Social science research by Chinese scholars at its best combines the best of world analytical tools with the cultural understanding of ‘native speakers’ of the local political and social cultures and traditions. Much of this work is encrypted in the Chinese characters and so not so available to sino-illiterates [中文文盲] in the rest of the world. Fortunately Susan Finder of Peking University and the Supreme People’s Court Monitor tipped me off about the article I translated below just shared on the WeChat public account 法科生之家.

This article’s neat meshing of the interpersonal relationship styles developing to bridge systemic difficulties of a particular government system is enlightening. It reminds me of some other favorites of mine introduced on this translation blog:

Society-Level

Interpersonal Relations

1994: Working for the Boss: The Art of the Staff Assistant (Part I)

[Too many candidate-translations already as I look around. Apparently the best way to search it is a Google customized one site:gaodawei.wordpress.com ]

This article that reminds me most of this one below — perhaps not coincidentally not coincidentally by another Central Party School scholar –is 2017 Zhang Xuebo: Observations on the History of Rule by Document 1982-2017.

Both address the question of how the ad hoc and not-going-by-the-rules and court decisions (should I say de-institutional/de-institutionalized?) is bridged in part by various strategies — in the article below by drinking culture and in Zhang Xuebo’s article by a process of transforming leader speeches to holy writ to party documents sent down from on high to bridge the holes in the once-apparently-still-maturing-but-under-Xi-who-knows Chinese legal system.

As in all Chinese phenomena, we can recognize the all-too-human parallels in other countries and other bureaucracies. Throwing parties takes the edge off conflicts and can improve networking in many bureaucracies and societies.

I should add the PRC journal Sociological Studies, 社會學研究 is available online. PRC database access outside the Great Bamboo Firewall has been shrinking. Good that it is still there.

Official Drinking Culture: Study of County Official Drinking

Qiang Ge’s Home for Law Students 2023-04-29 11:13 Posted on Hunan

Introduction

Why has China’s officialdom developed a unique drinking culture? With the formal system prohibiting it and with frequent crackdowns, and despite the reluctance of many officials themselves to participate in it, why does the drinking culture among officialdom still persist?

Original title: “How the institutional environment and governance needs to shape the wine culture of China’s officialdom — An empirical study based on the drinking behavior of county officials”

制度环境与治理需要如何塑造中国官场的酒文化 ——基于县域官员饮酒行为的实证研究

Source: Sociological Studies, 社會學研究 Vol. 4, 2019, reprinted from: Quantitative Research Methods

Author: Qiang Ge, Central Party School, Party Building Department 强舸，中央党校党建部

[Translator’s note: Qiang Ge is Associate Professor of the Party Building Department of the Central Party School, Deputy Director of the Party Building Principles Teaching and Research Department

Publications:

Abstract

Why has Chinese officialdom developed a unique drinking culture? With formal institutional prohibitions, frequent crackdowns, and the reluctance of many officials themselves, why does the culture of official drinking culture still persist? Based on the author’s observations and interviews conducted from 2011 to 2015 in various parts of China, this study argues that the current local governance in China suffers from three dilemmas:

Insufficient information in the pyramidal hierarchy,
Non-institutionalization of governance tasks, and
Inadequate organizational incentives.

Drinking behavior, however, plays a role in building trust and providing incentives, partially alleviating these dilemmas and improving governance performance. In other words, to a certain extent, the official drinking table does not undermine the institutional system, but serves the needs of the institutional environment itself. It makes up for the shortcomings of the formal system by embedding itself in the governance process, and is therefore viable. In recent years, the fight against the “Four Bad Working Styles” has curbed official drinking, significantly reducing related costs and improved efficiency. However, overall governance environment needs to be improved by increasing the institutionalization of governance and building compensation and incentive systems to eradicate official drinking.

I. The Phenomenon and Related Issues

The drinking culture is a unique phenomenon in the Chinese officialdom.

“I can hold my liquor”¹ is somehow a necessary quality for party and government cadres, especially leading cadres. This is obviously not a good phenomenon. Since the reform and opening up, official drinking has been a persistent problem for the Party, the government, and grassroots governance, causing many negative consequences, such as irregular use of public funds, damage to the government’s image, reduced work efficiency, and even casualties. Since the 1990s, governments at all levels have been vigorously regulating official drinking, but it has always been difficult to put an end to it. Therefore, the real-life question that this paper focuses on is: Why has a unique alcohol culture developed in China’s official circles? With the formal system of prohibition, frequent crackdowns, and even the reluctance of many officials themselves, why is the official drinking culture still viable?

In this paper, we answer the above questions through an empirical study. Since alcohol culture is prevalent in all areas of Chinese society, we restrict the study population as follows:

First, everyone at the drinking table has the status of an official, and drinking bouts with non-official participants are excluded from the discussion.²
Second, the characteristics and driving mechanisms of officials’ drinking behavior vary somewhat across levels and systems (party and government organs/state enterprises). This paper focuses on county party and government organs, which is the area that currently receives the most attention in terms of official drinking, and has the distinctive characteristic of heavy consumption of strong liquor.
Third, it refers only to drinking bureaus arising from official duties, which is the main focus of the existing literature, and excludes drinking bureaus of the nature of officials’ private parties.

There are two categories of sources of empirical material for this paper. The first category is the author’s observations and interviews in a dozen provinces across the country from 2011-2015;3 the second category is the author’s interviews with cadres in Beijing from 2014-2015. In the latter citation, the first category of materials is numbered W and the second category is numbered D. In the first category, the author observed a total of 57 drinking bureaus, nineteen in the eastern region, twenty in the central region, and eighteen in the western region. There were 63 people whose remarks were recorded, including nine county (city and district) committee secretaries, 31 deputy county-level cadres, and twenty-three section-level cadres. In the second category of materials, thirteen people were interviewed individually, eleven seminars were held, and 36 people had their remarks recorded. When analyzing the materials, the authors found that there was no significant difference in the drinking behavior of officials in the Eastern, Central and Western regions of China. The views in the interview materials cited later were all mentioned by at least three or more interviewees from different geographic regions, rather than being unique to one interviewee’s views or experiences.

II. Literature Review and Research Design

( I ) Review of the Literature

Since the 1990s, official drinking and its management have been a hot topic in society, with countless reports and comments, both visual descriptions of the problem and appeals for management, as well as simple analyses of the causes. In contrast to the media buzz, there is not much academic research on the subject, which is scattered in the fields of social eating and public drinking. In general, these papers respond to the reality of this paper at different levels.

The first question is how the official drinking culture has been created and spread. First, many reports and commentaries have emphasized that the official drinking culture is a manifestation of corruption, which originates from the personal preference of “love of drinking”, corrupt cadres’ style and the mercenary mentality of “taking advantage of the public” (Tong Wu, 1995). Specifically, at the early stage of reform and opening up, officials drank mainly because the material conditions at that time were not rich, and there was the mentality of “drinking to satisfy the craving, not drinking to lose”. In recent years, material abundance has increased, and for officials at higher levels of society, most of them do not need to use it to satisfy their cravings, but drinking, especially drinking high-grade wine such as Maotai, has become a status symbol and a consumption of personal desires for officials (He, 2013). The above explanation has its merits, but the problem is that it provides a specific explanation, which at most can only explain the behavior of some officials, i.e., there are indeed a few people who love to drink, take advantage, and show off, but it cannot answer the question why official drinking has become a common phenomenon. More specifically, it does not explain many officials simply do not love to drink or even physical condition does not allow drinking, but still in the official drinking table does not return to the phenomenon of drunk.

As a result, the focus has gradually shifted to human relations culture, with an emphasis on understanding the causal mechanisms that shape official drinking culture in the larger social context and in the specific context of government governance (Yan, Xia, and Wang, 2013). Specifically, the culture of relationships and favors has always occupied an important place in Chinese society, playing an important role in daily life, politics, and economics (Wank, 1999). One of the main ways in which the culture of hospitality is manifested is in governmental organizations and business establishments (Yang, 1994). Socializing over meals is a way for people to create or maintain relational capital and reproduce relationships. People can use the table to build and close relationships, gain resources, and seek benefits (Yanjie Bian, 2004). The addition of wine can stimulate better results.

According to Lai (2009), in Chinese social practice, drinking wine serves four purposes: maintaining human feelings, expressing sincerity, revealing true feelings, and reaching an exchange. Guan Jian (2008) further focuses on the official world and points out that formal communication in the official world is limited by environment, time and context, and is formal and stereotypical, while wine has a relaxing and stimulating effect, and drinking wine can create an intimate and equal atmosphere of informal communication among participants. Some things can not be discussed in the office, the wine table is a better platform for communication and socialization. Moreover, the “matters” handled during drinking are not only personal matters such as promotions, but also real business matters (Xu Haocheng, 2013). As a result, many people lament that “handling affairs while drinking” has become an unspoken rule in official circles and has become institutionally binding, to the extent that things cannot be done without drinking or without serious drinking (Wang Chun, 2010).

However, while official drinking can serve so many purposes, it also has so many negative consequences that it does not have legitimacy in the formal system, and governments at all levels often take measures to combat it. Thus, the second question is why official drinking is still alive despite the numerous measures taken to combat it. The existing literature provides answers at two levels: first, there are loopholes in the system, including the following: some regulations are not detailed, not systematic, and lacking in relevance and enforcement; some regulations are out of touch with reality and cannot be enforced. Second, there are problems with the implementation of the system. Even if it is a better system, it needs a strong enforcer to really work.

However, although governments at all levels have repeatedly issued bans, but for the lower levels of government, although the higher levels of government requirements are brought up more often, but strong measures are not taken and rarely are serious punishments imposed on offenders. The reason for this is that many superiors are often “on the wrong side themselves” when it comes to drinking, so it is impossible to really ban alcohol. More importantly, this reflects the power of the subtle rules of the official drinking culture, where officials are forced to implement the spirit of alcohol restriction and prohibition in the formal system, but continue to drink in private, following subtle rules (Yan, Xia, and Wang, 2013). Of course, due to strong political, social, financial, and other pressures, local governments sometimes forcefully ban alcohol, but often in a sporadic campaign-like manner. After the campaign is over, the drinking returns. Sorting through the relevant discourse, we seem to get a more systematic explanation: drinking is an important form of traditional Chinese human culture and social interaction. There are flaws in the formal system that allow the culture of favors to permeate it, ultimately allowing official drinking to flourish. The above explanation has its merits, but back in reality, we find two flaws in the argument that are enough to shake the foundation of the entire explanatory system.

(II) Flaw #1: What is the mechanism driving higher-level officials to drink?⁴

Why do officials drink? In the literature, the intuitive expression in the media is “I (the subordinate) do not want to drink, but the leader wants to drink, so I cannot not accompany him”. In academic papers, it is mechanistically stated that there are two characteristics of grassroots governance: “the drinking table” and “the official’s high ranking is overwhelming”, so subordinates have to drink in order to cater to their superiors and get things done. However, the above statement only explains the driving mechanism of subordinates’ drinking, but does not answer the question of where the motivation of superiors’ drinking comes from. Obviously, it is impossible that all superiors love to drink. Further, superiors have a heavier burden of drinking than subordinates⁵, and for reasons of age, superiors are often less physically capable of drinking.

In other words, most people at the official drinking table may not want to drink. In this case, what are the factors and mechanisms that encourage officials who do not want to drink to raise their glasses and get drunk more often? Elaborating on the mechanisms driving superior officers’ drinking is key to answering this question. The existing literature addresses this only slightly, namely that superiors are forced to drink for fear of offending others. But it does not answer the question behind the offense: what are the consequences of a superior’s offending a subordinate? Obviously, for a rational actor, the choice is made by comparing the consequences of being “offended” and being “forced to drink”. The existing literature explains the mechanism of subordinates’ fear of offending people: First, the drink table is a place where things cannot be done without drinking. Second, superiors hold the interests of subordinates in all aspects. Because of the power differential, subordinates cannot afford to offend their superiors. But why do the superiors who hold more power prefer to drink against their will rather than offend the subordinates?

(III) Flaw #2:Why do officials choose different drinking strategies for different occasions?

The literature lacks a comparative analysis of officials’ drinking strategies that hold across different occasions. It makes the broad assumption that all officials will adopt consistent drinking strategies on all occasions. The empirical material does not support this judgment. The authors’ observations suggest that different officials tend to choose different drinking strategies on different occasions.

On the first occasion, table participants were one of three combinations:

(1) a county-level leader and a township leader;
(2) a head of a commission or bureau and a township leader; and
(3) a county-level leader and a head of a commission or bureau not under his control.

The common denominator of the above combinations is that the participants at the drinking table do not have much contact with each other and are not very familiar with each other. At this time, they tend to get drunk.

On the second occasion, the table participants are one of the following three types of combinations:

(1) the county leader and the head of the commission and bureau under his charge;
(2) the head of the commission and bureau and his subordinates;
(3) the head of the township and his subordinates.

The common denominator of the above combinations is that the participants at the drinking table usually have more contact and are familiar with each other. At this time, they are often “just for fun”, and will even tell others to “not drink too much”. So, what mechanisms motivate officials to choose different drinking strategies on different occasions? Why does (excessive) drinking occur more frequently and to a greater extent among semi-acquaintances and even strangers than among acquaintances at official drinking tables?

( IV) Study Design

In summary, existing research is not sufficient to explain the formation and vitality of the official drinking culture, and we need to find a better explanation system. The new framework should incorporate the reasonable parts of existing studies, but more importantly, it must be able to answer two questions that cannot be answered by existing explanations.

In general, the fundamental problem with existing research is that it is oriented to underestimate the role of formal institutions, often presupposing that Chinese officials have a tendency to undermine formal institutions and establish subtle rules. However, although an actor does not necessarily comply with the formal system, he must have some interest in undermining the formal system in favor of more favorable subterfuge. Otherwise, his choice should be to comply with the formal system in order to obtain the corresponding incentives.

The literature generally takes the position that the mechanisms by which the official drinking culture operates should be analyzed in the context of specific governance situations. In doing so, the existing literature treats “drinking at the table” as a mechanism for actors to profit from undermining the formal system. This paper generally agrees with its mechanistic judgments about the drinking behavior of lower-level officials, although its discussion is too simplistic and fails to explain why higher-level officials consume alcohol. Here, the existing literature reverts to a superficial explanation of “love of drinking”, which clearly conflicts with the basic position of “analysis in specific governance contexts”. At a higher level, the use of alcohol by superiors is also an application of human logic, but the existing literature lacks an analysis of the specific mechanisms by which human logic works. Why do superiors in a dominant position also follow, or even actively use, human logic? What does drinking bring to them? And what might be lost by not drinking? In short , human logic is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the formation of an official drinking culture.

Therefore, this paper emphasizes that the driving mechanisms of superior drinking are also to be found in specific governance contexts. In fact, the answer to the question “why officials choose different drinking strategies on different occasions” is also more likely to be found in specific governance contexts. This is because the actors are the same on different occasions , but the institutional context and governance needs are different, which leads to different applications of human logic.

Furthermore, much Chinese governance research has long underestimated the role of formal institutions and overestimated the willingness of actors to break with formal institutions while complying with unspoken rules. But where does the binding power of subtle rules come from? In this regard, Zhou (2008) makes a seminal proposition: in the operation of the Chinese government, many seemingly subtle rules that violate the formal system are precisely the product of an institutional environment that serves the needs of the overall institutional system and governance at a larger level, and thus have a broad and deep legitimacy base. In other words, when understanding the behavior of officials, we should not simply consider them as people who try to undermine the system, but also pay attention to the role of the institutional environment in constraining the behavior of officials; we should not only see the conflict between the unspoken rules and the formal system, but also explore the connection between the unspoken rules and the formal system, and some unspoken rules are formed precisely under the role of the higher-level formal system.

Therefore, we must understand the drinking behavior of officials in the context of China’s specific institutional environment and the logic of government operations. It is not the culture of favors that finds institutional loopholes , but rather the needs of the system itself that lead to the logic of favors and drinking behavior embedded in the governance process , ultimately shaping the Chinese official drinking culture. Therefore , the theoretical question of this paper is: What mechanisms do the institutional environment and governance need to shape the official drinking culture? What role does drinking behavior play in the governance process?

Based on the analysis of empirical materials, the authors found that the current local governance in China suffers from three dilemmas: insufficient information on the pyramidal hierarchy, non-institutionalization of governance tasks, and insufficient organizational incentives, while the embedding of drinking behavior can play the role of building trust and providing incentives, partially alleviating these dilemmas and improving governance performance. In other words, to a large extent, official drinking culture does not undermine the institutional system, but is embedded in the governance process to make up for the deficiencies of the existing system, and therefore has a vitality.

The third and fourth parts of this paper will explore how drinking behavior alleviates the above dilemmas and thus embeds itself into the governance process from the perspectives of trust construction and incentive provision, respectively. Specifically , the trust-building role of drinking behavior can somewhat alleviate the two dilemmas of insufficient information and non-institutionalization of governance tasks , while the incentive role of drinking behavior can somewhat alleviate the two dilemmas of non-institutionalization of governance tasks and insufficient organizational incentives. Both sections will discuss the de-institutionalization of governance tasks , but address different aspects (this dilemma has three aspects) and each is related to the other two dilemmas. For this paper to have more explanatory power than previous studies, it must better address the two major gaps in existing research. Therefore, the paper will compare and analyze the reasons why officials adopt different strategies in different contexts, with a focus on the driving mechanisms of superior alcohol consumption. Finally , the theoretical discussion will conclude with a discussion of countermeasures and measures to eradicate official drinking based on the current achievements in the fight against the “four winds” and the overall environment of governance.

III. A Function Governing Drinking Behavior: Building Trust

( I) Insufficient information about the pyramidal structure of government

Local governments in China are very large.

The population is large, with most counties having a population of 100,000, and the largest county even having a population of over 2 million. This is equivalent to the first level of local government in most countries, i.e., there are at least two levels under it, but there is only one level under the county government in China.
The Chinese government is a developmental type of government and therefore has more functions than the governments of other countries.
Local governments also manage many institutions and state-owned enterprises.

The above factors make the number of agencies managed by county governments⁶very large (including townships and streets, commissions and bureaus, enterprises and institutions, etc.), more than 100 on average. Therefore, the county governments and their subordinate agencies form a disparate pyramid structure.

Without discussing other effects, this structure creates a dilemma of insufficient information in terms of interpersonal interactions among officials. Specifically, there are an average of one to two hundred cadres at the main section level managed by the county government, plus nearly a thousand at the deputy section level. Their evaluation and promotion are controlled by the county government, and there are only 14-18 county standing committee members and deputy county governors who have these powers. A dozen county-level leaders correspond to nearly a thousand section-level cadres, and the information exchange between the two is obviously insufficient. Insufficient information will affect the evaluation and promotion of subordinates, and the county leaders may not even know many section-level cadres who need his evaluation.

“I know all the section-level cadres in my area but I don’t know some of the deputy cadres. The township and not in charge of the commission, I can make contact with the main office, but for many of the deputy I do not have a counterpart. Not that I’m a bureaucrat, in a county thousands of section-level cadres, it is difficult to get to know everyone. However, when the it comes to the appointment of cadres, I have to take a stand and cast my vote in the standing committee.”
(W37, Standing Committee of a county party committee in S3 province, September 2014)

Moreover, the lack of information about the three county leaders who hold the most weight in the use of cadres (secretary, governor, and organization minister) is even more serious because these three positions “should be held in different places”. In other words, the locally grown county leaders have time to slowly get to know the local cadres, while they have little time to fully grasp the cadres’ information.

“In the end, party secretaries do two things: provide ideas and assign various tasks to cadres. But there is a problem in employing cadres, the party secretaries have to be transferred every so often. I have been in our county for just over a year, and I didn’t know any of the cadres here before so my job is not easy. ”
(D13, County Party Secretary of a county in H2 province, March 2015)

The information dilemma causes confusion for the superior, but the impact on the junior’s career is much greater. The superior does not even know his information, let alone trust him. Therefore, subordinates must make themselves known to their superiors in various ways. Of course, in addition to the work to achieve this goal of many means, such as private contacts, through intermediaries or hometown associations and other ways to squeeze into the leadership of small circles, or even to engage in illegal transfer of benefits. These means can generally bring greater benefits to subordinates, but the problem is that it is much input to the higher-ups, it is difficult and comes with high risk. Most officials do not have enough will and courage, nor enough ability and resources. In contrast, “drinking” although the benefits are not high, but there is an advantage to it that comes with very little risk, it is simple operation and all subordinates can be involved.

“Simply doing well as the local level is not enough. Leader have to manage too many people. The group may not even know you. We usually have limited opportunities to see the leaders in the township, most of time it is when we are in meetings, and it is impossible to have contact on such occasions. The good thing is that the secretary always have to come to our township for on-the-spot research once or twice a year. Other leaders will also come and they always have to come to dinner. At the wine table, I toast the leader once, the leader toasts me back once, and then three or four times more as we like at table. When we drink we are relaxed. This is a good opportunity to make some points, to say a few frank words and make a good impression. “

(W38, secretary of a rural township party committee in a county in S3 province, September 2014)

Compared with the senior position, the opportunity of drinking at the table is more valuable to the person in the deputy position.

“I am a deputy section level cadres, the county has several hundred of us. Our director can occasionally go to the Party Secretary’s office, I generally only see the county leaders in charge only and less work contact with the Party Secretary and other county leaders. But at the wine table, anyone can make a toast and introduce yourself during the toast. If the leaders are interested, you can talk more. That way I can have some impression on them. That is not a bad thing. I do not know how to exploit it, doing that would be risky. I do not want to be rich and powerful, only safe and secure with some hope for advancement.“
(W24, a deputy director of a county in J province, April 2014)

In the process of drinking, subordinates convey two levels of information:

First, they try to make their superiors put their names, positions and faces together.
Second, rely on the effect of alcohol and the atmosphere at the table, convey certain personality traits, such as brash, honest, sincere, etc., and thus build up initial trust with superiors. It is important to note that the trust built up this way is very limited, but it is better than not knowing each other.

However, this mechanism of motivating subordinates to drink is not triggered at the second type of drinking tables (see Part II for more details). Because there is no disparate structure between superiors and subordinates at this type of table⁷, there is sufficient information and sufficient opportunity to build trust at work without the use of alcohol as a mediator.

“There are different rules for different wine tables. I’m not familiar with the rural and township and other committee cadres, and I don’t usually have contact with them. So at the drinking table, someone rushed to me to toast me with a “full glass”, then I can generally remember them, think “not a bad guy, genuine”. But in their own department is different, our department a total of dozens of people and of course I know everyone. Last time the department dinner, a young man also “toasted me with a full glass”, I was very embarrassed. According to the rules, I have to drink at least a full glass, otherwise it looks like I am putting on airs. But I can’t handle that physically, I thought I could just drink a little bit like I do at home. “
(W57, Standing Committee Member of the County Party Committee and Minister of Organization of a county in S1 province, May 2015)

On the contrary, if the subordinate drinks too much at such a table, it may leave a negative impression.

“For people in your work unit or organization, you have many opportunities to display your capabilities. You don’t need to go to any special effort while you are drinking. If you are not doing well in the office, what good can it be to try to make an impression when you are out drinking with the group? Wouldn’t that be like saying to the leadership “I am a good-for-nothing”?“
(W9, director of a bureau in a county in Z province, May 2012)

(II) Non-institutionalization of Governance Problem #1: Resource Dilemma of Local Governance

Lack of information not only affects the personal development of officials, but also causes many problems in governance. Specifically, there is a problem of de-institutionalization of governance tasks in China, which is mainly reflected in three aspects:

Uncertain distribution of governance resources,
Unclear articulation of work tasks, and
Many ad hoc and phased tasks.

This section first discusses the first two aspects.

“Running to the Ministry For Funding” The leader, standing on the back of the local government’s representative office in Beijing [analogous to embassies in a way] throws a gift at the door of “a certain” ministry or commission holding the yellow banner of project funding, special funding items. See Google Translate of the Baidu Online encyclopedia article 跑部錢進 on this topic for more.

For a long time, the allocation of funds, resources, and policies in local governance in China has lacked systematic institutional regulation and has been subject to great uncertainty. The rise of the project system in recent years has further exacerbated this uncertainty. In the relationship between the central and local governments, this has given rise to the familiar phenomenon of “running to the ministry to get funding” pǎobù qiánjìn 跑部錢進 . Although the township level does not have a similar saying of “running to the ministry for funding,” it is more dependent on allocated resources. After the tax reform, townships basically lost their ability to draw financial resources and had to rely on higher-level allocations, but the institutionalized allocations were generally only enough to maintain basic operations, and more resources had to be sought by the townships themselves (Zhou Feizhou, 2006), so the wine table became an important arena for townships to seek resources from higher levels.

There has been much discussion of this phenomenon of “drinking at the table” in existing studies. First, the subordinates’ drinking for resources is similar to the driving mechanism of drinking for personal development, so we will not discuss it in detail here, but only emphasize two points:

First, the subordinates’ drinking in this case is for official business, which means that personal drinking behavior has become part of the governance process.
Second, the superiors in this case are not only county-level leaders, but also include those who are at the same administrative level as township officials, but have some resource allocation power for specific governance tasks.

This mechanism does not exist in the second type of drinking table. Whether it is a county-level leader and his or her administrative bureau, or within the bureau and the township government, the allocation of governance resources is highly institutionalized and generally does not require individual actions by officials.

The above analysis shows how the dilemma of insufficient information and uncertain resource allocation drives the mechanism by which subordinates choose drinking behavior to convey information and build trust to superiors, and also explores why this mechanism does not exist at the second type of drinking table. However, the mechanisms that drive superiors’ drinking choices have not been explained, and this requires the next section.

(III) Governance Non-institutionalization problem #2:Lack of clarity in coordination of task assignments

The local township government committee overwhelmed by multiple tasks send down from government levels above. From the Baidu Knows article 上面千条线，下面一根针，到底啥意思？

“A thousand needles from above, a line from below” [上面千根针, 下面一条线 shàngmiàn qiān gēn zhēn, xiàmiàn yītiáo xiàn], all kinds of governance tasks with clear boundaries in the higher levels of government ultimately depend on the same group of people at the grassroots level to carry them out. On the surface, the pressure is mainly on the grassroots, because they undertake a lot of tasks. However, when faced with a heavy burden of governance tasks, grassroots governments tend to be selective in their implementation, carefully completing those they consider important and coping with those they consider unimportant, without much impact on their performance (O’Brien & Li, 1999; Yang, Aiping, and Yu, Yanhong, 2012; Ni, Xing, and Wang, Rui, 2017). However, the performance of the superiors (county leaders/commissioners) to whom they are responding will be greatly diminished.

“When you are the leader you are not omnipotent. Although I am a county leader, but I am not the Party Secretary and I can’t control the township cadres. On the contrary, I have to rely on them to carry out a lot of my work, and although they will not confront me, they can always take countermeasures to defeat me. “
(W51, Deputy county head in N province, June 2015)

Faced with this situation, the higher officials generally have three options:

First, “fix” the county party secretary, let the secretary feel that the work is very important, list it as the “secretary’s project” that he personally supervises, then the lower levels generally dare not block it.
Second, provide sufficient material or moral rewards, prompting subordinates to be serious about completing the task.
Third, rely on personal relationships with subordinates, to ensure that the tasks you assign are taken seriously.

Among these three options, the first is generally not feasible, it is difficult to get the secretary to focus on something. If the secretary is fixed on everything, then the “party secretary’s project” will have no real meaning. The second option is sometimes feasible, sometimes not, because attractive material resources and spiritual rewards are limited, the higher-ups may not always be able to obtain them. The third option is feasible in most cases, although it is the least effective. Among them, drinking, a social method that conveys friendly messages in a short time, builds initial trust, and can be replicated on a large scale at low cost, is the preferred choice for developing personal relationships with subordinates.

“Every time I go to the countryside for dinner, I make sure to give a toast to every township cadre present. Why? We have to leave a good impression on the comrades below, so that they can seriously complete my work. After all, I am not a secretary, township cadres can work harder to implement my work, to a large extent, depends on their recognition of my rank. But there are too many cadres in the county, the township is far away, and I’m busy, usually no opportunity to make contact so you have to seize the opportunity to drink at the table. “
(W29, standing committee member and propaganda minister of a county in S4 province, June 2014)

On the contrary, if the superior at the table does not take the initiative to interact with the subordinate drinking, perfunctory, or even refuse the subordinate’s toast, it is likely to lead secret sabotage and damage the work performance evaluation of the superior.

“We has a Deputy County head sent down from the provincial level. He was young and promising. But when he came to my rural township to dinner, I toasted him but he did not drink, what’s with that? I do not expect him to be promoted, but to get ahead he needs to have policy achievements, if he doesn’t treat us right why should we do anything for him? Why does he look down on me? Later, he set out some tasks for us, I didn’t do much about it. Anyways so much work sent down to us from all the different business lines above there is do much to do. How could he find fault with me?“
(W19, township secretary of a county in S2 province, April 2014)

In contrast, there is a clear system of work connection and task distribution between county leaders and their subordinate commissions and bureaus, and within commissions and bureaus and townships, and superiors generally do not need to drink to build personalized relationships with subordinates.

IV. Second Governance Function of Drinking Behavior: Providing Incentives

The third section analyzes the mechanisms that drive most officials to drink, but there is one key gap – the county party secretaries. The phrase “after all, I am not the secretary” appears frequently in the interviews, and its theoretical logic can be expressed as follows: most superiors need to develop personal relationships with their subordinates, especially township officials, through drinking because they are “outside their control” in the formal system. However, the county party secretary has a firm grip on the two main concerns of lower-level officials, namely, personnel arrangements and resource allocation. In other words, it seems that the formal system has given the party secretary enough power to influence subordinates, so is there no mechanism to make the secretary choose to drink in the governance process?

To judge by our material, the answer is no. County party secretaries are rarely “undrinkable” and are often active actors at the drinking table. Yet, they are the least fit to drink at the table (older, heavier, and less fit). What factors and mechanisms, then, motivate secretaries to choose to drink? This part of the discussion begins. By understanding the behavioral choices of secretaries, we will recognize the fact that the drinking behavior of officials not only affects their own governance performance at the individual level, but also has an effect at the organization-wide level, enhancing organizational cohesion and dynamism to some extent.

(I) Insufficient organizational incentives

“The further you go down the hierarchy, the heavier the task, the harder the work, and the greater the pressure” [ yuè wǎng xià, rènwù yuè fánzhòng, gōngzuò yuè nán zuò, yālì yuè dà “越往下, 任务越繁重、工作越难做、压力越大”] is an important feature of current local governance in China.

First, the workload at the grassroots level is very heavy. Although you can selectively cope, but “cope” also requires time and energy, and at most in the quantitative reduction of the heavy degree of the task, it is impossible to qualitatively change the “heavy” itself.
Second, the responsibility is great, the pressure is great. There are many “veto” [Note: Must do or you don’t get promoted.] items in grassroots governance. There have been some improvement since the 18th Party Congress, but still a lot. Superior exert a lot of pressure. Conflicts easily arise during implementation.
Third, at the grass-roots level there is a big gap between its responsibilities and the financial resources it has to accomplish its heavy tasks. This makes work more difficult. Moreover, compared with the county authorities, township officials generally work in the township seat, have their home in the countryside, often returning home only once a week. For the education of children and for family life they have a lot of extra expenses or even make sacrifices. Upper levels of government assign very heavy governance tasks and make many demands, but provide only very limited incentives.

First, incomes are not high. At present, the monthly salary of section-level cadres in most areas of the country is 2,500-4,500 RMB per month. This is not high among people with the same education and seniority. Of course, it is often said that “civil servants have gray income”, this paper cannot prove or disprove this proposition, but only state a basic fact: except for the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, some townships and street committees have more financial income, most townships and streets in the country are “have just enough to cover basic operating expenses”吃飯財政, Since the total size of local government is so large, how could most township cadres get much gray income from it?
Secondly, the government “works overtime when required”, and there is little overtime pay, and even “not even a meal”.
Third, officials tend to care more about promotion incentives. However, because of the “many people and few positions” and “far from the leadership”, the township promotion is the most difficult, many people “can not even get to the deputy section chief level”.

(II) The organizational motivation of “drinking” by superior officers

The task is heavy, much effort is required, rewards are low and so work motivation, organizational identity and cohesion will be problematic. There are many cases of resignation in the media. Many more officials have not resigned, but are trying to find ways to transfer (even just to be temporarily seconded). In the face of such a situation, superiors cannot let things be.

Among them, county party secretaries have the strongest motivation to change this situation. On the one hand, the organization has given the secretary the most important power, so it puts the highest demands on him. On the other hand, the personal interests of the secretary are the most relevant to the interests of the organization than those of other superiors. The better the organization works, the more his authority will be consolidated, the more outstanding his performance will be, and the greater his chances of promotion will be.

The key difference between a secretary in the Chinese system and a regional official in the electoral system is that the latter is already a prominent member of society before taking office, having accumulated more wealth, social influence and even family power, and is still an elite outside of government. However, the former are “organizationally trained”, all authority is based on organizational identity, “without the organization, you are nothing”.

So, where do the higher officials, represented by the secretary, go to find new organizational incentives to alleviate the organizational dilemma? In summary, there are roughly three options:

First, try to provide more material and moral incentives within the authority.
Second, to take some institutional risks and let subordinates off the hook for some less serious working style problems (e.g., setting up private coffers, overspending on benefits).
Third, to make up for the lack of organizational incentives with their own personalized compensation to subordinates.

These three options are generally possible, but this paper focuses on the third, of which drinking is an important manifestation.

“At my age, and as a leader for so many years, I’ve go the three highs [hypertension, high blood glucose, and high cholesterol], gout, and all kinds of other problem. The doctor said it is best not to drink. Why do I still drink? I can’t not drink, go to the township must drink, and it must be a big drink. If you do not drink, who will work for you? Township comrades don’t have it easy. They are responsible for a lot, they make less money, and usually can’t see their wife and children. We as leaders, officials can’t promote them, can’t give them money so how can we in good conscience refuse to drink with them?”
(W44, secretary of a county party committee in H2 province, December 2014)

How can it be deduced from the fact that the subordinate cannot see his wife and children that the superior has no conscience if he does not drink? Without being in the specific context of local governance, it is difficult to understand this seemingly paradoxical logic. Township work has many difficulties, a lot of pressure, the superiors are aware of, also very sympathetic, but they can not solve them. Some of these problems are caused by the institutional environment, but there are also a lot of them are created by the superiors for the sake of their own political performance. Therefore, sympathy is fine but even so the task and pressures will remain the same as usual. At the same time, we must also find ways to provide other aspects of incentives and compensation, in order to maintain organizational cohesion. Drinking has played such a role.

“As for drinking with cadres in my organization, I mostly consider my health. In a good situation and there aren’t many people, if someone toasts me with wine, I toast back. If the situation isn’t good, I just do a “drink as much or as little as you like” toast. I am the Party Secretary so I have some privilege in that. But when I go to a rural township even if the circumstances aren’t good, I drink as much and toast as much as need be. I won’t be a slacker. When I drink, I am not just drinking myself but representing county party committee and the county party government and on behalf of the county party committee and the county party government those cadres who are making sacrifices and contributions.“
(D27, Secretary of a county party committee in J2 province, June 2015)

To some extent, in the perception of the higher officials, especially the county party secretaries, drinking in such scenarios (especially excessive drinking) is not only not a bad trend, but also has a strong moral justification. It has become a moral obligation that the higher officials must undertake in the process of governance. Driven by moral legitimacy, all actors at the table will often continue to drink even if they are not physically fit to do so. It is not the drinking that is important, but the expression of feelings and empathy in the process of drinking together. This enhances organizational identity and cohesion.

(iii) De-institutionalization of governance tasks

III: A large number of ad hoc and phased efforts

A further question is, what organizational incentives does drinking provide? This is answered below in relation to the third aspect of the de-institutionalization of governance tasks – the large number of ad hoc, phased tasks.

There are two advantages to answering this question in this section:

First, drinking behavior here is directly targeted at a particular governance task, and can more directly identify its place in the specific governance process.
Second, the organizational incentives here are applicable to both township cadres and bureaucrats (there are some differences in the logic behind these two types of situations, which the author will elaborate in the conclusion).

The city’s major projects, “creating culture and sanitation”, rural fire prevention and burning and general land acquisition and relocation are temporary, phased work. These tasks are time focused, responsible and heavy, requiring a large number of people to work around the clock. In order to promote the work, the work style of the higher leaders, especially the secretary, is often very brutal, “giving orders without room for error”, “rushing progress as if rushing life”, “scolding people regardless of the occasion without mercy”. The work style is often very brutal, “giving orders without leaving any room for error,” “rushing the progress as if rushing to death,” “scolding people regardless of the occasion without mercy.

“Our party secretary is usually fine, but when he gets hold of a project he gets pretty rough. At any moment he can break out swearing and cursing. Last year, many projects were launched in our district. So, the secretary asked all the committees, bureaus and township team members to work on Saturday. Many people complained: why? And no overtime pay. He did not care, let the office and the Organization Department to check the post, personally led a team to carry out a surprise visit, found discipline problems, scolded in the General Assembly: “They don’t want to work overtime? There is no overtime pay? Whoever doesn’t want to work overtime should give up their jobs to people willing to work overtime.”
(W51, a director of a district in X2 province, April 2015)

It is important to note that brutality should not be attributed primarily to personal qualities. This is largely shaped by the environment, because that working style is most helpful in accomplishing governance tasks.

“I know that my subordinates say I have a rough style. Among those who do a good job as a secretary, most are rough? County work has to get done. I worked in the provincial office for a few years but I only rarely got so angry there. Why? Because there it was rare to face an extreme emergency that felt like a fire was singeing my eyebrows or like there was a knife at my throat.”
(D33, a county party secretary in G1 province, October 2015)

However, although the rough style can help achieve governance goals, it can also create a serious gap and trauma between superiors and subordinates, which will always explode in the long run. Therefore, those superior officials who are rough in promoting their work will often take the initiative to organize a party to recover the hearts and minds of the people at the drinking table after the work is successfully completed.

“After the work is done, we have to reward everyone. The money should be paid, the recognition should be given. We also have to get together to drink and have a meal. I offended all the people below me; some cursed me every day. Some could not go home for a month, they must have been very bitter about that. So, I had to repair the relationship. The people who contributed the most, I gathered together to drink and have a meal. Some I made a special trip to eat and drink with the work units that had contributed the most. Of course, I couldn’t go to every event; for some others I had other leaders go. So I got the repair work done. On the next big project though, I’ll continue to have them work overtime and keep on cursing.”
(D25, a county party secretary in H3 province, June 2015)

The organizational motivation in the drinking interaction includes three aspects:

First, the superior expresses respect and recognition of the subordinate’s personality and work, and the subordinate also expresses understanding of the superior. Interpersonal relations are frequent and harmonious after a drinking session. With the help of alcohol and the atmosphere of the table, the superior and subordinate will carry out some similar dialogue: “Brother, you do not blame me, it is all for the work, I drank this glass to make amends to you”, “I know you are not easy, you could not take care of your family, this time it all depended on you”. “Leader you should not say that, you force me to grow, I do not do a good job should be scolded”.
Second, to build a temporary equal status between the upper and lower levels. “On the table, there are only brothers, there is no official official”, not only to build the image of the superior easy-going, but also to let those scolded subordinates release pressure.
Thirdly, sometimes it also allows subordinates to “bully” superiors to allow that “catch a breath” for themselves.

“Rural winter fire prevention, the summer and autumn burning ban are jobs that take up most of the month. Township workers must all scatter to the mountains. It doesn’t matter if the weather is hot or cold. When financial controls were looser, a day’s work could also bring in a couple of hundred RMB in travel allowance. But who wants to freeze to death in the mountains for this money during Spring Festival? We are forced to go, there is always a little resentment felt down in the stomach. So, after the event, the township workers gather people together for a big drink. On this occasion, the party secretary and the township head always have to drink more and to make an appearance to make the crowd happy. I will also participate in some township venues, and they drink a lot. I can usually drink, often drinking until I drop. People look, the secretary can drink a lot until he drops and is finally carried out. Ha ha they laugh and most of their angry feelings fade away.”
(W47, secretary of a district party committee in S2 province, March 2015)

V. Conclusion and Discussion

( I) The logic of governance at the drinking table

Based on the rich empirical material, this paper examines the driving mechanisms of officials’ drinking in the specific context of government governance. Compared with the existing studies, this paper distinguishes four types of officials:

Township officials,
Commission officials,
Other superiors (not the top officials), and
County party secretaries,

and discusses their different identities (actors/strategy objects), behavioral strategies, and specific roles of drinking behavior in different contexts from three dilemmas of government governance. The table below shows the role of drinking behavior. The following table presents the logic of governance at the drinking table in a systematic way. What needs to be further explained is that although different officials may choose drinking strategies in the same governance dilemma, there are also differences among them depending on the institutional environment and governance needs. This has not been fully discussed in the previous section, and is explained in detail here. The logic of governance at the drinking table

Note:

(1) The table distinguishes between three identities of officials in specific contexts, i.e., actors, strategy targets, and “neither a dilemma nor a strategy target”.
(2) “Yes” in the table refers to a specific official facing a relevant governance dilemma and therefore needs to become an actor and adopt a drinking strategy, with the “/” symbol followed by an explanation of the specific role of drinking. Actors and strategy targets correspond to each other in the same governance dilemma column.

First, in the dilemma of insufficient information, although both township officials and bureau officials will adopt drinking strategies, the latter will do so less frequently and to a lesser extent than the former. The reason for this is that, as mentioned above, the bureaux and commissions have clear county-level supervisors, and they have more work contacts and sufficient information, so they generally do not need to drink to build trust with their supervisors. However, they also need to drink to convey information and build trust with their superiors who are not in charge of them. On the one hand, this need is not so important, and their promotion depends first and foremost on the opinion of their supervisors, and their destination is mainly in their own system or related fields (i.e., the supervisors’ areas of responsibility).

In contrast, township officials do not have a clear supervisor, and the direction of promotion is not clear, so they need to convey information and build trust to as many superiors as possible. On the other hand, there are fewer opportunities for drinking in the committees and bureaus. All county leaders have work contacts with townships, and all of them have the task of going to townships, but they rarely have work contacts with bureaux outside their own areas of responsibility. As a result, the officials of these bureaus have fewer opportunities to drink with other county leaders on official business than township officials.

Second, the resource dilemma is mainly reflected in township governance. Specifically, townships are comprehensive “blocks”, where all resources may or may not be allocated to a township; commissions and bureaus are clearly divided into “strips”, which generally do not require resources outside the strips to carry out their work. However, the commission bureau sometimes need the help of other departments, so they may also become actors, through drinking to other commission bureau officials, not in charge of his county leaders or county party secretaries to express good faith, to obtain resources, through the wine table to do things.

There are two specific situations:

First, some daily work requires the cooperation of other units. For example, urban construction is the responsibility of the construction department, but also needs the help of city management, finance and other departments. However, the formal system rarely stipulates the obligation of the relevant departments to assist, which requires the construction department officials to fight for themselves.
Second, the resources required to respond to emergencies are often beyond the capacity of operational departments. As a result, the officials of the commission and bureau usually try to have a good relationship with officials in the fields of politics and law, propaganda, etc., so that they will help each other in case of emergencies.

Third, all supervisors face the dilemmas of ad hoc, phased work and insufficient organizational incentives. However, due to differences in the scope of responsibility, these dilemmas affect county commissioners significantly more frequently and to a greater extent than other superiors. Concomitantly, they are more motivated to act.

For example, the propaganda minister may face the above dilemma in “creating culture and sanitation”, the vice governor in charge of agriculture may face the above dilemma in fire prevention and burning ban, and different major projects may expose different leaders in charge to the above dilemma. Outside of their respective fields, deputies generally do not need to take much responsibility, nor is it possible for them to make this their own performance. However, for the secretary, doing a good job is his own achievement, and facing consequences for doing a bad job is a risk he runs.

Moreover, from the micro perspective of individual motivation, multiple considerations of norm compliance and instrumental logic based on humanistic culture govern officials’ drinking behavior. In this regard, there are certain differences between subordinates and superiors. Specifically, for a subordinate, especially one in poor health, the benefits of drinking behavior may not outweigh the costs he incurs by drinking and injuring himself.⁸

Therefore, if only instrumental considerations are at play, he is more likely to choose to drink less or not to drink at all. However, the long-term operation of the drinking culture also produces implicit norms. Drinking less or not drinking, especially in the face of superiors, can be perceived as unkind and breaking the rules, leaving a negative impression within the group and resulting in a loss of stock benefits. In this way, the potential loss and potential gain together will outweigh the cost, thus prompting them to choose to drink. However, it is difficult to distinguish, depending on the context, whether loss prevention or gain-seeking considerations dominate a subordinate’s drinking behavior of a certain type. This is more a matter of individual rather than situational variation.⁹

In contrast, the influence of drinking behavior on superiors does vary across contexts. In the case of the county secretary, for example, the organizational incentives he provides are of two types:

First, daily incentives are mainly motivated by normative considerations, and not drinking is seen as a failure to fulfill moral obligations, resulting in negative evaluations of inconsiderate subordinates.
Secondly, there are more instrumental considerations for specific incentives for a particular job, which does not mean that the secretary can choose to drink or not to drink, but rather that he can choose to drink at the table. In the daily incentive, he cannot choose the drinking table (he has to go to the township for work), and he should drink when he goes to the table; in the special incentive, he does not have to and cannot participate in all the relevant drinking games, so he will selectively participate in some of them according to the importance and performance of his work.

Other superiors are similar to the secretary, except that they are less motivated to drink. In addition, the other superiors are more instrumental in the lack of clarity in the work interface, which is reflected in the fact that they will not get drunk with township officials, but generally will not get drunk with commission officials, because the lack of clarity in the work interface mainly refers to the “blocks” of work that need to be “implemented” by the “articles”, and the system is not clear on the “implementation, and the system does not clearly specify the “piece” that lies in this area of responsibility.

(二) Further Discussion

The scholarly concern of this paper in a more general sense is: how to understand official behavior in the current Chinese governance environment? This is a hot topic in the academy (Xueguang Zhou and Wei Zhao, 2009), and this paper may expand on existing theory in two ways.

1. The relationship between institutional environment, social culture and officials’ behavior

The relationship between social culture and formal institutions is a hot topic in current governance research in China, and many studies have noted that traditional culture can change or even undermine formal institutions. In the competition, social culture may prevail, invalidate the formal system, dominate officials’ behavior, and shape some of the unique features of Chinese governance. The existing studies of official alcohol culture are a concentrated manifestation of this presupposition.

The author does not attempt to overturn this framework, but wishes to point out that it may not always be applicable. In governance, socio-cultural and institutional environments can compete as well as cooperate. This paper demonstrates that this framework is not appropriate for analyzing the drinking behavior of officials. While it is true that the culture of favors has an important influence on the formation of official drinking, its role is not predicated on the failure of the formal institutional system, but rather on the need for the culture of favors in the institutional environment, so that the culture of favors can be embedded. In the process of embedding, humane culture is also reshaped by the institutional environment to better meet the needs of governance. Thus, in this theoretical framework, social culture is not a cause but a mediator in the governance process, while the institutional environment is the dominant cause, shaping officials’ behavior at the source (including some behaviors that seem to be against the system).

In short, current governance research in China overestimates the erosion of institutional systems by social culture and individual behavior, and underestimates the shaping of individual behavior, interpersonal relationships, and social culture by formal institutions. Thus, when examining governance in China, it is important not only to see the conflict between subtle rules and formal institutions, but also to explore the connection between the two.

This raises new questions: In what ways do formal institutions and social culture compete against each other? And when do they cooperate? In other words, how do we choose and integrate analytical frameworks to understand the complex relationship between institutions and cultures according to specific objects? These questions need to be further explored.

2. The role of weak relationships in the operation of the organization

Organizational research has long noted that in addition to formal organizational structures and institutional systems, informal relationships among members also play an important role in the operation of organizations (Kornai, 1992; Zhou, Xueguang, and Zhao, 2009). Relationship theory clearly distinguishes between strong and weak relationships and has been explored in many empirical studies (Granovetter, 1973, 1974; Bian, 1997).

However, the relevant Chinese governance studies do not distinguish between types of relationships, and most of the empirical cases discuss strong relationships. In contrast, the drinking behavior in this study is more related to the operation of weak relationships. In general, in order to achieve certain goals (e.g., promotion or governance performance), officials employ a range of strategies, including three types of behaviors: those conferred or required by formal institutions,¹¹ strong relationships, and weak relationships. For example, an individual’s promotion begins with a track record and satisfies the basic conditions of the relevant system. But it is more critical to have a hand or related superiors to push, which often requires strong relationships, but also other superiors to push the boat.

Similarly, the superior first of all to promote a certain work task makes use of the authority and resources given by the system. However the superior also needs to have trustworthy and competent “own people” and to mobilize other people’s enthusiasm. The first two are more important to achieve the goal, but we cannot easily give up the weak relationship as an auxiliary strategy, and it is the consensus of the officialdom to make good connections. Therefore, when studying the operation of relationships in governance, it is necessary to distinguish between strong and weak relationships, and to examine their mechanisms of action comprehensively.

Compared with strong relationships, weak relationships have the disadvantage of being less useful or possibly even useless, but they also have their unique advantages. First, they are less costly and difficult to establish and maintain. While strong relationships require high costs and good interpersonal skills, weak relationships have few of these constraints.¹² Second, they are less risky. Strong relationships can cross legal boundaries if they are not careful, into bribery and gangster-like behavior.

Even if they do not violate the law, building too many strong relationships may also violate the taboo of “standing in line” in the officialdom. In other words, officials can only operate strong relationships in a limited and selective manner, but they can reproduce weak relationships on a large scale. In addition, heterogeneous weak ties may, by chance, bring key information, even far more than the benefits of investment. This is similar to Granovetter’s (1974) classic analysis of the job market.

While alcoholic beverages are a common means of building both strong and weak relationships, there are distinct differences between the two types of beverages.

First, as emphasized in the previous section, this paper examines official drinking bureaus, which are primarily weak relationship operations. The strong relationship generally corresponds to the drinking bureaus organized by officials in private.
Second, the distinctive feature of official drinking bureaus is that they can adequately convey information and provide organizational incentives, but strong relationships do not necessarily seek to get drunk without returning.

On the one hand, the atmosphere shaped by heavy drinking is no longer needed to provide information and incentives in strong relationships; on the other hand, the price to be paid for the exchange in strong relationships far exceeds the value of the drinking behavior.

3. How can the official drinking style be controlled?

After the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the fight against official drinking has become an important part of Opposing the “Four Working Styles” of Formalism, Bureaucracy, Hedonism and Extravagance. This has achieved good results by strictly controlling the level of alcohol and prohibiting drinking at lunch, which has significantly reduced the cost of hospitality and improved work efficiency.¹³ The fight against the “Four Working Styles” has externally combated The “Four Working Styles” have cracked down on the growing trend of official drinking. However, on the basis of the effectiveness of the “Four Working Styles”, the eradication of official drinking needs to start with solving the deep-seated problem of governance, that is, replacing the role played by drinking behavior in governance with institutional mechanisms. A series of national governance modernization initiatives are currently underway that are expected to transform the governance environment that induces official drinking in general. These initiatives are not in themselves designed to combat alcoholism, but they may be more effective than those that focus on alcohol.

First, improve the level of governance institutionalization. First, governance resources are sinking. In grassroots governance, townships have many tasks but few resources and lack a reasonable allocation system, so township officials need to use their personal relationships to obtain resources, and drinking behavior is thus embedded in governance. If townships had more resources and a reasonable distribution system, the incentive to drink would be reduced. In 2019, Beijing Municipality’s “whistle-blowing” reform 吹哨报到”改革 was highly recognized by the central government, which called on the whole country to send resources all the way down to the townships.
Second, clarify the relationship between authority and responsibility. The lack of clarity in the interface of work makes it necessary for superiors to develop personal relationships with subordinates, which can be alleviated in two ways. In the case of relations with commissions and bureaus, the development of the times has brought many new governance matters, which often exceed the boundaries of the original departmental authority and the division of labor among county leaders.

The current institutional reform aims to redistribute governance authority, which helps to alleviate the dilemma. In the case of townships, the overload of tasks means that they can only do some of the work assigned by their superiors and deal with others, so there is competition among superiors for support from their subordinates to avoid being overwhelmed. However, many of these tasks are unnecessary, and in 2019, the central government issued a special notice on solving the outstanding problem of formalism and reducing the burden for the grassroots.

Thus, if the total number of tasks can be reduced so that the grassroots can complete (rather than cope with) most governance tasks, the incentive for superiors to compete for support from subordinates through drinking behavior will also be weakened. Third, China is in a period of rapid development, and as a result, there are many temporary and phased tasks in grassroots governance, such as poverty eradication and urban construction. Since formal institutional incentives cannot meet the needs of these tasks, superiors need to provide organizational incentives through personal behaviors, but these tasks will naturally decrease due to the change of development stage.

Secondly, to improve the level of institutionalized governance is the fundamental solution. It must also be recognized that grassroots governance cannot be fully institutionalized. There will always be ambiguity in the relationship between authority and responsibility at the upper and lower levels, and some temporary tasks are inevitable (e.g., fire prevention, etc.). In such cases, it is necessary to improve the compensation and incentive mechanisms (e.g., overtime, major project rewards, etc.), and to replace the organizational incentives provided by individual actions of superiors with formal systems.

Finally, the information dilemma of the pyramid structure may be difficult to change in the short term. However, if the aforementioned governance tools to play a full role, can also be a large extent to stop the official drinking style. Specifically, if the top and bottom have sufficient motivation, it is easy to drink too much; however, when the top’s motivation to drink is dissipated, it is difficult for the bottom to take the initiative to raise a glass more often.

Moreover, the parallel system of job ranking being explored can also help to reduce the incentive for subordinates to drink. The reason is that, in order to get promoted, subordinates must convey information and build trust to enough superiors, so drinking behavior can be useful. The promotion of rank is mainly a threshold system, and the role of superiors is relatively small. From long-term research, many grassroots cadres may not care much about promotion, but since all benefits are only linked to their positions, they can only compete desperately for limited positions. With the choice of rank, their motivation to build personal relationship with their superiors will also be weakened.

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[18] O’Brien, Kevin J. & Lianjiang Li 1999, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China.” Comparative Politics 31 ( 2) .

[19]Wank, David 1999, Commodifying Communism:Business, Trust, and Politics in a Chinese City.New York:Cambridge University Press.

[20]Yang, Mei-hui 1994, Gifts, Favors and Banquets:The Art of Social Relationships in China.New York:Cornell University Press.

Notes

1 The term “wine culture” in this paper is not a cultural concept in the academic sense, but a widely accepted and realistic concept.

2 For example, the business promotion booze board is not included in the study, and such booze boards have more than sufficient legitimacy in the formal system. The system does not prohibit alcohol consumption in investment promotion, and consumption standards are much higher than for ordinary working meals. There have been many positive reports in the official media of drinking for investment purposes.

3 The observations are somewhere between participatory and non-participatory. The author also drank at the table, but more often observed the “civil war” of local officials from the sidelines. It is important to note that the author initially made other arrangements to visit these places, but inadvertently gained a great deal of material during his encounters. The author’s research idea came to him during one of the drinking sessions, and later he consciously collected some materials.

4 In this study, there are two types of subordination: first, subordination in terms of administrative level, for example, between county leaders and township and commission heads. Secondly, there is a difference in authority between the top and the bottom of the hierarchy, for example, the county-level authority is exercised by the commission and the bureau, so they have the authority to allocate resources and evaluate the township on certain matters.

5 First, it is customary for each person to toast the guest of honor (i .e., the superior) at least once, but not necessarily to each other. That is, if there are N people at the table, the guest of honor must drink at least N-1 glasses, while others can drink at least 1 glass. Second, high-level leaders have more reception tasks, and many interviewed secretaries have talked about the experience of drinking seven or eight games a night.

6 The “government” mentioned in this article includes the party committee and the government.

7 Commissions and bureaus, townships and streets are at most a few dozen staff; county leaders are responsible for six or seven commissions and bureaus, and more than a dozen commissions and bureaus, which add up to a few dozen people. The higher-ups have enough opportunities to get to know each person and fully understand their situation in all aspects of the work.

8 First, the probability of generating revenue is low. A subordinate official’s drinking behavior is a wide net and a lucky break. As long as there are enough of them, there will be gains, but he also knows that most of them do not actually lead to clear gains. Second, compared to promotion, drinking has a higher probability of targeting and gaining resources, but it is an official matter, and the body is one’s own.

9 For example, people with good health and good drinking capacity may drink more for the sake of profit ( the official drinking style of not getting drunk is also a burden for people with good drinking capacity ); but people with bad drinking capacity and poor health drink more to “not break the rules”.

10 Of course, the institutional environment itself is composite.

11 There are cases where the boundaries of the system are crossed, such as “promotion with illness,” but this does not make the formal system useless. The role of the formal system is that there is a higher price to pay for crossing the line, and “promotion with illness ” only happens to close associates or those with high interests.

12 official interactions focus on reading words, listening to the voice, a little carelessness may be more than words will be lost, which requires a high IQ and emotional intelligence. But the drinking table as long as the drink is dry enough, even if you say the wrong thing, few people care.

13 In the past, official receptions used to drink high-grade wine such as Maotai. This was the focus of a crackdown on the “four winds”, and now only low- and mid-range local wine is consumed. In the past, both lunch and dinner were often consumed at official receptions, but now there is very little alcohol consumed at lunch. As a result, spending on alcohol consumption has dropped significantly. The absence of alcohol at lunch has ensured productivity in the afternoon.

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官场酒文化：基于县域官员饮酒行为的实证研究

强舸法科生之家 2023-04-29 11:13 Posted on 湖南

导读

为什么中国官场会形成独特的酒文化？在正式制度禁止、频繁严打，甚至许多官员自己也不情愿的情况下，为什么官场酒风还具有生命力？

原文标题：制度环境与治理需要如何塑造中国官场的酒文化

——基于县域官员饮酒行为的实证研究

来源：《社会学研究》2019年第4期，转载自：量化研究方法

作者：强舸，中央党校党建部

摘要
为什么中国官场会形成独特的酒文化?在正式制度禁止、频繁严打, 许多官员自己也不情愿的情况下, 官场酒风为何还具有生命力?基于2011-2015年作者在全国多地进行的观察和访谈, 本研究认为, 当前中国地方治理存在金字塔科层结构的信息不足、治理任务非制度化、组织激励不足三个困境, 而饮酒行为发挥了构建信任、提供激励的作用, 部分缓解了以上困境, 提升了治理绩效。换言之, 官场酒桌一定程度上不是破坏了制度系统, 恰恰是应制度环境本身需要而产生的。它通过嵌入治理过程弥补了正式制度的不足, 并因此具有生命力。近年来, 反“四风”遏制了官场酒风, 大幅降低了相关费用, 提升了工作效率。不过, 根治官场酒风还需要通过提升治理制度化水平、构建补偿和激励制度以改善整体治理环境。

一、现象与问题

酒文化是中国官场的独特现象，1“能喝”在某种程度上是党政干部，特别是领导干部的必备素质。这显然不是好现象。改革开放以来，官场酒风一直是党风廉政建设、政府运作和基层治理的顽疾，造成了许多负面后果，例如违规使用公款、损害政府形象、降低工作效率等，甚至还会造成人员伤亡。20世纪90年代起，各级政府就开始大力整治官场酒风，但总是难以杜绝。因此，本文所关注的现实问题是：为什么中国官场会形成独特的酒文化？在正式制度禁止、频繁严打，甚至许多官员自己也不情愿的情况下，为什么官场酒风还具有生命力？

本文通过一项经验研究来回答以上问题。酒文化盛行中国社会各领域，因此我们对研究对象做如下限定：第一，酒桌上的所有人都具有官员身份，有非官员参与者的酒局不在讨论范围内。2第二，不同层级、不同系统 (党政机关/国企) 官员饮酒行为的特征和驱动机制有一定差别。本文聚焦于县域党政机关，这是当前官场酒风最受关注的领域，具有大量饮用高度酒的鲜明特征。第三，仅指因公务产生的酒局，这也是现有文献主要关注的对象，不包括官员私人聚会性质的酒局。

本文的经验材料来源有两类。第一类是笔者于2011-2015年在全国十几个省份的观察和访谈；3第二类是笔者于2014-2015年在北京与各地干部的访谈。后文引用时，第一类材料编号为W，第二类材料编号为D。在第一类材料中，作者观察的酒局总计57次，东部地区19次，中部地区20次，西部地区18次。有言论被记录者63人，其中县 (市、区) 委书记9人，副县级干部31人，科级干部23人。在第二类材料中，单独访谈13人，座谈会11次，有言论被记录者36人。分析材料时作者发现，东、中、西部官员在饮酒行为上没有显著差异。后文引用访谈材料中的观点都至少被不同地域3名以上受访者提及，而非某位受访者的独有观点或经历。

二、文献述评与研究设计

(一) 现有文献概述

20世纪90年代以来, 官场酒风及其治理一直是社会热点, 相关报道和评论数不胜数, 既有对问题的直观描述和治理呼吁, 也有对原因的简单分析。与媒体热议相对应的是, 相关学术研究并不多, 散见于饮食社交和公款吃喝两个领域。总的来说, 这些文献从不同层面对本文现实问题有所回应。

第一个问题是官场酒文化是怎样产生并蔓延的。首先, 许多报道和时评都强调, 官场酒文化是腐败的一种表现, 它源自“爱喝”的个人偏好、干部作风腐化和“占公家便宜”的市侩心理 (童武, 1995)。具体来说, 在改革开放初期, 官员喝酒主要是因为当时物质条件还不富裕, 存在“喝了解馋, 不喝就亏了”的心理。近年来, 物质大为丰裕, 对处于社会较高层级的官员来说, 大多不需借此解馋了, 但饮酒, 特别是饮用茅台等高档酒成了身份象征, 是官员对个人欲望的消费 (贺海峰, 2013) 。以上解释有其道理, 但问题在于, 它提供的都是特殊性解释, 最多只能解释部分官员行为，即确实有少数人爱喝、爱占便宜、爱显摆, 但回答不了为什么官场酒风会成为普遍现象。更具体地说，它解释不了许多官员根本不爱喝酒甚至身体状况都不允许喝酒了，却依然在官场酒桌上不醉不归的现象。

由此, 探讨焦点逐渐转向人情文化, 强调在更大的社会环境和政府治理的具体情境中去理解形塑官场酒文化的因果机制 (严霞、王宁, 2013) 。具体来说, 关系和人情文化一直在中国社会占据重要位置,在日常生活、政治、经济等领域发挥重要作用 (Wank, 1999) 。请客吃饭是人情文化的主要体现方式之一, 普遍存在于政府组织和商业机构中 (Yang, 1994) 。饮食社交是人们创立或维持关系资本,进行关系再生产的一种途径。人们可以利用餐桌建立、拉近关系, 获取资源, 谋求利益 (边燕杰, 2004) 。酒的加入则能激发更好的效果。黎相宜 (2009) 指出, 在中国社交实践中, 饮酒能发挥维持人情、表达诚意、流露真情、达成交换四种作用。管健 (2008) 进一步聚焦官场并指出，官场上的正式沟通受环境、时间和情境限制, 具有正规和刻板的特点, 而酒有放松精神、使人兴奋的作用，饮酒能在参与者中营造亲密、平等的非正式交流氛围。有些事在办公室谈不开，酒桌则是更好的沟通和交际平台。而且, 酒桌上办的“事”, 不仅有升迁等私事，更多是实实在在的公事 (徐浩程, 2013) 。因而, 不少人哀叹, “酒桌办事”已成为官场潜规则，产生了制度约束力, 乃至不喝、不拼命喝就办不成事 (王春, 2010) 。

然而, 虽然官员饮酒行为能发挥这么多作用，但也造成很多负面后果，所以在正式制度中不具有合法性，各级政府常常采取措施打击。因而, 第二个问题是为什么官场酒风在众多治理措施下还具有生命力？现有文献从两个层面给出答案：第一，制度有漏洞，包括以下几种情况：有的规定不细致、不成体系，缺乏针对性和执行力；有的规定脱离现实, 无法执行。第二, 制度执行有问题。即使是较完善的制度，也需要强力的执行者才能真正发挥作用。然而, 虽然各级政府三番五次下达禁令，但对下级政府来说，上级政府虽然要求提得多, 但强硬措施少, 很少给闯红灯者施以严厉处罚。究其原因，许多上级在喝酒上常常“上梁不正”, 所以不可能真正禁酒。更重要的是, 这体现了官场酒文化的潜规则力量, 官员虽然不得不在正式制度中贯彻限酒、禁酒精神, 但私下又会遵循潜规则继续饮酒 (严霞、王宁, 2013) 。当然, 由于强大的政治、社会、财政及其他压力, 某些时候各地政府也会强力禁酒, 但往往是运动式的。运动结束后, 饮酒之风就会回潮。

梳理相关论述，我们看似得到一个比较系统的解释：饮酒是中国传统人情文化和社会交往的重要形式。正式制度存在漏洞，人情文化得以渗透其中，最终使得官场酒风大行其道。以上解释有其道理，但回到现实中，我们会发现两个足以动摇整个解释体系根基的漏洞。

(二) 漏洞一：上级官员饮酒的驱动机制是什么?4

为什么官员要喝酒？现有文献中, 媒体的直观表述是“我 (下级) 不愿意喝, 但是领导要喝, 不能不陪”。学术论文的机制性表述是基层治理存在“酒桌办事”和“官大一级压死人”两个特征, 所以下级为了迎合上级、办成事, 不得不主动喝酒。然而, 以上表述只解释了下级饮酒的驱动机制, 却没有回答上级饮酒的动力从何而来。显然, 不可能所有上级都爱喝酒。进一步而言, 上级比下级有着更沉重的喝酒负担, 5并且由于年龄等原因, 上级的身体条件往往也更不适合喝酒。也就是说, 其实官场酒桌上多数人未必想喝酒。在这种情况下, 是什么因素和机制促使并不想喝酒的官员们频频举杯、一醉方休?

阐述上级官员饮酒的驱动机制是回答这个问题的关键。现有文献对此只是略有涉及，即上级被迫喝酒是怕得罪人。但它没有回答得罪人背后的问题：上级得罪了下级有什么后果？显然，对理性行动者来说, 他是比较了“得罪人”和“被迫喝酒”的后果才做出选择的。现有文献解释了下级怕得罪人的机制：第一，酒桌办事，不喝就办不了事。第二，上级掌握着下级各方面的利益。因为权力差别，下级得罪不起上级。但是，为什么掌握更多权力的上级宁愿违背自身意愿饮酒，也不愿意得罪下级呢？

(三) 漏洞二：为什么官员在不同场合选择不同的饮酒策略?

现有文献并没有比较分析官员在不同场合的饮酒策略，而是大而化之地认为所有官员在所有场合都会采取一致的饮酒策略。经验材料并不支持这一判断。作者的观察发现，不同官员在不同场合往往选择不同的饮酒策略。在第一种场合, 酒桌参与者是以下三类组合之一：(1) 县级领导和乡镇负责人; (2) 委办局负责人和乡镇负责人；(3) 县级领导和他不分管的委办局负责人。以上组合的共同点是酒桌参与者平日接触不多, 相互不太熟悉。这时, 他们往往会一醉方休。在第二种场合, 酒桌参与者是以下三类组合之一：(1) 县级领导和他分管的委办局负责人；(2) 委办局负责人和他的下属；(3) 乡镇负责人和他的下属。以上组合的共同点是酒桌参与者平常接触多，相互熟悉。这时, 他们常常是“意思意思”，甚至会嘱咐别人“别喝太多”。

那么, 是什么机制促使官员在不同场合选择不同的饮酒策略?在官场酒桌上，为什么半熟人甚至陌生人间的 (过量) 饮酒行为发生频率和程度要远高于熟人间?

(四) 研究设计

综上所述, 现有研究并不足以解释官场酒风的形成及其生命力, 我们需要寻找更完善的解释体系。新的框架要吸收现有研究的合理部分, 但更重要的是必须能回答现有解释无法回答的两个问题。

总的来说, 现有研究的基础性问题是在研究方向上低估了正式制度的作用, 往往预设中国官员具有破坏正式制度、建立潜规则的倾向。然而，行动者虽然并不必然遵守正式制度, 但也要有某种利益驱动才会去破坏正式制度，选择更有利的潜规则。否则, 他的选择应当是遵守正式制度以获得相应激励。

现有文献大致都秉持要在具体治理情境下分析官场酒文化的运作机制的立场。由此出发，现有文献将“酒桌办事”作为行动者破坏正式制度的获利机制。本文大致同意它对下级官员饮酒行为的机制判断，不过其论述过于简单，更没有解释上级官员为什么饮酒。在此, 现有文献又回到了“爱喝”的肤浅解释，这显然与“具体治理情境下分析”的基本立场相冲突。从更高的层面来说，上级饮酒也是对人情逻辑的运用，但现有文献对人情逻辑的具体作用机制缺少分析。处于优势地位的上级为什么也要遵循，甚至主动运用人情逻辑？喝酒会给他们带来什么？不喝又可能失去什么?简言之，人情逻辑是官场酒文化形成的必要条件，但不是充分条件。

因此，本文强调上级饮酒的驱动机制也要在具体治理情境中寻找。事实上，在具体治理情境中也更有希望找到“为什么官员在不同场合选择不同饮酒策略”的答案。因为不同场合的行动者是一样的，但是制度环境及治理需要是不同的，由此导致了人情逻辑的不同运用。

进一步而言，长期以来, 许多中国治理研究低估正式制度作用, 而高估行动者破坏正式制度却会遵守潜规则的意愿。但是，潜规则的约束力从何而来？对此，周雪光 (2008) 提出了一个开创性的命题：在中国政府的运作中, 许多看似违背正式制度的潜规则恰恰是制度环境的产物，它在更大层面上满足了整个制度体系和治理的需要, 因而具有广泛而深厚的合法性基础。换言之, 在理解官员行为时, 不能简单将官员视为企图破坏制度的人，而需要注意制度环境对官员行为的制约作用；不能只看到潜规则与正式制度的冲突, 而要挖掘潜规则与正式制度的联系，有些潜规则恰恰是在更高级别的正式制度作用下形成的。因此, 我们必须在中国特定的制度环境和政府运作逻辑中理解官员的饮酒行为。这不是人情文化找到制度漏洞，而恰恰是制度运作本身的需要导致了人情逻辑和饮酒行为嵌入治理过程，最终形塑了中国官场酒文化。因此，本文的理论问题是：制度环境和治理需要以怎样的机制塑造官场酒文化?饮酒行为在治理过程中发挥了哪些作用?

基于对经验材料的梳理分析，作者发现，当前中国地方治理存在金字塔层级结构信息不足、治理任务非制度化和组织激励不足三个困境, 而饮酒行为嵌入恰恰能发挥构建信任、提供激励的作用，部分缓解以上困境，提升治理绩效。也就是说，官场酒文化在很大程度上不是破坏了制度系统，而是嵌入治理过程，弥补现有制度的不足，因此具有了生命力。本文第三、第四部分将分别从信任构建和提供激励的角度探讨饮酒行为如何缓解上述困境，并由此嵌入治理过程。具体来说，饮酒行为的信任构建作用能一定程度上缓解信息不足、治理任务非制度化两个困境，而饮酒行为的激励作用则能一定程度上缓解治理任务非制度化、组织激励不足两个困境。这两个部分都会讨论治理任务的非制度化，但涉及的是不同方面 (该困境包括三个方面) ，并各自与另两个困境相关联。本文要想比以往研究更有解释力，就必须更好地解决现有研究的两个重大漏洞。因此，在具体论述中，本文会比较分析官员在不同场合采取不同策略的原因, 并重点分析上级饮酒的驱动机制。最后，结论部分将展开理论讨论，并在当前反“四风”取得成绩的基础上，从改善治理的整体环境切入，探讨根治官场酒风的对策和举措。

三、饮酒行为的治理功能之一:信任构建

(一) 政府金字塔层级结构的信息不足

中国地方政府的规模很大。第一, 人口多, 县域人口大多数十万, 最大的县的人口甚至超过200万。这相当于多数国家的一级地方行政区, 即属下至少还有两个层级, 但中国县级政府属下只有一个层级。第二, 中国政府是发展型政府, 承担的职能多于其他国家。第三, 地方政府还管理着大量事业单位和国企。以上因素使得县级政府6管理的机构数量非常多 (包括乡镇街道、委办局、企事业单位等) , 平均超过100个。因此, 县级政府及其下属机构间构成了悬殊的金字塔结构。

且不讨论其他影响, 仅就官员人际交往而言, 这一结构造成了信息不足的困境。具体来说, 由县级政府管理的正科级干部平均有一二百人, 加上副科级干部有近千人。他们的考核和晋升由县级政府掌握, 而拥有这些权力的县委常委和副县长只有14-18人。十几个县级领导对应近千名科级干部, 两者间的信息交流显然是不足的。信息不足会影响下级的考核和晋升, 县级领导可能都不认识许多需要他评价的科级干部。

我分管领域的科级干部都认识, 但有些副科干部并不熟。而对乡镇和不分管的委办局, 正职我能对上脸, 副职很多对不上号。不是说我官僚, 一个县上千科级干部, 很难都熟悉。可是, 干部任用的时候, 我在常委会上是要表态、投票的。 (W37, S3省某县县委常委, 2014年9月)

而且, 在干部使用中握有最大权重的三位县级领导 (书记、县长、组织部长) 信息缺乏的困境更严重,因为这三个岗位“应当异地任职”。也就是说, 本地成长的县级领导还有时间慢慢了解本地干部, 而他们却没有多少时间充分掌握干部信息。

书记说到底就做两件事:出主意、用干部。但在用干部上有个问题, 书记都要异地任职, 我到我们县也就一年多, 之前对这里的干部没有了解, 不好办。 (D13, H2省某县县委书记, 2015年3月)

信息困境给上级造成的主要还是履职困惑, 但对下级职业生涯的影响则要大得多。上级连他的信息都不了解, 就更别谈信任。因此, 下级必须通过各种方式让上级认识自己。当然, 在工作交往之外要实现这一目标的手段很多, 例如私下交往, 通过中间人牵线搭桥或老乡会等方式挤进领导小圈子, 甚至搞违法利益输送。这些手段一般能给下级带来较大收益, 但问题在于其投入多、难度大、风险高,多数官员既没有足够的意愿和胆量, 也没有足够的能力和资源。相比之下, “喝酒”虽然收益不高,但其优势在于风险很小、操作简单, 所有下级都可以用。

在地方光干得好不够, 领导管的人太多, 可能都不知道有你这号人。我们在乡镇平常见领导机会有限, 多数还是开会, 这种场合也不可能有接触。好在书记一年总得来我们乡调研一两次, 其他领导也会来, 来了总得吃饭。酒桌上, 我敬领导一次, 领导回一次, 随便再来几次, 一场酒总有三四次接触。喝了酒都放松了, 机会把握得好, 拉着手和领导说几句真心话, 能留一些好印象。 (W38, S3省某县某乡党委书记, 2014年9月)

相比正职, 酒桌上的机会对副职更为珍贵。

我这样的副科级干部, 全县有好几百。我们局长偶尔还能去书记办公室, 我一般只能见到分管县领导, 很少接触书记, 其他县领导就更少有工作上的接触。但在酒桌上, 谁都有敬酒资格, 敬酒时自我介绍一下。领导要是有兴致, 多聊几句, 对我能有些印象, 总不是坏事。我又不会钻营, 那样风险也大。我不求大富大贵, 只图安安稳稳, 有点进步希望就行。 (W24, J省某县某副局长, 2014年4月)

在饮酒过程中, 下级传递两层信息:第一, 努力让上级把自己的名字、职务和脸对上号。第二, 依靠酒精的作用和酒桌氛围, 传递某些性格特质, 例如豪爽、实在、真诚等, 并以此和上级构建起初步信任。需要指出的是, 这样构建起来的信任非常有限, 但总比不认识强。不过, 这一促使下级饮酒的机制在第二类酒桌 (详见第二部分分类) 不会被触发。因为在这类酒桌上, 上下级间并不存在悬殊结构, 7信息充足, 工作中有足够机会构建信任, 不需要用酒作为中介。

不同酒桌有不同规矩。乡镇和其他委办局干部我不熟, 平常也没接触。所以在酒桌上, 有人冲到我面前来个“拎壶冲”, 那我一般能记住, 觉得“人不错, 实在”。但在自己部门就不一样了, 我们部总共几十号人, 谁怎么样我不清楚?上次部里聚餐, 有个小伙子也给我敬个“拎壶冲”, 我就很尴尬。按规矩, 我至少得喝一满杯, 不然显得我架子大, 但我身体真不行, 本想自己人聚餐随便喝点就可以了。 (W57, S1省某县县委常委、组织部长, 2015年5月)

相反, 在这类酒桌上, 下级要是喝得太猛, 反而可能留下负面印象。

人在机关里, 单位领导天天见, 有心表现机会多得是, 不需要在喝酒上费劲。要平常啥事都干不好,光喝酒积极有啥用, 这不就等于跟领导说“我是酒囊饭袋”嘛。 (W9, Z省某县某局局长, 2012年5月)

(二) 治理任务非制度化之一：地方治理的资源困境

信息不足不仅影响官员的个人发展, 而且会在治理中造成很多问题。具体来说, 当前中国存在治理任务非制度化的问题, 主要体现在三个方面:治理资源分布不确定、工作衔接不明确以及大量临时性、阶段性的任务。本部分首先讨论前两个方面。

长期以来, 在中国地方治理中, 资金、资源和政策分配缺少系统的制度规范, 具有很大的不确定性。近年来项目制的兴起更进一步加重了这种不确定性。在中央和地方的关系上, 这孕育了我们熟知的“跑部钱进”的现象。乡镇一级虽然没有“跑部钱进”的类似俗语, 但对划拨资源的依赖性更强。税费改革后, 乡镇基本丧失了财政汲取能力, 只能依靠上级拨款, 但制度化拨款一般仅够维持基本运转, 更多资源需要自己争取 (周飞舟, 2006) , 酒桌就成了乡镇向上级争取资源的重要舞台。现有研究对这类“酒桌办事”现象已有不少讨论。下级为了争取资源喝酒与为了个人发展喝酒的驱动机制类似, 在此就不详细讨论了, 只需强调两点:第一, 下级在这种情况下喝酒是为了公事, 这意味着个人饮酒行为已经成为治理过程的一部分。第二, 这种情况下的上级不仅指县级领导, 而且包括那些行政级别与乡镇官员相同, 但在特定治理任务上拥有一定资源分配权的委办局官员。这一机制在第二类酒桌上则不存在。无论是县级领导与他分管的委办局, 还是委办局内部和乡镇政府内部, 治理资源分配的制度化水平较高, 一般不需官员通过个人行为争取。

以上分析了信息不足和资源分配不确定的困境如何驱动下级选择饮酒行为来向上级传递信息、构建信任的机制, 同时探讨了为什么这一机制不存在于第二类酒桌。但还没有解释上级选择饮酒的驱动机制, 这需要进行下一部分的讨论。

(三) 治理任务非制度化之二：工作衔接不明确

“上面千根针, 下面一条线”, 在上级政府中界限清晰的各类治理任务最终都要靠基层的同一批人执行。表面上看, 压力主要在基层, 因为他们承接的任务非常多。然而, 面对繁重的治理任务, 基层政府往往会选择性地执行, 认真完成那些他们认为重要的, 应付那些他们认为不重要的, 这并不会对他们的政绩产生太大影响 (O’Brien & Li, 1999;杨爱平、余雁鸿, 2012;倪星、王锐, 2017) 。但是, 被应付的上级 (县级领导/委办局负责人) 的政绩就会大打折扣。

当领导不是万能的。我虽然是县领导, 但我不是书记, 乡镇干部我管不到。相反, 我的很多工作得靠他们落实, 他们虽然不会跟我对着干, 但应付总是可以的。 (W51, N省某县副县长, 2015年6月)

面对这种情况, 上级官员一般有三种选择:第一, “搞定”县委书记, 让书记觉得这项工作很重要, 列为“书记工程”亲自督办, 那么下级一般不敢应付。第二, 提供足够的物质或精神奖励, 促使下级认真完成任务。第三, 依靠与下级的个人关系, 确保自己条线的工作被认真对待。在这三种选择中, 第一种选择一般不可行, 搞定书记很难, 书记要是次次都被搞定了, “书记工程”也就没有约束意义了。第二种选择有时可行, 有时不可行, 因为有足够吸引力的物质资源和精神奖励都是有限的, 上级未必总能拿得出。第三种选择在多数情况下是可行的, 尽管效力最低。其中, 喝酒这种能在短时间内传递友好信息、构建初步信任、可低成本大范围复制的社交方式成为上级发展与下级个人关系的首选。

每次下乡吃饭, 我肯定要给在场的每个乡镇干部敬杯酒。为什么?咱得给下面同志留下好印象, 好让他们认真完成我的工作。毕竟我不是书记, 乡镇干部能多努力地落实我的工作, 很大程度上取决于他们对我的认可程度。但县里干部太多, 乡镇又远, 而我工作忙, 平时没机会接触, 就得抓住酒桌上的机会。 (W29, S4省某县委常委、宣传部长, 2014年6月)

相反, 如果上级在酒桌上不主动与下级饮酒互动, 敷衍了事, 甚至拒绝下级的敬酒, 就很可能在工作中吃暗亏, 损害自身政绩。

以前我们有个副县长, 省里下来的, 年轻有前途。但来我这下乡, 吃饭我敬酒他都不喝, 牛什么?我不指望他提拔, 但他进步总得有政绩吧, 不还得我们干?他凭什么瞧不起我?后来, 他布置的工作, 我就是不积极干, 反正上面各条线派下来的活多得干不完, 他能抓住我什么把柄? (W19, S2省某县乡镇书记, 2014年4月)

与之不同, 在县级领导与分管的委办局、委办局内部和乡镇内部, 工作衔接、任务分配有明确的制度规定, 上级一般不需靠喝酒来构建与下级的个人化关系。

四、饮酒行为的治理功能之二:提供激励

第三部分分析了大部分官员饮酒的驱动机制, 但还有一个关键缺口——县委书记。访谈中频繁出现“毕竟我不是书记”这句话, 其理论逻辑可以表述为:多数上级之所以需要通过饮酒发展与下级, 特别是乡镇官员的个人关系, 是因为在正式制度体系中“管不到”他们。但是, 县委书记牢牢掌握着人事安排和资源分配这两大下级官员的命门。换言之, 看起来正式制度已经赋予了书记足够左右下级的权力, 在治理过程中是否就不存在促使书记选择饮酒的机制了呢?

经验材料提供了否定答案。县委书记少有“不能喝的”, 并且往往是酒桌上的积极行动者。然而, 他们却又是酒桌上最不适合喝酒的 (年龄大、工作繁重、身体较差) 。那么, 是什么因素和机制促使书记选择饮酒?本部分论述由此展开。通过理解书记的行为选择, 我们将认识到这样一个事实:官员饮酒行为不仅能从个人层面影响自身范围内的治理绩效, 而且能在整个组织层面产生作用, 在某种程度上提升组织凝聚力、激发组织活力。

(一) 组织激励不足

“越往下, 任务越繁重、工作越难做、压力越大”是当前中国地方治理的重要特征。第一, 基层工作非常繁重。虽然可以选择性应付, 但“应付”也需要时间和精力, 且最多在量上降低任务的繁重程度,不可能在质上改变“繁重”本身。第二, 责任大、压力大。基层治理的“一票否决”项很多 (十八大后有所好转, 但依然不少) , 上级施加的压力非常大, 但在执行中却很容易诱发冲突。第三, 基层的事权、财权却又与繁重任务高度不对等, 工作因此更难做。此外, 相比县直机关, 乡镇官员普遍工作在乡镇, 安家在县城, 常常一周才能回一次家, 在子女教育、家庭生活上都有不少额外的付出甚至牺牲。

上级政府下派了非常重的治理任务, 提出了很多要求, 但所提供的激励却很有限。第一, 收入不高。目前, 全国多数地区科级干部月工资在2500-4500元, 这在同学历、同年资的人员中并不算高。当然, 坊间常说“公务员有灰色收入”, 本文不能证明或证伪这个命题, 只陈述一个基本事实:除了长三角、珠三角部分乡镇街道拥有较多财政收入, 全国多数乡镇街道都是“吃饭财政”。总盘子就这么大, 大多数乡镇干部又能从中搞到多少灰色收入?第二, 政府是“让加班就加班”, 并且少有加班费,甚至“连饭都不管”。第三, 官员往往更在意晋升激励。但是, 由于“人多坑少”“远离领导”, 乡镇晋升难度最大, 许多人“连副科都混不到”。

(二) 上级官员“喝酒”的组织激励作用

任务重、付出大、回报低, 工作动力、组织认同和凝聚力就会出问题。媒体报道过许多官员辞职的案例。更多官员虽然没有辞职, 但也在想方设法调走 (哪怕临时借调) 。面对这种情况, 上级不能放任自流。其中, 县委书记改变这种状况的动机最强烈。一方面, 组织将最主要的权力赋予书记, 也就对他提出了最高的要求。另一方面, 相比其他上级, 书记的个人利益和组织利益相关度最高。组织运转得越好, 他的权威就越巩固, 政绩就越突出, 晋升机会也就越大。中国体制下的书记与选举体制下的地区主官的关键不同在于后者上任前已是社会名流, 积累了较多财富、社会影响甚至家族势力, 离开了政府依然是精英。但前者是“组织培养的”, 所有权威都基于组织身份, “离开了组织, 什么也不是”。那么, 以书记为代表的上级官员去哪里寻找新的组织激励来缓解组织困境呢?

归结起来, 大致有三种选择:第一, 在权限内努力提供更多物质和精神激励。第二, 冒一定的制度风险,放任下级一些不太严重的作风问题 (例如私设小金库、超标发放福利) 。第三, 以自己对下级的个人化补偿弥补组织激励不足。这三种选择一般都有可能被采用, 本文重点谈第三种, 喝酒是其重要的表现形式之一。

我这个年纪, 又当了这么多年领导, 三高、痛风, 什么毛病都有点。医生说最好别喝酒。怎么还喝?不喝不行啊, 到了乡镇必须喝, 还得是大喝。不喝酒, 谁给你干活?乡镇同志不容易, 任务重、钱少,平常老婆孩子都见不到。我们当领导的, 官也给人家升不了, 钱也给不了, 再不喝酒, 对得起自己的良心吗? (W44, H2省某县县委书记, 2014年12月)

下级见不到老婆孩子, 怎么就能推导出上级不喝酒就没良心呢?如果不置身地方治理的具体情境, 我们很难理解这看似吊诡的逻辑。乡镇工作有很多困难、很大压力, 上级都知道, 也很同情, 但他们解决不了。这些问题有的是制度环境造成的, 但也有很大部分是上级为了政绩主动制造的。所以, 同情归同情, 任务和压力还是照样派、照样给;但是, 同时也要想办法提供其他方面的激励和补偿, 以维系组织凝聚力。喝酒就发挥了这样的作用。

和机关干部喝酒, 我主要看身体, 状态好、人不多, 敬我的酒我就干了;状态不好, 我就随意。我是书记, 这点特权总是有的。但在乡镇, 状态再差, 该干的酒、该敬的酒, 我绝不会少。他们这么辛苦, 我喝酒不是为自己喝, 我是代表县委县政府喝, 代表县委县政府感谢做出牺牲和贡献的干部。(D27, J2省某县县委书记, 2015年6月)

某种程度上, 在上级官员特别是县委书记的认知中, 这种场景下的饮酒 (特别是过量饮酒) 不仅不是不良风气, 相反具有浓厚的道义正当性, 成为治理过程中上级必须承担的道德义务。在道义正当性的驱使下, 即使酒桌上所有行动者的身体条件都不适合继续饮酒了, 他们往往还是会继续喝。因为重要的不是酒, 而是在喝酒过程中一起抒发感情、实现共鸣, 提升组织认同和凝聚力。

(三) 治理任务非制度化之三：大量临时性、阶段性工作

进一步的问题是, 饮酒行为提供了怎样的组织激励?下面将结合治理任务非制度化的第三方面——大量临时性、阶段性工作来回答。在本节回答这个问题有两个优势:第一, 饮酒行为在这里直接针对某项治理任务, 能更直接标识出它在具体治理过程中的位置。第二, 这里的组织激励既适用于乡镇干部,也适用于委办局干部 (这两类场合背后的逻辑也有一些区别, 笔者将在结论部分详述) 。

城市的重大项目推进、“创文创卫”, 农村的防火禁烧以及普遍的征地拆迁等都属于临时性、阶段性工作。这些工作时间集中、责任大、任务重, 需要大量人员全天候工作。为了推进工作, 上级领导特别是书记的工作作风往往非常粗暴, “下命令不留余地”“催进度如同催命”“骂人不分场合不留情面”。

我们书记平常还好, 但一抓起项目就是土匪, 任何场合都能破口大骂。去年区里上了一大批项目。于是, 书记要求所有委办局、镇街班子成员周六上班。很多人有意见:凭什么?还不发加班费。他不管, 让办公室和组织部查岗, 亲自带队搞突然袭击, 查到就处分, 在大会上骂:“不想加班?嫌没加班费?谁不想加班把位子让出来, 愿意加班的多了。” (W51, X2省某区某局长, 2015年4月)

需要指出的是, 作风粗暴主要不应归因于个人素质, 这在很大程度上是环境塑造的, 因为这种作风最有助于完成治理任务。

我知道下面都说我作风粗暴。凡是能干出成绩的书记, 有几个作风不粗暴的?县里工作就得这么干。我在省厅干过几年, 那时候难得红次脸。为什么?那里没有这些火烧眉毛、刀架脖子的事。(D33, G1省某县委书记, 2015年10月)

然而, 粗暴作风虽然有助于实现治理目标, 但也会在上下级间造成严重的隔阂和创伤, 长期积累总会爆发。所以, 那些推进工作时作风粗暴的上级官员, 在工作较为圆满地结束后, 往往会主动组织聚会,在酒桌上找回人心。

活干完了, 得犒劳大家。该发钱的发钱, 该表彰的表彰。此外, 还得聚起来喝一顿。干事时我差不多把下面的人得罪光了, 有人天天被我骂, 一个月没回过家, 他肯定经常在心里骂我。所以, 我得去修补关系。出力最多的人, 我召集起来喝一顿;有时, 出力最多的单位我还专门去喝一趟。当然, 也不可能所有人都顾得上, 剩下的就让其他领导去吧。这次修补完了, 下次有大项目, 我也好继续让他们加班、继续骂。 (D25, H3省某县委书记, 2015年6月)

饮酒互动中的组织激励包括三个方面:第一, 上级表达对下级人格和工作的尊重和认可, 下级也表达对上级的理解。一场酒下来, 互动频繁、气氛和睦。借助酒精作用和酒桌氛围, 上下级会进行一些类似对话:“老弟, 你别怪我, 都是为了工作, 我干了这杯给你赔罪”, “我知道你不容易, 都没怎么顾上家,这次全靠你了”, “领导您别这么说, 您逼我才能长进, 我干得不好被骂是应该的”。

第二, 构建上下级间暂时的平等地位。“上了酒桌, 只有兄弟, 没有官大官小”, 既塑造了上级平易近人形象, 也能让那些被骂的下级释放压力。

第三, 有时还能让下级通过“欺负”上级来“出口气”。

农村冬季防火、夏秋禁烧, 一干就是大半个月, 乡镇所有人都得撒到山上去。不是大热天, 就是大冷天。以前管得松, 一天还能发一两百块钱补贴。但大过年的谁愿意为这点钱在山上冻个半死?都是被逼去的, 肚子里总有点气。所以, 事搞完了, 乡镇会把人聚起来喝顿大酒。这种场合, 书记、镇长总得多喝点, 出些洋相, 让大伙乐乐。我也会参加一些乡镇场子, 跟他们喝大酒。我酒量一般, 经常就喝趴下了。大家一看, 书记能喝半斤喝八两, 最后给抬出去了, 哈哈一笑, 气也就消了大半。(W47, S2省某区区委书记, 2015年3月)

五、结论与讨论

(一) 酒桌上的治理逻辑

基于丰富的经验材料, 本文在政府治理的具体情境中考察官员饮酒的驱动机制。相较于现有研究较为宽泛的探讨, 本文区分了乡镇官员、委办局官员、其他上级 (非一把手) 和县委书记四类官员, 从政府治理的三个困境出发, 分别讨论了他们在不同情境下的不同身份 (行动者/策略对象) 、行为策略和饮酒行为的具体作用。综合全文论述, 下表可以系统地呈现酒桌上的治理逻辑。

需要进一步阐释的是, 在同一治理困境下, 不同官员虽然都可能选择饮酒策略, 但他们之间也有因制度环境和治理需要的不同而产生的差别。前文对此尚未充分讨论, 在此详细阐释。

注: (1) 表格区分官员在具体情境下的三种身份, 即行动者、策略对象和“既不存在困境, 也不是策略对象”。(2) 表格中“有”指特定官员面临相关治理困境, 因而需要成为行动者, 采取饮酒策略, “/”符号后是对饮酒具体作用的解释。行动者与策略对象在同一治理困境下的纵列中相互对应。

第一, 在信息不足的困境中, 乡镇官员和委办局官员虽然都会采取饮酒策略, 但是后者的频率和程度要低于前者。原因在于, 正如前文所述, 委办局有明确的县级分管领导, 工作接触多、信息充分, 因此他们一般不需要通过饮酒来与分管领导构建信任。但是, 他们也需要通过饮酒行为向不分管他的上级传递信息、构建信任。不过, 一方面, 这种需求较小, 他们的晋升首先取决于分管领导的意见, 并且去向主要是在本系统或相关领域中 (即分管领导的分管范围) 。相比之下, 乡镇官员没有明确的分管领导, 晋升去向也不明确, 需要向尽可能多的上级传递信息、构建信任。另一方面, 委办局的喝酒机会较少。所有县级领导都与乡镇存在工作联系, 都有去乡镇的任务, 但很少与自己分管领域外的委办局发生工作联系。因此, 委办局官员因公务与其他县级领导喝酒的机会也少于乡镇官员。

第二, 资源困境主要体现在乡镇治理中。具体来说, 乡镇是综合性的“块”, 在制度上所有资源都可以向或不向某个乡镇划拨;委办局是分工明确的“条”, 开展工作一般不需要条线外的资源。但是, 委办局有时也需要其他部门的帮助, 因此他们也可能成为行动者, 通过饮酒向其他委办局官员、不分管他的县级领导或县委书记表达诚意、争取资源, 通过酒桌办事。具体包括两种情况:第一, 一些日常工作需要其他单位的配合。例如, 城建由建设部门负责, 但也需要城管、财政等部门帮助。然而, 正式制度很少规定相关部门的协助义务, 这就需要建设部门官员自己去争取。第二, 突发事件应对所需的资源往往超出业务部门的能力范围。因而, 委办局官员平常会尽量与政法、宣传等领域官员处好关系, 以期在发生突发事件时对方会施以援手。

第三, 所有上级都需要面对临时性、阶段性工作和组织激励不足的困境。但是, 由于工作负责范围的差异, 这些困境影响县委书记的频率和程度显著高于其他上级。与之相应, 他们的行动积极性也会更高。例如, 宣传部长会在“创文创卫”上面临上述困境, 分管农业的副县长会在防火禁烧上面临上述困境, 不同重大项目会让不同分管领导面临上述困境。在各自领域外, 副职一般既不需要承担太多责任, 也不可能将此作为自身政绩。然而, 对书记来说, 干好了都是自己的政绩, 干不好都是自己的隐患。

此外, 从个体动机的微观视角来看, 在人情文化的基础上, 遵守规范和工具性逻辑的多重考虑制约着官员的饮酒行为。在这方面, 上下级存在一定的差别。具体来说, 对下级, 特别是身体不好的下级来说, 饮酒行为带来的收益未必大于他因饮酒伤身付出的成本。8所以, 如果只有工具性的考虑, 他更可能选择少喝或不喝。但是, 酒文化长期运作也产生了隐性规范, 少喝或不喝, 特别是面对上级时少喝或不喝, 会被视作不近人情、坏了规矩, 在群体内留下负面印象, 造成存量利益损失。这样一来, 潜在损失和可能收益加在一起会大于成本, 从而促使其选择饮酒。不过, 我们很难根据具体情境区分到底是防止损失还是寻求收益的考虑主导着下级的某类饮酒行为。这更多是因人而异, 而非由情境决定。9

与之不同, 不同情境对上级的饮酒行为影响确有差异。以县委书记为例, 他提供的组织激励包括两类:第一, 日常化激励主要是出于遵循规范的考虑, 不饮酒会被视作没有履行道德义务, 造成不体谅下级的负面评价。第二, 针对某项工作的专门激励工具性考虑更多, 这并不是说书记可以选择喝或不喝,而是指可以选择酒桌。在日常化激励中, 他不能选择酒桌 (因工作需要必须去乡镇) , 上桌就应该喝酒;在专门激励中, 他并不必须, 也不可能参与所有的相关酒局, 因而会根据重要程度和工作绩效有选择地参与一些。其他的上级类似书记, 只是促使他们喝酒的动力较弱。此外, 在工作衔接不明确这点上, 其他上级的工具性考虑更多, 这体现在他们会和乡镇官员不醉不归, 但一般不会和委办局官员不醉不归, 因为工作衔接不明确主要是指“条”的工作需要“块”落实, 而制度没有明确规定“块”在这方面的职责。

(二) 进一步讨论

本文在更普遍意义上的学术关注是:如何在当下的中国治理环境中理解官员行为?这是学界的热门话题 (周雪光、赵伟, 2009) , 本文在两方面可能拓展现有理论。

1.制度环境、社会文化与官员行为的关系

社会文化与正式制度的关系是当下中国治理研究的热点, 许多研究注意到传统文化对正式制度的改变甚至破坏, 由此形成的理论预设是:社会文化与正式制度是对立竞争的关系, 它们各自构成决定官员行为的互斥性机制。在竞争中, 社会文化可能占据上风, 让正式制度失效, 进而主导官员的行为, 塑造中国治理的一些独特之处。已有的官场酒文化研究就是这一预设的集中体现。

笔者并不试图推翻这一框架, 但希望指出它未必总是适用。在治理中, 社会文化和制度环境既会竞争,也可能合作。本文证明该框架并不适合用来分析官员的饮酒行为, 虽然人情文化对官场酒风的形成确有重要影响, 但其作用的发挥不是以正式制度体系失效为前提, 而是制度环境需要人情文化, 所以人情文化得以嵌入。在嵌入过程中, 人情文化也被制度环境重新塑造, 以便能更好满足治理需要。因此, 在本文的理论框架中, 社会文化不是原因, 而是治理过程中的中介因素, 而制度环境是主导原因, 10从源头上塑造着官员行为 (包括一些看似违背制度的行为) 。

概言之, 当前中国治理研究高估了社会文化和个人行为对制度体系的侵蚀, 低估了正式制度对个人行为、人际关系和社会文化的塑造。因而, 在考察中国治理时, 不仅要看到潜规则与正式制度的冲突,而且要注重挖掘两者的联系。由此产生了一些新的问题:正式制度与社会文化在何种情况下对立竞争?又在何种情况下进行合作?换言之, 我们如何根据具体对象选择和综合运用分析框架, 去理解制度和文化的复杂关系?这些问题有待进一步探讨。

2.弱关系在组织运作中的作用

组织研究很早就注意到, 除了正式组织结构和制度体系, 成员的非正式关系在组织运作中也发挥着重要作用 (Kornai, 1992;周雪光、赵伟, 2009) 。关系理论明确区分强、弱两种关系, 并有诸多实证研究对此进行了探讨 (Granovetter, 1973, 1974;Bian, 1997) 。然而, 相关的中国治理研究并没有区分关系类型, 实证案例大多讨论的是强关系。与之不同, 本研究中的饮酒行为则更多涉及弱关系运作。总的来说, 为了达成某种目标 (如晋升或治理绩效) , 官员会运用一系列策略, 包括三类行为:正式制度赋予或要求的、11强关系和弱关系。例如, 个人晋升首先要有政绩并满足相关制度的基本条件。但更关键的是要有一把手或相关上级的力推, 这常常需要强关系, 也需要其他上级顺水推舟。同样, 上级推进某项工作首先要靠制度赋予的权威和资源, 同时要有信得过、办事得力的“自己人”,但也需要调动更多人员的积极性。就达成目标来说, 前两者更重要, 但也不能轻易放弃作为辅助策略的弱关系, 广结善缘是官场共识。因此, 在研究治理中的关系运作时, 有必要区分强关系与弱关系, 全面考察其作用机制。

与强关系相比, 弱关系的劣势是用处不大甚至可能没用, 但也有其独特的优势。第一, 建立和维系的成本和难度低。强关系需要高成本和较好的交际能力, 弱关系运作则很少受到上述限制。12第二, 风险小。强关系稍有不慎就可能越过合法边界, 例如行贿受贿、团团伙伙等。即使不违纪违法, 过多构建强关系也可能触犯官场的“站队”忌讳。换言之, 官员只能有限度、有选择地经营强关系, 但可以大范围复制弱关系。此外, 偶然情况下, 异质性弱关系还可能带来关键信息, 甚至远超投入的收益。这类似于格兰诺维特 (Granovetter, 1974) 对就业市场的经典分析。

酒局是建立强关系和弱关系都会用到的常见手段, 但两类酒局也有鲜明区别。第一, 正如前文中强调的, 本文研究因公酒局, 其中主要是弱关系运作。而强关系一般对应的是官员私下组织的酒局。第二,不醉不归是因公酒局的鲜明特征, 因为这样才能充分传递信息、提供组织激励;但强关系的酒局却未必追求不醉不归。一方面, 强关系中已不需大量饮酒塑造的氛围来提供信息和激励;另一方面, 强关系中达成交换需要支付的价格也远超饮酒行为所具有的价值。

(三) 如何治理官场酒风？

十八大后, 治理官场酒风成为反“四风”的重要内容并取得了不错成效, 通过严控酒品档次和禁止午餐饮酒, 大幅降低了接待费用, 提升了工作效率。13反“四风”从外部打击了愈演愈烈的官场酒风。但是, 在反“四风”取得成效的基础上, 根治官场酒风还需要从解决治理的深层次难题入手, 即用制度机制替代饮酒行为在治理中发挥的作用。当下正在推进的一系列国家治理现代化举措有望在整体上改造诱发官场酒风的治理环境。这些举措本身并不是为治理酒风提出的, 但其效果也许会优于那些就酒论酒的举措。

首先, 提升治理制度化水平。第一, 治理资源下沉。在基层治理中, 乡镇任务多但资源少, 且缺少合理的分配制度, 乡镇官员需要运用个人关系争取资源, 饮酒行为由此嵌入治理。如果乡镇能拥有更多资源且分配合理, 饮酒动力就会下降。目前我国正在推进这方面改革, 领导人多次强调:“尽可能把资源、服务、管理放到基层, 使基层有职有权有物”。2019年, 北京的“吹哨报到”改革得到中央高度肯定, 号召全国学习, 其要旨就是将资源下沉到乡镇。第二, 明确权责关系。工作衔接不明确使上级需要发展与下级的个人关系, 这可以从两方面缓解。就与委办局关系而言, 时代发展带来许多新的治理事务, 这些事务常常超出原有部门权限和县级领导的分工边界。当下的机构改革旨在重新划分治理权限, 有助于缓解相关困境。就乡镇而言, 任务过重决定了他们只能完成一些上级布置的工作而应付另一些上级, 上级间因此需要竞争下级支持, 避免被应付。但是, 许多任务其实是不必要的。2019年中央为此专门印发《关于解决形式主义突出问题为基层减负的通知》。因此, 如果能减少任务总量, 使基层有能力完成 (而非应付) 大多数治理任务, 那么上级通过饮酒行为竞争下级支持的动力也会削弱。第三, 中国正处于高速发展期, 基层治理因此存在大量临时性、阶段性任务, 例如脱贫攻坚、城市建设等。正式制度激励无法满足这些任务需要, 上级就需要用个人行为提供组织激励,但这些任务会因发展阶段改变而自然减少。

其次，提升治理制度化水平是治本之道, 但也必须认识到基层治理不可能完全制度化，上下级权责关系始终会有模糊地带, 有些临时性任务也不可避免 (例如禁烧防火等) 。针对这类情况, 就需要完善补偿激励机制 (如加班费、重大项目奖励等) , 以正式制度替代上级个人行为提供的组织激励。

最后, 金字塔结构的信息困境短期内可能很难改变。不过, 如果前述治理手段充分发挥作用, 也能在很大程度上刹住官场酒风。具体来说, 如果上下级都有充分动力, 就很容易喝多;但是, 当上级饮酒动力被消解后, 下级也就很难主动频频举杯。另外, 正在探索的职务职级并行制度也有助于削减下级饮酒动力。原因在于, 要想获得职务晋升, 下级必须向足够多的上级传递信息、构建信任, 饮酒行为就有了用武之地。而职级晋升主要是门槛制, 上级作用相对较小。从长期的调研所得看, 许多基层干部未必很在意职务晋升, 但由于各项待遇都只与职务挂钩, 他们只能拼命竞争有限的职务。有了职级选择, 他们与上级建立个人关系的动力也会减弱。

参考文献

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注释
1 本文的“酒文化”并不是学术意义上的文化概念,而是被广泛接受的现实概念。
2 例如, 招商引资酒局不在研究范围内,这类酒局在正式制度中也有较为充足的合法性。制度并不禁止招商引资中的饮酒, 消费标准也比普通工作餐高得多。官方媒体也曾多次正面报道为了招商的喝酒行为。

3 观察介于参与式和非参与式之间。作者也在桌上喝酒, 但更多地是旁观当地官员“内战”。需要说明的是, 最初作者去这些地方都另有安排, 但在接触中无意间获得了大量材料。作者在某次酒局中灵光乍现产生了研究设想, 后来又有意识地收集了一些材料。
4 本研究中的上下级包括两种情况:第一, 行政级别上的上下级, 例如县级领导与乡镇、委办局负责人。第二, 级别上是平级, 但职权上存在上下差异, 例如委办局行使的是县一级权限, 因而在某些事务上享有对乡镇的资源分配、考核等权限。
5 第一, 按惯例每人都至少向主宾 (也就是上级) 敬一次酒, 但却未必相互敬酒。即, 如果酒桌上有N人, 主宾至少要喝N-1杯, 其他人却最少可以只喝1杯。第二, 级别高的领导有更多接待任务,多位受访书记说起过一晚喝七八场的经历。
6 本文谈及的“政府”包含党委和政府。
7 委办局、乡镇街道最多也就几十个工作人员;县级领导少则分管六七个委办局, 多则分管十几个委办局, 这些部门正副职加起来也就几十人。上级在工作中有足够机会认识每个人并充分了解其各方面的情况。
8 第一, 产生收益的概率低。下级官员饮酒行为是广撒网、撞大运。只要次数够多, 肯定会有收益, 但他也知道多数行为其实不能带来明确收益。第二, 相比晋升, 喝酒对于争取资源的针对性和收益概率要大一些, 但这是公事, 而身体是自己的。
9 例如, 身体好、酒量好的人喝酒可能更多是为了利益 (不醉不归的官场酒风对酒量好的人同样是负担) ;但酒量不好、身体不好的人喝酒更多是为了“不坏规矩”。
10 当然, 制度环境本身是复合性的。
11 也有越过制度边界的案例, 例如“带病提拔”, 但不能就此认为正式制度没用。其作用体现在越界需要支付更高的代价, “带病提拔”只会发生在亲信或利益高度相关者身上。
12 官场交往注重察言观色、听话听音, 稍有不慎就可能言多必失, 这对智商和情商要求很高。但酒桌上只要喝酒干脆就够了, 即使说错话, 也很少有人在意。
13 过去公务接待常饮用茅台等高档酒。这在反“四风”中被列为打击重点, 目前基本只饮用中低档本地酒。过去公务接待时往往午餐和晚餐都饮酒, 现在午餐饮酒极少。饮酒开支因此大幅下降。午餐不饮酒确保了下午的工作效率。

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2019: PRC Official Drinking Culture: County Officials

Official Drinking Culture: Study of County Official Drinking

Notes

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官场酒文化：基于县域官员饮酒行为的实证研究

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关注“法律检索”公众号，后台回复“暑期学校”即可获取首届“大数据与法律检索”暑期学校课程PPT。回复“PPT”即可获得中国大学MOOC《大数据与法律检索》主讲人在深圳律协授课的PPT（六百多页干货）。

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2019: PRC Official Drinking Culture: County Officials

Official Drinking Culture: Study of County Official Drinking

Notes

Heavyweight benefits

Shenzhen Law Association training course “lawyer legal search core skills” B site address (click the original article after reading to watch)

官场酒文化：基于县域官员饮酒行为的实证研究

重磅福利

关注“法律检索”公众号，后台回复“暑期学校”即可获取首届“大数据与法律检索”暑期学校课程PPT。回复“PPT”即可获得中国大学MOOC《大数据与法律检索》主讲人在深圳律协授课的PPT（六百多页干货）。

深圳律协培训课程《律师法律检索核心技能》B站地址（点击文后阅读原文即可观看）

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