诉证明︰刘晓波供认其使用电脑撰写上述文章并发布在互联网站上,刘晓波的供述与上述证据可相互印证。

17、公安机关出具的到案经过证明︰北京市公安局于2008年12月8日晚,到刘晓波的住处北京市海淀区七贤村中国银行宿舍10号楼1单元502号将刘晓波抓获。

18、原北京市中级人民法院(1990)中刑字第2373号《刑事判决书》、北京市人民政府劳动教养管理委员会(96)京劳省字第3400号《劳动 教养决定书》证明︰刘晓波于1991年1月26日因犯反革命宣传煽动罪被免予刑事处分;1996年9月26日因扰乱社会秩序被处劳动教养三年。

19、公安机关出具的身份证明材料证明了被告人刘晓波的姓名、住址等身份情况。

本院认為,被告人刘晓波以推翻我国人民民主专政的国家政权和社会主义制度為目的,利用互联网传递信息快、传播范围广、社会影响大、公眾关注度高的特 点,采用撰写并在互联网上发布文章的方式,诽谤并煽动他人推翻我国国家政权和社会主义制度,其行為已构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪,且犯罪时间长,主观恶性大, 发布的文章被广為链接、转载、瀏览,影响恶劣,属罪行重大的犯罪分子,依法应予从严惩处。北京市人民检察院第一分院指控被告人刘晓波犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪 的事实清楚、证据确实、充分,指控罪名成立。对于被告人刘晓波在法庭审理中提出的辩解及其辩护人发表的辩护意见,经查,本案庭审查明的事实和证据,已充分 证明刘晓波利用互联网的传媒特点,以在互联网上发表诽谤性文章的方式,实施煽动颠覆我国国家政权和社会制度的行為,刘晓波的行為显已超出言论自由的范畴, 构成犯罪。故刘晓波的上述辩护及其辩护人发表的辩护意见均不能成立,本院不予采纳。根据被告人刘晓波犯罪的事实、性质、情节和对于社会的危害程度,本院依 照《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第二款、第五十五条第一款、第五十六条第一款、第六十四条之规定,判决如下︰

一、 被告人刘晓波犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪,判处有期徒刑十一年,剥夺政治权利二年。

(刑期从判决执行之日起计算,判决执行以前先行羈押的,羈押一日折抵刑期一日,即自2009年6月23日起至2020年6月21日止。)

二、 随案移送的刘晓波犯罪所用物品予以没收(请担负后)。

如不服本判决,可在接到本判决书的第二日起十日内,通过本院或直接向北京市高级人民法院提出上述。书面上述的应提交上述状正本一份,副本二份。

审判长贾连春代理审判员郑文伟翟长璽

二零零九年十二月二十五日

书记员顾昕

扣押物品处理清单

先烈物品予以没收︰

1、 笔记本电脑(IBM牌T43型)1台

2、 笔记本电脑(联想牌朝阳700Cfe)1台

3、 台式电脑(联想牌家悦型)1台

《零八宪章》征求意见稿(随案卷封存)7页

 

北京市第一中级人民法院刑事判决书

2009)一中刑初字第3901

公诉机关北京市人民检察院第一分院。

被告人刘晓波,男,53岁(19551228日出生),汉族,出生土吉林省长春市,博士研究生文化,无业,户籍所在地辽寧省大连市西岗区青春街 52-1-2号,暂住北京市海淀区七贤村中国银行宿舍10号楼1单元502号。19911月因犯反革命宣传煽动罪被免予刑事处分;19969月因扰 乱社会秩序被处劳动教养三年。因涉嫌犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪于2008128日被拘传,129日被监视居住,2009623日被逮捕。现羈押在北 京市第一看守所。

辩护人丁锡奎,北京莫少平律师事务所律师。

辩护人尚宝军,北京莫少平律师事务所律师。

北京市人民检察院第一分院以京一分检刑诉(2009247号起诉书指控被告人刘晓波犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪,于20091210日向本院提起公 诉。本院依法组成合议庭,公开开庭进行了审理,北京市人民检察院第一分院指派检察员张荣革、代理检察员潘雪楮出庭支持公诉,被告人刘晓波及其辩护人丁锡 奎、尚宝军到庭参加诉讼。现已审理终结。

北京市人民检察院第一分院起诉书指控,被告人刘晓波出于对我国人民民主专政的国家政权和社会主义制度的不满,自2005年以来,通过互联网先后在 “观察”、“BBC中文网”等境外网站上发表《中共的独裁爱国主义》、《难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》、《通过改变社会来改变政权》、《多面的中共独 裁》、《独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》、《对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》等煽动性文章。在文章中造谣、诽谤︰“自从中共掌权以来,中共歷代独裁者最在乎的 是手中的权力,而最不在乎的就是人的生命”;“中共独裁政权提倡的官方爱国主义,是‘以党代国’体制的谬论,爱国的实质是要求人民爱独裁政权、爱独裁党、 爱独裁者,是盗用爱国主义之名而行祸国殃民之实”;“中共的这一切手段,都是独裁者维持最后统治的权宜之计,根本无法长久地支撑这座已经出现无数裂痕的独 裁大厦”。并煽动︰ “通过改变社会来改变政权”;“自由中国的出现,与其寄希望于统治者的‘新政’,远不如寄希望于民间‘新力量’的不断扩张”。

20089月至12月间,被告人刘晓波还伙同他人起草、炮制了《零八宪章》,提出“取消一党垄断执政特权”、“在民主宪政的架构下建立中华联邦共 和国”等多项主张,试图煽动颠覆现政权。刘晓波在征集三百余人签名后,将《零八宪章》及签名用电子邮件发给境外网站,在“民主中国”、“独立中文笔会”等 境外网站上公开发表。

被告人刘晓波作案后被查获归案。

北京市人民检察院第一分院向本院向本院移送了指控被告人刘晓波犯罪的证人证言,现场勘验、检查笔录,电子数据司法鉴定意见书等证据。认為被告人刘晓波的行為触犯了《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第二款之规定,已构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪,罪行重大。提请本院依法判处。

被告人刘晓波在法庭审理中辩称︰自己无罪,自己只是行使宪法赋予公民言论自由的权利,自己所发表的批评性言论,并未给他人带来实际损害,也没有煽动颠覆国家政权。

被告人刘晓波的辩护人在法庭审理中提出的辩护意见是︰公诉机关指控刘晓波撰写的六篇文章及《零八宪章》没有造谣、诽谤、诬蔑的内容。刘晓波所发表的文章属于公民言论自由、表达个人观点的范畴,不构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪。

经审理查明,被告人刘晓波出于对我国人民民主专政的国家政权和社会主义制度的不满,于200510月至20078月间,在其暂住处北京市海淀区 七贤村中国银行宿舍10号楼1单元502号,以撰写并在互联网“观察”、“BBC中文网”等网站发表文章的方式,多次煽动他人颠覆我国国家政权和社会主义 制度。刘晓波在发表的《中共的独裁爱国主义》、《难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》、《通过改变社会来改变政权》、《多面的中共独裁》、《独裁崛起对世界 民主化的负面效应》、《对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》文章中诽谤︰“自从中共掌权以来,中共歷代独裁者最在乎的是手中的权力,而最不在乎的就是人的生命”; “中共独裁政权提倡的官方爱国主义,是‘以党代国’体制的谬论,爱国的实质是要求人民爱独裁政权、爱独裁党、爱独裁者,是盗用爱国主义之名而行祸国殃民之 实”;“中共的这一切手段,都是独裁者维持最后统治的权宜之计,根本无法长久地支撑这座已经出现无数裂痕的独裁大厦”。并煽动︰“通过改变社会来改变政 权”;“自由中国的出现,与其寄希望于统治者的‘新政’,远不如寄希望于民间‘新力量’的不断扩张”。

20089月至12月间,刘晓波又伙同他人撰写了题為《零八宪章》的文章,提出“取消一党垄断执政特权”、“在民主宪政的架构下建立中华联邦共和 国”等多项煽动性主张。刘晓波伙同他人在征集三百余人对文章的签名后,将《零八宪章》及签名用电子邮件发给境外网站,在“民主中国”、“独立中文笔会”等 境外网站上公开发布。刘晓波在互联网站发布的上述文章,被多家网站链接、转载并被多人瀏览。

被告人刘晓波作案后被查获归案。

上述事实,有下列经庭审举证、质证的证据在案证实,本院予以确认。

1、证人刘霞的证言证明︰她是刘晓波的妻子,与刘晓波共同居住在北京市海淀区七贤村中国银行宿舍10号楼1单元502号,家中一共有三台电脑,其中 一个台式机,两个笔记本电脑。因為她根本不懂电脑。刘晓波使用电脑主要是写文章和上网,家里只有她和刘晓波两个人单独住,没有其他人,平时家里也不怎幺来 客人,刘晓波有聚会也基本都是到外面去。家里的电脑以什幺形式上网她不清楚,是2001年底刘晓波联系安装的。她和刘晓波平日的生活来源就是刘晓波写东西 的稿费,刘晓波在银行以她的名字开户,稿费不定期的匯到帐户里,她每月不定期的去银行取钱。

2、中国银行股份有限公司北京市分行和木樨地支行出具的《开户证明》和《银行匯款单据》证明︰刘晓波的妻子刘霞的银行账户接收和支取过境外匯款(外币)。

3、中国联合网络通信有限公司北京市分公司出具的《关于协助对相关数据进行调查的復函》证明︰刘晓波使用的ABSL账号,有上网记录。

4、证人张祖樺的证言证明︰他与刘晓波于2008年年底共同制作完成了《零八宪章》,他也征集了签名,后刘晓波将《零八宪章》发表在境外网站。

5、证人何永勤的证言证明︰200812月初,他收到刘晓波发的《零八宪章》的电子邮件,刘晓波让他看后签名,他看后以电子邮件形式回復刘晓波,表示同意签名。

6、证人赵世英的证言证明︰200810月份,刘晓波通过网络向他传送了宪章,并征求他的修改意见,让他寻找别人签名,他在一次聚会上拿出宪章给聚会的十多人传看,有四人表示愿签名。刘晓波还通过网络让他到广州征集签名,他到广州征集了五人签名。

7、证人姚博的证言证明︰200810月份,刘晓波在一次与他见面时,跟他说了宪章的事,他同意在宪章后签名。

8、证人周舵的证言证明︰200811月份的一天,刘晓波到他家给他看了《零八宪章》的文稿,让他帮助修改。刘晓波走后他看了文稿,但没修改。当时没谈签名的事,可后来在网上看到宪章时有他的签名。

9、证人范春三的证言证明︰200811月底,他和刘晓波等人一起吃饭时,刘晓波拿出《零八宪章》给他看了,刘晓波问他是否签名,他同意签名。他知道刘晓波在境外的“博讯”、“独立中文笔会”等网站上发表文章,也在网上看到过,刘晓波写的文章内容都是时政评论类的。

10、证人徐君亮、智效民、滕彪的证言证明︰200811月至12月间,他们的电子邮箱先后接收到电子邮件《零八宪章》,不知是谁发给他们的,他们分别签名后将《零八宪章》发回了原邮箱。

11、证人王仲夏的证人证言证明︰200812月份,他在网上看到了《零八宪章》,他认同文章内容签了名。后他印制了一些《零八宪章》的文化衫,想自己穿和送给别人穿,宣传《零八宪章》。

12、公安机关出具的《搜查笔录》及物证照片证明︰2008128日,公安机关在见证人的见证下,对刘晓波的居住地北京市海淀区七贤村中国银行 宿舍10号楼1单元502号进行了搜查,发现并扣压了刘晓波撰写并发送文章到互联网上的工具二台笔记本电脑、一台台式电脑和一份《零八宪章》(征求意见 稿)的打印件。

13、北京市网络行业协会电子数据司法鉴定中心出具的《司法鉴定意见书》证明︰20081213日对搜查起获的刘晓波的三台电脑内存储的数据进 行了电子数据司法鉴定,鉴定中发现、提取到电子文本《中共的独裁爱国主义》、《难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》、《通过改变社会来改变政权》、《多面的 中共独裁》、《独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》、《对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》和《零八宪章》。

在电脑中的SKYPE聊天软件记录信息中,发现、提取该软件自200811月至128日间多次发送《零八宪章》及其“征求意见文本”的记录。

14、公安机关出具的现场勘验、检查笔录及工作说明证明︰

120081219日至20081223日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章 《刘晓波︰中共的独裁爱国主义》,该文章存在于域名為epochtimes.com(大纪元)的网站,该网站服务器位于境外。文章显示发布时间為2005 104日。该文章截止至20081223日,在互联网上存在登载或转载该文章的网页链接共计5个。

220081219日至200983日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》, 该文章存在于域名為epochtimes.com(大纪元)和域名為http://www.obseruechina.net/(观察)的网站,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為200615日和200616日。该文章截止至20081223日,在互联网上共存在登载或转载该文章的网页链接共计5个,总点击率402次。

3)、20081220日至200983日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰通过改变社会来改变政权》, 该文章存在于域名為epochtimes.com(大纪元)和域名為http://www.obseruechina.net/(观察)的网站,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為2006226日和2006227日。该文章截止至20081223日,在互联网上存在登载或转载文章的网页链接共计5个,总点击率748次。

420081220日至200983日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰多面的中共独裁》, 该文章存在于域名為http://www.secretchina.com/(看中国)和域名為http://www.obseruechina.net/(观察)的网站,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為2006313日。该文章截止至20081223日,在互联网上存在登载或转载文章的网页链接共计6个,总点击率512次。

520081220日至200983日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》, 该文章存在于域名為http://www.secretchina.com/(看中国)的网站,网站服务器位于境外,文章显示发布时间為200657日。该文章截止至20081223日,在互联网上存在登载或转载该文章的网页链接共计7个,总点击率57次。

620081220日至200983日,北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了暑名“刘晓波”的文章《刘晓波︰对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》, 该文章存在于域名為http://www.minzhuzhongguo.org/(民主中国)和域名為http://www.renyurenquan.org/(人与人权)的网站,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為200781日。该文章截止至20081223日,在互联网上存在登载或转载文章的网页链接共计8个,总点击率488次。

720081211日北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处一大队,在互联网上发现并下载了标题為《零八宪章》的文章, 该文章存在于域名為http://www.chinesepen.org/(独立中文笔会)的网站,该网站服务器位于境外,显示网络发布时间為2008129日,作者署名為公民群体。同日在域名為boxun.com(博讯)和域名為http://www.minzhuzhongguo.org/(民 主中国)的网站,发现并下载了标题為《中国各界人士联合发布<零八宪章>》,网站服务器均位于境外,文章显示发布时间為2008128日 和2008129日。上述文章截止至20081212日,在互联网上存在登载或转载该文章的网页链接共计33个,其中境外网站19篇,总点击率 5154次,回復158篇。2009129日,在域名為http://www.2008xianzhang.info/(零八宪章)的互联网站发现该网站首页显示截止至2009129日,《零八宪章》签名共计10390人。

8)、2009814日北京市公安局公共信息网络安全监察处对刘晓波使用的电子邮件进行了核查,经查,刘晓波使用的邮箱属境外,通过密码登录邮箱中核实,邮箱发件箱中最早发件时间為2008-11-25,发送的邮件中有30封涉及发送《零八宪章》。

15、刘晓波签字确认的文章证明︰刘晓波对公安机关网络监管部门下载、保存的文章《刘晓波︰中共的独裁爱国主义》、《刘晓波︰难道中国人只配接受 “党主民主”》、《 刘晓波︰通过改变社会来改变政权》、《刘晓波︰多面的中共独裁》、《刘晓波︰独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》、《刘晓波︰对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》、 《零八宪章》及从其电脑中提取的电子文本《中共的独裁爱国主义》、《难道中国人只配接受“党主民主”》、《通过改变社会来改变政权》、《多面的中共独 裁》、《独裁崛起对世界民主化的负面效应》、《对黑窑童奴案的继续追问》进行了辨认,刘晓波确认辨论的文章是其撰写并发布到互联网上的文章。刘晓波辨论并 签字确认的文章,有上述事实认定的煽动性言论。

16、被告人刘晓波的供诉证明︰刘晓波供认其使用电脑撰写上述文章并发布在互联网站上,刘晓波的供述与上述证据可相互印证。

17、公安机关出具的到案经过证明︰北京市公安局于2008128日晚,到刘晓波的住处北京市海淀区七贤村中国银行宿舍10号楼1单元502号将刘晓波抓获。

18、原北京市中级人民法院(1990)中刑字第2373号《刑事判决书》、北京市人民政府劳动教养管理委员会(96)京劳省字第3400号《劳动 教养决定书》证明︰刘晓波于1991126日因犯反革命宣传煽动罪被免予刑事处分;1996926日因扰乱社会秩序被处劳动教养三年。

19、公安机关出具的身份证明材料证明了被告人刘晓波的姓名、住址等身份情况。

本院认為,被告人刘晓波以推翻我国人民民主专政的国家政权和社会主义制度為目的,利用互联网传递信息快、传播范围广、社会影响大、公眾关注度高的特 点,采用撰写并在互联网上发布文章的方式,诽谤并煽动他人推翻我国国家政权和社会主义制度,其行為已构成煽动颠覆国家政权罪,且犯罪时间长,主观恶性大, 发布的文章被广為链接、转载、瀏览,影响恶劣,属罪行重大的犯罪分子,依法应予从严惩处。北京市人民检察院第一分院指控被告人刘晓波犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪 的事实清楚、证据确实、充分,指控罪名成立。对于被告人刘晓波在法庭审理中提出的辩解及其辩护人发表的辩护意见,经查,本案庭审查明的事实和证据,已充分 证明刘晓波利用互联网的传媒特点,以在互联网上发表诽谤性文章的方式,实施煽动颠覆我国国家政权和社会制度的行為,刘晓波的行為显已超出言论自由的范畴, 构成犯罪。故刘晓波的上述辩护及其辩护人发表的辩护意见均不能成立,本院不予采纳。根据被告人刘晓波犯罪的事实、性质、情节和对于社会的危害程度,本院依 照《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百零五条第二款、第五十五条第一款、第五十六条第一款、第六十四条之规定,判决如下︰

一、 被告人刘晓波犯煽动颠覆国家政权罪,判处有期徒刑十一年,剥夺政治权利二年。

(刑期从判决执行之日起计算,判决执行以前先行羈押的,羈押一日折抵刑期一日,即自2009623日起至2020621日止。)

二、 随案移送的刘晓波犯罪所用物品予以没收(请担负后)。

如不服本判决,可在接到本判决书的第二日起十日内,通过本院或直接向北京市高级人民法院提出上述。书面上述的应提交上述状正本一份,副本二份。

审判长贾连春代理审判员郑文伟翟长璽

二零零九年十二月二十五日

书记员顾昕

扣押物品处理清单

先烈物品予以没收︰

1、 笔记本电脑(IBMT43型)1

2、 笔记本电脑(联想牌朝阳700Cfe1

3、 台式电脑(联想牌家悦型)1

《零八宪章》征求意见稿(随案卷封存)7

Posted in 社会, 法律, 中国政治名案 | 1 Comment

PRC Scholars on Mobilization of Public Opinion in 2012 Diaoyutai/Senkakus Affair

Followers of Chinese media policy and China’s territorial disputes on its periphery may find this intriguing.

Three PRC scholars He Xiaojing, Liu Yungang, and Ge Qiujing at Beijing Normal University and Zhongshan University in the September 2015 issue of World Regional Studies published their analysis of China’s mobilization of public opinion in the 2012  Diaoyutai/Senkakus Incident. They used the idea of three levels of scale in geopolitics:

  • Practical geopolitics: policy formulation and implementation by government;
  • Formal geopolitics — academia; and
  • Popular geopolitics — the general public

to analyze the mobilization of Chinese public opinion by the PRC government in 2012 for the Diaoyutai/Senkakus Affair. They argue that in a dispute that the weaker party will broaden a dispute to the general public while the stronger party will want to avoid this and keep it at the government-to-government level.

In analyzing (see screen capture below) the most frequently used words in People’s Daily in articles related to the dispute, the three scholars found that PRC media used hard, emotionally laden terms such as “ever since ancient times” and “national sovereignty” early one but later switched  to words a bit softer and more likely to persuade such as  “issue”, “national territory” and “development”.

[Note: Media adaptability/finesse among people sending out media control directives is interesting.  Until a few years ago, some Chinese officials would talk about pernicious foreigners “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people”.  I hadn’t noticed that so often the past few years but a kindly academic corrected me on that point — I did a little online research and found by a recent (12/18/2015) Google News search  in Chinese shows that the term “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people”[ “伤害了中国人民的感情”] is still in wide use.  There was a story in the US media a few years ago that a US Congressman told a PRC Embassy person “That line makes you guys look like idiots”.  Wonder if that is what did it!? Or if the story is true?]

The authors conclude that the mobilization of the masses was effective and did help give China the high ground in the battle for world opinion.  They add that nonetheless more work needs to be done to properly guide international opinion so that, even as China quite properly stands up for itself, it will also use soft power to maintain and project China’s peaceful image.  This will prevent other countries with their own agendas from spreading the “China threat theory”.

I got this World Regional Studies article at  http://202.120.85.33/Jweb_sjdlyj/CN/article/downloadArticleFile.do?attachType=PDF&id=190  where it is a free download.

DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1004-9479.2015.03.003

贺小婧, 刘云刚, 等. 钓鱼岛事件的尺度政治与言论分析[J].世界地理研究,2015,24(3):24-33 by  He Xiaojing, Liu Yungang, and Ge Qiujing. Analysis of the Diaoyu Islands dispute by the method of politics of scale and text analysis [J].World Regional Studies, 2015,24(3):24-33

Posted in 外交, 媒体 | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

PRC academics on “Temporal evolution and mechanism of Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia”

This recent article in a Chinese geography journal,  Acta Geographica Sinica,  Temporal evolution and mechanism of Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia [中美在南亚地缘影响力的时空演变及机制 online in Chinese at   http://www.geog.com.cn/article/2015/0375-5444/36567 ] examines how changing US and China soft and hard power perceptions in South Asia are affecting the relative influence of the US and China in the region.

The author collects a variety of hard and soft power data for five South Asian countries over the past decade and sees China moving ahead.  The authors note a reversal of this trend in 2012 when US influence in the region increased more than China’s.   The data is fuzzy but the trends are interesting.

I copied below a Google Translate translation of the article (in Chinese at http://www.geog.com.cn/article/2015/0375-5444/36567 ).    This article is written in fairly simple declarative sentences so it is particularly suited for a machine translation.   Skim it for the useful parts, the robot grammatical infelicities aren’t too serious here.

Aside from the information presented, one can see Chinese assumptions about a declining US since 2008.  This is likely one of those extrapolations that often lead academics astray, especially considering more recent economic trends and growing security concerns about Chinese bullying.   Looking at the sources of information is interesting too, including how foreign ideas about soft power and even public diplomacy are influencing China.  The endnotes reflect the fact that Xi Jinping’s one belt one road strategy has been inspiring a great deal of current research on Chinese influence and strategy in Chinese academic journals.

img_3

The figure above shows PRC influence in the South Asia region exceeding that of the US after 2003.

Section 4.2 relating to soft power and increasing Chinese stress on public diplomacy is especially interesting.  I’ll copy it up top here; the full translated text is just below.

4.2 Soft Power

Hard strength to provide the material basis for the development of soft power, and hard power soft power to enhance the spirit of giving guidance. Both are serving to enhance the international image and geopolitical influence in a country [26 ]. With the changing times, the traditional hard power in the realization of national interests and international influence in expanding the role played by the increasingly restricted 27 ], and the role of soft power in enhancing the country’s external influence in the increasingly prominent. In the 1990s, the famous American political scientist, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye of the “soft power” and “smart power” concept, becoming the axis of the Obama administration’s diplomatic strategy. Joseph believes Soft power is an integral part of national foreign strategy is one source of national influence, the expansion of foreign influence can play an important role 28 , 29 ]. Chinese strategists also generally agreed that soft power is an important indicator of a country’s international status and influence. Countries need hard power to soft power also need to be flexible and internationally competitive edge in the international political arena 30 ].

Through public diplomacy, to “attract” and “agenda-setting” behavior in recent years, America’s soft power has been increasing. American popular culture is open, flexible, pluralism, individualism, populism and liberal values ​​and other elements to attract a lot of people’s eyes in the world, and to help the United States achieve a number of major foreign policy objectives 31 ]. That is the core values ​​of American federalism, democracy and open markets are the soft power of external radiation, enhance the attractiveness of the important resources 32 ]. In foreign policy, the United States promote the common values ​​of democracy and human rights, in order to obtain approval of the world.

In recent years, soft power has played an active role in the expansion of China’s geopolitical influence in South Asian countries and regions in. Culturally, China’s traditional culture gradually into the global epidemic Circle. Each year the number of overseas students studying in China increasing, foreign tourists also increased significantly. Chinese around the world to establish 471 Confucius Institutes and 730 Confucius Classrooms, distributed in 125 countries (regions) 33 ].China Radio International broadcasts in English increases. Also strengthen investment in outreach areas, Xinhua News Agency also created a 24-hour news channel. Diplomatically, China “bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors” peripheral diplomacy as well as establish a “rational, loving, responsible and non-dilated,” the international image, easing fears the rise of China’s neighboring countries to correct the international community wrong understanding of China, and expand the positive influence of China’s foreign 34 ].


Shufang, Geyue Jing, Liu Yuli Sino-US geopolitical influence in South temporal evolution and mechanism 70 (6):.. 864-878 [Shufang WANG, Yuejing GE, Yuli LIU The spatio-temporal evolution and driving mechanism of geopolitical influence of China and the US in South Asia [J] “Geographical Journal” editorial department, 70 (6): 864-878]

Temporal evolution and mechanism of Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia

Shufang 1, 2  , Ge Yuejing 1  , Liu Yuli 1 

Summary

Key words: geopolitical influence; temporal and spatial variation; evolution mechanism; South Asia; China; USA

The spatio-temporal evolution and driving mechanism of geopolitical influence of China and the US in South Asia

Shufang WANG 1, 2  , Yuejing GE 1  , Yuli LIU 1 

Abstract

Keyword: geopolitics influence; spatio-temporal changes; evolution mechanism; South Asia; China; the US

Show Figures

1 Introduction

Today the international community has entered the era of the centers of power shift and power structure adjustment, “the strength to become a more transformative weaker, less mandatory, tends to be more intangible” 1 ].Focus political attention gradually from external influence state power steering state. South Asia, the US and China is an important geostrategic region: on the one hand, South brink of China’s important maritime transport channel “Indian Ocean” and the western border areas of China, for China’s economic and trade development as well as security and stability have underestimated the role; the other On the one hand, the US economic recession and maintain strategic intent global hegemony and promote the implementation of the United States’ Asia-Pacific rebalancing “strategy to boost its own economic growth, while enhancing its presence and influence in Asia. In addition, the two countries as an important SAARC observer countries affects cooperation and development in South Asia. So how will the country of influence with fuzzy quantitative manner shown, to provide a new perspective of a country’s external capacity analysis? Proposed the concept of geopolitical influence of contemporary international relations conforms to the trends in the power structure, will be the measure of the national and international an important indicator of the image. It covers the hard power, soft power and interdependent forces  ( word comes from Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye co “power and interdependence.” Authors believe asymmetric interdependence is a source of power. the degree of asymmetric interdependence determines the size of the other party influence, thus referred to herein as interdependent force.), it is a comprehensive reflection of the country’s external competence. Therefore, geopolitical influence of external research to understand the actual capacity of countries today, analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the country’s external projection of power, and provide a reference for the country’s image-building.

National influence is the ability to play the role of a country to other countries or regions, the emphasis is the ability to change. And geopolitical influence is massing geopolitical body capacity under moment the combined effect of geopolitical body between manifested 2 ], we have stressed the comprehensive national strength, but also taking into account the inter-state physical distance and national-friendly distance. The latter is based on the former basis, taking into account the degree of association between each other regional countries and nations. In the 1990s, Harvard University political science professor Joseph Nye number of issues related to influence, namely the ever-changing international environment to understand how changes in national influence? After the Cold War, in the new international environment, the United States What kind of tools needed and the ability to maintain influence in the world 3 , 4 ]? Are influential countries can be quantified and measured, can be assessed and forecast? These academic research has become a topic of concern. Fu Mengzi that the international influence of the state is real and tangible, but the state more influence is a vague concept, difficult to quantitatively, because the analysis of the influence of the State need to consider many factors, such as strength, power, domestic and foreign Information, Policy and effectiveness 5 ]. – Wu Tiechuan considers that the national influence from hard power and soft power, hard power which is manifested as economic, military, science and technology, which can be quantified; and soft power is invisible to influence his country’s willingness to spiritual power, is uncontrollable, unpredictable and non-quantitative 6 , 7 ]. Some scholars believe that the influence of the State depends on a country’s total population, economic size, military strength and the breadth and depth of historical and cultural ties and the like. These factors can be measured, and lists the formula to measure the influence of the country 10 ]. In 2008, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Korea Institute of East Asian way through the questionnaire scoring quantification of soft power in Asia launched a poll. The results show that most people believe that China’s influence in Asia rising and produced a “positive” effect 8 ]. China’s influence in the international arena gradually increased, the impact on other emerging economies is increasing 9 ].

Geopolitical influence in the country comes from hard power, soft power and interdependent forces. Hard power as a material force, the efficiency of a country’s development is the external manifestations, is the cornerstone of a country’s external influence force; and soft power as a spiritual force, is the core foundation of a country’s culture and institutions [19 ]. Interdependence is neither force nor hard power soft power, are interrelated mutual penetration among countries. Interdependence force is through trade and investment between economies reflect, to some extent reflects a country’s geopolitical influence in his country or region.

From reading the literature shows that the State can not influence is not quantitative, some scholars and research institutions try to soft power and influence national study to quantify. Other literature relevant national influence, mainly from the political and economic 11 , 12 ], national and ethnic cultures 13 , 14 ], the national image 15 , 16 ] and the international spread of 17 , 18 ] analyzed the perspectives unfold.

Although the current literature to try from the perspective of different disciplines and different entry points to influence national study done some positive and beneficial to explore, but existing research has not yet formed a clear theoretical framework, there is no unique theoretical interpretation. Qualitative research methods using a static description and horizontal comparison, the main disciplinary perspectives research in international relations and political science, research focused discussion of comprehensive national strength and national influence one aspect. Existing research has the following disadvantages: first, a single perspective, the perspective of the lack of cross-disciplinary integration, such as national relations and geopolitics cross, political science and geography of the cross; and second, the current study used static, qualitative Analysis Method of hard power, soft power and interdependent forces, the lack of dynamic, quantitative analysis, it is difficult to fully and timely grasp of the national reality of geopolitical influence characteristics and trends; and third, research focuses on the internal single-factor analysis of national strength, the lack of Comprehensive analysis of the elements, but also the lack of national strength, to explore the influence of national and geopolitical influence relations.

In this paper, geography, international relations and political science perspective, the use of mathematical modeling method of Sino-US geopolitical influence in South temporal variation and evolution mechanism. Research aimed at retaining the form of the language on formal models, trying to help modeling approach national geopolitical realities influence the evolution of the real track, explore the scientific method and model of a national geopolitical influence evaluation.

2 study area and methods

2.1 Regional

South Asia, including India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives seven countries ( Figure 1 ), with a total area of about 5.03 million km 2, the total population of over 1.6 billion (2012). From the geographical point of view, South Asia is the outer edge of Eurasia crescent in the middle, the guardian of the Asia and Oceania leading maritime transport routes in Europe and Africa, near the Persian Gulf oil-producing region, overlooking the East-West major oil channel, its strategic position is very important, is directly related to China’s “energy channel security” 20 ].From border security point of view, the situation in South Asia that is directly related to China’s southwestern border of Xinjiang and Tibet of security, stability and development 21 ]. Based on the above two considerations, paper selects South Asia, for example, study the evolution of the past 10 years in South China and the US geopolitical influence. In the Select time series, taking 2003 as a starting point, once every two years is estimated a total of six years to forget geopolitical influence, generally reflects the dynamic changes in South China and the US geopolitical influence.

·         Figure Option
Figure 1 position in South Asia schematic Fig. 1 Location of South Asian countries

2.2 Research Methods

Geopolitical factors influence the selection of the index system 2.2.1 Indicators used in all levels of experience to judge selected and logical reasoning. Selection of indicators, including a hard power, soft power and interdependent forces.On the basis of outstanding dominant factors and operational principles, selection indicators draw hard power and comprehensive national strength reference Klein’s calculations, including the basic strength, economic strength, military strength and technological strength. Indicators have selected the soft power lies outside of attraction and radiation 22 ],were selected policy and institutional, national image and cultural exchanges three indicators. Interdependence of nations forces index reference “Power and Interdependence” 9 ], a book of international trade and direct investment to expression ( Table 1 ).

Table 1 constitute Tab geopolitical influence index system. 1 The index system of geopolitical influence

Construction of potential difference and potential of spatial interaction model is 2.2.2, and various forms of “force” the important reasons and key drive. Behind geopolitical influence is inseparable position and influence potential inherent differences in countries and regions in which the area. Based on this, a reference for a potential model for the region, combined with geopolitical influence index system constructed geopolitical influence model:

P i = ( H j + S j + M j ) e – r i j (1)

Where: i represents a country geopolitical influence in another country or region i’s; H j j represents the country hard power; j represents soft power; j represents interdependent force. ij represents a country to an integrated distance j i region. This equation shows that a country’s geopolitical influence in certain areas subject to two aspects: First, the power of the size of the country itself; the second is a specific region of the distance from the National friendliness and diplomacy.

Referring to Klein’s comprehensive national assessment framework, the basic strength of the A j, economic strengthA j, military strength A j, scientific and technological strength A j set different weights index  ( weight value is set to take twenty-two Index Comparison of heavy weight discriminant analysis method, with the expertise and experience of the comparative advantages of rational pairwise relative importance of indicators and judgment.), respectively, 1 / 5,2 / 5,3 / 10 and 1/10.

H i = 1 5 A 1 j + 2 5 A 2 j + 3 10 A 3 j + 1 10 A 4 j (2)

Where: A j represents national population and area; A j represents the gross domestic product; A j represents national military strength; A 4j represents national scientific and technological strength. j represents the soft power mainly by policy and institutional B j, B j image of the country and cultural exchanges B j, constitute.

S j = B 1 j + B 2 j + B 3 j (3)

Where: B j represents national policies and institutions, with the stability of the national development model and self-tuning capabilities to represent; B j represents the country’s image, the number of times indicated by the amount of official development assistance and foreign peacekeeping operations; B j representatives of cultural transmission and attractive, with exports and the number of overseas students Filmography represented.

Interdependence power of a country depends on the formation of an asymmetric dependence on another country’s trade and the importance of bilateral trade relations 23 ]. Therefore, under the authority of interdependence measure the following formula:

M j = φ j 1 – φ ji % ) + I ji (4)

Where: j represents power in asymmetrical interdependence in country j obtained; φ j J represents the country’s total trade; φ ji J i represents the country and the country’s total trade volume of trade accounted for the proportion of country j; I ji J represents a total investment of country i States.

Table 2 Evolution of the United States in the South Asian countries of geopolitical influence Tab. 2 The geopolitical influence of China and the US in South Asian countries

Integrated distance into account both the physical distance between countries, but also takes into account the distance between the friendly countries. Physical distance is the actual distance between the countries, represented by the distance between the center of gravity of the country; the distance between the friendly countries refers to the degree of intimacy between the two countries, with 1 to 9 means “friendship between countries distance” between the two countries, of which 9 represents the most hostile 1 represents the closest.

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2 the United States in South Asia geopolitical influencediagram evolution Fig. 2 The evolution of geopolitical influence of China and the US in South Asian countries

Because of the geographic impact indicators system, the physical meaning of the indicators are different, so this original value of the non-dimensional data processing. In the original values ​​are normalized, respectively, after measure out hard power and soft power interdependence of the overall strength of the force, or the like, then consider a combination of the distance between the countries, come to influence a country’s geopolitical value in a particular country or region.

2.2.3 Data Sources This selection reflected the basic strength, economic strength, military strength, policies and institutions, national image, cultural exchange, foreign trade and investment data. Data from the official website and related statistical yearbook, including South Asian Studies database (South Asia Archive), World Bank public databases (www.worldbank.org.cn), People’s Republic of China National Bureau of Statistics website (www.stats.gov.cn/ tjsj / ndsj), Chinese Ministry of Commerce website (http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/), Chinese Association of Higher Education Foreign Students Education Administration Branch (www.cafsa.org.cn/index.php?mid=6&tid= 603), US Department of Commerce website (http://www.commerce.gov/), the US National Bureau of Statistics Web site (http://www.census.gov/), the US Bureau of Economic Analysis website (http: // www. bea.gov/), the United Nations peacekeeping website (www.un.org/zh/peacekeeping), UNESCO website (www.uis.unesco.org/Pages/default.aspx), “China’s foreign aid” white paper Wait.

Table 3 nearly 10 years of Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia Tab. 3The geopolitical influence of China and the US in the South Asian region over the past decade

3 temporal evolution of Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia

3.1 Sino-US space-time evolution of the South Asian countries geopolitical influence

From the space perspective, the past 10 years, China in the geopolitical Pakistan influential in India and Sri Lanka to a small margin of influence; and US geopolitical India influential, edge influence in Sri Lanka and the Maldives to the more small. From the time point of view, China geopolitical influence in South Asian countries can be divided into two phases as a whole.

The first phase (2003-2007). During this period, China geopolitical influence in South Asia rises slowly. 2003 Chinese in Pakistan (8.93) is the largest geopolitical influence, while in Sri Lanka (5.15) and the Maldives (5.15) of geopolitical influence is minimized. 2007, China’s largest country in South Asia geopolitical influence is still in Pakistan, to enhance value from 8.93 to 10.08, rose to a lesser extent, while in Sri Lanka geopolitical influence lowest (6.76).

The second phase (2008-2012). Although affected by the global financial crisis, China’s geopolitical influence in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives have ups and downs, but the geopolitical influence of China in South Asia overall upward trend, enhance the rate larger than the previous stage. 2012 China’s influence in South Asia, seven countries are descending Pakistan (14.88), Nepal (12.18), Bhutan (11.59), Bangladesh (11.03), the Maldives (9.49), India (9.03), Sri Lanka ( 9.03). Apart from India, the 2012 China geopolitical influence in South Asia than in other countries the United States is high. Chinese influence in Pakistan rose from 8.93 in 2003 to 14.88 in 2012. China’s influence in India, from 2003 5.69 2012 9.03 all the way up, but still lower than the US 1.32.

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3 Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia FIG overall change Fig. 3 The changes of geopolitical influence of China and the US in the South Asian region

US geopolitical influence in South Asia can be divided into three stages in general.

The first phase (2003-2007). During this period, in addition to outside Pakistan and Bhutan, US geopolitical influence in other South Asian countries showed a slow upward trend. 2003, US geopolitical influence in Pakistan, the largest (10.1), geopolitical influence in the Maldives the smallest (6.9).

The second phase (2008-2009). US geopolitical influence in South Asia is still an upward trend. 2009 US influence in Pakistan to the edge of the largest (9.53), and geopolitical influence in the Maldives, the smallest (7.20).

The third phase (2010-2012). During this period, US geopolitical influence in South Asian countries began to decline.In 2011 the biggest drop, then began to rise.2012, US influence in South Asia, seven countries are descending India (10.35), Pakistan (9.85), Bangladesh (9.37), Nepal (8.91), Bhutan (8.65), Sri Lanka (7.52), Maldives (7.44). US influence in India, rose from 7.48 in 2003 to 10.35 in 2012, in Pakistan’s influence, from 10.10 in 2003 declined slightly to 9.85 in 2012.

Overall, 2003-2012 10 years, Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asian countries showed a slowly rising trend in slight fluctuations in. 2003 – 2007, China’s geopolitical influence in South Asia increased slightly, from 10% to 38%; and 2007–2012 years, growth expanded at between 15% to 48%. US geopolitical influence in the South Asian countries of the slow improvements in slight fluctuations. In 2003, the US geopolitical influence in the South Asian countries are higher than in China; in 2007 and 2011 are the two low periods, geopolitical influence declined, somewhat elevated in 2009, 2012 continue to rise.

3.2 Sino-US space-time in the South Asian region as a whole geopolitical influence in the evolution of

The past 10 years, China geopolitical influence in South Asia increased year by year, increased from 7.31 in 2003 to 11.59 in 2012, up 58.55 percent ratio. US geopolitical influence in South Asia despite slight fluctuations, but also slowly rising, increased from 7.86 in 2003 to 8.31 in 2012, an increase ratio of 5.73%. From the growth rate to see, in 2003–2012 years, China geopolitical influence in South Asia, growth was much faster than in the United States. From the comparison between the two, the Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia can be divided into three stages.

The first phase (2003-2004) US geopolitical influence in South Asia than in China large. In 2003, the US geopolitical influence in South Asia to 7.86, China is 7.31.

The second phase (2005-2009) China geopolitical influence in South Asia than in the US large gap is widening. In 2005, China geopolitical influence in South Asia is 8.62, the United States is 7.79. In 2009, China’s influence is 12.08, the United States is 7.42. Chinese geopolitical influence in rising, while the United States has declined, the gap between the two geopolitical influence gradually increases.

The third phase (2010-2012) China geopolitical influence in South Asia than in the US large gap has narrowed. 2011, China geopolitical influence in South Asia 11.12, 7.73 US; in 2012, the Sino-US geopolitical influence are rising, China geopolitical influence to increase slightly to 11.59, the United States rose to 8.31.

4 Analysis of the Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia, the evolution of the factors

National geopolitical influence the strength is affected by many factors, mainly depends on hard power, soft power, interdependence and friction. Among them, the hard power and soft power is the dominant factor in geopolitical influence, from the pull effect; interdependent forces are secondary factors geopolitical influence, from the thrust; and friction factor is the weakening of geopolitical influence, from the reverse force . The four together, causing the evolution of Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia.

4.1 hard power

Hard power is the country’s own geopolitical weight (including land area, population, economy, military affairs and science and technology) is a comprehensive reflection, is an important support national geopolitical influence. The size of the hard power of the State to determine the status of a country in the international community, the role and voice of 24 ]. In today’s international arena, there is not enough hard power support, the state is difficult to have the right to speak and international influence.

The early 1990s, after the Cold War, the United States as the world’s only superpower, the GDP has been ranked first in the world. 2012, US GDP $ 16.24 trillion; China $ 8.23 ​​trillion GDP is 50.65 percent of the total US economy; India’s $ 1.86 trillion GDP, the United States 11.44%; Maldives GDP 22.22 billion US dollars, the United States 0.137 % 25 ].Hard power with a strong foundation, America’s global geostrategic influence in the world. So, nearly 10 years, the US geopolitical influence in South Asian countries and regions, the rise in the small vibration. While China since the reform and opening up, the economy has been in a rapid growth trend. Especially since the 21 century, China’s economic development into the fast lane, hard power quickly enhance overall national strength growing geopolitical influence is also rising, especially in China’s neighboring countries and regions.

4.2 Soft Power

Hard strength to provide the material basis for the development of soft power, and hard power soft power to enhance the spirit of giving guidance. Both are serving to enhance the international image and geopolitical influence in a country [26 ]. With the changing times, the traditional hard power in the realization of national interests and international influence in expanding the role played by the increasingly restricted 27 ], and the role of soft power in enhancing the country’s external influence in the increasingly prominent. In the 1990s, the famous American political scientist, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye of the “soft power” and “smart power” concept, becoming the axis of the Obama administration’s diplomatic strategy. Joseph believes Soft power is an integral part of national foreign strategy is one source of national influence, the expansion of foreign influence can play an important role 28 , 29 ]. Chinese strategists also generally agreed that soft power is an important indicator of a country’s international status and influence. Countries need hard power to soft power also need to be flexible and internationally competitive edge in the international political arena 30 ].

Through public diplomacy, to “attract” and “agenda-setting” behavior in recent years, America’s soft power has been increasing. American popular culture is open, flexible, pluralism, individualism, populism and liberal values ​​and other elements to attract a lot of people’s eyes in the world, and to help the United States achieve a number of major foreign policy objectives 31 ]. That is the core values ​​of American federalism, democracy and open markets are the soft power of external radiation, enhance the attractiveness of the important resources 32 ]. In foreign policy, the United States promote the common values ​​of democracy and human rights, in order to obtain approval of the world.

In recent years, soft power has played an active role in the expansion of China’s geopolitical influence in South Asian countries and regions in. Culturally, China’s traditional culture gradually into the global epidemic Circle. Each year the number of overseas students studying in China increasing, foreign tourists also increased significantly. Chinese around the world to establish 471 Confucius Institutes and 730 Confucius Classrooms, distributed in 125 countries (regions) 33 ].China Radio International broadcasts in English increases. Also strengthen investment in outreach areas, Xinhua News Agency also created a 24-hour news channel. Diplomatically, China “bringing harmony, security and prosperity to neighbors” peripheral diplomacy as well as establish a “rational, loving, responsible and non-dilated,” the international image, easing fears the rise of China’s neighboring countries to correct the international community wrong understanding of China, and expand the positive influence of China’s foreign 34 ].

4.3 interdependence force

Interdependence of state power in the formation of the strength determines the size of the national and international influence. In world politics, interdependence means that interactions between countries or between the situation in different countries actors 9 ]. Constructivists believe interactive practice between countries so that they produce a mutual experience, mutual expectations and mutual recognition, mutual recognition of such a country to determine the identity of other countries with respect to positioning 35 ] that a State other countries degree of influence. Thomas Schelling pointed out that interdependence is actually a mixed motive game, conflict and harmony are the full performance, and power is inherent interdependent factors 36 ]. Neoliberal representative Keohane and Nye also emphasized asymmetrical interdependence is a source of power. Dependent small actors often interdependent as a power source, bargaining on certain issues or other issues so as to affect 9 ]. It can be seen that power is interdependent core, and the powers in the interdependence of the formation of a source of national geopolitical influence.

The past 10 years, Sino-US trade and investment in the South Asian countries continues to increase, while South Asia and Central America asymmetric interdependence is increasing. In this process, China and the US geopolitical influence in South Asian countries showed a slow upward trend in the slight fluctuations, indicating the influence of the United States in the form of asymmetric interdependence is also improving.

4.4 friction

Friction is hindered relative motion of objects (or relative motion trends) of force, contrary to the direction of relative motion of the object. Distance is a source of friction friction generated. Friction distance by the physical distance and the distance between the composition of a friendly country. Geopolitical influence in the country and friction inversely proportional to distance. The longer the distance and the greater physical distance between the friendly countries, the greater the friction distance, the less geopolitical influence; and vice versa. This suggests that the influence of geopolitical subject physical distance, was the spatial distribution of distance attenuation. Meanwhile, relations between countries are determined closeness national geopolitical influence the strength to some extent.

China in the Maldives and Sri Lanka lower geopolitical influence, partly by limiting physical distance. Seven South Asian countries, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and the Chinese territory bordering the closer the physical distance between countries; and Sri Lanka and the Maldives are China’s coastal country, distance. The Chinese in Pakistan, US geopolitical influence in India is higher, to a large extent due to the distance between countries is small and friendly.

5 mechanism of Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia, evolution

Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia whether evolution inevitability? What is the mechanism of evolution is? Which driving force to promote the evolution of geopolitical influence? How are among the driving forces interact. Geopolitical influence of evolutionary mechanisms of revealing and understanding conducive to clear and accurate understanding of the changes in China and the US geopolitical influence in South Asia, and help make a preliminary judgment on the trends.

In the evolution of Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia, geopolitical location, the result of geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-cultural nonlinear interaction of various systems ( Figure 4 ). Geographical location where the country’s geopolitical influence in the evolution of constraints force is the dominant geopolitical power, is the driving force of the geo-economic, geopolitical culture is radiation. Geo-political, geo-economic and geo-cultural constraints in the development of mutually promote each other. Geo-location is the geographical basis geo-economic development is the geo-cultural genes “soil.”

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4 Country geopolitical influence diagram evolution mechanism Fig. 4 The driving mechanism of geo-influenceevolution

5.1 Geographical Location – restricting force

Country where the location reveals the extent of the relationship and influence between countries in space 10 ].Geopolitical location of the country determines the physical distance between countries distance, thereby affecting the degree of inter-country geo-economic cooperation. Geographically, if relations between adjacent countries, and in the unnatural barrier zone, normal political dealings, then the time from the distance between the national economy and economic cooperation on the short, geo-economic cooperation opportunities to many.

From the geopolitical location, near China South Asia, more than the United States has geographical advantages.Seven South Asian countries, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh and neighboring China, the physical distance is shorter, relatively low commodity transportation costs. Since the state geographical proximity, the late 1990s, China put forward economic cooperation in areas of India, Burma and Bangladesh. For the common economic interests, with complementary resources and products, trying to build symbiotic economic sectors 37 ], while China played a leading role. Bangladesh economic corridor in India and Burma is on the use of China’s capital, the economy mode, infrastructure and technology to speed up the transportation and infrastructure, India, Myanmar, Bangladesh region, to carry out traffic interconnection, investment, border trade, infrastructure construction, labor export cooperation 38 ]. Through the promotion of China and India, Myanmar and Bangladesh, three pragmatic cooperation in neighboring countries to obtain economic benefits and gradually “spillover” to the political arena, and ultimately the regional economic and social development and stability. Therefore, geographical location at a specific time and space environment to determine the size of the country’s geopolitical influence.

5.2 Geopolitics – Leading Force

The past 10 years, China in Pakistan’s geopolitical influential, and geopolitical influence in India is small. US geopolitical influence in India is large, and geopolitical influence in the Maldives is small. Explore the causes behind the phenomenon, difficult to find, geopolitics played a significant role.

Fig. 5

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5 Figure 2013 GDP of the world’s major countries and regions (one trillion US dollars) Fig. 5 The GDP in the Major Countries and Regions in 2013 (trillion Dollars)

With the rapid economic development in East Asia, the United States announced in 2011 the strategic focus eastwards from Europe, the Middle East and the Gulf region, the implementation of “Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy” 8] . United States strengthened economic ties with India. Currently, the US has become India’s largest trading and investment partner. With the improvement of the investment environment in India, US capital investment in India will be a substantial increase, especially business processing and outsourcing. In contrast, economic cooperation, regional economic integration and India development process is very slow. Sino-Indian bilateral trade is very unbalanced. According to Chinese Customs statistics, bilateral trade volume in 2013 more than 65 billion US dollars. Among them, India’s exports to China of $ 14.5 billion, imports amounted to $ 513.7, trade deficit of nearly $ 40 billion 47 ] . After the financial crisis, the Indian trade protectionism, anti-dumping on Chinese goods policy, bilateral economic and trade relations impact.

China and Pakistan, the two sides in the economic, commercial and cultural fields to carry out all-round exchanges and cooperation to build a highly effective, practical and flexible framework, promote pragmatic cooperation, bilateral economic and trade cooperation has improved continuously. 2012 bilateral trade volume reached 12.4 billion US dollars, an increase of 17.6%. Chinese investment in Pakistan in terms of infrastructure, energy and mineral resources to maintain steady growth. May 2013, Prime Minister Li Keqiang build a “China-Pakistan economic corridor”, provides a strong platform for cooperation and interoperability dynamic economic development of China and Pakistan. It is foreseeable that China geopolitical influence in Pakistan will not be weakened, but growing. This from a geo-economic point of view the interpretation of the causes of the United States in India, China, Pakistan’s geopolitical influence in the higher force.

5.4 Geoculture – radiation

Different values ​​and ideologies between the two countries, South Asian countries had a different appeal, appeal and identity. In the government, the South Asian countries and the United States political system similar. South Asia, except Bhutan parliamentary system of constitutional monarchy, the other six countries are democratic republic, in which India, Bangladesh, Nepal, implementing a parliamentary republic, while Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives is a presidential republic implemented. Culturally, American popular culture, such as the basic elements of freedom, leisure, vitality, liberation, modern, vibrant 32 ] and other South Asian countries, people, especially the younger generation has a strong appeal.

Between China and South Asian countries have deep historical and cultural roots, it has a similar history of development orientation, have similar geopolitical objective, which constitutes a solid foundation for closer exchanges between China and South Asia 48 ] . Chinese and South Asian Cultural Exchange began in the Western Han Dynasty Han Dynasty.Eastern Han Dynasty, Buddhism from India into China. Look at the world from a civilized process, India close cultural ties, with the same structure and complementary 49 ] . Cultural interaction caused by the spread of Buddhism also extends to the mathematics, literature, linguistics, architecture, medicine and music, and other fields. In addition, China launched a civilization contemporary charm “radiation diplomacy”, the act of state of China’s rise, soften civilized behavior 47 ] . In order to build a harmonious and prosperous surrounding regions, China is committed to the establishment of a “harmonious but different” new order of international culture 50 ] , respect for cultural differences, different cultures expand “homogeneity.” To this end, China from a strategic height and the overall perspective of the surrounding cultural diplomacy work system design and three-dimensional layout, a series of cultural exchange activities, there are exchanges of religion, adding the Confucius Institute, China increased student funding, culture Friendship Year established organized activities and Friendship Association, the Chinese image in the South Asia region has been greatly improved, thus gradually enhance China’s cultural influence in South Asia 3 ] . As of October 2014, in Asia, China Confucius Institutes across 32 countries (regions) a total of 102, including South Asia, 7; 14 Confucius Classrooms opened throughout the KMT and 58, including South Asia, there are five ( Table 4 ).

Table 4 South Asian countries opened Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms case Tab. 4 The Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms in South Asia
  1. Conclusions and Outlook

By constructing geopolitical influence index system and mathematical model of the evolution in time and space in South China and the United States and geopolitical influence in South Asia, and resolve the factors affecting the evolution of geopolitical influence and driving mechanism, draw the following conclusions:

(1) in the last 10 years, the Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asia showed an increasing trend in the slight fluctuations. From the growth rate, China’s geopolitical influence in South Asia, the growth rate faster than the United States. In 2012, China geopolitical influence in Pakistan’s largest, geopolitical influence in Sri Lanka and India, the minimum; US geopolitical influence in India’s largest, while in the Maldives geopolitical influence is minimized. Apart from India, China geopolitical influence in other South Asian countries than the United States is high.

(2) National geopolitical influence evolution is a slow process. 2003–2012 years, the Sino-US geopolitical influence in South Asian countries and regions, although the change, but change slightly.Evolution and world power structure geo influential centers of power transfer, is a gradual process. This answers the famous American political scientist Joseph from one side. Nye in the changing international environment, how to understand the influence of changes in national problems 2 ] .

(3) the main factors in South Asia, China and the US geopolitical influence in the evolution of hard power, soft power, interdependence and friction. Among them, the hard power and soft power is the dominant factor in geopolitical influence, from the pull effect; interdependent forces are secondary factors play a role thrust; and the frictional force is weakening factor, plays a reverse force. Currently, there are some scholars believe that the State can not influence quantification and measurement 11 , 12 , 14 ] , because of many factors to be considered, there is no one formula or model can include these “hard” and “soft” factors. Some scholars believe that the influence of the State depends on demographic, economic, military and cultural history of the country, and to quantify these factors to calculate the value of national influence 10 ] . The article is extracted the main factors affecting the evolution of geopolitical influence, and try to factors indicators of decomposition, quantitative estimation by formula Sino-US geopolitical influence change in South Asia. The conclusions Although not accurately portray the objective reality, but in line with reality.

(4) the driving force of China-US geopolitical influence in South Asia, including the evolution of geo-location, geo-political, geo-economic and geo-culture. Geo location national geopolitical influence the evolution of constraints force, geopolitics is the dominant force, is the driving force of the geo-economic, geopolitical culture is radiation.Among them, the geopolitical location determines the friction of physical distance; geopolitics in political philosophy, foreign policy, as well as the breadth and depth of the geo-cultural cultural appeal and cultural ties reflected the connotation of soft power; geopolitical location of the land and geo-economic area in GDP, science and technology constitute important elements of hard power; geo-economic trade and investment in the form of interdependent power sources. 4 major factors driving the four aspects of the evolution of a common geopolitical influence. Existing literature, there Mechanism Arctic route geopolitical pattern evolving 51 ] , studies have geopolitical pattern and BARYCENTER mechanism of the World’s oil supply 52] , but also the evolution and mechanism on energy geopolitics pattern 53 ] , but not inquiry appears geopolitical influence in the evolution of the national mechanism theoretical literature.

(5) National Hard power is not equal to geopolitical influence, countries hard strength and do not represent their external geopolitical influence is high. The two are not the same proportional change, but non-linear relationship.2003–2012 years, the US hard power index higher than China, but the United States in South Asia’s geopolitical influence change size but staggered ups and downs. Because the strength of geopolitical influence determinants, in addition to hard power, as well as soft power, interdependence and friction, four kinds of mutual restraint forces, which work together in order to determine the level of geopolitical influence. Although hard power plays a dominant role, but it does not determine the influence of changing geopolitical strength and speed.This is different from people’s thinking, but that the State hard strength, national influence is high. Study confirmed some plausible logic is not the truth.

In this paper, although the use of quantitative methods to try estimates state geopolitical influence, analyze their evolution in time and space, and to explore the factors and drive mechanism, but there are still some deficiencies, such as not to influence factors weights assigned did not specify the physical distance The value of rationality. National geopolitical influence further research questions are: ① how to geopolitical influence measurement results to test and evaluate ②how to trigger geopolitical influence in the evolution of various factors quantitative analysis and evaluation ③ how geopolitical relations, geopolitical structure?? and research into the effects of geopolitical geopolitical influence in the past? ④ how interrelated scales between geopolitical influence thinking study for?

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

reference

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Cao Jinqing’s China Along the Yellow River Reading Notes 英文摘要:曹锦清 《黄河边的中国》

My brief Chinese language comment — notes below

我们洋鬼子了解中国文化,经济,习惯文化,等不容易。我对中国的了解是从中国人的交流与阅读中国学者写的书得到的。 依我看中国这个概念也很复杂,说不定也有点不清楚。中国指的又是个文化文化领域又是个相当年轻,有60多年历史的中华人民共和国 (30几年前中国人称呼它《新中国》。中国做文化领域有几千年的历史。我的国家,美国的历史比中华人民共和国的历史长而是比西欧很多国家段(比英国法国段, 比德国长 — 当然比较一个国家历史的长短复杂 — 法国现在是第五个共和国(他们法国人共和国建国之后换了宪法5次。 美国属于有几千年的历史的西方文化领域,中华人民共和国属于中国或者中华文化领域(中华民国之前的由国家(有时几个国家有他们朝代的名字也不叫中国)。

可能你的看法不一样,可是我们大概有共识中国这个文化领域历史很长,很复杂,很有意思。

给我最大的启发是15年出版的《黄河边的中国》。曹锦清1995年夏天为了了解草根中国与他的变迁访问了很多河南与陕西省平民与官员。他也把当时当地的情况与清末的情况来比较。 这样弄清楚当地的特色。

高大伟

《黄河边的中国》

作者:曹锦清 出版社:上海文艺出版社 出版日期:2001年1月 ISBN:753212057

“China Along the Yellow River – A Scholar’s Observations and Meditations on Chinese Rural Society”  Reading Notes for Book One

Shanghai Wenyi Chubanshe, September 2000
Publication data:

Publisher’s website at http://www.slcm.com and email cslcm@public1.sta.net.cn

Book cover photo and publication data (in Chinese)
Page numbers refer to the first edition. These reading notes are from Book One (to page 239) of this 772 page book. The notes cover the section on Cao’s first trip through rural Henan during May and June 1996.

The author of “China Along the Yellow River”黄河边的中国,  Professor Cao Jinqing  of the Shanghai Social Development Research Institute also wrote or edited

“The Road to the Restoration of Confucianism — A Collection of Essays by Liang Shuming”   (Shanghai, 1996, Yuandong Publishers) ,

“Escaping from the Ivory Towers of Idealism: Research on the Work Unit Phenomenon”  which focuses on the question can the work unit system, developed for the planned economy adapt to the market economy?

with Zheng Letian, “Social and Cultural Changes in Contemporary North Zhejiang Rural Villages”, [Shanghai, Yuangdong Publishers]  and  the related essay by co-author Zhang Letian .


Social scientist Prof. Cao Jinqing  was able to do the rural survey that resulted in “China Along the Yellow River” [Huanghe Bian de Zhongguo]  took advantage of his network of friends and relatives in rural Henan to talk with farmers throughout the province during the Spring and Fall of 1996.  Cao remarks that the village is the unit of study for those who want to understand the modern fate of Chinese culture (p. 170).  Cao alternated conversations in the field with extensive background research on rural China during the Ming and Qing dynasties. This historical background gives his analyses and descriptions a rich texture and great clarity and a good sense of what is traditional and what are recent changes.  For Cao,  reading the history and literature books from the Ming and the Qing dynasties and talking with country people are two complementary approaches to traditional China.

Chinese tradition can be approached through texts or through getting out and talking with a lot of people, says Cao.  What is apparent is that all social organizations are modeled after the family.  One of the central questions of Cao’s book is that now that Mao is gone, (and despite Mao’s most strenuous efforts)  is rural China snapping back to its traditional sources or is it, disrupted by the biggest rural – urban migrations and economic reform changing into something completely different?  One of the big diffrences Cao finds between villages is the amount of non-agricultural income the farmers get. As non-agricultural income increases,  urban culture (and the cash economy) penetrate.  Villages with little non-agricultural income tend to have the highest number of  children born above the family planning quota [hei haizi]. [See the online essay by Prof. Huang Ping of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences  “A Sociological Study of Non-Agricultural Activities of Rural Chinese” in Chinese on the UNESCO web site at  Selection of Articles in Chinese ]

The TV sets and the movie star pinups of the young married couples symbolize the arrival of urban culture in rural China.Cao remarks repeatedly on the growing influence of urban culture in the countryside seen in pinups, home appliances, TV and the many farmers who work in the city (or even in far off Xinjiang) during the idle season.

Chinese villagers, remarks Cao, hate and fear local officials but have an almost superstitious respect for high ranking officials.   (p. 199)  Cao noted that Henan rural people have great respect for Mao Zedong despite the famine that killed 10 percent of the population in southern Henan after the Great Leap Forward. (p. 172)

Henan is Geographically Closed Compared to Yangtze Region and Socially Closed: Local Officials Don’t Want Outsiders Be They Journalists or High Government Officials Talking to Local People

Henan is different from southern China in just as the Yellow River is different from the Yangtze. The Yellow River carries more a higher concentration of silt than any other river. So much so that the Yellow River from the Henan provincial capital of Zhengzhou eastwards has its riverbed well above the level of the surrounding countryside.  And forty meters above ground level at Kaifeng.  The river keeps getting higher and higher and higher.  The silting and raising of the bottom of the riverbed means that no rivers flow into the downstream stretch of the Yellow River and that navigation along it is not possible. Thus Henan is closed while the provinces along the Yangtze are opened up by that river that makes navigation possible deep into the Chinese interior. (p. 85)  People who live along the Yellow River get their water mostly from wells while people who live along the Yangtze get their water from the river.

Cao avoided going with officials so that village people would speak more freely about their incomes, village politics, relationships between the villagers and officials, family planning, corruption and family.  Many times local officials from the township or county discovered him and sternly questioned what he was doing there. Cao remarks that China’s villages are often kept closed by local officials. Even Chinese scholars cannot go there freely to do survey work.  Cao notes time after time that when officials heard that he was doing survey work, they accused him of breaking some kind of rule.  Officials feared that he was a journalist or an investigator from the central government. (54 – 55) .  This is a sign of very tense relations between officials and villagers. Some villagers, Cao said, were prepared to give him a full run down on local problems and official corruption in the hope that someone from the center would fix things.  (p. 57) .

Villagers sometimes feared that he was there to ferret out information about unregistered over the birth quota children.  The parents of the child and sometimes neighbors and relatives as well could be penalized if an extra child were discovered.  Cao with the help of the Kaifeng Party School mostly to counties where high county officials who would bail him out of trouble served but the officials as a precaution, but those officials were only told of Cao’s presence if a problem arose.  The usual way social research is done, said Cao, was for the county to be contacted,  the county contacts the xiang (district) and the xiang contacts the village.  And officials from each level not only accompany the researcher but shower the researcher with hospitality.  The problem with this, say Cao, is that with an official around,  the villagers will not speak frankly.

After Productivity Gains, Most Are Well Fed But Developing Industry is Difficult

Cao discusses the considerable gains in unit productivity since the 1970s owing to improved seed varieties, fertilizer and pesticides.  Mud and straw dwellings have often been completely replaced by brick.  In some villages people will hire builders instead of following the old custom that disappeared in the 1970s of gathering the relatives together and of course feeding them during construction work.  Land is generally allocated fairly evenly among the inhabitants of villages (typically one Chinese mu (1/15th of a hectare) per person, with some people getting a bit more sometimes if they belong to an influential clan, and sometimes they do not get extra land for a child who is over the birth quota.   Cao says that in rural Henan agricultural productivity has increased between three to five times since the 1950s owing to more fertilizer, improved seeds, and water conservation projects.Cao suggests that Chinese agriculture would be much more productive if farms could be larger, but the even allocation of land that is the guarantor of social stability blocks this line of advance (p. 36).

Villagers often say that over the past two decades, with the contract land system and improvements in irrigation and fertilizer the basic problems of food and clothing have been solved.  The problem today however is no spending money. Cao comments on the great number of village enterprise projects that have risen and failed driven by political pressure from above, handicapped by lack of experience and poor management below.  Village enterprises often collapse, Cao noticed,  when local people are taken in by swindlers from the big city. (p. 60 – 61)

Cao lets the farmers speak, adding in his analysis, but that analysis really emerges from a very through contextualization of what the local people are saying.  Cao,  never resorts to jargon. Indeed at the conclusion of the first half of the book (the book is divided into the Spring 1996 and the Fall 1996 trips to the Henan countryside)  Cao remarks on how the social theories imported into China from the West have messed up China something awful.  A swipe at Marxist-Leninism?  China needs to learn from Western social theory but rethink it so as to develop a theory that can be applied fluently to Chinese society.  Cao asks, “If we hold to a dogma that we don’t even believe in ourselves anymore, and don’t go study how social life and social  psychology is changing, how can we ever hope to solve the great many ideological problems before us?”  (p. 30)

One theme running through Cao’s book is the central importance of extended family and clan power in village politics.  Mao Zedong  tried to root it out of the traditional village, observed Cao, but the extended family/clan is still the basic fact of life.  Mutual aid among villagers, for example,  almost never went beyond extended clan groups. Cao made the fascinating observation that villages with a strong, effective leader who did go things for the village were nearly always to be found only in villages in which one surname dominated the village. [pp. 116 – 124 “Able Leader or Village Tyrant”]

When the Farmers Can Stand Up for Their Own Interests, China Can Become A Democratic Country

Cao writes that “the central task of modernizing Chinese villages is leading the village people, unable to stand up for their own interests and organize themselves to the point where they can stand up for themselves and organize themselves.” (p. 175)  Cao sees the election of village officers and the selection by village party members of the village branch party secretary as important advances in democracy.  One village leader said village democracy can work since people know each other, but how will it work in larger units such as the district?  Cao argues that the farmer’s conception of personal interest doesn’t go much beyond the village and do not think about representing their own interests but look to someone else to represent their interests.  In practice, village party committee are permitted to operate as long as they get the job done and there is not too much factionalism. If that happens, the district party committee will intervene and change the village committee. The corruption of village officials teaches villagers the importance of democracy, which is a weapon against corruption, remarks Cao.  (p. 63)

Cao observed time and time again as he asked villagers the name of the local branch party secretary or village officials, that the dominant surname always dominated village politics well above its proportion in the village.   The branch party secretary nearly always belongs to the dominant family/clan or at least to a large family (pp. 37 and 207) . In his discussion of the importance of the family/clan he stresses a feature of rural Chinese society that Chinese economist He Qinglian pointed to in the last chapters of her 1998 book  “China and The Pitfalls of  Modernization’  [ full text in Chinese at  Zhonggguo Xiandaihu de Xianjing  ]

Mao was unable to eradicate many of the customs and thinking of the old society, despite his most strenuous efforts. Now the question is will the old society return or is something else emerging?  The return of at least long-term land tenure with the responsibility system in agriculture seems to have restored many traditional relationships.  Especially these  four tradional relationships:

To land — exchanges with nature;

Non market exchanges based on human sentimental connections with relatives and others;

Market exchanges;  and

Relationships/exchanges  between the family and the state — that is the people are taxed and the state rules on the people’s behalf.

From Exchanges Based Upon Sentiment and Partiality to the Market

Large numbers of human exchanges based on personal feelings intrude upon modern political processes. Cao sees the same phenomenon operating in China that Max Weber saw in Europe:
.
“The human feelings in relationships that are such a deep source of pleasure are just what has prevented our people from cooperating in groups rationally on an equal basis with others. Max Weber wrote that to develop a modern rationalized organization, human sentimental relationships have to be eliminated from the process.  This process greatly improved organizational efficiency and became a powerful force for the modernization of the economy.  Some people say that an organization without human feeling (renqing) has become dehumanized. This is the very big price that humanity paid in order to create modern bureaucratic organizations. I suddenly understood what Weber meant.”  (p. 196)

What are the results? There are laws but they are not followed.  Laws are not strictly enforced. There is corruption in the Party and the government.  (p. 31).  Farmers are only operating in their local market — they will need a new way of organization to participate in national and international markets.  Farmers now enjoy freedom and the market, but few people understand that freedom and responsibility are interlinked.   Local officials charge all kinds of excess illegal arbitrary fees — they are not then ruling in the people’s behalf — are among China’s big problems.

Cao sees family planning and the tax burden on farmers as the two big flashpoints in the relationship between rural villagers and officials.  When Cao visits a village, he talks to a range of people from different income groups to get an idea of the tax burden (he calculated it at 24 percent in one village) and the proportion of children born over the family planning quota (he figured about half in  another village).  In one village an accounting table showed 4.7 percent tax rate (just under the five percent set by the State Council) but the village accountant explained that the tax rate was really 10.7 percent.  Villagers where nearly everyone depended exclusively on farming for their living were much more likely to have many “black children”.  (pp. 45 – 54)

Money Making Units Collecting Family Planning Fines and Taxes Swell in Size and Need to Collect Even More Taxes and Fines

In many areas, the district government would have ten or twenty divisions employing a total of over 100 people,  but the family planning section would by itself employ thirty or forty people.  Farmers understand that there is not enough land to support more people, but in their own case they want more children to help in farm work and for an heir.  The family planning office in one village, during the two years prior to a 1996 visit, to suppress excess births required all women of child bearing age to report to the district government office on odd numbered months.  Failure to report brought on a fine of 50 – 100 RMB.  One villager talked about some methods family planning official use when a fine is not paid such as taking away grain, livestock or even tearing down a house.  Sometimes neighbors and relatives would share in the fine or even in the destruction of their homes.  Family planning as an important source of revenue in many areas.   Here is a passage from a talk given at the Kaifeng Party School on family planning practices in some Henan counties:

“To accomplish their family planning mission, village cadres are doing whatever they think it takes — from fining people to corporal punishment, from taking away livestock to destroying houses, from holding close relatives responsible to holding neighbors responsible too. But many villages in the interior still have 25 percent more births than they should.

  “Many village, township and county governments have become dependent upon family planning fines as a source of “off-budget” income. Some county family planning committees assess a ten RMB (USD 1) per capita family planning fine quota on villages and townships, payable in advance. The township or rural district keeps half of the family planning fine, twenty percent is sent to the county and thirty percent is remitted to the village committee. If the county gets 20 RMB per capita, then the township gets another 50 RMB per capita. Some districts have lower excess births that others. In these districts, enforcement is often relaxed so that there will be more families to fine. The fines changed from a means to an end and the objective switched from reducing births to increasing births.” (p. 16)


On Village Democracy

There are three main conceptions of what a village is. There is the Marxist view that farmers are like potatoes — they are tied intimately to the soil, get their living from it but don’t have much to do with each other. A second theory divides people into social classes — that was theory was the basis of land reform (landlords vs. poor farmers) of the 1950s. A third theory (of pre-’49 scholar Liang Shuming)  sees a Chinese village as a family/clan organization.  Cao said that there is some truth to all of them and most Chinese villages are a mix of all three.    Villages on the north China plain tend to be larger (several hundred to a thousand or more households) than in the south, which is more mountainous.  Relations and exchanges between people and households are based on mutual courtesy and sentiment rather than on a market.  Owing to this mentality, argues Cao, people don’t think of themselves as a group with group business.  This mentality needs to be considered when analyzing village democracy and village committees.

Village organization descends most recently from the production brigade system. In rural Henan, sometimes the head of the production brigade was appointed or elected but was usually the result of an effort to balance several clans or the branches of the predominant clan.  People see issues from the perspective of the immediate family to extended family to clan and only then to the village.  Everywhere village people who are not able to represent their own interests see local officials systematically violating those interests.

What is the heritage of the collectivist thinking championed by Mao Zedong?  This kind of collectivist philosophy and style of popular mobilization  aimed at changing the Chinese village from what Sun Yat-sen called “a pile of sand” to a “piece of iron”.   Can the work brigades (equivalent to a village) fashioned by Mao become the source of democratic organization to handle public affairs?  Cao says after he can’t answer this question, but notes the village committees  mostly function as arms of the district that collects taxes, and sees to it that abortions and sterilizations are done.  Cao points out that the democratically elected village councils are the Chinese manifestation of an attempt at modernization.

Developing countries try to impose modernization from above by changing a system but the  social-psychological-cultural change need to achieve this is much harder and takes much longer than changing a system.  Cao sees democratically elected councils as floating atop a mass of traditional culture and traditional behaviors.  In most villages, people aren’t used to acting on their own behalf and if they want to, the village does not permit them to do so. Cao prefers, when considering this question not to thing about what should be, but what is, and even more what is possible.

Why Are Officials So Corrupt?

Why are village officials so corrupt? asks Cao at one point. Part of his answer is that in the mid 1980s some villagers started to get rich through sideline industries and by the late 1980s through some of the township and village enterprises.  Although  it should be said that in village after village introduced in the book the local TVEs that collapsed quickly or died at birth. The outside swindler and faking results for TVEs by local officials who want to rise are two typical TVE stories in his Henan villages.  Village officials saw some fellow villagers getting rich and wanted it for themselves. Cao observes that village people don’t like corrupt officials, yet their custom of giving presents for favors is a corrupting influence. So another part of the problem is the gift-giver.  Cao finds much in the Chinese villages of today that reminds him of his readings about China in ages past. His discussion of corruption includes a discussion of the famed clean official of Song Dynasty Kaifeng, Bao Gong, and the wide appeal that story has even today.

Village committee core officials (party secretary,  village chief,  village accountant)  work 200 days a year on village business are lowly paid. They draw just 100 RMB per month in salary.  The village budget might be 50 – 60,000 RMB annually spent on village roads, bridges, and schools. [pp. 66 – 67]

Mao’s solution to corruption, remarks Cao, was to mobilize the people against the officials, but that approach disrupted administration and proved to be very expensive.  Democracy depends upon a true democratic election system and press freedoms and individual freedom of expression — but real democracy based on people aware of and determined to use their rights — to seize power.  Not a country like India, remarks Cao, with vast numbers of passive people who receive these political rights as a gift. (p. 237)

Corruption Will End Only When Villagers Stand Up for Their Rights and Organize Themselves

Yet at the root of corruption Cao sees the inability of the villagers to create democratic institutions to represent them. The villagers says Cao, are always looking for someone to be the boss on their behalf (ti min zuo zhu) rather than organizing themselves and choosing someone to be accountable to them (min zhu). This is another theme Cao returns to regularly. Can democratic centralism be a kind of halfway house?, he asks.  Cao observes that democratic centralism is centralism without the democracy as it is practiced in rural China.  Democracy only goes as far as the expectation that officials will “listen to the people”.  But democratic socialism lacks built-in institutional guarantees to assure its functioning.  The central question for China, Cao writes, is to determine how to teach rural people to have a democratic consciousness through village and xiang-level elections.  “A modern political party with no interest of its own other than the well-being of the people, should make thorough studies of how to accomplish the political modernization of China.  This is an even bigger and more difficult task than economic modernization.” (pp. 237 – 238)

No Limit to Payrolls So No Limit to Fines and Taxes, Either

Another thread running through this books is the tax burden on farmer. In village after village farmers say that the tax burden is high and getting heavier.  Cao traces this to the role of the village, the rural district/township and county as the employer of last resort. Payrolls keep getting bigger and taxes increase accordingly.   In one xiang, Cao notes how during the last twenty years government and party payrolls tripled and quadrupled with many superfluous workers. The sections that increased fastest were those that brought in income such as family planning, public security and finance from fines and taxes. (pp. 91 – 93) .  When the xiang was organized as a People’s Commune, party and government staff totaled 20. Now there are 150.  When local leader were asked how many workers were needed, they said 30 would do instead of 150.

In discussions with a village leader, party secretary and accountant,  Cao heard four main reasons for this:

After the commune was dissolved, responsibilities of government and party sharply decreased, but the people who held the old jobs were still around.

Moreover, as a new function was created, new jobs and new sections keep payrolls growing.

The county kept sending retired soldiers and school graduates to the xiang. Jobs were created for them.  And payrolls got bigger year by year.

Higher-level government and party officials saw to it that positions were created for their children, relatives and friends.

In the more prosperous areas officials would look to taxing township and village enterprises, but in the poorer areas where there weren’t any companies, so the officials would count on bringing in money from family planning fines in addition to taxes assessed on farmers.

What is the population of the a certain rural district (xiang)? The agricultural and economics section says 23, 192; public security 25000; family planning says 26,000. Of course population is a moving target, says Cao.  The many “black children” (hei haizi) making an accurate count difficult.

Many government and party organizations in the xiang are responsible to their own higher-level organizations and are not under the xiang party and government. This is the so-called tiao/stovepipe  problem that makes coordination difficult.  In general if there is money to be made, the superior organizes jealously guards it against the local government; but if there is no money to be made or if it is a money loser, they don’t mind if the local government takes over.

The xiang government and party finds itself caught between the local policies of the county and the interests of the locals. If they implement a policy too zealously, they may be kicked out by the county as a scapegoat if the farmers protest.  The county sometimes imposed tasks — unfunded mandates — such as setting up facilities in the villages all the while demanding that the burden on farmers be reduced.  The village committee is supposed to represent the local people but is actually an implementer of the orders of the xiang.  One xiang party secretary said that a village party secretary needs to have a strong clan behind him when he tries to carry out unpopular orders.   The xiang looks for a strong, able person to be village branch secretary or village head.  People who want the job often have corrupt motives. So corruption and the power of clans keeps growing in the villages.  (95 – 96)

Communist Disneyland??

One of the more startling chapters in the book was Cao’s discussion of a visit to Nanjie Cun (805 households, population 3000)  near Luohe City in south central Henan.  The village decided in the 1980s to recollectivize, hew to a Maoist line and set up prosperous enterprises. It is run a charismatic leader Wang Hongbin. The leader is idolized in the Maoist manner. There is a Mao statue guarded day and night and Maoist slogans are everywhere.   The village got nationwide attention for its prosperity and Maoism. Political achievements also helped economic ones as the village became a favored place of pilgrimage for the communist faithful. See the :Industry and Commerce Times (Taiwan) report on the Nanjie Village controversy .

Cao found that Nanjie Cun is a perfect type of the one-family name highly clan-conscious village run by a benevolent leader.  The top leaders, all named Wang, belonged to the same clan. The village made a strong distinctions between the inner and the outer.  The very many visitors were kept to a tourist track and museums and had almost no contact with villagers.  Cao introduced him as a social scientist who wanted to interview some officials and villagers, but was refused and told, read these books and come back if you have questions.  [p. 131 – 153]   Cao concluded that from a sociological perspective the village is an ethical collectivity (lunli gongtongtai) and not a contractual collective community [qiyuhua de jiti zuzhi]. Wang Hongbin is a ruler on behalf of the people and not an official chosen by the people.

Nanjie Cun has three basic policies:

Low salary, high welfare benefits. This policy aims also at eliminating selfishness

Contracts are let out not to individuals as in the responsibility contract system but to collectives

Criticism meetings aimed at combating the selfishness of individuals.

Cao concludes that Nanjie Cun is a true collectivity and they are achieving collective prosperity.  Cao concludes that its success depends upon the existence of a particular personality that can drawn on elements in the culture, but it is a personal success and the disappearance of the leader will mean the end of the organization.  Cao also mentions that the Nanjie Cun enterprises employ 12,000 people only 2000 of who are villagers. The 10,000 others work for wages and do not share in benefits. Thus Cao remarks, some have criticized Nanjie Cun as “collective capitalism”.  [pp. 131 – 153]

Cao visited Zhulin, another collectivized village, and one much poorer than Nanjie Cun, which relies on industry. There too is a charismatic leader and the dominance of one family name: eighty percent of the people are named Li.  Here too, success depends upon the leader, and so it is not actually a model for other villages. [pp. 157 – 165]

Not Just the Political System But Social Psychology and Customs Must Change If More Than Superficial Changes Are to Occur

Cao concludes that the weakness of Chinese farmers is that they do not work together well and cannot see things. This Cao said is very evident in water and waterworks disputes between and within villages.  Thus collective interests objectively exist but do not subjectively exist.  Cao criticized some Chinese intellectuals who see democracy and dictatorship as just a matter of political systems. Cao says the difference is much deeper than that.  Those intellectuals are blinded by political theory and do not understand that the effectiveness of a political system depends upon social psychology and customs.  Cao says until Chinese villagers learn to stand up and represent themselves instead of just needed other people to represent them, any laws and democratic system will be merely like a little oil slick floating on the water. [p. 167]

China Along the Yellow River  Notes  Part II

(2-1/  pp. 243 – 254)

Here are some more reading notes from “China Along the Yellow River”. This section covers the introductory material to Book Two of Shanghai sociologist Cao Jingqing’s travels in rural Henan from September 6 to November 21, 1966.

The 770 pages of Cai’s  “China Along the Yellow River”  ( Huanghe Biande Zhongguo from Shanghai Wenyi  Chubanshe) are full of insights on society, economics, politics and society in rural China. The book is worth reading and studying.  I finished my Long March through this book several weeks ago. The quality is maintained throughout the book.  These notes cover pp. 253 ? 254.  In Beijing the book is available on the 3rd or 4th floor of the Beijing Bookbuilding (Beijing Tushu Dasha) near the literature section.  A second printing in January 2001 has brought up the total press run to 10,000 copies.

Reading notes for Book One are at  China Along the Yellow River — A Scholar’s Observations and Medications on Chinese Rural Society Reading Notes, Book One   http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/english/sandt/china-along-yellow-river.htm

Cai Jinqing in fall 1996 began his second survey in rural Henan after a summer of reading in history.  Cai’s summer studies focues on rural society and rural government in late Qing China and the relationship between the two.  Cai writes that an examination of history shows that although over the past half century rural China has seen large changes in its political arrangements, there remains nonetheless a large continuity in the old methods of production, and in social and political
relationships.  There certainly has been change, but not really qualitative change.  Now has appeared that greatest shift in Chinese history. One again  liberated Chinese peasants are moving into non-agricultural occupations in the countryside.  Will this finally break the great continuity and so overcome the inertia of history? It is still hard to tell.   Cai has been trying for some years to create a theoretical framework for understanding rural China.  Can it emerge from survey work, or can the theories of western sociology and cultural studies be employed to create such a framework?

A tradition vs. modernization framework can be employed of course, but what does modernization mean? Is it a change in the form of agricultural production?  Maximizing yield in a situation where there is one person per mu (1/15th of a hectare) blocks the consolidation of farmland.  Does modernization mean per capita income? Without industrialization, rural China can be adequately fed and clothed but no more.  Does it mean a change in the political consciousness of China’s peasants? Without a change in the current means of production, there is no way in which peasants can be elevated to the status of citizens.  The modernization
of rural China seems to depends on rapid commercial and industrial growth and thus on the modernization of the cities.  Only if China’s commercial and industrial sector can absorb the majority of China’s agricultural population will the modernization of rural Chinese society be possible.  This will be a long historical process, especially in western China.    Many of the habits of Chinese society and politics are rooted in China’s rural past.   Many of the new concepts that China will
need to be interpreted in the light of China?s national experiences. (pp. 243 – 245)

Commonly the experience of modernization in third world countries is modernization imposed from the exterior and from the top towards the bottom.  This is quite different from the bottom-up modernization process that occurred in the original modern countries.  In the developing countries, intellectuals have been the missionaries of modernization who entered the political process and then modernization political and legal systems.  They used political power and education to
reform social structures and to modernize the economy.   Yet if China approaches modernization from the inner towards the outer and from the bottom up, we find that there is a tremendous amount of inertia in rural society.  There are obstacles in old methods of production and in old social and political relationships that would be difficult to overcome, even across the span of several generations.

The Central Plains (zhongyuan) gave birth to the Chinese people.  Once it had a mild and moist climate.  Visiting the farmers of Henan, their burden and the difficulty of modernization become apparent.  The people lack farmland and the farmland lacks water these are the two guardian tigers block the way to modernization.  Farmers along the coast of Jiangsu Province can switch into other sectors and use agriculture to supplement their incomes.  Yet in the center and west of China,
agriculture will remain the principal sector for a long time to come. According to reports, of the 80 million Chinese who live in abject poverty, water shortages are the direct cause of poverty for 60 million of them.   Chinese has over the past five decades made great progress in agriculture.  China’s population more than doubled but per mu (1/15 of a hectare) productivity increased from three to five times with the wide application of modern agricultural technologies.   (p. 247)

Technological has brought important changes. However  even today the foundation of agriculture is still built on the old small-scale, intensive family based method of production.  This household organization of production and with it the customary way of relying on a web of personal relationships to obtain resources and the
ever-increasing bureaucratic nature of local government organization are still central.  This traditional household organization based means of production has strengthened steadily since opening and reform made once again the household the basic unit of agricultural production.  These facts cast a shadow on rural China?s prospects for modernization.

Some say that the May 4th New Culture Movement marked a decisive break with traditional China. This was certainly true for the intellectuals who took the West as their tutors.  For the Chinese peasantry however, the old system that “takes the household as its basic unit and a mode of behavior that relies on a web of personal relationships to obtain resources” has remained just as in the past a central fact of their lives.  Just as Marx said, the past has a hold on the present as the
dead a hold on the living.   Pessimism is not helpful but the kind of optimism that brings with it rash actions are even worse.

The purpose of this second survey period is to expand the areas of Henan Province covered to the northern, western and southern parts of the province and to shift the focus from the farmer household to the country district (xiang) and county level government.  The network of students and teachers of the Kaifeng Party School along with the relatives of the acquaintances of author Cai Jingqing helped arrange access to these areas.

A difficult question is the place of China?s traditional pattern of human relationships in the modern age.  As a human being I love and cherish this way of living even as my rational mind has its doubts. As an observer and researcher of modern Chinese rural society, I find that  it is just there  “personal relationships” that block the development and maturation of politics, the economy and ethics in China and that inhibit the development of the “individual in society” and of the “awareness
that one is a citizen”. Yet as a person, I want to live amidst these direct and sincere personal relationships.  (p. 250)

A professor Hu of the Kaifeng Party School said,  “Reforms must be paid for.  Who is paying for them?  Reform also creates profits. Who gets the profits”  Hu continued, “It is first the farmers and secondly the workers of the state-owned enterprises who are paying for reform. According to what I have seen in eastern Henan Province, since 1985 many farmers have not seen improvements in their living standards.  What they have experienced is with the steady rise in their tax burden a decline in their actual standard of living.  Among the workers of the state owned enterprises in Kaifeng City and Kaifeng County, two-thirds are
either laid off or looking for work (xia gang, dai gang).  For people who have lost their rice bowl, life has become difficult and uncertain. Who has profited from reform?”

” First of all are local government officials at all levels, and especially those government and Party officials who have some real power.  Second of all are directors and managers of factories that have contracts.  Third are the owners of private industry and merchants.    This is a very serious and complex problem. If the burden of reform is borne by the workers of the state-owned enterprises and the peasants and the profits are reaped by government and party officials and the owners of private business, then the reforms are not China away from socialism but not to western-style capitalism but to a uniquely Chinese style of bureaucratism.   China may very well be heading that way.   This betrays the intention of the planners of reform and also the wishes of the people who are determined that China should become a liberal society.  Observing what is really going on in China’s interior, the actual process of reform seems to be bringing China along this third pathway. ”

China’s reforms started in the countryside.  The household contract responsibility system gave peasants the right to manage their own land and their personal freedom.  The result was a great increase in agricultural production and made possible great developments in the industrial and commercial sectors. Thus I could say that the peasants are the direct beneficiaries of this reform.  The ever-increasing burden on farmers is directly related to the tendency for the size of local government organizations at every level to expand and the increase of bureaucratism.  This is in turn related to the problem of political reform of local government. The increase in the farmer’s burden since 1985 has meant that there has been no real increase in their standard of living since then.  .. The picture is more mixed for workers, since some have been able to greatly increase their incomes by changing jobs.

Some local level government and Party officials use their power to reap benefits for themselves.  Thus, this local level is just where the Party and government has paid the highest price for reform. The price has been paid in the corruption spread by these corrupt local officials who have corrupted markets, beliefs, loyalties, public morality, and principles. Corruption in the Party and government is the key problem.  Eliminating corrupt morals and illegal profits among Party and government officials and factory chiefs who have special contracts is the absolute precondition to ensure that the reforms of socialism go in the proper
direction.   (pp. 251 – 252)

Hu maintains that most of the peasants in the Chinese interior have been the price but not reaping the benefits of reform. The poorest peasants suffer from three kinds of disasters — natural disasters, disasters from local government, and the disaster of fluctuating market prices.  Local officials run campaigns to encourage all the peasants to plant one or another crop in the hope of improving their incomes. Very often the result is that everyone plants the crop, prices plunge and farmers end
up not being able even to cover their operating costs.   In 1995, the market price of cotton was higher than the official purchase price so many country and district government sent police to the countryside to force farmers to sell as the lower, official price.  This year the market price for cotton is lower than the official price so many local government purchasing offices are refusing to accept cotton. Administrative orders from local governments that farmers plant this or
that are one of the principal causes of wide fluctuations in prices.

According to a State Council order, the farmer’s burden may not exceed 5 percent.  In fact, it is very often 30 –  40 percent.  Hu continued, therefore, whenever you travel around the countryside you notice the very strong bad feelings of the peasants and local officials for each other.   During one trip, a peasant told me, “One day the peasants will revolt. When that day comes, I’ll be the first to go to the county and district government and kill all those corrupt officials.”   Naturally,
that is the talk of a hothead.

There is a peasant saying that goes:  “Law isn’t as important as policy,  policy isn’t as important as a document coming down from on high, and that document isn’t as important as the words of a leader.”

[Faluu meiyou zhence da, zhengce meiyou hongtou da, hongtou meiyou tsuiba da]

China Along the Yellow River reading notes  2-2 (pp. 254 ?264)

County government is the most important of the four levels of local government  (provincial, city or regional, county, and rural district [sheng, shi (qu), xian, xiang].  Qing Emperor Yongzheng wrote that the county magistrate is the official closest to the people and the foundation of government. ?If the county magistrate is honest, the people benefit most of all, if the magistrate is corrupt, the people suffer the most.?nbsp; Although in today China now extends even lower to the townships and rural districts (xiang), these levels are largely outposts of the county rather than semi-autonomous levels of government in themselves.

Government and Party leaders are especially important. Moreover from the perspective of rural sociological and cultural studies, the county is a complete social and cultural unit.   Studies of households, villages and groups of villages depend upon an understanding of the county, but the county is largely a distinct unit for the purposes of study.   Counties can even have their own languages, cultural traditions, and histories.   (p. 254)

Wuyang County in central Henan covers 777 square kilometers and has a population of 510,000.  Ninety-seven percent of the people are involved in agriculture.  The proportion of local government income from tobacco tax has grown from 30 percent in the 1950s to 42 percent in the 1960s to about 80 percent during the 1980s.  During the five decades of the PRC, the number of local government offices grew from 10 in 1949 to 23 in 1957, 27 in 1966, decreasing to 13 in 1971 but rising again to 29 in 1978 and 36 in 1985.  In addition to Party and government offices, the offices of the county people congress  and other organization have also added many employees.   Although the number and organization of county offices have been constantly changing since the late Qing dynasty, the trend is clear. More and more offices and employees that result in an ever-increasing burden on the local people.   The contract responsibility system and the market economy seem to be major factors in accelerating the trend breaking down large families into nuclear families.   Most of Wuyang County people live just above the line of abject poverty? they are just barely adequately fed and clothed (wenbao).  (pp. 258 ?259)

County and district (xiang) finance is very difficult.  In 1993, eleven of the fourteen townships in the county were not able to meet their payrolls on time.  Growth in rural incomes has been slow even as production has steadily increased. People don have enough money to buy more.  In 1993 per capita peasant income was 705 RMB (USD 100). Taking inflation into account, there was only a very small increase over the previous year. This per capita figure is 216 RMB below the national average.  The peasants of Wuyang County have no other resources than the one mu (1/15 of a hectare) that they farm.  They can draw no resources from the seacoast, they can get income from the city, and there are no natural resources below the ground.  Their situation is typical for counties in central and western China.

Nonetheless, the one mu per person of land keeps people out of abject poverty. People are building better housing for themselves although most people don have much in the way of interior furnishings. The county for all its problems, like most counties in central and western China, are in better shape today than it has been in one to two hundred years.  (p. 260)

Handicapped by the lack of capital , local officials promoted many schemes to promote commerce in industry. Nearly all failed. In recent years over 6000 township and village enterprises were started up but as of late 1996 only 300 were still operating.  Where TVEs have succeeded seems to be more along the coastal China. These successes seem to have been based on successful enterprises that grew out of the People Communes but more importantly the business experience from the port cities involved in China trade and the growth of commerce their going back to the late Ming Dynasty.  The mental accumulation of ideas seems in the end to have been and even more important kind of accumulation than capital accumulation.   This kind of

rimitive accumulation?of ideas has just begun in  rural central and western China.

Where the nearly all the people depend upon farming to make a living, increasing productivity through mechanization and large farms is just not possible. In Wuyang County, as in central and western China,  mechanization would make it possible for one family to farm 80 mu in an area that has one mu per person land. To do that would require finding jobs for the 95 percent of the population that would be displaced.

Wuyang County has 128,000 peasant households and so a workforce of about 300,000 in the villages.  The slogan there is ut 100,000 people to work on various projects and to send a labor army of 100,000 strong down south of the Yangtze to find work?   People can find work at home, so many look for jobs outside their area. Wuyang County organized the export of its labor.

Most of the peasants in the Chinese interior still live the traditional agricultural life that has been typical of the area for thousands of years.  The western thinking that has penetrated China for the past hundred years hasn affected them much.  Although the peasants are sometimes very angry at the heavy burden local officials impose on them and how those officials eat and drink away their earnings, this anger is as old as that practice that itself goes back to ancient times.  (p. 263)    According to official reports, the government project that organized labor exports increased farmer income by 50 percent and official revenues by 25 percent.  The two biggest effects of this organized labor export is to change the traditional culture of the area as well as to change for the better the relationship between the people and officials.  Now a study would be needed to see if these claims are true. (p. 264)   The percapita farmland available in  Wuyang County is just one-tenth of a hectare (1.5 mu) .

In Henan Province there are two poles typical of life. Either  the peasants continue dozing in the same passivity typical of the  agriculture based culture they have lived in for millennia.  Or else appear many county and township officials who make big plans but their interventions in economic life are typically ineffective.   Here’s hoping that Wuyang County can escape being caught in a vicious cycle that alternates between these two poles.

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CASS Scholar Li Dongyan on China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Prospects and Ways Forward

Li Dongyan’s article is three years old but still useful to understand changing Chinese thinking on UN peacekeeping.

China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Prospects and Ways Forward

中国参与联合国维和建和的前景与路径

李东燕

Online: 2012-11-28 14:38:00   来源:《外交评论(外交学院学报)》(京)2012年03期

From the 3/2012 issue of Foreign Affairs Review published by the China Foreign Affairs University

http://www.cssn.cn/61/6105/201211/t20121128_135889.shtml

Abstract:  Since the late 1980s, China has gradually expanded its participation in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  With changes in UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding and actions as well as China’s changing international role, China faces new challenges and difficulties in this area.  China needs to improve and adjust its participation, its overall approach, and the mode of its participation in these activities.  With respect to the role and implementation of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, China still needs to maintain its traditional basic concepts on peacekeeping and effectively deploy its traditional strengths as well as to develop its cooperation with non-traditional actors.  China’s participation in these areas should be broader.  In particular, China should increase its role in policies and decision-making affecting peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political peacemaking.  In this way, “Western concepts” and “Chinese concepts” can re-inforce and complement one another in the implementation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding”.

Brief introduction of author:  Li Dongyan is a researcher in the World Economics and Politics Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Introduction

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding are two kinds of different yet closely connecting peace missions of the United Nations.  Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are organized differently within the United Nations.   Peacekeeping operations have been traditional activities of the UN ever since 1948.  Although the peacebuilding concept was proposed early on, it did not find a home in the organization until 2005 when the UN passed a resolution that established a new organization, the Peacebuilding Commission.  From a missions and authorities perspective, peacekeeping operation mission authorities include monitoring ceasefires, maintaining local peace and security; promoting peaceful resolution of disputes and dialogue among various nationalities; stop armed conflicts;  demobilization of combatants, and their repatriation and return to society; restoring organizational capacity to support rule of law and civil administration; organize and oversee elections; protect citizens;  protect human rights; and fighting violence and crime.  The principal task of peacebuilding is to support the peaceful post-conflict progress of a country.  This mission includes soliciting and coordinating resources, monitoring restoration and reconstruction work,  providing advice and information, developing an overall strategic policy that includes political, security, rule by law, human rights, humanitarian work, and social development.   The objective of peacebuilding is to prevent post conflict countries from once again falling back “by building sustainable peace”.  From a resources perspective, peacekeeping mission expenses are covered by the contributions of UN member countries.  The UN General Assembly makes a peacekeeping assessment on member countries for their share of peacekeeping costs.  This assessment takes into consideration the economic situation of each country and whether it is a permanent member of the Security Council.  The Peacebuilding Commission relies on contributions by member countries and other contributors to the Peacebuilding Fund to support countries on the peacebuilding agenda and other countries designated by the Secretary-General.

Although peacekeeping and peacebuilding are distinct organizationally, in their funding, and in their mission and authorities, the two types of missions are intimately connected in their shared focus on peace, security, politics, rule of law, and human rights.  Both are integral parts of multidimensional and comprehensive UN peacekeeping missions through which the UN seeks to stop conflicts and ensure that post conflict countries build a sustainable peace.  Thus far, the UN has already conducted peace operations in 66 countries around the world.  Fifteen of these missions are still underway.  As of November 30, 2011, the number of people participating in current missions had reached 98,548 peacekeepers and 17,771 civilian personnel.  As of February 2012, there were also 2,323 UN volunteers.  (Note 2)   As of March 2012, there were twenty-two countries are on the UN peacebuilding agenda.  These countries were chiefly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. (Note 3).

With the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations became more frequent as did academic work on peacekeeping. From the late 1980s into the 1990s, the number of articles in international journals on peacekeeping rose by 350%. (Note 4)   Influential journals such as “International Organizations” also started to increase their discussion of UN peacekeeping operations.   New journals such as “Global Governance” and “International Peacekeeping” also carried many articles on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In both academic discussions and in the actual practice of the United Nations,  discussions gradually broadened from narrowly defined “traditional peacekeeping” concept to include peacemaking, peacebuilding, state building, and institution building towards the hybrid or mixed concept of “hybrid peacekeeping”.  (Note 5)   Ever since the late 1980s, as Chinese participation and role in UN peacekeeping operations broadened, attention to and discussion of China’s role in peacekeeping has increased both within China and abroad.  Li Beici, Shen Dawei and others have written articles about China’s participation in UN peacekeeping.  (Note 6)

The many issues closely related to China’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions have become the foci of many arguments and discussions.

  • Is the UN framework for peacekeeping and peacebuilding correct?
  • Is the idea that organizing elections should be “the first priority” correct?
  • Can the Western concepts of “nation building” and “institution building” be successfully transplanted in Africa through UN peacekeeping missions? (Note 7)
  • Can UN peacekeepers take on the important task of “resolving internal conflicts within states”? (Note 8)
  • Should China send combat troops to participate in UN peacekeeping missions?
  • Should China contribute more peacekeeping troops to UN missions?
  • How to reconcile the principle of non-interference with peacekeeping missions?
  • How to understand and put into practice the peacekeeping concepts of fairness and impartiality?

These issues need to be examined more deeply from both the perspective of developing and reforming UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding and from a Chinese foreign policy perspective.  Particularly as problems such as Libya and Syria arise, issues such as “the responsibility to protect interventions”, “election interventions” ,  national reconstruction and rebuilding of institutions have become important components of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. This has steadily lowered the threshold for UN intervention, made the political aspects of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations more apparent.   For China, this has meant facing challenges and making needed adjustments as it reconciles its increased participation in UN peacekeeping with its non-interference principle.

China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has a steadily growing influence in the world and is expected to play a larger role in world political and security affairs.  Participating in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations is a responsibility that China cannot shirk.  As China develops and the nature of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations change, China can no longer simply participate and simply increase the size of the peacekeeping forces it contributes to UN missions. China needs to move up from simple participation, to participating in the creation of UN mission ideas, tactics and strategies.  This will require adjustments and compromises.  Being all this in mind, this article will evaluate trends in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, China’s participation, and then present the author’s personal views on how China can further improve and expand its participation in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

In April 2011, the author took part in a “China Scholars’ Study Trip on China Participation in UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding” organized by the East Asia Representative Office of the American Friends Service Committee and the Quaker United Nations Office.  The study group examined UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding programs in several countries including Burundi, Congo (Kinshasa).   The study group members had discussions with government officials, civic organizations, NGOs, local media, UN organizations, and UN peacekeepers including peacekeepers in Congo (Kinshasa).  This article is based on that study trip and discussions in the field on peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa.

  1. China Faces A Period of New Adjustments in its Participation in UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Ever since China began to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in the late 1980s, in both the changes in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, China has faced many new problems surrounding its participation in UN operations.  As China continues its participation, it will need to pass through a new period of adjustments.

  1. Basic Evaluation of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding can be characterized overall as active support, careful decision-making and appropriate levels of participation.  Although China came relatively late to UN peace operations,  its contributions to funding peace operations, number of peacekeepers contributed to UN missions, and the scope of mission participation has been steadily increasing.  China contributes more peacekeeping personnel than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. The Chinese government has been clear in its attitude about peace operations: “China firmly supports and actively participates in UN peace operations.” (Note 10) Most media and Chinese people also support UN peacekeeping. (Note 11)  Chinese policy and principles with regard of UN mission participation stress traditional peacekeeping.  China insists upon principles such as non-interference in the internal affairs of states that are found in the UN Charter, that UN missions be authorized by the Security Council, that the host country must consent to the presence of the UN mission,  caution in the use of force, impartiality etc. (Note 12)

China sends peacekeepers, engineering troops, medical personnel, and logistical support personnel as well as other peacekeepers such as observers and civil police.  Although the UN has asked China to contribute a formed combat unit, China has not, except for formed police units, and has not, thus far, sent combat units on UN missions.  China has participated very little in political, rule of law, institutional rebuilding issues related to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. China is regard as willing to do “hard” matters but not in “soft” matters.  Chinese non-governmental organization are also not involved. China lacks ties to  NGOs in UN mission host countries and to other international NGO actors.  This issue has often been pointed out in research on Chinese peacekeeping. (Note 13)  Moreover, China participates more in peacekeeping missions than it does in peacebuilding projects.

According to end 2011 UN statistics, China paid 3.189% of the total assessments paid by UN member countries, ranking eighth.  China paid 3.93% of the peacekeeping assessment, ranking seventh.  According to December 31, 2011 statistics, China had 1924 peacekeepers deployed on UN missions, ranking sixteenth.  China contributes more peacekeepers than any of the developed countries and more than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council.  Among the newly developing countries,  China contributes far fewer peacekeepers than does India but comes in only just behind Brazil and South Africa. (Note 14)   In peacebuilding, most of the funds come from Europe and countries such as Canada and Japan.  The top contributors to peacebuilding are in order Sweden, the UK,  The Netherlands, Norway, Japan,  Canada, Germany,  Ireland,  Finland, and Denmark.  Based on 2006 – 2011 statistics, Sweden was in first place with contributions totaling 84.44 million dollars,  followed by the UK 61.93 million dollars, and The Netherlands 46.46 million dollars.  China contributed 4 million dollars to peacebuilding projects, about the same as India and South Korea.  (Note 15)

Overall, China is an active and cautious participator and contributor to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.  China’s participation does not lag behind other countries, but the Chinese model for participation in UN operations and the route China takes to participate in UN missions is relatively simple.  China participates in a narrow range of missions which could be expanded.  China urgently needs to make adjustments and improvements in its engagement in UN missions.

  1. New Challenges China Faces in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

With the growth of China’s overall national strength and with the changes in the nature and content of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, Chinese in its participation in UN missions faces many new problems and challenges. China is often confronted with difficult choices such as between participation and not participation; between limited participation and large-scale participation; between a forced intervention and a non-coercive intervention; between an armed intervention and an unarmed intervention.

First of all, China confronts a contradiction between the role that it is expected to play in the international community and its own difficult circumstance of being constrained, doubted, and pressured.  On one hand, China faces the expectation that it will take up a larger share of international duties and responsibilities.  The UN and the member countries expect that China will make greater contributions and provide more Chinese personnel and Chinese financial support.  On the other hand, some members of the UN are worried about the rise of China.  They disagree with the Chinese model of development.  Some go so far as to see China as a potential threat and are always on the alert for the expansion of Chinese influence.  This kind of international environment is not encouraging for increased Chinese participation in international multilateral military and security cooperation.  This makes China especially cautious as it makes choices about expanding its participation in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities so it keeps a low profile.  Therefore, increased Chinese participation will need to go through a “break-in” period in which China and other UN member countries, and particularly with the great powers, increase their mutual trust.

Challenges also arise from changes in the nature and content of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.   These changes have put under pressure the basic principles of the UN Charter and the basic principles of traditional peacekeeping.  These changes also go outside the scope of the issues and areas that China understands related to peacekeeping – those of peace and development.  This will require China in its implementation of peacekeeping to make further adjustments and changes as it seeks new ways and means for participating in peacekeeping.

Issues surrounding interventions related to “the responsibility to protect”, “state building”, “institution building” and “good governance” are problematic for China.  The issue of humanitarian intervention has always been a difficult one for UN peacekeeping. Since “the responsibility to protect” was first proposed, it has already been partially implemented in Ivory Coast, Haiti, and Guinea-Bissau. The “Libya-type intervention” was a classic case of a “responsibility to protect intervention”.  This precedent means that “responsibility to protect” interventions may become increasingly frequent including authorizations for “the responsibility to protect” in traditional peacekeeping missions. What begins as a Libya-type “responsibility to protect” intervention could later become authorized as a peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission.  Peacekeeping and peacebuilding, one of the UN’s means of intervention, thus becomes more deeply and widely enmeshed in the internal affairs of a country.  In many cases, the nature of the political intervention already exceeds the scope of a humanitarian intervention.  Owing to these trends, China must confront an increasing tension between peacekeeping interventions and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states.   Chinese participation in these operations is becoming increasingly complicated.  Chen Jian, chair of the China United Nations Association, described the challenges this way:  Formerly, disorder, civil war, coups etc. far away from China on the other side of the world had no effect on us.  China’s will no longer be able to stand apart from far away conflicts. (Note 16).

Although there continues considerable debate on the theory and practice of nation-building, institution building and good governance,  nation building and good governance have become fashionable terms of discourse to use in discussing peacekeeping and peacebuilding and in setting priorities.  These terms have been imposed on the United Nations from the top on down.  For example, for the “Special Mission to United Nations to the Republic of the South Sudan”  begun on July 9, 2011,  the authorizing language includes phrases such as “on the issues of political transition, governance and nation building”, “promote the participation of the people in the political process, including starting up various constitution-building processes, holding elections according to the constitution, promote the establishment of an independent media, and ensure the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking etc.”,  “support the formulation of thorough reforms in the security sector”, and “support the government of the Republic of the South Sudan a military justice system that supports the civil justice system”. (Note 17).   Apart from peace and security, UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are also charged, in their mission authorizations,  with issues such as initiating, organizing and supervising elections, building the rule of law, reform the public security and police systems, protecting civilians, human rights, freedom of speech, media freedom, and fighting corruption.  Much of this goes beyond what China understands as the scope of multilateral international cooperation on peace and development. Therefore, China needs to make further adjustments in its approach to the steadily increasing demands for ever more complicated peacekeeping and peacebuilding duties to include reforms in the selection and training of peacekeeping personnel.

One more points is that with the increase in the number of organizations involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding,  we see involved in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding various kind of organizations such as regional organizations, NGOs, and charitable organizations. These organizations have become global partners with the UN in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  For example, NATO, the EU, the African Union, the Arab League, the East African Community, the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) have all actively participated in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding actions.  The UN has been paying increasing attention to mobilizing and organizing local social organizations and NGOs, especially in peacebuilding. For example, UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding in African countries includes helping to establish and providing expert training to youth organizations, women’s organizations, organizations opposed to violence as well as news organizations and media.   The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission “recognizes the important contribution of civil society, including non-governmental organizations and the private sector, to all stages of peacebuilding efforts” in each stage of peacebuilding and encourages the civil organizations of countries in which peacebuilding projects are underway to participate in peacebuilding and peace consultations.   [Note 18]     http://www.un-ngls.org/IMG/pdf/PBC-1-OC-12_English.pdf

  1. The Need to Work Through the Process of Breaking Down Friction Points Between “Western Thinking” and “Chinese Thinking”

Differences between Chinese thinking and Western thinking about peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

First of all, western countries, and the international organizations and NGOs that they lead,  emphasize humanitarian intervention and interventions to build a state polity.  They make priorities of issues such as the rebuilding of state institutions, elections and good governance. These include funding and building legislative and legal advice centers, courts, police schools, and “good governance” offices.   China, on the other hand, stresses the right of the country involved to makes its own decisions and to speak for itself, stresses the importance of building state capacity and of economic and social development for promoting peace and security.  Most Chinese participation involves building roads and sites, sending medical units and providing other kinds of logistical support.

Secondly, as noted earlier, the NGOs of the western developed countries actively participate in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding actions and stress mobilizing host country people from the grassroots on up so that local civic organizations and NGOs can participate in state reconstruction and institutional reconstruction.  These activities include funding and training civic society and NGOs and supporting independent media.  China lacks ties with national civic organizations and international NGOs.  When we carried out our survey in Africa, we noticed how people from western NGOs and charitable organization as well as religious people participated in UN peacekeeping and related activities, built ties to host country civil society, and provided policy suggestions to the UN on peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  Among the suggestions put forth for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the kind of suggestion put forth most often is to pay closer attention to the local level – to “resolution of local conflicts”, to listen to “the voices of civil society” and to stress “local institutions” and the role of the local people in the process of national reconstruction. (Note 19)

Thirdly, on the question of conflict resolution, China’s traditional way of thinking and values call for protecting national unity and territorial integrity and maintaining ethnic unity.   Western ways of thinking tend to see separation and partition as ways to “prevent and reduce the level of violence” and as a “means of restoring peace”.  (Note 21)  In recent years, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund’s major orientation has been towards the implementation of peace agreements, including institution building in the security, justice and administrative sectors as well as disarmament, demobilization and the social re-integration of former combatants, good governance, etc.   Only a small part has been used on social and economic development.  For example, in Burundi, the United Nations helped organize elections, support the building of administrative management institutions, including good governance offices. Issues of development and employment were a low priority.  Financial support of project by developed countries also reflected this “western way of thinking”.  For example, Germany provided funds to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and to the United Nations Mission to the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) so that they can provide assistance on the legislative process.  The Netherlands and U.S. governments supported the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)  set up a commission to fight transnational crime.  Japan, the UK, and other countries are supported the UN projects such as building a police training school in Congo (Kinshasa).

During our African study trip, our group had a discussion with the Chinese Embassy in Burundi.  The Chinese Ambassador stressed that while good governance is indeed important, economic and social development and other issues such as employment are just as important and deserve attention.  The Chinese representative, at meetings at which the UN Peacekeeping and Peacekeeping Evaluation Committee makes its reports, often stresses that peacebuilding needs to put the country first by respecting its autonomy and independence.  The UN should give top priority to making breakthroughs in deep seated issues including problems of social and economic development. (Note 22)  These views express the Chinese way of thinking on peacekeeping and peacebuilding and the different Chinese understanding on the roots of conflict and way to resolve conflicts.  Those who advocate the “politics first” approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding believe that the resolution of political problems is the foundation of peacekeeping.   However, in resolving conflicts which arise because of problems such as land, resources, minerals, and elections is the key factor in peacebuilding and “development itself will worsen these conflicts”. (Note 23)

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding today are based on Western values and there exists a fairly completely way of thinking of designing missions and mission concepts. A system built along those lines including a system of reports, inspections and evaluations.  However, based on Chinese ways of thinking and Chinese experience, peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions have a high starting point and high standards but show few results, are excessively Western in orientation, are divorced from conditions on the ground.  They stress ideals but neglect results, stress form but neglect substance, stress freedom but neglect stability, stress elections but neglect security and development.

Differences in the debates on the philosophy and methods of peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not limited to disagreements between China and the western countries.  Some research on the “freedom-oriented”  “nation building” model has been critical, arguing that these efforts at “freedom-oriented” peacebuilding have not eliminated the roots of conflict.   This approach not only does not create a free and democratic country, it actually makes a relapse into continued conflict more likely.   Experts who have a “security first” perspective believe that competition should not be encouraged if security conditions along with trustworthy and stable institutions are not yet sufficiently mature. (Note 24)   Debates about UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding highlight the fact that in areas where there is a high potential for development, every kind of way of thinking and method needs to be tested by actual practice.

China needs to make larger adjustments in its policies and strategies on participation in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding owing to trends in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding and the challenges that China itself faces.  China should not keep to the same positions it has held in the past.  China should encourage the consideration of diverse ideas on peacekeeping and peacebuilding so that they can be improved and complement one another.  China should actively participate from the outset in the creation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities so as to promote the developing of thinking on UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

  1. Factors China Should Consider in Expanding Participation in Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Expanded Chinese participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is not simply a matter of scaling up its current participation and making more financial contributions.  This is not a matter than China alone can decide.  China’s participation, the scale of its participation and the way it participates are constrained by various factors.  China’s participation and strategic adjustment should be based on consideration of a number of factors including:  the role and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, whether the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding activity are in accord with China’s own fundamental interests, and whether the host country and most of the UN member states support it.

  1. Is a UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission necessary?

China’s decision to participate should consider the effectiveness and outlook for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  That is, to what extent can the peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission be successful, is necessary and is worthy of China’s support.  During our field survey, we listened to local government officials and NGOs give their evaluations of the role of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  Two views came through loud and clear: one the one hand, be it in Burundi or in Congo Kinshasa, people affirmed the necessity of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  One the other hand, people also had criticisms for and expressed anger at the United Nations.  The people we interviewed said that if it weren’t for the United Nations, public order would be even less stable and that more people would have been killed.  UN organizations also supported some assistance projects to promote development and had improved the lives of local people.  With the help of the UN, Burundi was able to hold several elections during which there were no major outbreaks of violence. The UN considers this a model of success.  In the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we also saw local government office buildings, courts, police stations, jails etc.  which had been built with the help of the United Nations.  These facilities supplied part of the material basis for establishing democracy and the rule of law.

The shortcomings and flaws of the United Nations are evident as well. It is relatively easy for the UN to succeed in a small country like Burundi.  In a large country like Congo (Kinshasa) the role of the UN is much more limited and its accomplishments are harder to see.  Although the UN did help Congo (Kinshasa) establish local courts, police stations and prisons, these facilities haven’t played their proper role and remain just buildings.  In Congo (Kinshasa) the lack of penalties for crimes remains very serious.  Rapes on a large scale still regularly occur.  There are regular demands for the UN to withdraw and attacks on UN personnel.  UN support in the areas of social and economic development is just a drop in the bucket.  Local governments and civil society complain that they haven’t heard to UN assistance projects.  Overall, local people have a mixed albeit positive evaluation of the work of the UN.  In some cases, host country people have a certain amount of sentiment against the UN and so are just barely accepting of the presence of the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission. Given this popular feeling, it is difficult for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding to achieve an ideal result.

As an external intervening force, the strategy and plans developed by the United Nations are often not suited to the local situation, has only very limited effectiveness, and faces many problems. Those who support UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding admit that the state re-building and institution re-building carried out by the United Nations in African “failed states”  has many shortcomings.  For example the elections promoted as part of the UN peacebuilding strategy cannot fundamentally resolve local conflicts.  Western state institutions cannot be successfully transplanted to the African continent.  The conceptions of the foreign states providing assistance and the African “failed states” and “post-conflict states” are inevitably different.  International actors are unable to reconstruct African states. (Note 25)   The priority projects in the UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding agenda conflicts to a certain extent with those of the host countries.  The UN on the one hand stresses that it is essential that “host countries continue to consent to and effectively co-operate” with peacekeeping and peacebuilding” but on the other hand stresses that “allow the erosion of UN principles” for the sake of getting the consent of the host country.  (Note 26)  The contradictions pointed out earlier are also part of the problem – whether to focus on the government or on the people, whether to stress elections or security, stress separation or unity.  These contradictions often mean that in practice UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding is often fluctuating between these alternative conceptions and so progress is difficult.

Although there is indeed great support and a will to promote UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding and increased demand for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there are also very mixed evaluations of disagreements about the role and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  Therefore, China clearly must continue to be cautious and be selective in its willingness to participate in UN peacekeeping missions.  Both the United Nations and China should work hard to improve peacekeeping and peacebuilding and not simply keep investing more money in programs that have not been effective.

  1. Is Increased Participation in China’s Interests  and Under What Conditions

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has a responsibility to participate in and support UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  From the perspectives of capacity, finances and manpower, China is certainly capable of doing more.  Additional considerations are that both the Chinese government and people support peacekeeping and the good reputation that Chinese peacekeepers and police have already earned on UN missions. During our survey trip in Africa, we heard praise for Chinese peacekeepers from both the UN and local people.  We need to consider the question whether increased Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding is in accord with China’s own interests and basic principles.

Research in both China and abroad has examined how participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities meets China’s interests and needs.

These include (Note 27):

  • Fulfilling international duties and responsibilities;
  • Raise China’s reputation and image on the international scene;
  • Develop a cadre of Chinese who familiar with international work who are comfortable working openly with foreign partners;
  • Expand international cooperation and exchanges and
  • Protect Chinese interests overseas.

No doubt, expanded and improved Chinese participation would provide an opportunity to train peacekeepers, police, and other participating personnel on the international stage.  This would also give China an opportunity to strengthen its relationships with the United Nations, regional organizations, the governments and peoples of the countries in which Chinese peacekeeping forces operate.  Moreover, Chinese participation will also enable China to better protect regional and global security environments which are intimately connected to China’s own interests.  These include providing assistance to navigation in international waters, promoting anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, and other types of international cooperation against cross-border crime.  Overall, China not only has capability and financial resources for expanded participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, its own interests also drive its participation.

  1. To What Extent do the UN and Member-States Encourage Chinese Participation

Support and expectations for greater Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping operations comes from many quarters – from scholarly articles to the UN to other UN member-states. The UN has found from long experience that “No matter from political, military, or a financial perspective, the contribution of big countries to peacekeeping is          absolutely essential.”  (Note 28)  The United Nations encourages building up global partnerships for peacekeeping and peacebuilding and hopes that big, rising and developing countries like China and India will increase their support, and believes that increased Chinese participation will be very important for the United Nations. The UN is confident that China can use its position as a permanent member of the Security Council, and make good use of its growing economic and military power and China’s influence on developing countries to help eliminate the disagreement between the North and the South on peacekeeping issues, and contribute to an “inclusive global peacekeeping alliance.”  (Note 29)   In 2009, the UN Deputy Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Affairs Guehenno said that he hoped that China would send troops to take part in UN peacekeeping operations including providing air transport, and aviation technical support, saying “I would be happy to see the Chinese People’s Liberation Army provide this kind of support to UN peacekeeping operations.” (Note 30)

Bates Gill, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in a report on China and peacekeeping wrote that China should be encouraged to participate in multilateral security cooperation and that western countries should increase their engagement with China peacekeeping related discussions, training and other forms of capacity building.  Gill believes that China’s increased participation in peacekeeping will strengthen China’s engagement with other countries on global and regional security issues. This will be helpful in promoting a greater contribution and support from China for regional stability and effective international peacekeeping operations. (31)   During our African study trip, we heard that view from the United  Nations, from the countries in which peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions were underway, from international NGOs,  and from academic institutions.  They all hope that China will increase its cooperation and exchanges and hope that China will make a greater contribution to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding projects.

However, as discussed above, some UN member countries have conflicted feelings about China increasing its international influence.  In these countries, some want to see encourage greater Chinese international participation while others want to limit it.  The 2009  US Department of Defense report on Chinese military power that China’s capabilities to participate in faraway peacekeeping and humanitarian missions are also capabilities that “could allow China to project power to ensure access to resources or enforce claims to disputed territories.” (Note 32)   Differences between “Chinese thinking” and “Western thinking” and the effect of the “China threat theory” have made China less interested in increasing its participation and why China chose to consider cautiously the question of whether to participate.   China clearly cannot make a unilateral decision to expand its participation.  Moreover, China is being forced to accept a peacekeeping and peacebuilding model that it does not support and does not understand well.  The extent of China’s participation will depend upon the degree of cooperation China has with UN institutions, the countries in which peacekeeping operations take place and other member states.

  • Ways and Means to Increased Chinese Participation

For China, improving and expanding participation is not simply a matter of scale or the amount of a contribution, participating in new areas or widening the scope of participation or creating a new model of participation.  More important is to improve the quality of Chinese participation and its effectiveness. In that sense, there are many areas in which China can improve and expand its participation.

1 — Interventions that are legal, just and necessary under the UN Charter and basic peacekeeping principles

China’s participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding needs to be based on an evaluation that the mission is legal, just, necessary, possible, and appropriate.  The purposes and basic principles of the UN Charter and other related basic peacekeeping principles are the guiding principles for a Chinese decision to participate in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  China still insists on UN authorization, the agreement of the host country in which the operation will take place, and opposes excessive intervention, armed intervention are absolutely necessary.  Both in theory and in practice, China opposes the excessive expansion of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  All countries oppose this both as a matter of policy as well as in practice.

China has already been increasing its participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions under the United Nations framework.  Looking at it in terms of China’s stress on the United Nations, there are three bases for Chinese participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding:

  1. The principles of the UN Charter referred to earlier as well as traditional peacekeeping principles
  2. Relevant precepts of international law, decisions of the UN Security Council, and the commonly accepted values and principles of  UN member states including international humanitarian law, and principles such as the protection of civilians, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and tolerance.
  3. Principles supported by China such as “peaceful co-existence”, “peaceful development”, and “harmonious society”.

China on these bases participates in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  China participates in legal and necessary international interventions in order to carry out its joint responsibility as a UN member state.  Therefore the question of whether this “violates” the non-intervention policy does not arise.  There are no grounds for standing on the principles of the UN Charter as a justification for refusing to move forward on peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues.

  1. Using China’s Traditional Strengths to Open Up New Areas for Participation

Traditional areas for Chinese participation are engineering troops, medical teams, and logistical support.  These traditional Chinese strengths have won widespread trust and should be built upon even further.  However some areas which are not traditional areas for Chinese participation China also has both the capacity and the capability to expand its participation.

In the political and security areas such as administrative organizations, rule of law organizations, and projects such as demobilization and refugee re-settlement China can also increase its cooperation with the UN.  China could provide relevant training support including infrastructure, equipment, technology, personnel, and financial support.  China could also cooperate with the UN in supporting projects such as “administrative personnel training centers” , “policing capacity training classes”, and “demobilization and re-integration training centers”, “women and children protection centers” and “civil dispute resolution offices”.

Economic and social development are not priorities for in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  However, youth employment, gender equality, and protection of children fall within the scope of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  China has both the capacity and the opportunity to participate more and to contribute more resources in those areas.  China would be able to increase its support for youth employment and youth training projects including support for cultural and recreation centers and sports centers.  Getting youth involved in work and cultural activities helps get young people away from violence, increases their group solidarity and broadens their social contacts.  During our trip to Africa, we saw how local people appreciated the schools, hospitals and roads that China had built.  China should participate more in these “small projects that can make a big difference”.   These projects have relatively small technical and financial requirements.  One or two small brick or wooden buildings with some simple improvements are all that is needed, are easy to build and maintain, and meet the goals and purposes of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

  1. Expand Participation of Non Traditional Actors, Strengthen Co-operation with Local Civil Society and International NGOs

Traditional peacekeeping actors are in general part of “high-level politics” and are a guided by government departments.  However, as the authorized domains of peacekeeping and peacebuilding have increased and partnerships have expanded, many non-state actors are also participating.

China can put more stress on participation by non-state actors.  First, by promoting cooperation between local civil society and international non-state actors. Second is by diversifying the Chinese personnel who participate, including their participation in NGOs.   Local civil society, religious groups, NGOs etc. are grassroots forces for promoting peace and development.  International NGOs as they help the UN complete peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks also seek to be effective. Most of the work of international NGOs is at the local “micro” level such as clinics, assistance centers for women and girls, AIDS testing center,  peace education training, and technical training. The local counterparts to international NGOs are local civic organizations, NGOs, media, and religious people.  Some international NGOs have a long history and have been have been participating in international peace operation from the beginning and have an established relationship with the UN.  The US Public Service Commission that organized and sponsored our survey trip to Africa was one of these.  The Commission, which has “general consultative status” at the UN Economic and Social Council, actively supports UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding work and maintains close contact with the UN and provides the UN with relevant advice and policy suggestions.

China has comparatively few personnel in organizations involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding and lacks interactions with in-country local civic organizations and with international NGOs.  China should continually look for ways to participate in varies kinds of actors so that Chinese civic organizations, charitable organizations, volunteers and enterprises can participate in projects connected to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

China could appropriately increase the participation of Chinese police.  Statistics from January 2005 to January 2011 show that the UN demand for police has been steadily increasing. The number of police in peacekeeping more than doubled from 6,765 to 14,377.  Over the same period, the number of military peacekeeping personnel increased by 46% from 56,197 to 82,196.   Although the UN has urgently requested that China send combat troops,  China’s conditions for sending combat troops are very strict, and can only be sent according to the seriousness of the situation.  Moreover, Chinese legal personnel, administrative personnel, and technical training personnel can also participate in peacekeeping forces.  This would diversify China’s participation.

  1.  Expand China’s Participation from the Traditional Model to More Diverse Participation

China could choose according to circumstances from among several models for participation. For example, China could choose the simple enhancement model by which it would take an existing program and simply increase the number of personnel and funds it contributes.  It could also choose the proactive engagement model, in which China would actively propose, plan and open a UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding program. New models and new areas, from taking the lead in planning of operations to funding support, this would mean promoting the development of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding according to Chinese thinking, Chinese experience and Chinese resources.  This would include a new synthesis of “Chinese thinking”, “UN thinking” and “Western thinking”.  This is because China guided programs within the UN framework will need to win the support of other UN members including the support of countries in which the UN mission operates.

An entry point for building peace is the combination of “sustainable peace” and “sustainable development”.   The UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding thinking is about moving from sustainable peace to sustainable development. Considering that currently most of the funds for peacebuilding come from the developed countries, the major focus of the funding is the reconstruction of the political and legal systems of post-conflict countries.  In addition to increasing its support of “state capacity building”, China could, as a supplement to UN “good governance and peace” programs, promote the “development and peace” portion of peacebuilding. China could link sustainable development to aspects of peacebuilding such as repatriation and resettlement, social re-integration, stability and security, youth employment, gender equality, and the elimination of poverty.

China’s participation should go beyond the “road repair, bridge-building, build hospitals” model and experiment with new ways of thinking and new models.  In particular, when participating in non-traditional areas, including areas in which there are innovations in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, China should look for areas in which Chinese ways of thinking and Western ways of thinking will complement one another.

Conclusion:  China’s Future Role in UN Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The way that China will participate in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is a topic much discussed both in China and abroad.  There are many different views within China as to whether China should send combat troops to participate in peacekeeping. Foreign scholars are also studying how China might participate in future peacekeeping missions in forms such as whether China will like, some developing countries, be a “troop contributing country” or, like some developed countries, “financial support contributing country” or a “policy-setting country that give background support to negotiations”.  Some studies suggest that if China abandons its traditional participation model it might lose its traditional strengths on “hardware” issues and fall into a competition with the developed countries on “soft” issues. If China persists in insisting on its traditional approach, then then the developed countries will use “soft” principles to criticize and constrain China and force China to give in. (Note 36)

The suppositions and analyses made in many quarters reflect the great attention that it being paid to China’s future participation and role.  Based on the analysis above, the authors basic judgements about Chinese participation in peacekeeping and peacebuilding are:

China will continue to actively support UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding and seek to improve and broaden that participation.  China’s participation is its contribution to UN protection of regional and global security. This is carrying out the joint responsibility of member-states of the UN and also is in line with China’s own interests and needs.  However, China will make decisions about participating in UN missions very carefully.

In multilateral peacekeeping cooperation, China needs to make decisions on adjustments to its participation and contributions.  China will work closely with various parts of the UN and with other countries involved to increase exchanges, increase mutual trust and cooperation.

China is not going down the road of a “big troop contributing country” and, for now, is cannot play the role of a “policy-setting country that give background support to negotiations”.  However, in both those areas, China has the potential to make greater contributions.  In addition to maintaining China’s traditional strengths in peacekeeping, China’s participation should participate more broadly and gradually diversify the different kinds of Chinese personnel participating in UN peacekeeping..

Endnotes (original text)

①见联合国大会决议《建设和平委员会》(A/RES/60/180)。

②见“联合国维持和平概况”,联合国网站,http://www. un.org/zh/peacekeeping/resources/,2012年2月29日登录。

③见“联合国建设和平基金”,联合国网站,http://www. unpbf. org/countries/。

④Oldrich Bures,“Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping”, International Studies Review, Vol.9, No.3, Fall 2007, p.407.

⑤Chetan Kumar and Jos De la Haye,“Hybrid Peacemaking: Building National‘Infrastructures for Peace’”, Global Governance, Vol.18, No.1, January-March 2012,pp.13-20.

⑥见Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang,“China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Prospects and Policy Implications”, SIPRI, Policy Paper 25, November 2009, http://books. sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP25. pdf;沈大伟:《中国在全球治理方面大有可为》,“第四届世界中国学论坛”,http://unpanl. un. org/intradoc/groups/public/。

⑦相关研究可见Séverine Autesserre,“Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention”, International Organization, Vol.63, No.2, Spring 2009, pp.249-280; Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States”, International Security, Vol.32, No.4, Spring 2008, pp.106-139。

⑧〔法〕夏尔-菲利普·戴维:《安全与战略:战争与和平的现时代解决方案》,王忠菊译,北京:社会科学文献出版社,2011年,第270页。

⑨李康云(Courtney J. Richardson):《对中国作为兵力派遣国的对比研究》,载赵磊、高心满等:《中国参与联合国维持和平行动的前沿问题》,北京:时事出版社,2011年,第467—487页;广野美和(Miwa Hirono):《在当地民众中建立信任——维和中的公正性原则》,载赵磊、高心满等:《中国参与联合国维持和平行动的前沿问题》,第488—512页。

⑩见《第65届联合国大会中国立场文件》,人民网,http://world. people. com. cn/,2010年9月13日。

(11)2004年“零点指标数据网”(www. Horizonkey. com)发布的一项最新民意调查结果显示,七成中国人支持政府参与国际维和行动,表示反对的约占一成。其中25.3%表示非常赞成中国更积极地参与维和行动,45.4%表示比较赞同中国更积极参与,11.1%表示比较反对更积极参与,2.5%的人表示非常反对。该机构2010年公布的另一项调查结果显示,47.8%的受访者认为中国应该扩大对国际维和行动的投入,46.6%的受访者认为中国应该维持参与现状,主张减少投入的占4.3%。见马丽:《七成居民赞成中国更积极参与维和行动》,零点研究集团,www. Horizonkey. com;中国发展研究基金会委托零点研究咨询集团为“中国发展高层论坛2010”所做的《中国公众和在华外国人士眼中的中国国家地位观调查》,http://www. horizonkey. com/tongqi. pdf。

(12)见《第65届联合国大会中国立场文件》。

(13)克里斯·阿尔登、张春、贝尔纳多·马里亚尼、丹尼尔·拉吉:《非洲冲突后重建:中国日益增长的作用》,《国际展望》,2011年第6期,第100—115页。

(14)数据来源:“2012年会员国应缴纳的会费”,联合国网,http://www.un.org/zh/members/contribution. shtml;“维持和平的经费筹措”,联合国网,http://www. un.org/zh/peacekeeping/operations/financing. shtml;“Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operation”,2011-12-31,联合国网,www. un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/。

(15)数据来源:“联合国建设和平基金”,联合国网,http://www. unpbf. org/donors/contributions/。

(16)陈健:《中国多边外交面临新课题》,《解放日报》,2010年10月25日。

(17)联合国安全理事会第1996(2011)号决议,2011年7月8日。

(18)联合国建设和平委员会文件,“主席在非正式协商基础上提交的民间社会参加建设和平委员会的暂行准则”(PBC/I/OC/12),2007年6月6日。

(19)Séverine Autesserre,“Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention”, pp.249—280.

(20)〔法〕夏尔-菲利普·戴维:《安全与战略:战争与和平的现时代解决方案》,第274页。

(21)同上书,第288页。

(22)“李保东大使在安理会审议建设和平委员会年度报告时的发言”,中华人民共和国常驻联合国代表团网,http://www. china-un.org/chn/gdxw/t809098.htm,2011年3月23日。

(23)Chetan Kumar and Jos De la Haye,“Hybrid Peacemaking: Building National‘Infrastructures for Peace’”, p.14.

(24)相关争论见:Jens Meierhenrich,“Forming States after Failure”, in Robert Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,2003, pp.155—156; Michael Barnett, Hunjoon Kim, Madalene O’Donnell, and Laura Sitea,“Peacebuilding: What Is in a Name?” Global Governance, Vol.13, No.1, January-March 2007, p.51。

(25)Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull,“Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States”.

(26)见《秘书长关于联合国中非共和国和乍得特派团的报告》,联合国安理会文件(S/2010/611)。

(27)赵磊、高心满等所著《中国参与联合国维持和平行动的前沿问题》一书分析了中国参与维和的各种利益需求,包括履行大国责任、提高国际形象、提升国家实力、加速军队现代化、维护海外利益、建设和谐世界等。见赵磊、高心满等:《中国参与联合国维持和平行动的前沿问题》。

(28)Fred Tanner,“Addressing the Perils of Peace Operations: Toward a Global Peacekeeping System”, Global Governance,Vol.16, No.2, April-June 2010, p.213.

(29)Ibid., pp.213—214.

(30)“联合国维和事务主管访问中国”,联合国电台网,http://www. unmultimedia.org/radio/,2007年11月19日。

(31)Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang,“China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Prospects and Policy Implications”.

(32)“Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,2009”, http://www.cfr.org/china/annual-report-congress.

(33)可参考《第65届联合国大会中国立场文件》,中华人民共和国外交部网,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/

(34)Monthly Summary of Contributions(Police, UN Military Experts on Mission and Troops), As of 31 December2011, http://www. un. org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/.

(35)相关讨论可参阅李康云《对中国作为兵力派遣国的对比研究》,第487页。

(36)[法]夏尔-菲利普·戴维:《安全与战略:战争与和平的现时代解决方案》,第111-112页。

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Xue Li of CASS: Xi Jinping’s Foreign Policy Takes Shape

Xi Jinping’s Foreign Policy Takes Shape

January 9, 2015 from China Net

http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_24_119024.html

China is already the Number Two great power and is hoping to become Number One.  Issues for China in great power diplomacy under these circumstances have become “How does China as a great power get along with the United States?  In particular, how does China get along with large, medium and small sized states which do not have a comprehensive strength comparable to China’s?”

By Xue Li, Director of the International Strategy Research Office, World Politics and Economics Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

In the over thirty years since opening and reform began, China, a rapidly rising power, has not started a war.  This is unparalleled in the history of rising powers.  This is powerful evidence that China has in fact followed the policy it set in 1982 of conducting an “independent, sovereign and peaceful diplomacy”.  The special features of this foreign policy are not entering into alliances to avoid falling under the control of other states and stressing that diplomacy should serve the needs of economic construction.  This clearly breaks with China’s politics-driven diplomacy before opening and reform began.   Since about 1990, China has shifted its emphasis from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy.  China has become more and more skillful and confident in its multilateral diplomacy.  Since the 1990s, China has stressed building various degrees of partnership relations.  Currently China has established partnership relations with 67 countries and five local or regional organizations.

Building on these foreign policy lines and achievements, the new government has, in line with the rise in national strength and changes in international relations, has spent the last year making adjustments to its foreign policy.  The outlines of the new diplomacy, which have already emerged, show a clear Xi Jinping style.  Xi Jinping’s diplomacy has these characteristics:

  1. A steadily increasing consciousness that China is a great power

China’s leaders since Mao Zedong have stressed that China is a great power.  However China in those days was relatively backward economically and in science and technology.  The Chinese economy did not rank in the top ten.  Many countries had greater national comprehensive strength than China.  Great power diplomacy then referred to the United States, the Soviet Union, the European Union, Japan and other countries that were great powers on a global scale.  However, since 2008, China’s political and economic strength has begun to be felt around the world.  More and more countries see China as either a future superpower or already a superpower.  Since the opening of the Eighteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the new Party center leaders have collectively realized that the gap between the overall comprehensive power of China and the United States has been shrinking daily and that China’s overall economy may surpass that of the United States after some years. China is already the Number Two great power and is hoping to become Number One.  Big power diplomacy under these circumstances has become “How does China as a great power get along with the United States?”  In particular how does China get along with large, medium and small sized countries which do not have comprehensive strength comparable to China’s?” This change in China’s position and roles has given rise to a number of diplomatic behaviors and characteristics.

  1. Proactive

China’s role and position have become more prominent.  China is already the largest trading partner for over 120 countries.  The influence of China’s policies on other countries is becoming clearer and clearer and so many countries pay close attention to every move that China makes.  In this atmosphere, continuing with the old foreign policy of “being modest about one’s strengths and keeping a low profile” [韬光养晦] would be unreasonable and not beneficial to China’s further development.  Therefore, China adopted active foreign policy, strengthened its own sense of responsibility and tried to provide some public goods.   China’s proactive foreign policy can be seen in its setting of the “The Silk Road Economic Belt” and “The 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” strategies,  in promoting the construction of a new kind of great power relationship and a new type of international relations,  and in taking full advantage of its special convening roles when when China hosts diplomatic activities [主场外交][i].   Naturally, these kinds of diplomatic efforts start from China’s own neighborhood.  Examples include the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund and China’s proposal for a China – ASEAN free trade area.  Some regional efforts focus on regions beyond China’s own region. These include strongly promoting the creation of a BRICS Development Bank, promoting the creation of an Asia-Pacific Trading Area Security Region, strengthening the regional security organization Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia and promoting an Asian security vision based on security cooperation.

  1. Focus on Neighboring States, Reach Out to States that Can Play Pivotal Roles

In October 2013, China conducted working group discussions of unprecedented scale and scope on its diplomacy with neighboring states which propounded the ideals of “friendly, honest, kind and tolerant” and promoted a “correct view of what is proper and beneficial” and establishing a “community of common destiny” with the ASEAN countries.  These meetings arrived at a consensus on the importance of China’s relations with neighboring states.  China reached out to pivotal countries with the proposal, in Kazakhstan to build a Silk Road Economic Belt, in Indonesia proposing a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, in proposing the construction of a China – Pakistan economic corridor and a China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor.

  1. Bottom Line Thinking

This means that we must be determined to protect China’s national interests such as:

  • Insisting that Japan recognize that a dispute exists about the Diaoyutai [Senkakus] Islands and make this a precondition for improving bilateral political relations with Japan;
  • Insisting that the Philippines give up on its law suit and return to the negotiating table; and
  • Strengthening China’s presence in the South China Sea by blowing sand to create land in the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands.
  1. Strengthening Public Diplomacy

Talks held in park-like settings and evening strolls[ii]  are innovative experiments in foreign relations.   Chinese people found something new in these meetings. They realized that diplomacy is conducted not only in formal meetings but can also be done through deep discussions in informal settings.  These meetings had an impact that would be difficult to achieve in formal negotiations.  Moreover, when Xi Jinping while on foreign travel tries to meet the ordinary people of the countries he visits.  In his speeches Xi often includes popular sayings, folk songs and greetings used in the host country.  This has made a deep impression on ordinary people who pay attention to foreign affairs.

At the Center’s late November 2014 Meeting on Foreign Affairs Work,  Xi Jinping clearly stated that China must have a great power diplomacy with special Chinese characteristics.  This applies not only China’s relations with great powers but means, for China itself as a great power, that China will not conduct a foreign policy like previous great powers.

In the discussion about I have perhaps left out some of the characteristics of China’s foreign policy and will rely on others to make up for my omissions.


Translator’s Notes:

[i]  China through “Host diplomacy”  主场外交 [zhuchang waijiao] seeks, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in a 2013 press conference, to use the active role of the host to take a more active role in formulating responses to international issues.  Chen Dongxiao in the article “China’s ‘Host Diplomacy’: Opportunities, Challenges and Tasks” [ http://www.ciis.org.cn/gyzz/2014-10/14/content_7294218.htm ]  in the 5/2014 issue of the China Institute of International Studies journal Guoji Wenti Yanjiu examines the active role of host in convening international meetings can suit China’s increasingly proactive foreign policy and increase China’s international influence.  As host, China also has opportunities to boost the effectiveness of its public diplomacy as it hosts larger numbers of elites from developing countries, improves China’s image in the world, and get out “China’s story’.

[ii] References to the setting of the June 2013 Obama – Xi meeting  in Sunnylands Summit in California  and  the night stroll of the two leaders during 2014 Obama-Xi November 2014 meeting in Beijing.  See for example the Baidu Encyclopedia article on “park diplomacy” in Chinese at http://baike.baidu.com/subview/10683319/10894621.htm and on the evening strolls article at http://www.renminbao.com/rmb/articles/2014/11/21/60462.html

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