Visiting my wife’s family in Nantou County, Taiwan, I’ve noticed much favorable discussion of Admiral Lee Hsi-ming’s book 《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win”. Apparently an English translation is in the works. Some links added (Google Translates of original Chinese language links and English language versions of two official Taiwan defense reports) as with as an interlude with additional information Admiral Lee’s book is available in Chinese ebook format on Amazon in the United States.
I bought an ebook Kindle version for myself on Amazon and have been reading it. 《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win”. is well-written and clear aimed at a general audience — see for example the two excerpts I have translated just below.
Certainly the excellence of the book and the deep experience and high positions held by the author show that it deserves translation — the fourth chapter on American attitudes, degree of commitment, U.S. reliability and the debate over whether ‘strategic ambiguity’ with regards to what would be the U.S. reaction of China should attack/reclaim its wayward province concludes that Taiwan must depend first upon itself and then hope for American assistance to help make a Mainland China attack on Taiwan too costly to be contemplated or to succeed.
During my stay in the United States, I made many visits to members of Congress on Capitol Hill to seek their support for Taiwan. When it came to defending Taiwan against the threat of China, I always told them, “As a professional soldier who has served in the military for over 40 years, I do not and should not expect the United States to sacrifice the lives of young people to defend Taiwan. However, Taiwan needs the assistance of the United States to strengthen its defense capabilities, and with the help of the United States, we will be stronger and more intimidating.”
As a member of Taiwan, we must think more rationally: Is it unrealistic to expect other countries to sacrifice the lives of their people to defend Taiwan? It doesn’t seem right to expect other people to save our own country, does it? It is only natural to save one’s own country.
Moreover, there is a standard answer to the question “Is the United States trustworthy?”, that is, if you can provide benefits in line with the national interests of the United States, then you are trustworthy, and if not, then you are not. Therefore, instead of discussing the trustworthiness of the U.S., we should look to ourselves and review whether the benefits we can provide are in line with the U.S. interests. Or we should try to combine Taiwan’s interests with those of the United States. Therefore, Taiwan’s reasonable expectation of U.S. support is actually an overlap of interests between the two sides.
《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win” by Lee Hsi-ming p. 146 in Kindle edition (bolded in the original), published by Linkin in Taiwan in late 2022.
and on the U.S. debate about strategic ambiguity:
(2) From strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity?
The U.S. attitude toward Taiwan is to maintain the status quo, which is in line with U.S. national interests, and therefore repeatedly emphasizes that it “opposes unilateral changes to the status quo in Taiwan”. This “one-sidedness” of course includes the regimes on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In order to achieve this goal, the U.S. government has for many years maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity in cross-strait affairs.
Strategic ambiguity means that it is not clear whether the U.S. will intervene in the event of a Chinese military attack on Taiwan. Strategic ambiguity has a “double deterrent” function, on the one hand, it makes the Chinese Communist Party uncertain whether the U.S. will intervene in the Taiwan Strait issue, and therefore does not dare to use force lightly; on the other hand, it prevents forces within Taiwan advocating Taiwan independence from gaining clear support, and makes Taiwan not dare to declare independence rashly since that may lead to a cross-strait military conflict. It is undeniable that the balance and flexibility of the strategic ambiguity policy has effectively maintained the “separate but not separate, harmonious but not unified” status of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait over the years, and has been quite effective in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
However, since the Trump administration started the “anti-China” trend in U.S. – China relations, there have been many voices in the U.S. political and academic circles questioning the strategic ambiguity policy. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a leading U.S. think tank, published “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous” in the September 2020 issue of Foreign Affairs. The main point of his article “Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous” in Foreign Affairs in September 2000 was that if strategic ambiguity persists, the United States will not be adequately prepared for cross-strait conflict.
The main argument of those who support strategic clarity is that the reason for adopting a policy of strategic ambiguity in the past is that the U.S. is facing a China that does not have the ability to violate Taiwan. As China grows in size and underestimates the willingness and strength of the United States to defend Taiwan, and as the military imbalance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait continues to widen, these factors will increase the chances that the Chinese Communist Party will take the risk of starting a war. This would mean that the risks of an ambiguous strategy would outweigh the benefits. In other words, the United States must make a clear commitment to ensure Taiwan’s security by responding to the Chinese Communist Party’s use of force against Taiwan.
But some experts still argue for continued strategic ambiguity. This view is represented by Bonnie Glaser, director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund, a Washington think tank. She argues that a policy of strategic clarity could anger China and push the regime into a precarious corner. Avril Haines, director of national intelligence, also said that from the perspective of the U.S. authorities, that if the U.S. changed its “strategic ambiguity” policy toward Taiwan and took the initiative to state its intention to “interfere with ‘contingencies’ in the Taiwan Strait,” then people advocating Taiwan independence would certainly become more outspoken. Mainland China would see this as a “serious destabilization. Other reasons include the fact that a policy of strategic clarity would be a “serious destabilization”. Some argue that a policy of strategic clarity would force other major powers in the Asia-Pacific region to follow suit and make similar statements in defense of Taiwan. This would increase instability in the region and make the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea more likely to become arsenals of gunpowder.
Since there are strong arguments for and against this policy, it is expected that the U.S. political and academic communities will continue to debate this policy line.
If we look at his past attitude toward cross-strait issues, we will find that he has always advocated strategic ambiguity, and Kurt M. Campbell, director of the White House National Security Council’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, has also expressed his opposition to changing the policy of strategic ambiguity. Therefore we can judge that the U.S. government is not likely to change this policy. In addition, Japan, which plays a significant role in the Taiwan issue, has also adopted a policy of strategic ambiguity. Although the joint statement of the U.S.-Japan summit talks between President Biden and Prime Minister Suga in April 2021 stated the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, that does not mean that Japan will actually send troops to help ensure Taiwan’s security. Japanese scholar Yasuhiro Matsuda pointed out that the government has been discussing and preparing for it for a long time, and its strategic ambiguity is focused on “not making prior commitments and ensuring Japan’s right to decide as much as possible”.
《臺灣的勝算》 “How Taiwan Can Win” by Lee Hsi-ming p. 127 in Kindle edition (bolded in the original), published by Linkin in Taiwan in late 2022.
Book Review [provided by publisher Linkin]
Is the “Overall Defense Concept” a Viable Strategy for the Small to Constrain the Large? Reading How Taiwan Can Win 《臺灣的勝算》
by F.S. Mei longtime researcher on national defense and the security relationship between the United States and Taiwan. Director of Taiwan Strait Security Research and Analysis Center (New York, USA)
How Taiwan Can Win: An Asymmetrical Strategy for a Small Power Against a Large,Power A Overall Defense Concept That All Taiwanese Should Understand is a book by Admiral Lee Hsi-ming, former Chief of the General Staff, Vice Minister (Policy) of National Defense (from 2016 to 2017), and Commander of the Republic of China Navy (ROCN, from 2015 to 2016 of the Republic of China on Taiwan.
In his book, Admiral Lee Hsi-ming discusses his brainchild, the Overall Defense Concept (ODC). The ODC is not a panacea for Taiwan’s struggle against the Communist regime alone, nor is it even a solution that can temporarily make us forget our inability to respond to military threats, but it is a concrete, pragmatic solution and a starting point for rational argumentation about Taiwan’s defense strategy.
Editor’s Note: What is the “Overall Defense Concept (ODC)”?
The “Overall Defense Concept” (ODC) advocated by Lee Hsi-ming is a defense strategy based on the theory of “Deterrence by Denial,” which aims to make the enemy realize that they cannot achieve their political goals before they intentionally start a war and have to give up the idea of raising troops.
ODC is also a defense strategy based on “asymmetric warfare”. It focuses on the disparity in military power between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and combines the characteristics of the battlefield environment in the Taiwan Strait to develop small, precise, and lethal weapons that are low-cost, efficient, numerous, high-quality, and highly survivable, with the goal of maximizing Taiwan’s defensive advantages to prevent the PLA from successfully invading or politically controlling Taiwan.
In terms of structure, the “overall defense concept” consists of two major elements, namely, “war-force integration” and “operational concept”.
- Warfare integration: In the design and construction of a survivable, resilient and reliable warfare force that can strike a balance between peacetime and wartime, traditional and asymmetric, it includes three elements: high survivability warfare force, traditional warfare force, asymmetric warfare force.
- The concept of warfare: under the concept of asymmetric warfare, to counteract the incoming enemy and make it impossible to achieve the mission of capturing Taiwan, its composition is divided into four major items: battle force protection, coastal victory, beach and shore defeat, and defense in depth.
Our society has many critics, but few do, and even fewer are able or brave enough to make concrete and workable proposals. This is especially true in the defense field, where it is almost uncommon for those in high positions to criticize and propose controversial reforms while in office. The overall culture of the national army has become increasingly conservative over the past 30 years, risk averse and shying away from experimentation and innovation, making it increasingly difficult to make progress or promote painful reforms. In such an environment, it is surprising that such an initiative as the “Overall Defense Concept” has emerged.
ODC’s concept was recognized and supported by the U.S. Department of Defense and the National Security Council during Lee’s tenure as Chief of Staff. His strategic concept also coincides with that of the former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby’s book, The Strategy of Denial, published last year (2021). The Strategy of Denial, published last year by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, is consistent with the theoretical and practical arguments that have received a high degree of professional recognition.
[Interlude: Eldridge Colby interviewed on A Book Talk with Elbridge Colby on “The Strategy of Denial” via YouTube from the Global Taiwan Institute
See also Elbridge Colby article THE MORALITY OF A STRATEGY OF DENIAL from the October 2022 issue of First Things
BBC Chinese interviewed Admiral Lee in late 2022 — 專訪台灣前參謀總長李喜明：傳統建軍投資沒有效率，台灣應「以小博大」－ BBC News 中文
Admiral Lee Hsi-ming’s book is available from Amazon.com as a Kindle book download in traditional Chinese characters. 臺灣的勝算：以小制大的不對稱戰略，全臺灣人都應了解的整體防衛構想 (Traditional Chinese Edition) Kindle Edition
End Interlude, resume book review translation]
Bravely Face the Reality of Limited National Resources
The greatest value of the ODC is that it boldly outlines a viable direction and gives the entire population room to discuss and debate this national policy. It boldly confronts the pragmatic trade-offs that Taiwan must make given its limited defense resources. Those resource constraints include not only financial (budget) but also political capital/national will and time.
臺灣的勝算：以小制大的不對稱戰略，全臺灣人都應了解的整體防衛構想 [How Taiwan Can Win: An Asymmetrical Strategy to Control the Big with the Small, An Overall Defense Concept that All Taiwan People Should Understand, by Former ROC Taiwan military Former Chief of Staff Lee Hsi-ming, published by Linking Publishing (聯經出版)
Politicians, regardless of party affiliation, are unwilling and afraid to be honest with the public about the limitations and realities involved. In other words, we are faced with the fact that with limited financial resources, limited time, a threshold of suffering that the public can accept, and a political cost that politicians dare to bear, it is impossible for Taiwan to resist the Chinese Communist Party alone for a long time.
Because of the “wants and needs” mentality of the general public (e.g., national security, sovereign independence, less taxation, less military service, etc.), our political parties and politicians are naturally timid about facing this difficult issue.
On the one hand, the government must present a defense policy and defense strategy that reassures the public that it can keep them safe. On the other hand, the general public does not have the ability to do the math on defense policy and defense strategy. Thus the military and government are unlikely to fully disclose information that would undermine people’s confidence in national security and perhaps even expose the embarrassing fact that our strategic resources do not match our strategic goals.
Whether it’s whether reducing the length of mandatory service to four months will affect combat effectiveness or whether the defense budget is less than 2.2 percent of GDP (Note: According to the latest data, the Republic of China Executive Yuan approved the 112th annual ROC central government budget on August 25, 2022. The overall defense budget reached New Taiwan Dollars 586.3 billion , accounting for 2.4% of GDP. ) I believe that many people have questioned the adequacy of military spending to resist the Chinese Communist Party, which spends 17 times more than Taiwan, but most are apparently reluctant to look deeper, and dare not think about how to solve these problems. Although Chief of Staff Lee’s ideas are strongly supported by the U.S., the fundamental reasons why they are not tolerated by those in charge in Taiwan are evident.
Overall Defense Concept’s Pragmatic Choices and Controversies
The ODC is certainly not without its limitations. That is, it is a defense strategy aimed at thwarting the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) mission to land and occupy Taiwan and eliminate the ROC regime, but it is not a comprehensive and effective defense against all CCP threats.
For example, an asymmetric anti-landing force structure would be relatively weak against coercive military threats such as blockades and attacks on outer islands. However, as mentioned above, even if Taiwan’s full national capacity is exhausted, we will not be able to build a national defense capability that is sufficient to resist and effectively counter all possible forms of military aggression by the CCP alone.
Understanding this cold reality, given reasonable (and tolerable) national defense/national security resource limitations for the Taiwanese people, if there is only one choice, the only rational course of action is to prioritize defense against the “deadly” or “most (soon) deadly” threat, which is the CCP’s full-scale invasion and occupation of Taiwan and rapid regime change to make it a fait accompli. In contrast, an attack on the outer/outlying islands or an air and sea blockade would either be irrelevant to achieving the goal of unifying Taiwan by force, or else it would take a long time and could lead to foreign intervention, which would be disproportionately risky and beneficial for Beijing.
ODC is a concept of choosing and prioritizing. The phrase “only children make choices” is exactly the opposite. Choices, and often painful ones, are the responsibility of adults.
For the sake of Taiwan’s survival and security, we cannot help but increase the proportion of asymmetric operations in the strategic concept of defense in the Taiwan Strait. In doing so, we will have to sacrifice some of the traditional capabilities we wish to have, because there are only so many resources and time available. This is certainly a controversial aspect of the ODC, but it is also an enlightening one for all of Taiwan.
Traditional vs. Asymmetric Warfare: a “Fish in a Bear’s Paw“ Hybrid Concept
I do not share the same philosophy as Chief of Staff Lee, but I do agree that “asymmetric warfare” and innovative methods of warfare should play a greater role in the defense concept of the Taiwan Strait. For example, we could use artillery to block or mission kill a limited number of high-cost minesweepers to protect the integrity of the minefield and interrupt the rhythm of the communist landing operation.
In addition, I share many of the concepts and specific recommendations mentioned in his discussion. For example: the lack of a “priority focus” concept in the national army; attacking the enemy’s ability to carry out its mission so as to force it to fail; prioritizing cost-effectiveness and operational effectiveness; reviewing the source of attack mentality; force protection measures; combining the advantages of the geographical environment and making good use of civilian resources; and the concept of homeland defense forces.
On the whole, although the ODC also embraces some traditional warfare capabilities, its core thinking is still focused on developing asymmetric capabilities. I personally prefer the hybrid concept of “fish in a bear’s paw”, and believe that Taiwan’s debate on ODC should focus on the proportion of “fish in a bear’s paw” (traditional warfare) and “fish” (asymmetric warfare), rather than the unnecessary chatter of choosing one or the other.
The lessons of the Russian-Ukrainian war thus far, while confirming many of the asymmetric defense concepts advocated by the ODC (and the U.S. over the years), also seem to highlight the critical importance of securing external supply lines, the indispensability of air power, and the importance of long-range precision firepower to attack the enemy’s logistical nodes. Therefore, what we should do is to invest more resources in national defense (not only in the budget, but also in manpower/services, policy support, political capital support, public opinion support, etc.), and at the same time, we should build a consensus on how to balance the traditional vs. asymmetric capabilities of the national army with limited resources.
Since Taiwan cannot single-handedly defend itself against a single military threat or effectively counter all forms of military threats from the CCP in the long term, the most logical strategic interest for both the U.S. and Taiwan is to build a military division of labor that can be relied upon. Some of these capabilities can (or have to) be built on their own, but others must be provided by the United States (and other regional allies). Taiwan is responsible for which parts of defense operations (e.g., counter-landing, behind-the-beach defense) and the U.S. is responsible for which capabilities (e.g., Common Operational Picture (COP), localized sea control/support escort, real-time information and target acquisition, electronic combat support, etc.), all of which need to be verified through pre-war consensus and cooperation mechanisms. This is also the reason why we need to proactively develop and implement a new approach to the field. This is also the “minimum commitment clarity” that we must actively seek from the United States.
Do Not Wait for the Enemy to Make Us Accept Reality
There is a saying in the military: “If you cannot do a thorough examination of yourself in peacetime, the enemy will make you do it in wartime.” 如果平時自己不檢討、敵人就會幫你驗收。
We are still debating our own defense strategy and military building priorities, but (fortunately) before the enemy can verify them in practice, our friends can’t help but help review them.
The U.S. has been suggesting for years that we strengthen our innovative, asymmetric warfare capabilities to meet the challenge of the growing disparity in national and military power between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, but we have largely ignored and rejected the ODC concept. Since the second half of last year, the U.S. has taken steps to adjust its security assistance policy toward Taiwan and has used forceful means to shape our military procurement priorities and guide Taiwan’s military build-up and preparedness priorities.
In fact, the Biden administration has already indicated to the Taiwan side in November 2021 that it does not support the traditional defense concept of military construction, and in March 2022, it has announced a new policy and blocked several military acquisitions by Taiwan that are relevant to air and sea warfare. This basically rang the death knell of the strategic concept in the latest version of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Report (NDR ). The U.S. side’s guiding philosophy of asymmetric warfare may, to a certain extent, be considered an affirmation and vindication of the “overall defense concept.
How Taiwan Can Win 《臺灣的勝算》is the advice of ROC military Chief of Staff Lee Hsi-Ming to protect our country. It may be unpleasant to our ears, but if we really care about the safety of our country, then we should seriously implement the right medicine in the little time we have left, instead of worrying about whether that medicine is bitter or not!
(Editor’s note: This article was provided by Linkin Publishing, and the title and internal notes were rewritten by the editor of The Reporter.)
Excerpt from 《臺灣的勝算》 [“How Taiwan Can Win”] by Lee Hsi-ming
pp. 208 – 210 available in Chinese in a Kindle edition on amazon.com; bolding in original.
3. Countermeasures to Seizure of the Outer Islands
The Chinese Communist Party’s military action plan to seize our outer islands by force has always been a hot topic in the study of the Taiwan Strait conflict. A brief analysis of the current cross-strait military strength, as well as the geographical location and defensive capabilities of the outer islands, reveals that the geographical location of all the frontline outer islands is “close to the enemy and far away from us”, and Taiwan has no geographical advantage. Except for Kinmen and Matsu, which are slightly defensible, the defense of the other outer islands, such as Dongsha, Nansha and Wuqiu, is simply impossible in the face of the military capabilities of the Chinese Communist Party. As for the outer islands like Kinmen, which are slightly more defensible, the situation of the people there is quite similar to that of Crimea, and I believe that the Chinese Communist Party must also understand that in order to seize Kinmen, the Chinese Communist Party can follow the Russian model of using hybrud warfare to take it, without the need to use large-scale traditional troops to seize it in a violent way by firepower attack.
Considering the geographical environment and Taiwan’s ability to provide assistance to the frontline islands, once the CCP seizes the frontline islands by force, there is almost nothing Taiwan can do except for the islands to defend themselves and hold on alone.
However, since the CCP can easily seize the outer islands by force at this stage, why has it not taken any action after all? From a political and military point of view, the existence of these outer islands has a completely different political significance for Taiwan than it did in the 1950s and 1960s. Under the general strategic thinking, the outer islands no longer have the strategic value of “must be taken by the attacking side, must be secured by the defending side”. If the Chinese Communist Party is determined to seize the outer islands by force due to other political agendas, I am afraid there are only two meanings left in this action:
First, to demonstrate to the mainland and the international community its political determination to unify Taiwan; and second, to intimidate the Taiwanese people and force the government to negotiate a compromise.
However, is it possible to achieve the political goal of “promoting unification by force” with such military actions? Let’s try to analyze:
- (1) The outer islands on the front line were far away from the main island of Taiwan, and the belonging of the outer islands was not causally related to the survival of Taiwan in practice.
- (2) As for the effect of PRC intimidation effect, the war of perceptions conducted towars Taiwan in recent years has had a big impact, especially on young people who have strong feelings for China. This however will not ensure Taiwan’s compliance; intimidation in fact will drive the Taiwan people further and further away from China.
- (3) The seizure of the outer islands would be strongly condemned by the international community. Amidst the atmosphere of competition between the U.S. and China, that seizure would tend to substantiate the U.S. accusation that “the Chinese Communist Party is ruining the regional order”.
- (4) Since the military action to seize the outer islands by force would be basically a violation of international laws such as the “Law of Armed Conflict”, it is likely to trigger economic sanctions from democratic countries such as the United States.
- (5) The seizure of the outer islands by force will immediately cause a high degree of alarm among the neighboring countries, especially Japan, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines. These countries all have territorial disputes with the Chinese Communist Party. A seizure of the outer islands would in turn cause them to align themselves more closely with the democratic camp led by the United States.
- (6) The impact of forceful seizure of the outer islands on the neighboring countries would be beneficial to the U.S. in integrating the regional countries, making it easier for the U.S. to lead a “mini-NATO” in East Asia.
- (7) In view of the evolution of time and space, the frontline outer islands no longer have strategic value for Taiwan’s defense. If the Chinese Communist Party does not succeed in forcing Taiwan to compromise after seizing the outer islands, it will in effect reduce Taiwan’s defense burden.
In short, the option of seizing the outer islands by force has no strategic value to the CCP and is definitely not a smart war decision. In Taiwan, there are always calls to strengthen the defense of the outer islands, but my opinion has always been different. Due to the fact that the overall war-making capacity would be very dispersed, no matter how to increase the defense of the outer islands, it would be futile from a military warfighting perspective. Any more military investment would be a waste. From the overall strategic consideration, we should instead think in the opposite direction.
In 2009, when I was the Director of Strategic Planning at the Ministry of National Defense, I was in charge of the “Essence Project” military reduction program. At that time, the initial plan for the military strength of the outer islands was: “All troops in Kinmen and Matsu should be withdrawn to their home islands, and the government should allocate a budget for the defense of Kinma, and the county government should coordinate the establishment of the Kinma Self-Defense Force to carry out defense matters.
If the Chinese Communist Party wants to seize the island by force in the future, the garrison on the island will be unable to resist, and in the end, whether they are sacrificed or captured, it will be a major blow to the morale of the nation. If the outer islands are defended by civil defense and all the “regular troops” are transferred back to Taiwan, this deployment adjustment will not only strengthen the defense capability of the main island of Taiwan itself, but even if the Chinese Communist Party really seizes Kinmen by force, it will be a battle in which the “regular troops” bullying a “militia”. That could not be seen as a real victory but as a fight that would damage China’s image, and will provoke public opinion and international public anger. If the Chinese Communist Party carefully considers the aftermath of seizing the outer islands, it will not use force to seize the island because of their lack of military value. But of course, this radical idea was not adopted in the end.
To sum up, from a purely military point of view, if there is no breakthrough innovation, Taiwan can only respond to the forceful seizure of the outer islands by the Chinese Communist Party by counting on the islands to try to hold out on their own. Any military assistance provided would only have political and not military value. Any investment in the military defense of the outer islands would be unlikely to do the slightest bit of good.
———
3. 奪占外島的對策
中共以武力奪占我外島的軍事行動方案，始終是研究臺海衝突的熱門議題。簡要分析現行兩岸軍事實力，以及各外島的地理位置與守備能力，可以發現所有前線外島的地理位置都是「敵近我遠」，臺灣毫無地利優勢。而當前除了金門、馬祖稍具守備能力，其餘東、南沙及烏坵等外島的防務，面對中共的軍事能力，根本是不堪一擊。至於像金門這種稍有守備能力的外島，當地民情與克里米亞的情況頗有相似之處，相信中共也必然了解，要奪取金門，中共可以仿效俄羅斯使用混合戰09的模式便可拿下，不需要動用大規模傳統兵力，以火力攻擊的暴力方式奪取。
考量地理環境及臺灣對前線各外島的馳援能力，一旦中共以武力奪占前線外島，除了各外島自我防衛獨力固守外，臺灣幾乎無計可施。
不過，既然現階段中共可輕而易舉以武力奪取外島，為何始終沒有採取行動？從政軍觀點來看，這些外島的存在，與五、六○年代相較，對臺灣的政治意義完全不同。在全般戰略思考下，外島已不具「攻方所必取，守方所必固」的戰略價值。如果中共基於其他政治企圖，執意以武力奪取外島，此行動恐怕只剩下兩個意義：
一則向大陸民眾及國際社會展現統一臺灣的政治決心；再則藉此恫嚇臺灣民眾逼迫政府談判妥協。
然而，此種軍事作為可能達成「以武促統」的政治目的嗎？我們試著分析一下：
(1) 前線各外島與臺灣本島距離遙遠，外島的歸屬實務上與臺灣存亡沒有因果關係。
(2) 就恫嚇效果而言，臺灣近年來對內的認知作戰有不少影響，尤其是年輕世代對中國充滿情緒，非但無法保證臺灣因而就範，反而會將臺灣民心愈推愈遠。
(3) 奪占外島將掀起巨大國際譴責聲浪，在美中大國競爭的氛圍中，很容易坐實美國所謂「中共是區域秩序的破壞者」的指控。
(4) 由於以武力奪占外島的軍事行動，基本上違反「武裝衝突法」等國際律約，很可能引發以美國為首等民主國家的經濟制裁。
(5) 武力奪占外島將立即引起周邊國家，尤其是日本、印度、越南、菲律賓等與中共有領土糾紛國家的高度警戒，進而使得各國明確，且更緊密地倒向以美國為首的民主陣營。
(6) 武力奪取外島對周邊國家的衝擊，將有利美國整合區域國家，使得以美國為首的東亞「小北約組織」更易實現。
(7) 鑑於時空演變，前線各外島對臺灣防衛作戰已不具必須固守之戰略價值，若中共奪取外島後並未成功迫使臺灣妥協就範，無形中反而減輕了臺灣的防衛負擔。
總而言之，以武力奪取外島的選項，對中共而言毫無戰略價值，絕非聰明的戰爭決策。在臺灣，強化外島防衛的呼籲始終不竭，然而我的看法卻非如此；囿於整體戰力極端懸殊的事實，無論如何增加外島防衛戰力，從軍事作戰觀點來看均屬徒然，再多的軍事投資都是浪費。從整體戰略考量，我們反而應該逆向思考。
二○○九年，我擔任國防部戰略規劃司長時負責「精萃案」裁軍計畫。當時對外島兵力的規劃初案為：「金門、馬祖所有兵力撤回本島，金馬防務由政府撥付預算，由縣府自行統籌成立金馬自衛隊執行防務事宜。」
當時立案的考量是這樣的：裁軍如果是無法改變的現實，而金馬兵力已經沒有能力獨力固守，如今為了專案還須再裁減，若他日中共欲以武力奪取，島上駐軍必然無力抵抗，最後不論是犧牲或被俘，對國人的士氣都是重大打擊。如果以民防形式守衛，將外島「正規兵力」全數調回臺灣，此部署調整不但可強化本島防衛能力，即使中共真以武力奪取金馬，亦將是一場「正規軍」欺凌「民兵」的戰役，可謂勝之不武、有損形象，更會激起民意與國際公憤。如果中共仔細考量後遺，復因缺乏軍事價值的誘因，反而不會使用武力奪島，金馬遭受戰火摧殘的可能性也比較低。不過想當然耳，這個大刀闊斧的構想最終未被採納。
總歸而言，純就軍事觀點分析，迫於現實的無奈，如果沒有突破式創舉，面對中共武力奪取外島，臺灣只能以各外島「獨力固守」因應，而任何軍事上的援助，都只有政治面的效應；任何增加外島防務的軍事投資，也都難有效益可言。
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